Abingdonboy
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I agree it may be a case of revisiting SOPs-the IAF's decsion to have 4 Garuds on each flight now pays credence to this. Also there seems to be a serious disconnect between the IAF and the CAPFs/state police. Both have laid some sort of blame at the other for this incident- IAF is unhappy that the SOP of clearing a 2km exclusion zone around any HLZ was not practiced and the CAPFs/state police are annoyed the IAF left behind a policeman.It can't be true that IAF had zero communication after they were grounded. They all carry comm equipment (including satellite phones) precisely for this kind of scenario. They should have communicated their position to HQs or friendly units nearby, and waited with the injured person until help arrived. If necessary, they should have laid out defences to guard against hostiles temporarily, and if it came to it, then fought and held off the hostiles until help arrived, instead of leaving the weapons, chopper and a man all at the mercy of lady luck.
The IAF crew included a gunner and a machine gun. If they were not armed enough for the mission, then that is their fault too, and they need to seriously revise their SOP.
Also, let us not forget that it has been a few days since the incident happened, and the CRPF and MHA and others have been criticizing the IAF for their actions. If there actually was any justification for the IAF crew's actions, they have had plenty of time to explain themselves. If not to the media and public, then at least to the MHA and MoD. The fact that no convincing explanations have been offered so far lends credence to the suspicion that they don't have any justification to give.
But yes, we can wait for the CoI to submit its report.
We have no way of knowing what the IAF has instructed its crews to do in such a scenario.
And sir, just because there are contingencies like sat phones and the like for this kind of situation- this is on paper and any combatant will tell you that the second you get into the field all plans and intent go out the window as the first round is fired. There is a huge margin for things getting to the FUBAR stage in practice. Also the helos onboard comns WERE rendered ineffective by the initial contact or the hard landing.
Like I said- that no matter what the IAF helo and crew had onboard the helo wrt weapons it was nowhere near enough to do what you have said ie set up a 360" perimeter to ward off hordes of heavily armed Moaists.
I do feel though, that a lot of lessons will be learnt from this incident and SOPs will be revised.