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Saudi Arabia rebukes Russia over comments on OPEC+ deal
BY ASSOCIATED PRESS
ISTANBUL ENERGY
APR 04, 2020 9:34 AM GMT+3

This Oct. 9, 2018, file photo shows an oil rig and pump jack in Midland, Texas. (Odessa American via AP)



Saudi Arabia sharply criticized Russia on Saturday over what it described as Moscow blaming the kingdom for the collapse in global energy prices, showing the tensions ahead of an emergency meeting of OPEC and other oil producers.

Oil prices sharply fell after the so-called OPEC+ group of countries including Russia failed to agree to production cuts in early March. A price war began soon after, with Saudi Arabia threatening to pump at a record-breaking pace to seize back market share even as the coronavirus pandemic saw demand sharply drop as airlines worldwide halted flights.

International benchmark Brent crude fell to around $24 a barrel, compared to prices of over $70 a year ago. Prices slightly have rebounded with President Donald Trump tweeting and talking about the need for a production cut, but rancor between Saudi Arabia and Russia could imperil a deal emerging from a planned teleconference Monday.

That anger could be seen early Saturday in two critical statements released by the kingdom's state-run Saudi Press Agency. The first came from Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan under the headline: “ Statements Attributed to One of Russian President’s Media Are Completely Devoid of Truth.”

“Russia was the one that refused the agreement, while the kingdom and 22 other countries were trying to persuade Russia to make further cuts and extend the agreement,” the prince said.





He also said an alleged Russian contention that “the kingdom was planning to get rid of shale oil producers” was false as well. U.S. shale producers have made America one of the world's top producers, but they've been hurt badly by the price collapse. Trump has met with concerned producers about that.

Prince Faisal did not identify the story, nor the outlet he was critiquing.

A second statement came from Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, one of King Salman's sons. The prince criticized Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak by name for suggesting Saudi Arabia wanted to cut out shale producers.

The prince “expressed his surprise at the attempts to bring Saudi Arabia into hostilities against the shale oil industry, which is completely false as our Russian friends recognize well,” the statement said.

Saudi Arabia's statements likely seek to defuse any possible confrontation between the kingdom and Trump, who tweeted Thursday that Moscow and Riyadh “will be cutting back approximately 10 Million Barrels” without elaborating. Trump's tweets and public comments have affected oil prices in the past.


https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/saudi-arabia-rebukes-russia-over-comments-on-opec-deal
Pray to god oil wealth ends. arabs will go back to riding camels and Iranian mullahs will go back to Qom.
 
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Low oil prices drag Middle East economies to collapse
Low prices seriously threatening most MENA oil producing countries who need higher prices to balance budgets
Ovunc Kutlu and Nuran Erkul Kaya |04.04.2020

thumbs_b_c_f0acda605c2167f9178cda8001933a78.jpg



ANKARA/ISTANBUL

The low oil price environment in the global market is dragging the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries to collapse, whose economies are strongly dependent on crude oil production and exports.

Due to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) keeping global oil consumption weak, and the oil price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia, crude oil prices are fluctuating below $30 per barrel since March 6 when OPEC and non-OPEC nations failed to reach an output curb deal.

Low crude prices are seriously threatening most oil-producing countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) who need higher oil prices to balance their budgets.

Nigeria needs a breakeven price of $144 per barrel of Brent crude on average to balance its government balance this year, while Bahrain requires $96 a barrel, according to data from global rating agency Fitch Ratings.

Saudi Arabia, OPEC heavyweight and the world's largest crude exporter need a breakeven of $91 per barrel, while Oman needs $82 a barrel, Abu Dhabi requires $65 per barrel and Qatar needs $55 a barrel, the data shows.

While Algeria needs $109 per barrel of average Brent crude in 2020 to balance its budget, Angola has a breakeven price of $55 per barrel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) needs $70 a barrel, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) data.

The data shows that Venezuela and Libya each need around $100 per barrel to balance their budgets this year, while Iraq stands at $60 a barrel and Iran is at a whopping $195 per barrel.

For non-OPEC countries such as Russia, Mexico and Kazakhstan, an average Brent crude price of $42 per barrel, $49 per barrel and $58 per barrel are needed this year to balance their budgets.



Nine nations' oil earning can fall $192 billion

Oil-producing countries in the MENA region are also expected to have lower economic growth rates in 2020 due to low oil prices, according to the International Institute of Finance (IIF).

Saudi Arabia is now estimated to grow by 0.7% this year, down from the previous forecast of 2%. While Kuwait's economic growth expectation is lowered to 0.8%, from 2.8%; the UAE now has a growth forecast of 0.6%, down from 1.9%.

Iraq's economy is anticipated to contract by 0.3%, instead of growing by 3.2%; and Iran's economy is expected to shrink by 8.4% this year, instead of 5.1%.

If oil prices would average around $40 per barrel this year, IIF said it estimated nine oil-exporting countries in the MENA region to see their hydrocarbon earnings decline by a total of $192 billion.



Saudi Arabia to have the biggest fallout among GCC

"The oversupply is growing exponentially as refiners remain well off-peak and I have demand down by about 38 million barrels per day," Mark Rossano, an energy analyst at the U.S-based market intelligence company Primary Vision, told Anadolu Agency.

He stated that China has already canceled 10 shipments from Saudi Arabia in April and May, and more cancellations are arising for Nigeria, Angola, Russia, and Iraq.

With the oil demand down and the glut of oil supply in the global oil market, he said oil prices may continue to stay below $30 per barrel.

The low oil prices damage Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Angola, and Saudi Arabia most, according to Rossano.

"The UAE and Qatar are a bit more insulated with their sovereign wealth fund, and liquified natural gas (LNG) plays a big role for Qatar which has been a huge benefit to the country in the last few years, he noted.

"Qatar will not get the same kind of impact compared to the rest although 2020 will be a 'lost' year for LNG. However, the trajectory is still in their favor over the long term," Rossano said.

He pointed out that Kuwait and the UAE are "fairly insulated" for now, but Saudi Arabia has the biggest fallout among the Gulf of Cooperation Countries (GCC).

"Additionally, the ones that are facing serious at-home risk are Iraq, Iran, and Nigeria," Rossano said, pointing out to local protests in Iran and Iraq that erupted at the beginning of this year.

He said he anticipates that the next 18 months will be painful especially for those heavily dependent on oil revenues.

"The recession started in the last quarter of 2019 as refined product demand started to weaken in May of last year. The situation only got worse as the year progressed," Rossano said.

"Refinery margins were abysmal across the global complex with distillate the only saving grace, but that quickly evaporated leaving units running at a negative margin. This started economic run cuts well ahead of COVID-19. The virus was just jet fuel dumped onto a raging forest fire, so terrible pricing will persist into 2021," he explained.

According to International Energy Agency (IEA) data, the income of Iraq will decrease by around 70% to $30 billion this year due to the low oil prices, while Nigeria is forecasted to see a 75% drop in its revenues from $45 billion to $11 billion level this year.

Ali Al-Saffar, the Middle East and North Africa Program Manager at the IEA said some countries will be better equipped to deal with a period of low oil prices than others.

"For relatively large producers with modest local population sizes, like Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar, large financial savings will provide some protection from the fiscal pressure brought on by lower oil prices. Others, like Iraq and Nigeria, do not have the same luxury," he noted.

The countries will need to get past the most difficult short-term crisis anyway they can by tapping reserves and running deficits of accumulating debt, according to the expert.

"But in the longer term, a rethink of the economic structure is needed, including by incentivizing a larger role for the private sector involvement in a diverse range of sectors to reduce the overall dependence on oil and gas revenues," Al-Saffar added.

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/low-oil-prices-drag-middle-east-economies-to-collapse/1792024
 
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Pray to god oil wealth ends. arabs will go back to riding camels and Iranian mullahs will go back to Qom.
we are exporting around 500k barrels a day and price is around 50 USD (20 USD for extraction)==>> 15 m USD per day vs for example KSA that exports 10 m barrel a day...
 
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we are exporting around 500k barrels a day and price is around 50 USD (20 USD for extraction)==>> 15 m USD per day vs for example KSA that exports 10 m barrel a day...
Yes I am aware. I had to throw Iran under the bus otherwise all the sectarians would be baying for my blood because I took a swipe against their idol ~ Saudia Arabia.
 
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Foreign Workers’ Misery In UAE Getting Bigger Due To Covid-19 Crisis
On Apr 6, 2020
The new coronavirus crisis has demonstrated once again the reality of the misery suffered by migrant workers in the Emirates and the severe arbitrariness they face in their basic rights.

The UAE government has unleashed the hands of private companies to violate the rights of workers and employees, ignoring the basic guiding principles of human rights and international demands that states the necessity of supporting people with low incomes, including obligating them to pay their full salaries and grant them paid leave.

The UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation Affairs issued a decision regarding the stability of employment in the private sector during the period of precautionary measures to limit the spread of the Coronavirus, and included only those arriving.

The decision came to define five stages for dealing with expatriate employees during the precautionary period, the first of which is the implementation of the remote work system, and secondly the granting of paid leave.

In the third stage, he will be granted leave without pay, and in the fourth stage he will temporarily reduce his wages, and in the end he will permanently reduce his wages in a shameful and arbitrary procedure.

With this decision, the Emirates unleashed private companies to amend the contracts of expatriates or force them to leave unpaid or reduce salary permanently or temporarily and provided them with a legal umbrella, as the worker in the Emirates has no right to complain or resort to the judiciary.

Millions of foreign workers in the UAE face high risks with regard to their rights, with Abu Dhabi announcing comprehensive closures and the failure of operators to pay salaries or consider the possibility of dismissing employees.

Human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have warned of violations of the rights of employees and workers and that they may not receive their salaries and may be subject to arbitrary dismissal or even deportation – which is a catastrophe for their families dependent on their income.

The researcher at Human Rights Watch, Heba Zayadin, said that foreign workers in the Gulf, especially the UAE, are already in a bad position under the labor administration system that gives employers broad powers over migrant workers and leads to abuse and exploitation.

The vast majority in the UAE are currently being held in camps, and they are the most vulnerable, and they live in conditions that make social separation impossible, which are recommended by the World Health Organization to prevent the Coronavirus.

The majority of foreign workers in the UAE are from Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan. Many complained that they felt fear for their health and also job security.

The UAE hosts the second largest number of foreign workers in the Arab Gulf region, with 8.7 million workers.



https://emiratesleaks.com/en/foreign-workers-misery-uae-getting-bigger-due-covid-19-crisis/
 
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COVID-19, the oil price war, and the remaking of the Middle East

Beirut%20amid%20COVID.jpg

The Middle East is facing an unexpected turning point. The region will not look the same after COVID-19 as it did before it. Prior to the outbreak, the Middle East had managed to normalize the geostrategic implications of the Arab Spring. Tunisia transitioned to a fully functioning democracy, Egypt ended up with a strongman, Syria became a catastrophe, Jordan and Morocco enacted some reforms, while Algeria and Sudan are still struggling with transitions and Lebanon stands on the brink of economic collapse.

In direct response to the Arab Spring, the Gulf states used their oil wealth to finance stimulus packages focused on employing more citizens, increasing existing salaries, building infrastructure, and financing religious organizations. These expansionary fiscal policies succeeded in quelling the protests against the Gulf monarchies. Once the threat at home dissipated, the Gulf states redirected their spending abroad to stifle protest movements across the region. In Egypt, for instance, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait threw their financial support behind President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi to help with Cairo’s increasing budget deficit and mega-infrastructure projects. Similar Gulf financial support was given to Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Iraq, as well as the fighting parties in Libya. This Gulf financial support for struggling economies, sometimes referred to as “the Middle East’s shadow central bank,” proved to be effective in mollifying protesters and stopping the gathering storm.

Fast forward to 2020, however, and the geoeconomics and geopolitics of the world are in free fall because of COVID-19, the oil price war, and a severe economic shutdown. For the Middle East and the Gulf monarchies in particular, the oil price war against Russia and U.S. shale and the shutdown of economies around the world have increased the pressure on the Gulf’s already-depleted financial resources, which usually act as a safety valve for the turbulent region.

Financing regional foreign policy goals

In 2011, when the Arab Spring seemed to be an inescapable fate for most Arab leaders, the Gulf monarchs quickly introduced stimulus packages and provided support for their less wealthy neighbors, with the aim of preempting the demonstrations that engulfed the region. For instance, the late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia spent $130 billion to increase salaries, create new jobs, provide loan forgiveness schemes, and finance public housing as well as the Sunni clerical establishment. The UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman followed the same playbook and increased salaries, food and oil subsidies, and spending on infrastructure. Once the situation stabilized within the Gulf states, the main players (i.e., Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar) used their reserves to pursue their foreign policy goals in the region. Qatar positioned itself as a champion of democracy and financially backed post-revolution governments in Tunisia and Egypt. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait threw their financial weight behind President Sisi and King Abdullah to stabilize Egypt and Jordan’s budgets. Despite the growing rift between Riyadh and Beirut, Saudi Arabia maintained its status as the main financial backer for Lebanon. On the Arabian Peninsula, the wealthier nations — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait — pledged financial support packages for Bahrain and Oman. Saudi Arabia promised assistance for Yemen during the conflict with the Houthis. In 2018-19 another wave of Arab Spring protests emerged, and the Gulf countries used the same playbook with Sudan, and are actively trying to so with Algeria as well.

Twin challenges

Today, the Gulf monarchies are facing two distinct challenges: COVID-19 and its economic repercussions, and the oil price war with Russia. Throughout the 2010s, the Gulf monarchies actively sought to diversify their economies away from oil and gas by investing their accumulated oil wealth into non-oil sectors: infrastructure, tourism, health care, logistics, retail, and technological and financial solutions. These forward-looking attempts at economic diversification are still reliant on oil revenues though, and break-even prices for government budgets vary widely across the Gulf region. For 2020, the IMF listed breakeven prices for a barrel of oil as the following: $45 for Qatar, $54 for Kuwait, $91 for Bahrain, $83 for Saudi Arabia, and $70 for the UAE. These figures are double or triple current oil prices, but the Gulf states remain hopeful about striking a U.S.-sponsored deal with Russia to cut production by 10-15 million barrels per day. However, the sudden global economic recession triggered by COVID-19, and the looming uncertainties about China’s economic recovery, will undoubtedly weaken international demand in the second and third quarters of the year. Global geoeconomic realities will be at odds with the Gulf economies’ dire needs and hopes for a resurgence of oil prices to pre-pandemic levels. The limited clarity on the way forward with COVID-19 adds another layer of complexity to the challenge of low oil prices, which will already lead to a huge drop in 2020 GDP growth, increase budget deficits, and hamper diversification efforts.

For the Gulf monarchies to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, the sudden global economic downturn, and the low oil prices, they would need to tap into their sovereign wealth funds and tighten their budgets by cutting government spending. Limited Gulf finances means sending thousands of foreign workers in the region back to their home countries: to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia. These non-oil producers have long relied on remittances from their blue-collar and white-collar workers in the Gulf. For example, Egypt’s remittances for 2019 exceeded $25 billion, making it the country’s main source of foreign currency. In Lebanon remittances comprised 12.7 percent of GDP in 2018, and the country’s reliance on them has only increased as its economy has gone into freefall.

Geopolitical knock-on effects

Indeed, the Gulf’s tighter finances will extend beyond lower remittances and affect the stability of countries that previously enjoyed Gulf bailouts in times of crisis. There is no clearer example of this tectonic change in Middle East geopolitics than Lebanon. Before the COVID-19 crisis, Saudi Arabia and France were in discussions to offer financial support for Lebanon's deteriorating economy. Unsurprisingly, however, Saudi Arabia has since redirected its finances to combat the outbreak and mitigate its effect on the kingdom’s citizens, residents, and businesses. The response to COVID-19 took precedence over any efforts to bail out Lebanon, and eventually the country, for the first time in its history, defaulted on a $1.2 billion bond payment, which will worsen its economic crisis and delay the post-COVID-19 recovery.

But Lebanon is not alone either. Jordan, a country which has been under increasing political and economic pressure in the last few years, will have to make $1.76 billion in debt payments in 2020 and no Gulf financial help is on the horizon. Pakistan and Morocco, other major recipients of Gulf aid and financial support, are currently facing a liquidity crunch because of COVID-19. There is a long list of Middle Eastern countries that are in need of financial support during the current crisis, but this support might not come from the Gulf capitals this time around.

Reshuffling the regional order

The COVID-19 outbreak will reshuffle the geopolitics and geoeconomics of the Middle East. The Gulf countries have been the region’s de-facto central bank and used their surplus wealth to stabilize troubled Arab capitals in the years following the tumultuous Arab Spring upheavals. The current historically low oil prices could not come at a worse time. The pandemic and the resulting recession hit the global economy hard and dramatically reduced demand for oil, limiting the likelihood that a deal can be struck to cut production and shore up prices. These geoeconomic realities will deprive the volatile Middle East of its main financial safety valve, the Gulf. Countries in dire need of financial support will not only have a slower economic recovery post-COVID-19, but they may also fall short in meeting their debt obligations, and ultimately face social upheaval.

https://www.mei.edu/publications/covid-19-oil-price-war-and-remaking-middle-east
 
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Saudi Arabia: What happens when the oil stops

David Hearst

22 April 2020 13:42 UTC | Last update: 42 min 52 sec ago
In a post oil era, Mohammed bin Salman would lose his power of patronage but the collapse of Saudi economy is bad news for the region
000_1mw43a.jpg

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (AFP)
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Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) can no longer plead youth or inexperience.

That time has passed.

What you see is what you get. The misrule, blunders and war associated with him as crown prince will only continue with him as king.

The full repertoire of the crown prince's statecraft was on display in a stormy telephone call he made to Russian President Vladimir Putin on the eve of an Opec meeting last month which ended in a calamitous price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia.

A big mistake
Mohammed bin Salman can see for himself just how big a mistake that call was. The price of oil has collapsed, storage will rapidly run out, and oil companies face the real prospect of having to cap wells. The oil and gas sector accounts for up to 50 percent of the kingdom's gross domestic product and 70 percent of its export earnings. This has just disappeared.

Mohammed bin Salman is finding out now how weak his cards are

As anyone who has met Putin will tell you, you can bargain as hard as you like with the Russian president. You can even be on opposing sides of two regional wars, in Syria and Libya, and still maintain a working relationship, as the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to do.

But what you must not do is back Putin into a corner. This is what the Saudi crown prince did by giving Putin ultimatums and shouting at him. Putin just shouts back, knowing that the Russian balance of payments is in better shape to play that game of poker than the Saudi one is.

MBS is finding out now how weak his cards are. To be fair, before he made that call, he took advice from someone as arrogant and unthinking as he is. US President Donald Trump's son-in-law and Middle East advisor Jared Kushner listened to what the Saudi crown prince was about to do and did not object.

This explains why Trump's first reaction was to welcome the oil crash. Trump thought for every cent cut from the price of oil, a billion dollars of consumer spending power would be released at home. That was until his attention turned to what the oil price collapse was doing to his own oil industry.

Saudi Arabia without oil
With the price of Brent Crude less than $20, Mohammed bin Salman is about to find out what happens when the world does not need his oil. In the past, the standard response to that hypothesis was condescending looks. Not any more. The prospect of Saudi becoming a debtor nation is real.

The prospect of Saudi Arabia becoming a debtor nation is real

Saudi Arabia’s financial decline has been in the works for some time. When his father Salman took over as king on 23 January 2015, foreign reserves totalled $732bn. In December last year they had depleted to $499bn, a loss of $233bn in four years, according to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA).

The kingdom's GDP per capita has also declined, from $25,243 in 2012 to $23,338 in 2018, according to the World Bank. The nest egg has been diminished with speed. The IMF has calculated that net debt will hit 19 percent of GDP this year, 27 percent next year, while coronavirus and the oil crisis could push borrowing to 50 percent by 2022.

The war in Yemen, a coup in Egypt and interventions across the Arab world, outsized arms purchases from America, vanity projects like the building of a futuristic city Neom, not to mention his own three yachts, paintings and palaces, each play a part in draining Saudi coffers.

Saudi’s economy was already struggling before coronavirus took hold with a growth rate of just 0.3 percent and a drop of 25 percent in construction since 2017. Add to that the lockdown imposed by coronavirus and the cancellation of the Umrah and Hajj, which attract up to 10 million pilgrims a year, and a further $8bn is wiped off the balance sheet.

But it isn’t just what the Saudi crown prince spent his money on that caused the problem. It was also what he put his money in that went bad.

Bad investments
One indication of bad investments is the decline in the relative value of sovereign wealth funds. Big brother Saudi Arabia now finds itself dwarfed by its much smaller Gulf neighbours on that score.

Big brother Saudi Arabia now finds itself dwarfed by its much smaller Gulf neighbours on the value of sovereign wealth funds

The chief sovereign wealth fund, Public Investment Fund (PIF), ranks at 11th in the world, behind Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Kuwait Investment Authority and Qatar Investment Authority. When sovereign funds are pooled by nation, UAE comes first with funds worth $1.213 trillion then Kuwait with $522bn, Qatar with the $328bn and Saudi with $320bn.

Even before the coronavirus pandemic took hold, the IMF thought that plans to increase PIF to a trillion dollars would not be enough to generate the income needed if Saudi diversified from oil. If "Saudi Arabia were to grow its PIF from its current $300bn to this scale, financial returns alone would not constitute adequate income replacement in a post-oil world. Oil production of 10 million barrels per day, valued at $65 per barrel, translates to annual oil revenues of about $11,000 per Saudi at present,” the IMF wrote.

2020-03-19t110408z_1758157976_rc2zmf9kuk3q_rtrmadp_3_saudi-oil-freight.jpg

An Aramco employee walks near an oil tank at Saudi Aramco's Ras Tanura oil refinery (Reuters)
Another measure of decline is what has happened to the investments themselves. Masayoshi Son, the CEO of Japan's Softbank, recalled how he got $45bn after spending just 45 minutes with MBS for his $100bn Vision Fund. "One billion dollars per minute," Son said. Softbank announced last week it expects its Vision Fund to book a loss of $16.5bn.

PIF paid almost $49 a share for a stake in Uber Technologies Inc. in 2017. Uber shares have dived since. It sold almost of all its $2bn stake in Tesla toward the end of 2019, just before Tesla stock went through the roof, with an 80 percent rally this year. At this rate the PIF stake in Newcastle United is looking like a solid bet in comparison.

The oil crash comes less than two weeks after PIF splashed another $1bn on stakes in four European oil companies and the Carnival cruise liner - all of which casts in doubt the strategy of PIF diversifying away from oil. "I don't understand why the PIF is doing what they are doing now when their country is going to need every penny," one Middle Eastern banker told the Financial Times.

"It very much reminds me of the QIA [Qatar Investment Authority] in its early years. There's a strategy, but they are not adhering to a strategy. They want high visibility but they also want to make money. They want to diversify the economy, but want to be opportunistic.”

No financial stimulus
Saudi Arabia today can not afford the financial stimulus to cushion the impact of the pandemic that its Gulf neighbours are making. The kingom is spending one percent of GDP on supporting its economy during the lockdown, while Qatar is spending 5.5 percent, Bahrain 3.9, UAE 1.8.


Even if he becomes king, Mohammed bin Salman will likely be the last
Read More »
There are many examples of money running out. The king decreed that the state would pay 60 percent of salaries during the coronavirus shutdown.

But employees of the Saudi’s biggest telecoms company STC are only getting 10 percent of their salaries, I am told, because the government is not paying STC the money for the furloughed staff.

The Saudi Ministry of Health has been requisitioning hotels to run as hospitals. Instead of compensating hotel owners for the temporary loss of their property or paying them a cost price, they are forcing them to pay the running costs in addition to the costs of disinfecting the rooms.

Or take the paycut Egyptian doctors working in the Saudi private health sector are being forced to take. Those who are on annual leave, are not being paid. Those who are instructed to work from home on shifts by their hospitals to lessen the risk of infection, either have to take that time from their annual leave or work for free.

So, as Bloomberg reported, the prospect of Saudi becoming a net debtor nation is real. The question is how soon that happens.

The IMF calculated that with oil prices of $50 to $55 a barrel, Saudi Arabia’s international reserves would fall to about five months import coverage in 2024. With oil at zero, a once unthinkable balance of payments crisis and abandonment of the dollar peg is now all too likely.

Regional effect
Both pillars of Mohammed bin Salman’s plan to modernise and reform his country are crumbling. His plan to generate foreign investment by selling off five percent of Aramco on foreign stock exchanges has gone and now PIF, the main vehicle for diversifying his economy away from oil, is in chaos too.

How Mohammed bin Salman's biggest gamble may cost him the throne
David Hearst
Read More »
Many in the region would cheer MBS's demise. He has simply done so much harm to so many people, particularly in Egypt. In a post-oil era, MBS would lose his power of patronage, the power of an oligarch who can spend a billion pounds a minute and not blink.

But the collapse of Saudi Arabia’s economy, which for decades has been the engine room of the economy of the whole region, would quickly be felt in Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia - all of which send millions of their workers and professionals to the kingdom and whose economies have grown to depend on their remittances.

This is not a prospect anyone should welcome.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

David Hearst
David Hearst is the editor in chief of Middle East Eye. He left The Guardian as its chief foreign leader writer. In a career spanning 29 years, he covered the Brighton bomb, the miner's strike, the loyalist backlash in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in Northern Ireland, the first conflicts in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia and Croatia, the end of the Soviet Union, Chechnya, and the bushfire wars that accompanied it. He charted Boris Yeltsin's moral and physical decline and the conditions which created the rise of Putin. After Ireland, he was appointed Europe correspondent for Guardian Europe, then joined the Moscow bureau in 1992, before becoming bureau chief in 1994. He left Russia in 1997 to join the foreign desk, became European editor and then associate foreign editor. He joined The Guardian from The Scotsman, where he worked as education correspondent.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/what-happens-saudi-arabia-when-oil-stops
 
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Saudi Arabia: What happens when the oil stops

David Hearst

22 April 2020 13:42 UTC | Last update: 42 min 52 sec ago
In a post oil era, Mohammed bin Salman would lose his power of patronage but the collapse of Saudi economy is bad news for the region
000_1mw43a.jpg

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (AFP)
1.4kShares

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) can no longer plead youth or inexperience.

That time has passed.

What you see is what you get. The misrule, blunders and war associated with him as crown prince will only continue with him as king.

The full repertoire of the crown prince's statecraft was on display in a stormy telephone call he made to Russian President Vladimir Putin on the eve of an Opec meeting last month which ended in a calamitous price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia.

A big mistake
Mohammed bin Salman can see for himself just how big a mistake that call was. The price of oil has collapsed, storage will rapidly run out, and oil companies face the real prospect of having to cap wells. The oil and gas sector accounts for up to 50 percent of the kingdom's gross domestic product and 70 percent of its export earnings. This has just disappeared.

Mohammed bin Salman is finding out now how weak his cards are

As anyone who has met Putin will tell you, you can bargain as hard as you like with the Russian president. You can even be on opposing sides of two regional wars, in Syria and Libya, and still maintain a working relationship, as the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to do.

But what you must not do is back Putin into a corner. This is what the Saudi crown prince did by giving Putin ultimatums and shouting at him. Putin just shouts back, knowing that the Russian balance of payments is in better shape to play that game of poker than the Saudi one is.

MBS is finding out now how weak his cards are. To be fair, before he made that call, he took advice from someone as arrogant and unthinking as he is. US President Donald Trump's son-in-law and Middle East advisor Jared Kushner listened to what the Saudi crown prince was about to do and did not object.

This explains why Trump's first reaction was to welcome the oil crash. Trump thought for every cent cut from the price of oil, a billion dollars of consumer spending power would be released at home. That was until his attention turned to what the oil price collapse was doing to his own oil industry.

Saudi Arabia without oil
With the price of Brent Crude less than $20, Mohammed bin Salman is about to find out what happens when the world does not need his oil. In the past, the standard response to that hypothesis was condescending looks. Not any more. The prospect of Saudi becoming a debtor nation is real.

The prospect of Saudi Arabia becoming a debtor nation is real

Saudi Arabia’s financial decline has been in the works for some time. When his father Salman took over as king on 23 January 2015, foreign reserves totalled $732bn. In December last year they had depleted to $499bn, a loss of $233bn in four years, according to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA).

The kingdom's GDP per capita has also declined, from $25,243 in 2012 to $23,338 in 2018, according to the World Bank. The nest egg has been diminished with speed. The IMF has calculated that net debt will hit 19 percent of GDP this year, 27 percent next year, while coronavirus and the oil crisis could push borrowing to 50 percent by 2022.

The war in Yemen, a coup in Egypt and interventions across the Arab world, outsized arms purchases from America, vanity projects like the building of a futuristic city Neom, not to mention his own three yachts, paintings and palaces, each play a part in draining Saudi coffers.

Saudi’s economy was already struggling before coronavirus took hold with a growth rate of just 0.3 percent and a drop of 25 percent in construction since 2017. Add to that the lockdown imposed by coronavirus and the cancellation of the Umrah and Hajj, which attract up to 10 million pilgrims a year, and a further $8bn is wiped off the balance sheet.

But it isn’t just what the Saudi crown prince spent his money on that caused the problem. It was also what he put his money in that went bad.

Bad investments
One indication of bad investments is the decline in the relative value of sovereign wealth funds. Big brother Saudi Arabia now finds itself dwarfed by its much smaller Gulf neighbours on that score.

Big brother Saudi Arabia now finds itself dwarfed by its much smaller Gulf neighbours on the value of sovereign wealth funds

The chief sovereign wealth fund, Public Investment Fund (PIF), ranks at 11th in the world, behind Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Kuwait Investment Authority and Qatar Investment Authority. When sovereign funds are pooled by nation, UAE comes first with funds worth $1.213 trillion then Kuwait with $522bn, Qatar with the $328bn and Saudi with $320bn.

Even before the coronavirus pandemic took hold, the IMF thought that plans to increase PIF to a trillion dollars would not be enough to generate the income needed if Saudi diversified from oil. If "Saudi Arabia were to grow its PIF from its current $300bn to this scale, financial returns alone would not constitute adequate income replacement in a post-oil world. Oil production of 10 million barrels per day, valued at $65 per barrel, translates to annual oil revenues of about $11,000 per Saudi at present,” the IMF wrote.

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An Aramco employee walks near an oil tank at Saudi Aramco's Ras Tanura oil refinery (Reuters)
Another measure of decline is what has happened to the investments themselves. Masayoshi Son, the CEO of Japan's Softbank, recalled how he got $45bn after spending just 45 minutes with MBS for his $100bn Vision Fund. "One billion dollars per minute," Son said. Softbank announced last week it expects its Vision Fund to book a loss of $16.5bn.

PIF paid almost $49 a share for a stake in Uber Technologies Inc. in 2017. Uber shares have dived since. It sold almost of all its $2bn stake in Tesla toward the end of 2019, just before Tesla stock went through the roof, with an 80 percent rally this year. At this rate the PIF stake in Newcastle United is looking like a solid bet in comparison.

The oil crash comes less than two weeks after PIF splashed another $1bn on stakes in four European oil companies and the Carnival cruise liner - all of which casts in doubt the strategy of PIF diversifying away from oil. "I don't understand why the PIF is doing what they are doing now when their country is going to need every penny," one Middle Eastern banker told the Financial Times.

"It very much reminds me of the QIA [Qatar Investment Authority] in its early years. There's a strategy, but they are not adhering to a strategy. They want high visibility but they also want to make money. They want to diversify the economy, but want to be opportunistic.”

No financial stimulus
Saudi Arabia today can not afford the financial stimulus to cushion the impact of the pandemic that its Gulf neighbours are making. The kingom is spending one percent of GDP on supporting its economy during the lockdown, while Qatar is spending 5.5 percent, Bahrain 3.9, UAE 1.8.


Even if he becomes king, Mohammed bin Salman will likely be the last
Read More »
There are many examples of money running out. The king decreed that the state would pay 60 percent of salaries during the coronavirus shutdown.

But employees of the Saudi’s biggest telecoms company STC are only getting 10 percent of their salaries, I am told, because the government is not paying STC the money for the furloughed staff.

The Saudi Ministry of Health has been requisitioning hotels to run as hospitals. Instead of compensating hotel owners for the temporary loss of their property or paying them a cost price, they are forcing them to pay the running costs in addition to the costs of disinfecting the rooms.

Or take the paycut Egyptian doctors working in the Saudi private health sector are being forced to take. Those who are on annual leave, are not being paid. Those who are instructed to work from home on shifts by their hospitals to lessen the risk of infection, either have to take that time from their annual leave or work for free.

So, as Bloomberg reported, the prospect of Saudi becoming a net debtor nation is real. The question is how soon that happens.

The IMF calculated that with oil prices of $50 to $55 a barrel, Saudi Arabia’s international reserves would fall to about five months import coverage in 2024. With oil at zero, a once unthinkable balance of payments crisis and abandonment of the dollar peg is now all too likely.

Regional effect
Both pillars of Mohammed bin Salman’s plan to modernise and reform his country are crumbling. His plan to generate foreign investment by selling off five percent of Aramco on foreign stock exchanges has gone and now PIF, the main vehicle for diversifying his economy away from oil, is in chaos too.

How Mohammed bin Salman's biggest gamble may cost him the throne
David Hearst
Read More »
Many in the region would cheer MBS's demise. He has simply done so much harm to so many people, particularly in Egypt. In a post-oil era, MBS would lose his power of patronage, the power of an oligarch who can spend a billion pounds a minute and not blink.

But the collapse of Saudi Arabia’s economy, which for decades has been the engine room of the economy of the whole region, would quickly be felt in Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia - all of which send millions of their workers and professionals to the kingdom and whose economies have grown to depend on their remittances.

This is not a prospect anyone should welcome.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

David Hearst
David Hearst is the editor in chief of Middle East Eye. He left The Guardian as its chief foreign leader writer. In a career spanning 29 years, he covered the Brighton bomb, the miner's strike, the loyalist backlash in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in Northern Ireland, the first conflicts in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia and Croatia, the end of the Soviet Union, Chechnya, and the bushfire wars that accompanied it. He charted Boris Yeltsin's moral and physical decline and the conditions which created the rise of Putin. After Ireland, he was appointed Europe correspondent for Guardian Europe, then joined the Moscow bureau in 1992, before becoming bureau chief in 1994. He left Russia in 1997 to join the foreign desk, became European editor and then associate foreign editor. He joined The Guardian from The Scotsman, where he worked as education correspondent.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/what-happens-saudi-arabia-when-oil-stops

I can understand Americans and Iranians are frustrated at the man in top picture, neither surprised to see another analysis on middleasteye.net.
May be they should also analyse how low oil prices has brought regional terrorism to minimal, although oil is still being retailed at old higher prices.
 
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Expats leaving Dubai is bad news for the economy
Wealthy Gulf Arab monarchies have, for decades, depended on foreign workers to transform sleepy villages into cosmopolitan cities. Many grew up or raised families here, but with no formal route to citizenship or permanent residency and no benefits to bridge the hard times, it’s a precarious existence.

By: Bloomberg | Updated: June 11, 2020 2:56:05 pm
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The Burj Khalifa skyscraper, center, stands beyond an empty road among other office buildings on the city skyline seen from Dubai Design District in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on Tuesday, June 9, 2020. (Photographer: Christopher Pike/Bloomberg)
It took Sarah Sissons less than a month to call an end to 25 years in Dubai. The 39-year-old moved back to Australia in May with her husband and daughter. She first came to the Gulf business hub as a teenager, when her father was a pilot for Emirates, and never really left.

“Dubai is home for me,” said Sissons, who owned a small cafe and worked as a freelance human resources consultant. But “it’s expensive here and there’s no safety for expats. If I take the same money to Australia and we run out of everything, at least we’ll have medical insurance and free schooling.”

It’s a choice facing millions of foreigners across the Gulf as the fallout from the pandemic and a plunge in energy prices forces economic adjustments. Wealthy Gulf Arab monarchies have, for decades, depended on foreign workers to transform sleepy villages into cosmopolitan cities. Many grew up or raised families here, but with no formal route to citizenship or permanent residency and no benefits to bridge the hard times, it’s a precarious existence.


Coronavirus global updates, June 11: Trump talks of ‘big comeback’ from crisis; Disneyland to reopen

The impact is starkest in Dubai, whose economic model is built on the presence of foreign residents who comprise about 90% of the population.

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Oxford Economics estimates the United Arab Emirates, of which Dubai is a part, could lose 900,000 jobs — eye-watering for a country of 9.6 million — and see 10% of its residents uproot. Newspapers are filled with reports of Indian, Pakistani and Afghan blue-collar workers leaving on repatriation flights, but it’s the loss of higher earners that will have painful knock-on effects on an emirate geared toward continuous growth.

“An exodus of middle class residents could create a death spiral for the economy,” said Ryan Bohl, a Middle East analyst at Stratfor. “Sectors that relied on those professionals and their families such as restaurants, luxury goods, schools and clinics will all suffer as people leave. Without government support, those services could then lay off people who would then leave the country and create more waves of exodus.”

With the global economy in turmoil, the decision to leave isn’t straightforward. Dubai residents who can scrape by will likely stay rather than compete with the newly unemployed back home. The International Labor Organization says more than 1 billion workers globally are at high risk of pay cuts or job losses because of the coronavirus.

Some Gulf leaders, like Kuwait’s prime minister, are encouraging foreigners to leave as they fret about providing new jobs for locals. But the calculation for Dubai, whose economy depends on its role as a global trade, tourism and business hub, is different.

The crisis will likely accelerate the UAE’s efforts to allow residents to remain permanently, balanced against the status of citizens accustomed to receiving extensive benefits since the discovery of oil. For now, the UAE is granting automatic extensions to people with expiring residence permits and has suspended work-permit fees and some fines. It’s encouraging local recruitment from the pool of recently unemployed and has pushed banks to provide interest-free loans and repayment breaks to struggling families and businesses.

A Dubai government spokesperson said authorities were studying more help for the private sector: “Dubai is considered home to many individuals and will always strive to do the necessary to welcome them back.”

Dubai’s main challenge is affordability. The city that built its reputation as a free-wheeling tax haven has become an increasingly costly base for businesses and residents. In 2013, Dubai ranked as the 90th most expensive place for expatriates, according to New York-based consultant Mercer. It’s now 23rd, making it the priciest city in the Middle East, though it slipped from 21st place in 2019 as rents declined due to oversupply.

Education is emerging as a deciding factor for families, especially as more employers phase out packages that cover tuition. Though there’s now a wider choice of schools at different price points, Dubai had the region’s highest median school cost last year at $11,402, according to the International Schools Database.

That will likely lead parents to switch to cheaper schools and prompt cuts in fees, according to Mahdi Mattar, managing partner at MMK Capital, an advisory firm to private equity funds and Dubai school investors. He estimates enrollments may drop 10%-15%.

Sarah Azba, a teacher, lost her job when social distancing measures forced schools online. That deprived her of an important benefit; a free education for her son. So she and the children are returning to the U.S., where her 14-year-old son will go to public school and her daughter to college. Her husband will stay and move to a smaller, cheaper home.“Separating our family wasn’t an easy decision but we had to make this compromise,” Azba said.

For decades, Dubai has thought big, building some of the world’s most expansive malls and tallest buildings. From the desert sprang neighborhoods lined with villas designed for expat families lured by sun and turbo-boosted, tax-free salaries. New entertainment strips popped up and world-class chefs catered to an international crowd. But the stress was building long before 2020. Malls were busy but shoppers weren’t spending as much. Residential properties were being built but there were fewer buyers. New restaurants seemed to cannibalize business from old.

The economy never returned to the frenetic pace it enjoyed before the 2008 global credit crunch prompted the last bout of expatriate departures. Then, just as it turned a corner, the 2014 plunge in oil prices set growth back again. The Expo 2020, a six-month exhibition expected to attract 25 million visitors, was supposed to be a reset; it’s now been delayed due to Covid-19.

“Dubai, like the rest of the Gulf, is reliant on foreign workers. Policy makers have been reluctant to stimulate the economy with direct spending, perhaps preferring to preserve their cash in exceptionally uncertain times. But this could lead to an exodus of expatriates that would prolong the virus-induced slowdown,’’ said Ziad Daoud, Bloomberg Economics Chief Emerging Markets Economist.

Weak demand means recovery will take time. Unlike some Middle Eastern countries, the UAE isn’t seeing a resurgence in Covid-19 infections as it reopens, but its reliance on international flows of people and goods means it’s vulnerable to global disruptions.

Emirates Group, the world’s largest long-haul carrier, is laying off employees as it weighs slashing some 30,000 jobs, one of the deepest culls in an industry that was forced into near-hibernation. Dubai hotels will likely cut 30% of staff. Developers of Dubai’s man-made islands and tallest tower have reduced pay. Uber’s Middle East ride-hailing unit Careem eliminated nearly a third of jobs in May but said this week business was recovering.

Dubai-based Move it Cargo and Packaging said it’s receiving around seven calls a day from residents wanting to ship their belongings abroad. That compares with two or three a week this time last year. Back then, the same number of people were moving in too. Now, it’s all outward bound.

Marc Halabi, 42, spent the past week reluctantly sorting belongings accumulated over 11 years in Dubai. Boxes line the rooms as he, his wife and two daughters decide what to ship back to Canada. An advertising executive, Halabi lost his job in March. He’s been looking for work that would allow the family to remain but says he can’t afford to hold out any longer.

“I’m upset we’re leaving,” Halabi said. “Dubai feels like home and has given me many opportunities, but when you fall on hard times, there isn’t much help and all you’re left with is a month or two to pick up and move.”

70% of Dubai companies expect to go out of business within six months due to coronavirus pandemic, survey says
PUBLISHED THU, MAY 21 20209:55 AM EDTUPDATED THU, MAY 21 20202:19 PM EDT

Natasha Turak@NATASHATURAK




KEY POINTS
  • Almost half the restaurants and hotels surveyed by the Dubai Chamber expected to go out of business in the next month alone, with three-quarters of travel and tourism companies expecting to close in that time.
  • The Dubai Chamber of Commerce in late April surveyed 1,228 CEOs across a range of sectors during the city’s strictest lockdown period.
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A picture shows the closed compound of the Dubai Mall amid the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic on March 23, 2020 in the United Arab Emirates
Giuseppe CACACE | AFP via Getty Images
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — A staggering 70% of businesses in Dubai expect to close their doors within the next six months as the coronavirus pandemic and global lockdowns ravage demand, a survey by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce revealed Thursday.

The Chamber surveyed 1,228 CEOs across a range of sectors between April 16 and April 22, during the emirate’s strictest lockdown period. Nearly three-quarters of those surveyed were small businesses with fewer than 20 employees. Of the respondents, more than two-thirds saw a moderate-to-high risk of going out of business in the coming six months: 27% said they expected to lose their businesses within the next month, and 43% expect to go out of business within six.


Dubai, which has one of the most diversified and non-oil dependent economies in the Gulf, relies on sectors like hospitality, tourism, entertainment, logistics, property and retail. Its hotels and restaurants are internationally acclaimed, but nearly half the restaurants and hotels surveyed by the organization expected to go out of business in the next month alone. Some 74% of travel and tourism companies said they expected to close in that time, and 30% of companies in transport, storage and communications expect the same fate.

“Full and partial city-lockdown measures are bringing demand in key markets to a standstill ... The double-shock impact is pushing economic activity down to levels not seen even during the financial crisis,” the Dubai Chamber wrote in its report released Thursday, entitled “Impact of Covid-19 on Dubai Business Community.”

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A Dubai Chamber spokesman later on Thursday qualified some of the survey’s results, saying in a statement that “Dubai Chamber surveyed 1228 out of 245,000 companies in Dubai in April when the lockdown measures were in the most strict phase ... their sentiments were based on the expectation that the strictest lockdown phase would be prolonged.”

“We anticipate that business confidence will improve significantly in the coming weeks and months as businesses return to more normal operation.”

A population contraction?
But amid the current uncertainty, businesses in UAE’s seven emirates, as elsewhere across the world, are slashing salaries, putting employees on unpaid leave, and reducing staffing levels.


The UAE has just over 26,000 confirmed coronavirus cases, with 233 deaths as of Thursday. Dubai, the country’s commercial and tourism hub, imposed a strict 24-hour lockdown on its population of 3.3 million for about three weeks beginning in early April.

I so far think we’re looking at a minimum population contraction of 10% for the year.
Nasser al-Shaikh
FORMER DIRECTOR GENERAL, DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
While the lockdown has been loosened through the Muslim holy month of Ramadan allowing malls and some businesses to open at a 30% capacity, demand is slow to return and company layoffs are continuing. Most hotels sit empty and tourism is nonexistent: there have been no inbound passenger flights for non-UAE nationals since March 24.

For a country that relies on an 80% expatriate population for much of its economic activity, the stakes are even higher: if residents can no longer find work, they will likely return to their home countries, depleting the consumer base needed to enable any economic recovery. More than 150,000 Indian nationals and 40,000 Pakistani nationals had already left or registered to leave the UAE by early May, according to those countries’ diplomatic missions.

“I so far think we’re looking at a minimum population contraction of 10% for the year,” Nasser al-Shaikh, former director general of the Dubai government’s department of finance, tweeted earlier this month.

The Dubai Chamber added in its report: “Though this is a temporary shock for most markets – with recovery to gradually kick in as soon as restrictions are eased – trade with GCC markets is particularly challenging as they suffered double oil price / COVID-19 shocks.”

Stimulus packages
In late March the Dubai government announced a 1.5 billion dirham ($408 million) stimulus package aimed at enhancing liquidity and cushioning the blow of the virus lockdowns, which included a raft of fee refunds and reductions, and reduced utility costs. Abu Dhabi in the same month announced a $27 billion emergency stimulus plan to aid private sector businesses and banks.

The UAE’s central bank also deployed a $70 billion package to help commercial banks provide debt relief. But many businesses still need more support, or are hesitant to take on new debt given the shaky outlook for recovery, according to reports.

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The Dubai Chamber report notes that in March, “banks seem to have increased lending to SMEs which saw a 5.3% y-o-y growth, to reach a value of AED93.4 billion ... This improvement was mainly due to the government stimulus package announced in March.”

“Dubai Government continues to monitor and offer support where necessary to help all of Dubai’s business community during this time,” a Dubai Chamber spokesman said in the hours after the survey’s release.

Economy already slowing pre-Covid
The coronavirus crisis follows a number of years of declining revenues for some of the emirate’s most important sectors, primarily real estate and hospitality. Residential property prices had already fallen 30% from their 2014 peak amid oversupply and weakening demand, and revenue per available hotel room was down more than 25% since 2015.

Last year Dubai’s economy grew at just 1.94%, its slowest pace since the dark days of its near economic collapse in 2009. That crisis, more than ten years ago, was sparked by a property crunch that forced Dubai to seek a $20 billion bailout from its wealthier and more conservative neighbor, UAE capital Abu Dhabi.

But the global pandemic will likely exact a toll on Dubai far greater than the downturn of a decade ago. The Chamber’s report warned: “The impact of COVID-19 crisis on the world economy during 2020 is projected to be greater than the 2008-09 financial crisis.”

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/21/cor...-companies-expect-to-close-in-six-months.html
 
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Twilight of an era The end of the Arab world’s oil age is nigh
NONE JULY 18, 2020
THEIR BUDGETS don’t add up anymore. Algeria needs the price of Brent crude, an international benchmark for oil, to rise to $157 dollars a barrel. Oman needs it to hit $87. No Arab oil producer, save tiny Qatar, can balance its books at the current price, around $40 (see chart).

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So some are taking drastic steps. In May the Algerian government said it would slice spending in half. The new prime minister of Iraq, one of the world’s largest oil producers, wants to take an axe to government salaries. Oman is struggling to borrow after credit-rating agencies listed its debt as junk. Kuwait’s deficit could hit 40% of GDP, the highest level in the world.

Covid-19 sent the price of oil plummeting to all-time lows as people stopped moving around in order to limit the spread of the virus. With commerce resuming, the price has ticked back up, though a peak in demand may be years away.

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But don’t be fooled. The world’s economies are moving away from fossil fuels. Oversupply and the increasing competitiveness of cleaner energy sources mean that oil may stay cheap for the foreseeable future. The recent turmoil in oil markets is not an aberration; it is a glimpse of the future. The world has entered an era of low prices—and no region will be more affected than the Middle East and north Africa.

Arab leaders knew that sky-high oil prices would not last for ever. Four years ago Muhammad bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, produced a plan called “Vision 2030” that aimed to wean his economy off oil. Many of his neighbours have their own versions. But “2030 has become 2020,” says a consultant to Prince Muhammad. Oil revenues in the Middle East and north Africa, which produces more of the black stuff than any other region, fell from over $1trn in 2012 to $575bn in 2019, says the IMF. This year Arab countries are expected to earn about $300bn selling oil, not nearly enough to cover their spending. Since March they have cut, taxed and borrowed. Many are burning through cash reserves meant to fund reform.

Pain will be felt in non-oil producers, too. They have long relied on their oily neighbours to put their citizens to work. Remittances are worth over 10% of GDP in some countries. Trade, tourism and investment have spread the riches around to some degree. Still, compared with other regions, the Middle East has one of the highest proportions of unemployed young people in the world. Oil has bankrolled unproductive economies, propped up unsavoury regimes and invited unwelcome foreign interference. So the end of this era need not be disastrous if it prompts reforms that create more dynamic economies and representative governments.

There is sure to be resistance along the way. Start with the region’s wealthiest oil producers, which can cope with low prices in the short run. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have huge sovereign-wealth funds. Saudi Arabia, the region’s largest economy, has foreign reserves worth $444bn, enough to cover two years of spending at the current rate.

But they have all been hit hard by the pandemic, as well as low oil prices. And they have long overspent. In February, before the coronavirus broke out in the Gulf, the IMF predicted that the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—would exhaust their $2trn of reserves by 2034. Since then Saudi Arabia has spent at least $45bn of its cash. If it continues at that pace for another six months it would strain the Saudi rial’s peg to the dollar. Devaluation would hit real incomes hard in a country which imports almost everything. Officials are worried. “We are facing a crisis the world has never seen the likes of in modern history,” says Muhammad al-Jadaan, the finance minister.

In an attempt to balance the books, Saudi Arabia has suspended a cost-of-living allowance for state workers, raised petrol prices and tripled its sales tax. Even so, the budget deficit could exceed $110bn this year (16% of GDP). More taxes—perhaps on businesses, income and land—could follow. But raising taxes risks further depressing commerce, which has been hobbled in order to contain the coronavirus.

The kingdom had hoped an increase in religious and leisure tourism would at least partially compensate for the decline in oil revenue. That now seems a fantasy. The holy city of Mecca has been closed to foreigners since February. Last year the annual haj drew 2.6m pilgrims; this year it has been capped at around 1,000. “The kingdom is stuck in the oil dependency it needs to climb out of to survive,” says Farouk Soussa of Goldman Sachs, a bank.

Still, some see an upside to the upheaval in oil-producing states. The countries of the Gulf produce the world’s cheapest oil, so they stand to gain market share if prices remain low. As expats flee, locals could take their jobs. And the region’s struggles may convince some countries to speed up reforms. Credit-rating agencies praise Saudi Arabia’s tax rises as a step towards turning a rentier economy into a productive one. To drum up fresh revenue, Arab leaders speak of a wave of privatisations. The kingdom recently announced the sale of the world’s largest desalination plant at Ras al-Khair. But at the moment investors seem more inclined to pull their money out of the region altogether.

Meanwhile, public anger is growing. Saudis mutter about the new taxes, which fall most heavily on the poor. “Why is MBS not taxing the rich?” gripe the jobless on social media, referring to Prince Muhammad by his initials. “Why doesn’t he sell his yacht and live like us?” asks a mother of four from the north, where the prince is building more palaces. In Iraq officials enraged by pay cuts have thrown their support behind a protest movement that is seeking to topple the entire political system. In Algeria, where income per person has fallen from $5,600 in 2012 to under $4,000 today, protesters are drifting back to the streets. The region’s rulers can no longer afford to buy the public’s loyalty.

Where the oil doesn’t flow
Protests have already resumed in Lebanon, where the pandemic temporarily halted months of demonstrations over corruption and a collapsing economy. Lebanon is not an oil producer (though it hopes to become one). Its crisis, which could see GDP shrink more than 13% this year, comes from the unravelling of a post-civil-war economic order too reliant on services and a bloated financial sector. But the slump in the Gulf has made it worse. A long-term drop in oil prices will bring more pain even for Arab countries that do not pump the stuff.

Remittances from energy-rich states are a lifeline for the entire region. More than 2.5m Egyptians, equal to almost 3% of that country’s population, work in Arab countries that export a lot of oil. Numbers are larger still for other countries: 5% from Lebanon and Jordan, 9% from the Palestinian territories. The money they send back makes up a sizeable chunk of the economies of their homelands. As oil revenue falls, so too will remittances. There will be fewer jobs for foreigners and smaller pay packets for those who do find work.

This will upend the social contract in states that have relied on emigration to soak up jobless citizens. About 35,000 Lebanese graduate from university each year; the Lebanese economy only employs 5,000 of them. Most look abroad for work. The exodus has speeded up the brain drain. Egypt used to supply unskilled labour to the Gulf. In the 1980s more than one-fifth of its migrants toiling in Saudi Arabia were illiterate. Today most have a secondary education; the share of university graduates has doubled. Egypt is now struggling with covid-19 in part because it lacks enough doctors: more than 10,000 have emigrated since 2016, many to the Gulf.

With fewer opportunities in the oil-producing states, many graduates may no longer emigrate. But their home countries cannot provide a good life. Doctors in Egypt earn as little as 3,000 pounds ($185) a month, a fraction of what they make in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. A glut of unemployed graduates is a recipe for social unrest. Add to that, perhaps, an influx of compatriots forced to come home when their contracts run out. Many do not wish to, since emirates like Dubai and Qatar offer not just well-paying jobs but first-class services and relatively honest governance. A Gallup poll published in January found that just 10% of Egyptian migrants in the rich parts of the Gulf want to return.

Businesses will be hurt as well. Oil producers are big markets for other Arab countries. In 2018 they took 21% of exports from Egypt, 32% from Jordan and 38% from Lebanon. Firms can pursue other trading partners, of course. Egypt already exports more to both Italy and Turkey than it does to any Arab country. But the stuff it sells there—petroleum products, metals and chemicals—tends to create few jobs for Egyptians. Countries in the region buy more labour-intensive goods, such as crops, textiles and consumer products. More than half of the televisions exported from Egypt wind up in the GCC. Jordan’s pharmaceutical industry, which generates more than 10% of its total exports and supports tens of thousands of jobs, sends almost three-quarters of its exports to Arab oil producers. Smaller, poorer Gulf states will make for more impecunious customers.

They will also send out fewer wealthy tourists. In Lebanon visitors from just three countries—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—account for about one-third of total tourist spending. Most visitors to Egypt are from Europe, but Gulf tourists stay longer and spend more money at restaurants, cafés and malls. These countries can look elsewhere for revenue, but it will be hard to replace the wealthy tourists in their backyards. Saudis spend the summer in Cairo or Beirut because those cities are close, culturally familiar and speak the same language. Slovenians or Singaporeans are unlikely to do the same.

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It is something of a historical accident that the Gulf states rose to become hubs of power and influence in the Middle East. For centuries they were backwaters sustained by pilgrimage and the pearl trade. The rulers of the region were in the great old Arab capitals: Cairo and Damascus fought wars against Israel and led the cry for Arab nationalism. Beirut was the financial and cultural hub.

These old powers, now well into decline, have an uneasy relationship with the newcomers. In a recording leaked in 2015 Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, the Egyptian president, mocked the Gulf’s wealth. He told an adviser to ask the Saudis for $10bn in financial aid, a request that was met with laughter. “So what? They have money like rice,” Mr Sisi quipped in response.

They have been generous with it, if selectively so. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE gave Egypt about $30bn in aid after 2013, when Mr Sisi overthrew an elected Islamist government. The Sunni leadership in Lebanon has long been a client of the Gulf states. Rafik Hariri, who led the country after its civil war, made his fortune as a contractor in Saudi Arabia. His son Saad, who also served as prime minister, holds Saudi citizenship. The GCC has bailed out Jordan twice in the past decade.

In recent years, though, funding has started to dry up. Partly this is due to political disputes. Seen from Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, many Arab states they once subsidised now look like bad investments. The Saudis are frustrated that Mr Sisi did not send troops to support their ill-fated invasion of Yemen, and that the younger Mr Hariri was too tolerant of Hizbullah, the Shia militia and political party backed by Iran. Their diminishing largesse also reflects their diminishing fortunes. Egypt has not received any money in years. No one from the Gulf looks willing to bail out Lebanon. Jordan had to plead to receive a five-year, $2.5bn aid package from the Gulf in 2018, half of what it got in 2011. None of this is necessarily bad: many Arabs would appreciate less foreign influence in their countries. But it will add to the financial pressure on their own indebted governments.

It may also presage a broader change in the region’s politics. For four decades America has followed the “Carter Doctrine”, which held that it would use military force to maintain the free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. Under President Donald Trump, though, the doctrine has started to fray. When Iranian-made cruise missiles and drones slammed into Saudi oil facilities in September, America barely blinked. The Patriot missile-defence batteries it deployed to the kingdom weeks later have already been withdrawn. Outside the Gulf Mr Trump has been even less engaged, all but ignoring the chaos in Libya, where Russia, Turkey and the UAE (to name but a few) are vying for control.

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President Xi has a bridge to sell you
A Middle East less central to the world’s energy supplies will be a Middle East less important to America. Russia may fill the void in places, but its regional interests are narrow, such as its determination to preserve its Mediterranean port at Tartus in Syria. It does not wish to—and probably cannot—extend a security umbrella across the Arabian peninsula. China has tried to stay out of the region’s politics, pursuing only economic benefits: construction contracts in Algeria, port concessions in Egypt, a wide range of deals in the Gulf.

As Arab states become poorer, though, the nature of their relationship with China may change. This is already happening in Iran, where American sanctions have choked off oil revenue. Officials are discussing a long-term investment deal that could see Chinese firms develop everything from ports to telecoms. It is framed as a “strategic partnership”, but critics worry it could leave China in control of the infrastructure it builds, as it has in some indebted Asian and African countries. Falling oil revenue could force this model on Arab states—and perhaps complicate what remains of their relations with America.

No way out
Ask young Arabs where they would like to live, and there is a good chance they will choose Dubai. A survey in 2019 found that 44% viewed the UAE as the ideal country to emigrate to. They often frame their admiration in contrast to their home countries. For all its faults, Dubai (and its neighbours) offers something unusual in the region: the police are honest, the roads well paved, the electricity uninterrupted.

As Lebanon’s economy crashes, everyone is talking of emigration. Yet there are few jobs in the Gulf. “Dubai was always the escape,” says one woman. “Now it’s like we’re trapped, with no backup plan.” Young people across the region have the same fears. Egypt can feel like a country crumbling under its own weight; Jordan is perennially in crisis. Almost ten years after a Tunisian fruit-seller lit the spark of the Arab spring, the frustrations that caused it persist. The end of the oil age could bring change. But it will bring pain first. ■

This article appeared in the Middle East & Africa section of the print edition under the headline "Twilight of the petrostates"

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OIL AND GAS FORECAST TO 2050

The world’s energy system is going through a transition. Over the
next thirty years it will change significantly in its composition as it
decouples from carbon, population and economic growth.
DNV GL’s Energy Transition Outlook seeks to understand the
nature and pace of this change. We have created an independent
forecast of what we believe to be the most likely energy future.
It will inform our own strategic choices over the years to come,
and we hope it will also provide useful insight to our customers,
partners and other stakeholders.
We forecast energy demand to flatten, mainly due to increased
efficiencies in the use of energy, after 2030. Industry across energy
sources and throughout the energy value chain will continue to
make energy available, affordable and clean.
There won’t be a ‘silver bullet’ for sustainable energy production;
instead the world will benefit from a portfolio of technically
sophisticated and cost-effective energy. The oil and gas industry
will continue to play an important role in this portfolio and
hydrocarbons will account for 44% of the total energy mix in
2050. Key areas of demand for fossil fuels will be within heavy
transportation, air and shipping. Gas is predicted to become the
largest energy carrier from 2033 to the end of our forecast period.
Tomorrow’s energy system will be characterized by enhanced
efficiency with reduced waste of energy, cost and resources in
all stages of the value chain. For oil and gas this not only means
enhanced recovery and cost efficiency, but also the use of each
energy source and carrier where it is most effective. A plateau in
demand and cheaper resources will lead to tough competition
between energy sources where supply exceeds demand. There
will be an increased need and opportunity to serve energy systems
with a flexible mix of sources and carriers, and to identify and
exploit synergies between these.
This transition does not come by itself, and the details of the energy
system will vary significantly between regions and countries.
Increased dialogue and collaboration is required to drive the
transition: between industry, policymakers and regulators,
between various parts of the energy industry and between
countries and regions.

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