Geo Politics of Bangladesh and Neighbourhood.

[Major d1]

Bangladesh is a small country with a great geopolitical importance, situated at the conjunction of South Asia and South East Asia which is regarded by political scientist D.C. Barman as “highly sensitive” considering its geographical, economic and political importance in the region. The unique geopolitical significance of Bangladesh results from myriad interwoven strands, each representing facets of this nation’s complex historical evolution which, in turn, are crucially influenced by specific features of its geographical location. Bangladesh has problem on some geopolitical issues regarding her border, rivers, maritime border, border trade, Asian high way etc. Here the points are discussed briefly.

GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES AND NEIGHBOURHOOD

Geo politics is the art and practice of using political power over a given territory. term coined by Rudolf Kjellén,Swedish political scientist, at the beginning of the 20th century.Our foreign policy advocates for friendship to all and malice to none, which also dictates our strategic and security outlook. So, one should not be surprised that Bangladesh is very reluctant to view her neighbors as a source of security threats despite the fact that she is having some bilateral issues with her neighbors, particularly India, and Myanmar due to their aggressive policy, in the shape of land/maritime border demarcation, illegal migration, refugee influx, illegal drugs and small arms trade, and human trafficking.

There are several conflicting geopolitical issues between Bangladesh and its neighbourhood_India and Myanmar.

WATER SHARING

Of all the resources that people depend on, only air is more directly vital to sustaining human life than water. Deprive a person of air, and he dies in minutes. Deprive him of water, and he dies in days. Deprive him of food, and he can go on for weeks or months, depending on his physical condition at the beginning of the fast and on whether he has adequate supplies of water.

Bangladesh is called the mother of rivers, as it has 710 big and small rivers according govt. statistics. The rivers of banglaesh can be devied into four river systems-

1. Brahmmaputra-Jamuna,

2. Ganga-Padma,

3. Surma-Meghna and

4. Rivers of Chittagong.

The length of Bangladesh’s rivers is 24,140. The waters of fifty-six rivers from the Ganges and the Brahmaputra river systems flow from India to Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is getting drier every year due to India’s unilateral withdrawal of water from the common river Ganges flowing upstream from India. The quantity of water down the Farakka point has been critically declining due to taking out of the Ganges water by upper riparian India through various canals by violating the water sharing agreement. [1]

GANGES & BRAHMPUTRA

The Ganges and Brahmaputra river basin in South Asia is the largest in the region, encompassing over 1.6 million km2. Flowing from the Himalayans in Nepal and Tibet, both rivers course through India, and ultimately join in Bangladesh where they discharge into the Bay of Bengal. Before the Ganges enters Bangladesh, it divides off a smaller river, the Bhagirathi- Hooghly that flows through the port of Calcutta. Four-fifths of Bangladesh, an area smaller than New YorkState, is straddled by this delta system. Approximately half of the countryþs GDP is based on agriculture, and hence this riversþ irrigation value is vital to the countryþs economy and its over 120 million inhabitants. [2]

The topography of Bangladesh (i.e. its sea level elevation and delta wetlands) and its geographical location make it extremely vulnerable to natural disasters.

The major dispute between Bangladesh and India is on the sharing of the Ganges water during lean period.

Duration: 1951 to Now

The origin of the conflict dates back to 1951 when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan.

India began plans for the construction of a mile-long “barrage” (a river flow obstruction) at Farakka, 18 kms from the Bangladeshi border, to increase the diversion of Ganges water to the Bhagirathi-HooghlyRiver to flush silt and keep Calcutta harbor operational during the dry season. It was thought that by increasing the river flow, the harbor could be kept from deteriorating from silt deposition. However, Pakistan protested on the grounds that this action would wreak havoc on the environment. Nevertheless, India continued, and began construction in 1962. With no other course of action, Pakistan (and then later Bangladesh) took the matter before the United Nations General Assembly in 1968 and discussions continued in that forum until 1976. The international attention to the issue caused India to at least concede that the Ganges was an international river, and that þeach riparian State was entitled to a reasonable and equitable share of the waters of an international river.þ [3]

In 1971, Bangladesh became an independent nation, with India aiding it in its independence struggle against Pakistan. It was expected that better relations between India and Bangladesh would result, but India persisted with its Farakka plans, and this led to a general souring of the relationship. In 1972, an Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission was established to study the river flow and develop the river water on a cooperative basis. However, work on the Farakka barrage continued, and it was finally completed in 1975. A short-term agreement was subsequently signed by India and Bangladesh to conduct a 40 day trial test of the barrage during the dry season.

Unfortunately, four months later, the President of Bangladesh was assassinated by elements of the military that found him too cooperative with India. The next dry season, India began to divert water at Farakka unilaterally, and continued to do so until 1977 when a treaty on þSharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka and on Augmenting its Flowsþ was signed by the two countries and guaranteed a minimum flow level for Bangladesh for a five year period. After the expiration of this treaty in 1982, two more short-term agreements were concluded on water sharing until 1988. Thereafter, India began unilateral diversions at will. Moreover, domestic political upheavals, and the growing polarization caused by rising national religious factions (Hindu India vs. Islamic Bangladesh), contributed to a rising level of animosity between the two nations.

The political climate began to change when in 1992, the prime ministers of the two countries met and agreed to renew efforts for a solution. In addition, Bangladesh revived its attempts to internationalize the affair by bringing forth the dispute before the UN General Assembly and the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting in 1993. In addition, the issue was raised in the South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), although no definite action was taken. SAARC comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, and its main goal is to “accelerate the process of economic and social development in member states, through joint action in the agreed areas of cooperation.”[4]

In 1996, a new atmosphere of regional cooperation was created with a change of government in India, and in December of 1996, a Ganges Water Sharing Treaty was signed that is supposed to last for thirty years. The Treaty addresses the heart of the conflict: water allocation during the five months of the dry season (January-May). During the rest of the year, there is sufficient water that India can operate the Farakka diversion without creating problems for Bangladesh. However, increasing upstream withdrawal in Northern India has further lowered the dry-season flow at Farakka, further complicating matters. Hence, the Treaty stipulates that below a certain flow rate, India and Bangladesh will each share half of the water. Above a certain limit, Bangladesh will be guaranteed a certain minimum level, and if the water flow exceeds a given limit, India will withdraw a given amount, and the balance will be received by Bangladesh (which will be more than 50%). [5]

Despite the Treaty, there are still factions in Bangladesh that feel that India should not be drawing off any water at Farakka, as well as elements in India that donþt want Bangladesh to receive any water. Annually, the Ganges brings to its mouth over 2 million tons of silt. Due to increasing deforestation in the foothills of the Himalayans, the amount of erosion is growing. With such levels of silt, it is increasingly no longer possible for the Hooghly to retain a flushing role for CalcuttaHarbor, and it is time for India to realize this and terminate Ganges water withdrawal and concentrate on port development further downstream.

In addition, due to silt deposition and flooding patterns, the Ganges is actually naturally shifting eastward, and it is only a question of time before the HooghlyRiver will no longer be capable of supporting deep harbor operations. India should except this fact and plan for a harbor much closer to the Bay of Bengal, else it should consider regular and more intensive dredging operations. [6]

TIPAIMUKH DAM

India’s proposed Tipaimukh Dam will be a disaster for the Environment of Bangladesh. Though India has claimed that it will not hamper Bangladesh, but the Farakka Dam is an example for everyone in Bangladesh how it made the disaster. The Indians are going ahead with the construction of the massive Tipaimukh barrage-this events collectively impinge on us in more than one ways but the one which directly affects our very ability to survive is the issue of water-sharing of some 53 common rivers between India and Bangladesh. By constructing Tipaimukh and other barrages, India is depriving us of life-giving waters, drastically reducing our ability to survive and therefore this is the issue needing immediate and continued public attention and the subject of this commentary. India has resumed construction of the Tipaimukh barrage on the Barack river just a kilometer north of Jakigonj in Sylhet; the construction work was stalled in March 2007 in the face of protests within and outside India. The barrage when completed in 2012 is supposed to provide 1500 megawatts of hydel power to the Indian state of Assam but in return its going to bring about a major disaster for Bangladesh, practically contributing to drying up of 350 km long Surma and 110 km long Kushiara rivers which water most of the north-eastern regions of Bangladesh. The Tipaimukh barrage is going to seriously affect not only agriculture in large portions of Bangladesh, particularly in winter, but is also going to bring about negative ecological, climatic and environmental changes of vast areas in both Bangladesh and India. [7]

IndiaRiver Linking Project:
India’s River Diversion Plan: Its impact on Bangladesh .Indian plans to divert vast quantities of water from major rivers, including the Ganges and Brahmaputra, threaten the livelihoods of more than 100 million people downstream in Bangladesh, the Bangladeshi government fears. Ministers are so concerned that they are considering appealing to the United Nations to redraft international law on water sharing, said a report of the leading British daily The Guardian. A recent report by correspondent John Vidal from Dhaka said: The ambitious Indian plans to link major rivers flowing from the Himalayas and divert them south to drought-prone areas are still on the drawing board, but Bangladeshi government scientists estimated that even a 10% to 20% reduction in the water flow to the country could dry out great areas for much of the year.

More than 80% of Bangladesh’s 20 million small farmers grow rice and depend on water that has flowed through India. “The idea of linking these rivers is very dangerous.It could affect the whole of Bangladesh and be disastrous,” said Hafiz (uddin) Ahmad, the water resources minister. “The north of Bangladesh is already drying out after the Ganges was dammed by India in 1976. Now India is planning to do the same on [many of] the 53 other rivers that enter the country via India. Bangladesh depends completely on water.”
The minister was quoted as saying that the government had protested to India but had so far not had any response. “Without this water we cannot survive,” he said. “If [rice] production falls then we would not know how to survive. We want no kind of war, but international law on sharing water is unsure and we would request the UN to frame a new law. It would be a last resort.” “Great parts are turning into a desert, rivers have lost their navigability, salt water is intruding into farming areas. You can walk across the river Gori at some times of the year,” said the minister. [8]

ASIAN HIGHWAY

Govt decides to get connected as per original UN-Escap plan [9]

AHN, a proposed network of 1,41,000km of standard roadways crisscrossing Asian countries and linking them with Europe, was conceived in 1959 with an aim to promote development of international road transport in the continent. The Asian Highway, also known as the Great Asian Highway, is a cooperative project among countries in Asia and Europe and the UN-Escap for improving the highway systems in Asia.

It is one of the three pillars of Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID) project endorsed by the Escap commission at its 48th session in 1992. The ALTID is comprised of Asian Highway, Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) and facilitation of land transport projects.

Agreements have so far been signed by 32 countries to allow the highway to cross the continent and reach Europe. A significant part of the funding comes from the larger more advanced nations as well as international agencies such as the Asian Development Bank. The project is scheduled for completion in 2010.

At least 15 countries, including Pakistan became founding members by signing the agreement when the idea was conceived in 1959. In 1971, Bangladesh automatically became a founding member but its status was later lowered to observer after it missed the

Abandoning the country’s previously proposed routes, the government decided to connect Bangladesh to the Asian Highway Network (AHN) accepting routes proposed by India & the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN-Escap).

“We decided to connect Bangladesh to the Asian Highway Network for the welfare of the country,” Communications Minister Syed Abul Hossain told reporters after a meeting at Bangladesh Secretariat.

. It is strange that according to the ESCAP-crafted laws Bangladesh cannot even propose any amendment to the AH routes now without signing the agreement first! And not signing will mean that Bangladesh will be left out and the AH will bypass Bangladesh leaving it isolated and causing it to lose in the process the opportunities of trade, investment and service revenues. It is not clear where the AH can go in its westward advance if it bypasses Bangladesh.

This assertion has been made despite the knowledge that the cost-benefit of the proposed routes does not favour Bangladesh at all. Indeed Bangladesh will not be benefited from the currently proposed routes for the AH is quite clear. One question is whether this route would then serve merely as a transit corridor for India to carry its cargo of men and materials from its one part to another through Bangladesh.

Bypassing Bangladesh through the Indian “chicken neck” is also improbable. Bangladesh has a bargaining chip here if the member countries of ESCAP are serious about running the AH from east and southeast Asia to the Sub-continent and beyond. India has been asking for an easy passage through Bangladesh.

Cox’s Bazar-Myanmar route

The point here is that AH must serve the country’s best interests – and to ensure that an AH passing through Chittagong – Cox’s Bazar – Myanmar and beyond is the way. Since its inception in 1959 the perception has always been that the AH will pass through Cox’s Bazar – Myanmar and onward east and west. Both AH 1 and AH 2 enter Bangladesh from India through Benapole, Jessore, Banglabandha and Dinajpur, respectively. Both converge on Dhaka and move on to Tamabil, Sylhet. Neither of them fulfil the ESCAP-laid principles that the AH connects the ports, container depots and business centres of participating countries.

There is no indication how the Nepalese and Bhutanese traffic will move westward along AH if the current route alignments stick. Will they move back westward through Benapole? The AH 2 also allows an easy access of North Indian traffic into Bangladesh and then on to Eastern India. Even then it remains no more than a sub-regional route.

By merging with both AH 1 at Jessore and AH 2 via Hatikamrul, AH 41 travels to Dhaka and then separates out to move to Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf to stop there. There is no indication that this route will move into Myanmar and beyond. The AH 2 also allows an easy access of North Indian traffic into Bangladesh and then on to Eastern India. Even then it remains no more than a sub-regional route.

The route has been designated as a sub-regional route though it traverses Bangladesh territory only. India, Nepal and Bhutan are potential users. No other country will use this route. Thus Indian desire to use Bangladesh ports becomes easier to fulfil. Conceived fifty years ago, the Asian Highway’s 141,000 km route charted out by ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) is hitherto an unfulfilled dream. Peoples from Turkey to Indonesia with Bangladesh and other countries in-between are yet to see AH’s construction materialize. The dream of seeing loaded containers and international passenger buses rolling down this route from Shanghai or Singapore, or from Dhaka for that matter, to Istanbul and beyond, may not be fulfilled.
Some progress regarding the AH has been achieved in recent years in defining the road links on the basis of an agreement among some of the member countries of ESCAP.

Wrong track

The AH was one of the two major regional projects initiated by then ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Fareast), the other was the Mekong River project. The Trans-Asian Railway project was added to the list later. It may be mentioned here that the Asian Development Bank was also set up under the auspices of ECAFE with the primary focus on providing the financial underpinning to the regional projects like these. The projects however remained stalled due the Indochina war and the path of isolation chosen by Burma’s military government since 1962. ESCAP (ECAFE’s new name since 1974) revived the projects in the 1980-1990s. The Mekong River project has been successfully implemented to the satisfaction of the riparian countries with financial assistance of bilateral and multilateral donors. By now the AH has advanced a stage; but in this advance Bangladesh has fallen in the wrong track.

Now let us have a detailed look at the designated three routes through Bangladesh.

Both AH 1 and AH 2 enter Bangladesh from India through Benapole, Jessore, Banglabandha and Dinajpur, respectively. Both converge on Dhaka and move on to Tamabil, Sylhet. Neither of them fulfil the ESCAP-laid principles that the AH connects the ports, container depots and business centres of participating countries. The justification for a second entry into Bangladesh through Dinajpur has been to give access to Bhutan and Nepal to AH. However to fulfil the ESCAP-laid requirement that the route originating in any country must connect the capital city of the next country of entry, then Nepal and Bhutan should travel to Delhi and then move on to Bangladesh through the Benapole-border.

Furthermore, there is no indication how the Nepalese and Bhutanese traffic will move westward along AH if the current route alignments stick. Will they move back westward through Benapole? Is that a viable option for them? If the purpose of AH 2 is to give access to Nepal and Bhutan only then this route is the best candidate for becoming a sub-regional route rather than a part of the arterial AH. The AH 2 however also allows an easy access of North Indian traffic into Bangladesh and then on to Eastern India. Even then it remains no more than a sub-regional route.

The third route through Bangladesh (AH 41) is shown to originate at Mongla port and moves on to Jessore to meet AH 1 just after the Benapole border crossing and then moves on to Hatikamrul in Kushia to meet AH 2. By merging with both AH 1 at Jessore and AH 2 via Hatikamrul, AH 41 travels to Dhaka and then separates out to move to Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf to stop there. India, Nepal and Bhutan are likely users. No other country will use this route. Thus Indian desire to use Bangladesh ports becomes easier to fulfil.

The two main arterials of the AH thus enter Bangladesh from India in the west and converges on to Tamabil in Sylhet before crossing into the Indian state of Meghalaya on to Assam, Monipur and Nagaland. It can go further to Myanmar, Southeast Asia and China, and can serve as a sub-regional network in that area though its suitability as a continent-wide Asian Highway remains in doubt. Dr.. Rahmatullah has made it abundantly clear that the route through Tamabil is unsuitable for the AH. In addition to the 1200km extra distance, he says, “the route passes through a mountainous region through four Indian states through which vehicles can move only slowly as the gradients are steep. Trucks with heavy load will have difficulties in moving, fuel consumption will be huge, making travel costly”.

Tamabil is not suitable for India, Myanmar or Bangladesh or for any country between south and southeast Asia”. It is not clear why India will not be benefited since it can easily move its cargo of men and materials through Bangladesh to eastern India, a long held aim of India. It can also move to Southeast Asia from its eastern states if it chooses and finds profitable. [10]

TRANSIT

Why Bangladesh would not mull over transit offer by India?

Is there any room for trust and faith thats firmly required between the two countries? No, certainly not. Rather, this faithlessness and lack of confidence is created by India only because of their big brotherly attitude from India.

India articulates transit as an economic issue. Ok thats good. But, where is the certainty of economic benefit in the in returns for transit? Is there any assurance that we would not have to sit for a bargaining meeting to get a hold of money promised by India? Bangladesh is being experienced this sort of legacy from India. India is, time and again, infringing the treaties with Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujib has ratified the constitution as soon as he came back to the country from India following handing over the Berubari under Mujib-Indira boarder treaty. But, India has reneged on its promises to ratify the constitution of their own. Is Bangladesh being paid water in accordance with treaty? Answer is certainly not. Attention from India to minimize the incredible US$ 2 billion dollar trade deficit is being noticed at all?Not yet today.
India is not making any venture to remove tariff barrier on commodities, is not ensuring the entrance of tariff free commodity, rather twisting unnecessary boarder problem by fencing instead of resolving 6.5km unsettled boarder. They keep themselves implicated in captivating the possession of newly surfaced islands instead of solving the problem South Talpotri.
700 Bangladeshi have been killed notoriously by the BSF throughout 2000-2007 according to Human Rights Organization Report. Crime like abduction has been daily event. No country in the world, in the wake of numerous problems, would not offer transit, accordingly, why Bangladesh? A lot of things including sovereignty of Bangladesh must be taken into account prior to offering transit.

How much Bangladesh is all set relating to roads with 4 lens? And how much grounding it has for repairing the roads and also for long time security? Why Bangladesh would have to bear the risk of AIDS spread by Indian truck drivers? The most important thing is to be taken into account that the Bangladesh would have nothing to do against India having been a regional power with atomic weapons if it dispatches conventional arms and military weapons to north-eastern provinces through Bangladesh. Thus, Bangladesh would become an everlasting enemy and be targeted by separatist group of north-eastern provinces if transit is given.
The separatist group may launch attack inside Bangladesh. Consequently, security measures would be impeded and a turbulence situation would be come into view. Patriotic BDRs and boarder-side farmers who have given their blood and sacrifice themselves to protect the country , the children who became orphan, the widow who lost her husband- these all will sacrifice themselves, but will not leave a bit room for transit.
The concept of transit, transshipment and corridor?

Transit refers to the passage across another countrys territory using its own surface transport, while transshipment refers to the same movement using the transport of transiting countries. (Bangladesh Foreign Policy, 322, Harun ur Rashid). For example- if India using its own transport dispatches commodities through Bangladesh to North-Eastern provinces, we may call it transit system. But, if India dispatches commodities using Bangladeshi transport through Bangladeshi land, we may call it transshipment system. Commodities from India after 1947 were to be transported to North-Eastern part of India across eastern Pakistan. It continued till 1960. In 1960 the relation between India and Pakistan turned into most horrible and India banned the flight transportation over India, therefore, Pakistan blocked transit facilities across the eastern Pakistan.

Transit, security and sovereignty

It appears to have been divided the territory of Bangladesh into two sides because of transit route if you observe in the view of security. This is being said that Indian commodity would be dispatched in the form of sealed, Bangladesh would have no control over the sealed thing. India seems to have been created a ground for dispatching military weapons to north-eastern provinces in the name of transit system across Bangladesh if necessary. To this end, Indian forces may get down in soul of Bangladesh, that means through transit or corridor a crocodile is to be invited digging a cannel by Bangladesh.
The relation between India and China is much more related with transit across Bangladesh. As of today, boarder dispute between India and China yet to be solved and apprehensions of war between the two countries having atomic weapons should not be denied. So, in that prospective war India would bring her troops to north-eastern provinces through Bangladesh as it is happened during Second World War in the fate of Belgium. If India-China war is took place, India will conquer Bangladesh by virtue of transit or corridor as Hitler conquered Belgium. (Talukdar Moniruzzaman, transit: khal kete kumir anar porikolpona).

Half of the total military of India has been deployed in the seven sisters region to tackle the unrest there. As India is required more troops there, it cannot be brought to a standstill if it utilizes the transit facility for the purpose of sending troops and military ingredients. It might be presumed that if a war between India and Nepal is happened, the Shiliguri corridor would be closed and in that case Indian troops would have no other way but to march forward by transit route across Bangladesh. In that hasty moment a great military power like India could be defied.

In 1996 the ULFA leader Poresh Borua has made it clear and said “Bangladesh will be targeted and get attacked if it assists India that goes against our Liberation movement.” so, transit and sovereignty cannot be departed.

What would we get in returns for transit?

Answers of some questions must be come across first if we are to offer transit to India. What would Bangladesh get a hold in exchange of transit? Would Bangladesh get transit through India to dispatch commodities to Nepal? Through India towards China? And transshipment through India to Pakistan? Would Bangladesh have a facility to bring in electricity from Nepal over India? Would Bangladesh have a passage in dispatching cargos?

Nehru Doctrine, Transit and South Asia

Demand for transit or corridor across the territory of Bangladesh and ascertaining of unilateral supremacy of India throughout the South Asia all these are integrally connected and based on Nehru doctrine. Nehru used to dream India to be in the same queue with USA, USSR and China, in the power politics. At the same time, India would be in a state of determinant and chief controller of South Asia is the main theme of Nehru Doctrine. The theory is functioning behind making the South Asian countries dependent on India and ascertaining supremacy of India in this region is the Nehru Doctrine. The comment of Bhobani Sen Gupta in this context is worth mentioning it is as follows- “India will not tolerate an external intervention in a conflict situation in any South Asian country, if the intervention has any implicit or explicit anti Indian implication. No South Asian government must therefore ask for external military assistance with an anti Indian-bias from any country. It a South Asian country genuinely needs to deal with a serious internal conflict situation, it should ask half from neighboring countries including India. The exclusion of India from such a contingency with is considered to be an anti-Indian move on the part of government concerned.

If this is be the latent dream and state character of India, how much it will be the horrifying, awful, dire, calamitous and grim that is comprehensible to all. [11]

BORDER ISSUES

The India-Bangladesh border is unique for several reasons. One such unique characteristic is the close proximity of Indian and Bangladeshi border villages. In the border villages there are houses where the front door is in India and rear opens on the Bangladeshi side. Such instances are the norm and not an exception

In 1947 the Radcliffe Award delineated the boundaries between India and East Pakistan. In 1974, following independence, a comprehensive new boundary agreement, the Indo-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement, was signed by the prime ministers of Bangladesh and India, but it has yet to be ratified.

The 1974 Indo-Bangladesh Agreement. The 4,351-kilometer boundary between India and Bangladesh, of which 180 kilometers runs along river lines, has yet to be fully delineated. A dispute over a 6.5-kilometer stretch of floodplain shared with the Indian state of Tripura has yet to be resolved. Ratification of the boundary agreement has been delayed due to the existence of 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladesh enclaves in India, complicating the process of delineating the boundary line. These enclaves, which were not taken into account by the Radcliffe Award, came into being when the previous rulers of the princely states of Cooch Behar (which merged with India) and Rongpur (which merged with East Pakistan) gambled away portions of their lands to each other. The problem is further complicated by shifting river courses. The locals mistakenly think that the boundary runs in the mid-channel of a river irrespective of subsequent changes in the river course. As a result, border people of either side take possession of land that has fallen on their side as a result of a change in the river course. Heated disputes and exchanges of fire from the border outposts have occurred. A recent conflict between border forces in April 2001 at Pyridwah and Boraibari raised tensions but was handled with restraint by both governments.

Chitmahal is the enclaves between India and Bangladesh border in the Indian state of West Bengal. India has about 92 exclaves of Bangladesh, and 106 exclaves of India are within Bangladeshi soil. The enclaves were part of the high stake card or chess games centuries ago between two regional kings, the Raja of Cooch Behar and the Nawab of Rangpu,] The little territories were the result of a confused outcome of a treaty between the Kingdom of Koch Bihar and the Mughal Empire.

After the partition of India in 1947, Cooch Behar district was merged with India and Rangpur went to then East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in 1971. In 1974, both countries agreed to exchange the enclaves or at least provide easy access to the enclaves, but since then little has materialised. Talks between the two countries on the issue resumed in 2001, but the lack of a concrete time frame has relegated the issue to the back burner.

The residents of the enclaves live in abysmal conditions, with a lack of water, roads, electricity, schools and medicines. Crime also is rampant, as complaining would mean crossing the international boundary due to the lack of law enforcement resources. Residents of the enclaves may only go to their respective countries on the production of an identity card, after seeking permission from the border guards, causing much resentment.

Bangladesh exclaves

Available sources indicate that along the northwestern boundary there are at least 192 enclaves, the political status and exchange protocol of which are yet to be settled. Of the total, 119 enclaves inside India are claimed by Bangladesh while 73 enclaves inside Bangladesh are claimed by India. An account of 75 enclaves in northwestern Bangladesh which are inside India and identified as parts of Bangladesh suggest that 41 of them are in lalmonirhat (2 in hatibandha upazila, 1 in Lalmonirhat Sadar, 4 in kaliganj, 3 in aditmari, 28 in patgram, and 3 in phulbari), 16 in kurigram district (all in bhurungamari upazila) and 18 in panchagarh district (2 in Panchagarh Sadar upazila, 12 in boda and 4 in debiganj

1.Dohogram–Angorpotha (Teen Bigha Corridor)

A Bangladeshi exclave administrated Pathgram upzila in Lalmonirhat zila lies within the Indian province of West Bengal. The exclave has an area of 25 km2 (10 sq mi) with a resident population of 20,000 people. The exclave lacks all facilities. The lone health complex remains virtually useless for lack of power supply as India refused to link the exclave with mainland Bangladesh with power supply lines.

The Tin Bigha Corridor, “no larger than a football field,” is the name of a strip of land measuring 178 mtrs x 85 mtrs in the district of Cooch-Behar in West Bengal, which connects northern Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves with the mainland of Bangladesh.

The corridor has a long and complex background. For a proper appreciation, one needs to go back to the Radcliffe Award, the Berubari dispute and the legal developments that followed. The then East Pakistan was created by dividing the province of Bengal and by adding to the part separated from India some areas of Assam. This division took place on the basis of the report of the Bengal Boundary Commission, known as the Radcliffe Award.

In the agreement signed on 16 May 1974 by Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh, it was decided to put into effect the demarcation of boundaries at selected stretches. Section 14 of the agreement was about handing over of the southern part of South Berubari to India in exchange of a passage in perpetuity linking Angarpota-Dahagram with Patgram in Bangladesh. The Berubari dispute was thus finally resolved by Article 1.14 of the Agreement which stated:
“India will retain the southern half of South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves, measuring an area of 2.64 square miles approximately, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves. India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 metres x 85 metres near ‘Tin Bigha’ to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) of Bangladesh.”

During the Pakistani period, under the 1952 agreement, India agreed to hand over ‘Tin Bigha’ to Pakistan in perpetuity to link Angarpota-Dahagram in exchange of the southern half of South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves. Whereas, in 1974 agreement, India instead of handing over ‘Tin Bigha’ to Bangladesh in perpetuity, only agreed to grant a lease in perpetuity of Tin Bigha to Bangladesh despite the fact that Bangladesh agreed and handed over the sovereignty of half of South Berubari union No. 12 to India in perpetuity. The Bangladeshi draftsmen of the agreement completely ignored this due to which by handing over the sovereignty of South Berubari Union No. 12 to India, Bangladesh in exchange received nothing except a lease in perpetuity of the Tin Bigha from India.

CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS PROBLEM

In terms of ethnic composition, Bangladesh is the most homogenous of the states of South Asia. Almost 98 per cent of the population is made up of Bangalees. Nonetheless, since its independence in 1971, the country was facing considerable problems in integrating its ethnic minorities to the national mainstream. These minorities, primarily, but not exclusively. Chakmas, constitute less than 1 per cent of the total population and are concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) – a hilly, sylvan territory covering about 9 per cent of the total area of Bangladesh backed.

However, a complex webs of reasons, like, relative exposure of the tribal people to education, modernization arid political turmoil during the last years of Pakistani ruler their failure to support the Liberation War. They gradually developed a sense of being alien from the national mainstream and finally, appeared to the political arena with socio-political demands that would end their century old backwardness, thus, giving rise to an ethnic problem in the country.

Lack of mutual understanding, sensitivity to each other’s interests and moderation between the tribal people,the central government coupled with intransigence on the part of both the sides transformed an usual problem of nation building into an ethnic conflict. Since late 1970s, sporadic armed clashes with varied degree of intensity are taking place between government troops and the members of Shariti Bahini (Peace Corps) – the armed wing of the movement called Fahari Jana Sanghaty Samity (PJSS)..

That Bangladesh’s quest for finding out a solution to its ethnic-problem has heen seriously complicated by overt and covert involvement of India in the problem. Indian involvement in the ethnic turmoil in CHT has largely been clandestine while providing the Shanti Bahini insurgents with sanctuary, huge ammunitions, training and military assistanc.It was alleged that the Indian intelligent agencies wre involved. In her official pronouncements, New Delhi confessed only its ‘humanitarian” assistance to the refugees, while persistently denying any assistance rendered to the insurgent.

ROHINGA ISSUE

More serious is the issue of the Rohingyas. The Rohingyas are Muslims who inhabit the Arakan region facing Bangladesh. For their looking like Bangladeshis or ethnicity and their religion, they have been always under harassment by the predominant Burmese people of Myanmar who mainly run that country and form its elites especially among the ruling armed forces. : Myanmar has a poor human rights record for suppressing and depriving its minority communities of basic rights and privileges and as a result of these thousands of Muslim Rohingya refugees cross into Bangladesh territory to escape the atrocities committed by the military junta.

The Rohingyas have been always persecuted in their homeland for their distinctiveness. In 1991, following some incidents, the Burmese border security forces and the army drove out over 250,000 Rohingyas from Arakan and they had to be sheltered by Bangladesh since that time. After some years, talks between the two countries led to the return of a large number of the Rohingyas. But many still remain as the repatriation programme was suspended in 2007. Instead of resuming it, Myanmar authorities seem to be planning to push in afresh on a large scale the Rohingyas into Bangladesh. Press reports quoting different sources indicate that there is the possibility that the Myanmar authorities are plotting to start fresh troubles to create the ground for pushing into Bangladesh some 2 million Rohingyas. In other words, they have plans to push out their entire Rohingya population from Arakan into neighbouring Bangladesh.

Thus, Bangladesh government should be extremely wary from now on to watch these developments to be able to frustrate and defeat them. The Bangladesh-Myanmar borders could soon turn out to be a hotbed of serious troubles. For precluding such an outcome, Bangladesh needs to much increase its vigil in the Bangladesh-Myanmar borders and deploy security forces in adequate number. More important would be launching immediate wide ranging diplomatic activities to be able to prevail on Myanmar authorities to see reason and be restrained from pushing Rohingyas into Bangladesh. Among Myanmar’s neighbors, China has the greatest influence on that country. Therefore, it should be the lookout of Bangladesh to use their Chinese friends to put pressure on Myanmar to hold back from their various adventuristic designs against Bangladesh including the pushing in of the Rohingyas. In sum, Bangladesh has no choice but to be proactive in relation to Myanmar to be able to offset another large scale pouring in of Rohingya refuges from across the borders into its territories.
The numbers of Rohingyas who have remained in Bangladesh for the last two decades, have created serious problems for this country. They have to be sheltered, fed, clothed and taken care of in different ways mainly by Bangladesh notwithstanding that foreign aid or UN assistance also came for their upkeep. But the main responsibility for the looking after of the refugees from Myanmar has been one of Bangladesh and its government. For a long time and before the repatriation of these refugees started, Bangladesh authorities were found too stressed in caring for these uprooted people. Another big wave of Rohingyas coming from across the borders would mean resurrection of huge problems which seemed about to end.
Media reports from various sources indicate that a mass forced migration of the Rohingyas into Bangladesh would be imminent. Already, some thousands of Rohingyas have crossed over into Bangladesh territories during the last couple of weeks. From what they had to say, the authorities here could form an impression that the Myanmar military and para military are once again letting loose a rein of terror on these helpless people so that they get frightened and tortured enough into fleeing their homes leaving their everything behind. So, it is more than high time for Bangladesh government, to wake up from its slumber or to shake off its low key response and to counteract the growing problem while it remains controllable or reasonable. Any delay in this matter could mean a situation where it would have to face up to a sudden flood of refugees which would be much more difficult to control or even try such a thing in view of its purely humanitarian aspects.
Bangladesh government needs to contact Myanmar authorities at the highest level and persuade them to call off the terrorizing of the Rohingyas immediately. Only from an easing of conditions for them–locally– the Rohingyas are likely to get back their confidence and the motivation to stay in their home country. The most effective way to deter this push in of Rohingyas in great number would be contacting countries such as China which have most leverage on Myanmar and the UN with the aim of using their influence to stop the repression of the Rohingya population.

DEFENSE ISSUE

To save sovereignty strong defense is the most important thing. Bangladesh Rifles, newly named Border Guard of Bangladesh and Border Security Force/BSF of India. The role of Former BDR is praise worthy, but BSF killed thousands of Bangladeshi without any reason, they attacked BDR also.

BORDER TRADE

Currently India is the 2nd largest trading partner of Bangladesh, and India’s position is at the top for Bangladesh’s imports trade.Though bilateral trade between the countries has increased after the 1990s, the balance of trade is significantly in favour of India. However, Bangladesh has always been trade deficit with India, and recently it has increased exponentially. Limited export base, backward industries, inadequate infrastructure,lower productivity in Bangladesh, appreciation of Bangladesh’s Taka against Indian Rupee, earlier and faster trade liberalization program in Bangladesh compared to India, tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) imposed by the Indian government, huge illegal trade, diversified exports and technologically advanced

Industrial base of India are identified as the main reasons of this huge trade imbalance. [11]

Structural and policy measures such as sound physical, social and economic infrastructure, superior product quality, export diversification, sufficient institutional facilities for banking, credit and insurance, improved law and order situation, labor unrest free environment, an honest and efficient administration, continuous political stability, huge domestic and foreign investments, joint ventures in Bangladesh with buy back arrangements, competitive devaluation of the Bangladesh currency against the Indian currency, removal of illegal trade, tariff and NTBs- free entry of Bangladesh’s exports to Indian market are suggested to improve this trade deficit. Also cordial and productive cooperation between these two nations is crucial to materialize these. Therefore, an analysis of current trade status between the two nations, obstacles and opportunities for mutual trade expansion is very critical for economic development of both countries, especially of Bangladesh, as Bangladesh has been suffering from historical trade deficit with India since its independence. The trade deficit has been increasing exponentially since the recent past. Official data show that compared to 1983, trade deficit in 2003 is more than 46 times higher1 (IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics). This growing deficit is a cause of serious concern for Bangladesh and has important economic and political implications.

Problems Causing Indo-Bangladesh Trade Imbalance

Although the trade deficit with a particular country is not bad if the over all trade balances satisfactory, yet from the distribution aspect of trade policies (the distribution of Benefits and cots among groups of producers and groups of consumers) the growing trade

Deficit with India is a great concern for Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s fear is that if this Deficit continues, Bangladesh will be dependent only on a few products for its exports, And imports from India displace domestic production to such an extent as to deindustrializeBangladesh. As a result, it is argued, a severe polarization in Bangladesh and High levels of unemployment will occur. Therefore, increasing trade deficit with India is A problem and attempts are made here to find out the causes of this problem.

Bilateral Exchange Rate

Bilateral exchange rates between Bangladesh and India during 1986 to 1999 have been Presented in Table 13 in order to explore the dynamics underlying this expansion of trade Imbalance between these two countries. Available data exhibit that the nominal and real Values of the Bangladesh’s Taka vis-à-vis the Indian Rupee have been appreciating, with Negligible exceptions, over the years. This appreciation of Taka has a significant positive Effect on the increased trade deficit of Bangladesh with India. It is evident from the table that the nominal exchange rate, Taka per Rupee, had been Continuously declining right from 1986 to 1996. In 1997, though it increased slightly, it Started to decline again from 1998. This declining trend of the exchange rate implies that Taka had been appreciating. In nominal term, the exchange rate decreased to 1.140 in 1999 from 2.411 in 1986 indicating a 52.71 percent appreciation of Bangladesh’s Taka Against Indian Rupee during 13 years of time.

Joint Ventures

The trade imbalance can greatly and effectively be reduced by cordial and productive Mutual cooperation. There are still many opportunities that could be exploited for the Greater benefit of both countries and thus reducing the trade deficit of Bangladesh with India. For example, Bangladesh can obtain financial benefits by the greater economic Integration with Indian North-Eastern States (NES), which are geographically situated in A disadvantageous location from the main land.* Dash, K.C. 1996. ‘ The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 69, No.2.

Illegal Border Trade

Being near the notorious ‘golden triangle’–a heaven for illegal drug dealings.Moreover huge amount of Illegal arms dealing, human trafficking, illegal trade of medicine, daily accessories, garments, chemicals, jute, disel, fertilizer, **** Indian books,cds and DVDs, etc. The cattle-smugglers of West Bengal, their knowledge of the border areas, the gaps and the vulnerable areas through which infiltration could happen, their contacts with cattle traders and truckers in the hinterland of India and their contacts with cattle merchants in Bangladesh, all of this combines to form a massive cross-country network.Governments lost huge amount of revenues every year . Bangladesh faces an imminent danger and this cannot be tackled without full cooperation, which is unlikely to be forthcoming, from Myanmar and India.

MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE WITH INDIA, MYANMAR

Maritime boundaries and Talpatty (New Moore) Island

Being surrounded by India and Myanmar, Bangladesh can hardly overemphasize the need to demarcate its maritime boundary on just and equitable basis to assert her sovereignty over its resource rich EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) and beyond through which almost 90% of its external trade is conducted. Failure in delineating maritime border may cause Bangladesh to be reduced to a mere landlocked country and lose its strategic significance and relevance in South Asian context.

Maritime boundary negotiations commenced in 1974 but have stalled because of differing perceptions on the applicability of the principles of international law in delimiting the maritime boundary. According to international practice, territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles into sea. Thereafter, water areas with a depth of 70 fathoms are considered as the continental shelf, after which an EEZ of 200 nautical miles is measured. Nations therefore pay particular attention to the drawing up of a baseline for finalizing maritime boundaries, as it has important effect on the total area of the EEZ.
The continental shelf of Bangladesh is enlarging because of an annual deposit of around 2.2 billion tons of sediment deposited into the sea by its river systems. This not only gives hope for land reclamation but also for exploiting seabed resources of hydrocarbon and mineral deposits.

Talpatty/New Moore Island :is 2 square kilometers of uninhabited offshore island at the mouth of a river flowing between an Indian and a Bangladesh district,12 which is visible only during low water. It emerged in 1970 as a result of a tectonic upheaval of the seabed. There is considerable fishing activity in the area. The island assumes significance because possession of the island provides the potential for offshore exploration of oil. Bangladesh belatedly laid claim to it in 1979. In 1981, a tense situation was calmed through diplomacy and by vacating the island, but resolution of the dispute and delineation of the maritime boundaries are priorities.

A country is supposed to enjoy its rights to fishing and extracting and exploring other marine resources in its 12–24 nautical mile territorial sea from the coastline, 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and 350 nautical mile continental shelf from the baseline.
According to the Law of the Sea, 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic Zone and 350 nautical miles of the continental shelf under the Bay of Bengal is bangladesh’s maritime boundary.

Bangladesh has problems with India and Myanmar on the issue of ‘starting point’ on how to mark the coastline to draw its marine boundary, with apparently overlapping claims of the three neighbouring countries because of the funnel-like coastline of the Bay.

Bangladesh has been preparing its grounds for justifying its claim over the un-delineated maritime boundary, into which neighboring India and Myanmar have reportedly encroached and started initial preparations for hydrocarbon exploration, according to officials at the foreign ministry.

Despite India and Myanmar’s encroachment into Bangladesh’s territorial waters, Dhaka has opted for going for the third round bidding for hydrocarbon exploration in deep water in its claimed 200 nautical miles of territorial water in the Bay of Bengal.

We will go for making new blocks throughout our 200 nautical miles of sea and float international tenders,the energy advisor, Mahmudur Rahman, told INS. He said he had information that India and Myanmar have encroached into 19,000 square kilometers and 18,000 square kilometers into Bangladesh’s maritime territories and floated international tenders for hydrocarbon exploration.

In 2009, Bangladesh registered its objections with the United Nations regarding the claims of India and Myanmar to its territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal.Both the countries want to extract natural resources from the disputed marine territory, with natural prolongation into the continental shelf and the baseline.

The cases have been referred to the international tribunal as ‘fall-back positions’ as a safeguard if no satisfactory results would come out of bilateral negotiations, she said.

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an independent judicial body set up by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the convention.

The government, Dipu Moni said, is scheduled to submit a memorandum to the UN body claiming its legitimate authority over its territorial waters adjacent to Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal by July 1. Myanmar is scheduled to submit its memorandum by December 1.
Bangladesh, she said, is scheduled to submit a memorandum to the UN body claiming its legitimate authority over its territorial waters adjacent to India in the Bay of Bengal by May 31, 2011. India is scheduled to submit its memorandum by May 31, 2012.
The prime ministers of Bangladesh and India, during the visit of the Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, to New Delhi in January, agreed on the need for an amicable demarcation of the maritime boundary between the two countries.
Bangladesh negotiators on maritime boundary held meetings with their counterparts in India and Myanmar early this year .‘But we are yet to get any indication from India and Myanmar regarding meetings in Dhaka,’ the official said.
Experts, however, believe an amicable demarcation of the boundary between the two countries will require ‘strong political commitment at the highest level and its translation into reality through bureaucracy.’
‘The ball is in Delhi’s (and Yangon’s) court. It is not in our court now,’ Professor Imtiaz Ahmed of Dhaka University told New Age on Sunday evening.‘Unfortunately, the problem with Delhi is that its political commitment is not usually delivered to the bureaucracy properly. Another problem with them is that they make the process (of bilateral negotiations) slower,’ Imtiaz, a teacher of international relations, said.
Under the UN provision, no claims submitted by a country will be taken for final consideration before settling the objection raised by a neighbouring country, which might have overlapping claims.

The delay in establishing Bangladesh’s claim to its maritime territory has prompted the other neighbors to encroach, observed another source. The country is now lacking the necessary data even to protest if any of the neighbors make any undue claim, although the government had announced earlier determination of the maritime boundary baseline as per the UN convention, completion of the physical survey, and purchase or charter of necessary equipment for the survey, which is a priority project of the prime minister, with a deadline in June this year.

The move Remain:

Bangladesh should fully concentrate on arbitration, having lost two other options. It would take the issue to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal Dealing in Demarcation of Sea Boundaries.

But India blocked Bangladesh’s access to either ICJ or the other tribunal, by lodging its protest before Bangladesh could take recourse to such an action.Arbitration is, therefore, the lone option left for Bangladesh. Bangladesh should, in no way, neglect its preparations to place its side of the case before the UN Arbitration Tribunal.

CONCLUSION

Bangladesh is a poor country. Its poor due to its lack of knowledge of its resources, lack of appropriate and aggressive national policy on protection of its natural rights, political instability and brainless leader.

Bangladesh and Indai are hugging neighbours. Bangladesh wont get its water right by begging to India, it must follow the rules of arbitration. For the proper share of its sea border she must go to UN court of arbitration. To reduce deficit border trade she must look forward to china and other east asian countries. She must make bond with muslim countries of middle east to keep pressure on India on United Nation and for legal support it must strengthen its relation with China,Japan and Russia. Bangladesh should take the Asian Highway Rout AH-41,instead of AH-1/AH-2 to get connected with all the east asian contries.

REFEERENCES

1. Holiday, Friday,28 March,2009,p1

2. McCaffrey, S.C., “Water, Politics, and International Law”, in Water in

 

[Indian_gorkha]

Bangladesh is a small country with a great geopolitical importance, situated at the conjunction of South Asia and South East Asia which is regarded by political scientist D.C. Barman as “highly sensitive” considering its geographical, economic and political importance in the region. The unique geopolitical significance of Bangladesh results from myriad interwoven strands, each representing facets of this nation’s complex historical evolution which, in turn, are crucially influenced by specific features of its geographical location. Bangladesh has problem on some geopolitical issues regarding her border, rivers, maritime border, border trade, Asian high way etc. Here the points are discussed briefly.

GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES AND NEIGHBOURHOOD

Geo politics is the art and practice of using political power over a given territory. term coined by Rudolf Kjellén,Swedish political scientist, at the beginning of the 20th century.Our foreign policy advocates for friendship to all and malice to none, which also dictates our strategic and security outlook. So, one should not be surprised that Bangladesh is very reluctant to view her neighbors as a source of security threats despite the fact that she is having some bilateral issues with her neighbors, particularly India, and Myanmar due to their aggressive policy, in the shape of land/maritime border demarcation, illegal migration, refugee influx, illegal drugs and small arms trade, and human trafficking.

There are several conflicting geopolitical issues between Bangladesh and its neighbourhood_India and Myanmar.

WATER SHARING

Of all the resources that people depend on, only air is more directly vital to sustaining human life than water. Deprive a person of air, and he dies in minutes. Deprive him of water, and he dies in days. Deprive him of food, and he can go on for weeks or months, depending on his physical condition at the beginning of the fast and on whether he has adequate supplies of water.

Bangladesh is called the mother of rivers, as it has 710 big and small rivers according govt. statistics. The rivers of banglaesh can be devied into four river systems-

1. Brahmmaputra-Jamuna,

2. Ganga-Padma,

3. Surma-Meghna and

4. Rivers of Chittagong.

The length of Bangladesh’s rivers is 24,140. The waters of fifty-six rivers from the Ganges and the Brahmaputra river systems flow from India to Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is getting drier every year due to India’s unilateral withdrawal of water from the common river Ganges flowing upstream from India. The quantity of water down the Farakka point has been critically declining due to taking out of the Ganges water by upper riparian India through various canals by violating the water sharing agreement. [1]

GANGES & BRAHMPUTRA

The Ganges and Brahmaputra river basin in South Asia is the largest in the region, encompassing over 1.6 million km2. Flowing from the Himalayans in Nepal and Tibet, both rivers course through India, and ultimately join in Bangladesh where they discharge into the Bay of Bengal. Before the Ganges enters Bangladesh, it divides off a smaller river, the Bhagirathi- Hooghly that flows through the port of Calcutta. Four-fifths of Bangladesh, an area smaller than New YorkState, is straddled by this delta system. Approximately half of the countryþs GDP is based on agriculture, and hence this riversþ irrigation value is vital to the countryþs economy and its over 120 million inhabitants. [2]

The topography of Bangladesh (i.e. its sea level elevation and delta wetlands) and its geographical location make it extremely vulnerable to natural disasters.

The major dispute between Bangladesh and India is on the sharing of the Ganges water during lean period.

Duration: 1951 to Now

The origin of the conflict dates back to 1951 when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan.

India began plans for the construction of a mile-long “barrage” (a river flow obstruction) at Farakka, 18 kms from the Bangladeshi border, to increase the diversion of Ganges water to the Bhagirathi-HooghlyRiver to flush silt and keep Calcutta harbor operational during the dry season. It was thought that by increasing the river flow, the harbor could be kept from deteriorating from silt deposition. However, Pakistan protested on the grounds that this action would wreak havoc on the environment. Nevertheless, India continued, and began construction in 1962. With no other course of action, Pakistan (and then later Bangladesh) took the matter before the United Nations General Assembly in 1968 and discussions continued in that forum until 1976. The international attention to the issue caused India to at least concede that the Ganges was an international river, and that þeach riparian State was entitled to a reasonable and equitable share of the waters of an international river.þ [3]

In 1971, Bangladesh became an independent nation, with India aiding it in its independence struggle against Pakistan. It was expected that better relations between India and Bangladesh would result, but India persisted with its Farakka plans, and this led to a general souring of the relationship. In 1972, an Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission was established to study the river flow and develop the river water on a cooperative basis. However, work on the Farakka barrage continued, and it was finally completed in 1975. A short-term agreement was subsequently signed by India and Bangladesh to conduct a 40 day trial test of the barrage during the dry season.

Unfortunately, four months later, the President of Bangladesh was assassinated by elements of the military that found him too cooperative with India. The next dry season, India began to divert water at Farakka unilaterally, and continued to do so until 1977 when a treaty on þSharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka and on Augmenting its Flowsþ was signed by the two countries and guaranteed a minimum flow level for Bangladesh for a five year period. After the expiration of this treaty in 1982, two more short-term agreements were concluded on water sharing until 1988. Thereafter, India began unilateral diversions at will. Moreover, domestic political upheavals, and the growing polarization caused by rising national religious factions (Hindu India vs. Islamic Bangladesh), contributed to a rising level of animosity between the two nations.

The political climate began to change when in 1992, the prime ministers of the two countries met and agreed to renew efforts for a solution. In addition, Bangladesh revived its attempts to internationalize the affair by bringing forth the dispute before the UN General Assembly and the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting in 1993. In addition, the issue was raised in the South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), although no definite action was taken. SAARC comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, and its main goal is to “accelerate the process of economic and social development in member states, through joint action in the agreed areas of cooperation.”[4]

In 1996, a new atmosphere of regional cooperation was created with a change of government in India, and in December of 1996, a Ganges Water Sharing Treaty was signed that is supposed to last for thirty years. The Treaty addresses the heart of the conflict: water allocation during the five months of the dry season (January-May). During the rest of the year, there is sufficient water that India can operate the Farakka diversion without creating problems for Bangladesh. However, increasing upstream withdrawal in Northern India has further lowered the dry-season flow at Farakka, further complicating matters. Hence, the Treaty stipulates that below a certain flow rate, India and Bangladesh will each share half of the water. Above a certain limit, Bangladesh will be guaranteed a certain minimum level, and if the water flow exceeds a given limit, India will withdraw a given amount, and the balance will be received by Bangladesh (which will be more than 50%). [5]

Despite the Treaty, there are still factions in Bangladesh that feel that India should not be drawing off any water at Farakka, as well as elements in India that donþt want Bangladesh to receive any water. Annually, the Ganges brings to its mouth over 2 million tons of silt. Due to increasing deforestation in the foothills of the Himalayans, the amount of erosion is growing. With such levels of silt, it is increasingly no longer possible for the Hooghly to retain a flushing role for CalcuttaHarbor, and it is time for India to realize this and terminate Ganges water withdrawal and concentrate on port development further downstream.

In addition, due to silt deposition and flooding patterns, the Ganges is actually naturally shifting eastward, and it is only a question of time before the HooghlyRiver will no longer be capable of supporting deep harbor operations. India should except this fact and plan for a harbor much closer to the Bay of Bengal, else it should consider regular and more intensive dredging operations. [6]

TIPAIMUKH DAM

India’s proposed Tipaimukh Dam will be a disaster for the Environment of Bangladesh. Though India has claimed that it will not hamper Bangladesh, but the Farakka Dam is an example for everyone in Bangladesh how it made the disaster. The Indians are going ahead with the construction of the massive Tipaimukh barrage-this events collectively impinge on us in more than one ways but the one which directly affects our very ability to survive is the issue of water-sharing of some 53 common rivers between India and Bangladesh. By constructing Tipaimukh and other barrages, India is depriving us of life-giving waters, drastically reducing our ability to survive and therefore this is the issue needing immediate and continued public attention and the subject of this commentary. India has resumed construction of the Tipaimukh barrage on the Barack river just a kilometer north of Jakigonj in Sylhet; the construction work was stalled in March 2007 in the face of protests within and outside India. The barrage when completed in 2012 is supposed to provide 1500 megawatts of hydel power to the Indian state of Assam but in return its going to bring about a major disaster for Bangladesh, practically contributing to drying up of 350 km long Surma and 110 km long Kushiara rivers which water most of the north-eastern regions of Bangladesh. The Tipaimukh barrage is going to seriously affect not only agriculture in large portions of Bangladesh, particularly in winter, but is also going to bring about negative ecological, climatic and environmental changes of vast areas in both Bangladesh and India. [7]

IndiaRiver Linking Project:
India’s River Diversion Plan: Its impact on Bangladesh .Indian plans to divert vast quantities of water from major rivers, including the Ganges and Brahmaputra, threaten the livelihoods of more than 100 million people downstream in Bangladesh, the Bangladeshi government fears. Ministers are so concerned that they are considering appealing to the United Nations to redraft international law on water sharing, said a report of the leading British daily The Guardian. A recent report by correspondent John Vidal from Dhaka said: The ambitious Indian plans to link major rivers flowing from the Himalayas and divert them south to drought-prone areas are still on the drawing board, but Bangladeshi government scientists estimated that even a 10% to 20% reduction in the water flow to the country could dry out great areas for much of the year.

More than 80% of Bangladesh’s 20 million small farmers grow rice and depend on water that has flowed through India. “The idea of linking these rivers is very dangerous.It could affect the whole of Bangladesh and be disastrous,” said Hafiz (uddin) Ahmad, the water resources minister. “The north of Bangladesh is already drying out after the Ganges was dammed by India in 1976. Now India is planning to do the same on [many of] the 53 other rivers that enter the country via India. Bangladesh depends completely on water.”
The minister was quoted as saying that the government had protested to India but had so far not had any response. “Without this water we cannot survive,” he said. “If [rice] production falls then we would not know how to survive. We want no kind of war, but international law on sharing water is unsure and we would request the UN to frame a new law. It would be a last resort.” “Great parts are turning into a desert, rivers have lost their navigability, salt water is intruding into farming areas. You can walk across the river Gori at some times of the year,” said the minister. [8]

ASIAN HIGHWAY

Govt decides to get connected as per original UN-Escap plan [9]

AHN, a proposed network of 1,41,000km of standard roadways crisscrossing Asian countries and linking them with Europe, was conceived in 1959 with an aim to promote development of international road transport in the continent. The Asian Highway, also known as the Great Asian Highway, is a cooperative project among countries in Asia and Europe and the UN-Escap for improving the highway systems in Asia.

It is one of the three pillars of Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID) project endorsed by the Escap commission at its 48th session in 1992. The ALTID is comprised of Asian Highway, Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) and facilitation of land transport projects.

Agreements have so far been signed by 32 countries to allow the highway to cross the continent and reach Europe. A significant part of the funding comes from the larger more advanced nations as well as international agencies such as the Asian Development Bank. The project is scheduled for completion in 2010.

At least 15 countries, including Pakistan became founding members by signing the agreement when the idea was conceived in 1959. In 1971, Bangladesh automatically became a founding member but its status was later lowered to observer after it missed the

Abandoning the country’s previously proposed routes, the government decided to connect Bangladesh to the Asian Highway Network (AHN) accepting routes proposed by India & the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN-Escap).

“We decided to connect Bangladesh to the Asian Highway Network for the welfare of the country,” Communications Minister Syed Abul Hossain told reporters after a meeting at Bangladesh Secretariat.

. It is strange that according to the ESCAP-crafted laws Bangladesh cannot even propose any amendment to the AH routes now without signing the agreement first! And not signing will mean that Bangladesh will be left out and the AH will bypass Bangladesh leaving it isolated and causing it to lose in the process the opportunities of trade, investment and service revenues. It is not clear where the AH can go in its westward advance if it bypasses Bangladesh.

This assertion has been made despite the knowledge that the cost-benefit of the proposed routes does not favour Bangladesh at all. Indeed Bangladesh will not be benefited from the currently proposed routes for the AH is quite clear. One question is whether this route would then serve merely as a transit corridor for India to carry its cargo of men and materials from its one part to another through Bangladesh.

Bypassing Bangladesh through the Indian “chicken neck” is also improbable. Bangladesh has a bargaining chip here if the member countries of ESCAP are serious about running the AH from east and southeast Asia to the Sub-continent and beyond. India has been asking for an easy passage through Bangladesh.

Cox’s Bazar-Myanmar route

The point here is that AH must serve the country’s best interests – and to ensure that an AH passing through Chittagong – Cox’s Bazar – Myanmar and beyond is the way. Since its inception in 1959 the perception has always been that the AH will pass through Cox’s Bazar – Myanmar and onward east and west. Both AH 1 and AH 2 enter Bangladesh from India through Benapole, Jessore, Banglabandha and Dinajpur, respectively. Both converge on Dhaka and move on to Tamabil, Sylhet. Neither of them fulfil the ESCAP-laid principles that the AH connects the ports, container depots and business centres of participating countries.

There is no indication how the Nepalese and Bhutanese traffic will move westward along AH if the current route alignments stick. Will they move back westward through Benapole? The AH 2 also allows an easy access of North Indian traffic into Bangladesh and then on to Eastern India. Even then it remains no more than a sub-regional route.

By merging with both AH 1 at Jessore and AH 2 via Hatikamrul, AH 41 travels to Dhaka and then separates out to move to Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf to stop there. There is no indication that this route will move into Myanmar and beyond. The AH 2 also allows an easy access of North Indian traffic into Bangladesh and then on to Eastern India. Even then it remains no more than a sub-regional route.

The route has been designated as a sub-regional route though it traverses Bangladesh territory only. India, Nepal and Bhutan are potential users. No other country will use this route. Thus Indian desire to use Bangladesh ports becomes easier to fulfil. Conceived fifty years ago, the Asian Highway’s 141,000 km route charted out by ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) is hitherto an unfulfilled dream. Peoples from Turkey to Indonesia with Bangladesh and other countries in-between are yet to see AH’s construction materialize. The dream of seeing loaded containers and international passenger buses rolling down this route from Shanghai or Singapore, or from Dhaka for that matter, to Istanbul and beyond, may not be fulfilled.
Some progress regarding the AH has been achieved in recent years in defining the road links on the basis of an agreement among some of the member countries of ESCAP.

Wrong track

The AH was one of the two major regional projects initiated by then ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Fareast), the other was the Mekong River project. The Trans-Asian Railway project was added to the list later. It may be mentioned here that the Asian Development Bank was also set up under the auspices of ECAFE with the primary focus on providing the financial underpinning to the regional projects like these. The projects however remained stalled due the Indochina war and the path of isolation chosen by Burma’s military government since 1962. ESCAP (ECAFE’s new name since 1974) revived the projects in the 1980-1990s. The Mekong River project has been successfully implemented to the satisfaction of the riparian countries with financial assistance of bilateral and multilateral donors. By now the AH has advanced a stage; but in this advance Bangladesh has fallen in the wrong track.

Now let us have a detailed look at the designated three routes through Bangladesh.

Both AH 1 and AH 2 enter Bangladesh from India through Benapole, Jessore, Banglabandha and Dinajpur, respectively. Both converge on Dhaka and move on to Tamabil, Sylhet. Neither of them fulfil the ESCAP-laid principles that the AH connects the ports, container depots and business centres of participating countries. The justification for a second entry into Bangladesh through Dinajpur has been to give access to Bhutan and Nepal to AH. However to fulfil the ESCAP-laid requirement that the route originating in any country must connect the capital city of the next country of entry, then Nepal and Bhutan should travel to Delhi and then move on to Bangladesh through the Benapole-border.

Furthermore, there is no indication how the Nepalese and Bhutanese traffic will move westward along AH if the current route alignments stick. Will they move back westward through Benapole? Is that a viable option for them? If the purpose of AH 2 is to give access to Nepal and Bhutan only then this route is the best candidate for becoming a sub-regional route rather than a part of the arterial AH. The AH 2 however also allows an easy access of North Indian traffic into Bangladesh and then on to Eastern India. Even then it remains no more than a sub-regional route.

The third route through Bangladesh (AH 41) is shown to originate at Mongla port and moves on to Jessore to meet AH 1 just after the Benapole border crossing and then moves on to Hatikamrul in Kushia to meet AH 2. By merging with both AH 1 at Jessore and AH 2 via Hatikamrul, AH 41 travels to Dhaka and then separates out to move to Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf to stop there. India, Nepal and Bhutan are likely users. No other country will use this route. Thus Indian desire to use Bangladesh ports becomes easier to fulfil.

The two main arterials of the AH thus enter Bangladesh from India in the west and converges on to Tamabil in Sylhet before crossing into the Indian state of Meghalaya on to Assam, Monipur and Nagaland. It can go further to Myanmar, Southeast Asia and China, and can serve as a sub-regional network in that area though its suitability as a continent-wide Asian Highway remains in doubt. Dr.. Rahmatullah has made it abundantly clear that the route through Tamabil is unsuitable for the AH. In addition to the 1200km extra distance, he says, “the route passes through a mountainous region through four Indian states through which vehicles can move only slowly as the gradients are steep. Trucks with heavy load will have difficulties in moving, fuel consumption will be huge, making travel costly”.

Tamabil is not suitable for India, Myanmar or Bangladesh or for any country between south and southeast Asia”. It is not clear why India will not be benefited since it can easily move its cargo of men and materials through Bangladesh to eastern India, a long held aim of India. It can also move to Southeast Asia from its eastern states if it chooses and finds profitable. [10]

TRANSIT

Why Bangladesh would not mull over transit offer by India?

Is there any room for trust and faith thats firmly required between the two countries? No, certainly not. Rather, this faithlessness and lack of confidence is created by India only because of their big brotherly attitude from India.

India articulates transit as an economic issue. Ok thats good. But, where is the certainty of economic benefit in the in returns for transit? Is there any assurance that we would not have to sit for a bargaining meeting to get a hold of money promised by India? Bangladesh is being experienced this sort of legacy from India. India is, time and again, infringing the treaties with Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujib has ratified the constitution as soon as he came back to the country from India following handing over the Berubari under Mujib-Indira boarder treaty. But, India has reneged on its promises to ratify the constitution of their own. Is Bangladesh being paid water in accordance with treaty? Answer is certainly not. Attention from India to minimize the incredible US$ 2 billion dollar trade deficit is being noticed at all?Not yet today.
India is not making any venture to remove tariff barrier on commodities, is not ensuring the entrance of tariff free commodity, rather twisting unnecessary boarder problem by fencing instead of resolving 6.5km unsettled boarder. They keep themselves implicated in captivating the possession of newly surfaced islands instead of solving the problem South Talpotri.
700 Bangladeshi have been killed notoriously by the BSF throughout 2000-2007 according to Human Rights Organization Report. Crime like abduction has been daily event. No country in the world, in the wake of numerous problems, would not offer transit, accordingly, why Bangladesh? A lot of things including sovereignty of Bangladesh must be taken into account prior to offering transit.

How much Bangladesh is all set relating to roads with 4 lens? And how much grounding it has for repairing the roads and also for long time security? Why Bangladesh would have to bear the risk of AIDS spread by Indian truck drivers? The most important thing is to be taken into account that the Bangladesh would have nothing to do against India having been a regional power with atomic weapons if it dispatches conventional arms and military weapons to north-eastern provinces through Bangladesh. Thus, Bangladesh would become an everlasting enemy and be targeted by separatist group of north-eastern provinces if transit is given.
The separatist group may launch attack inside Bangladesh. Consequently, security measures would be impeded and a turbulence situation would be come into view. Patriotic BDRs and boarder-side farmers who have given their blood and sacrifice themselves to protect the country , the children who became orphan, the widow who lost her husband- these all will sacrifice themselves, but will not leave a bit room for transit.
The concept of transit, transshipment and corridor?

Transit refers to the passage across another countrys territory using its own surface transport, while transshipment refers to the same movement using the transport of transiting countries. (Bangladesh Foreign Policy, 322, Harun ur Rashid). For example- if India using its own transport dispatches commodities through Bangladesh to North-Eastern provinces, we may call it transit system. But, if India dispatches commodities using Bangladeshi transport through Bangladeshi land, we may call it transshipment system. Commodities from India after 1947 were to be transported to North-Eastern part of India across eastern Pakistan. It continued till 1960. In 1960 the relation between India and Pakistan turned into most horrible and India banned the flight transportation over India, therefore, Pakistan blocked transit facilities across the eastern Pakistan.

Transit, security and sovereignty

It appears to have been divided the territory of Bangladesh into two sides because of transit route if you observe in the view of security. This is being said that Indian commodity would be dispatched in the form of sealed, Bangladesh would have no control over the sealed thing. India seems to have been created a ground for dispatching military weapons to north-eastern provinces in the name of transit system across Bangladesh if necessary. To this end, Indian forces may get down in soul of Bangladesh, that means through transit or corridor a crocodile is to be invited digging a cannel by Bangladesh.
The relation between India and China is much more related with transit across Bangladesh. As of today, boarder dispute between India and China yet to be solved and apprehensions of war between the two countries having atomic weapons should not be denied. So, in that prospective war India would bring her troops to north-eastern provinces through Bangladesh as it is happened during Second World War in the fate of Belgium. If India-China war is took place, India will conquer Bangladesh by virtue of transit or corridor as Hitler conquered Belgium. (Talukdar Moniruzzaman, transit: khal kete kumir anar porikolpona).

Half of the total military of India has been deployed in the seven sisters region to tackle the unrest there. As India is required more troops there, it cannot be brought to a standstill if it utilizes the transit facility for the purpose of sending troops and military ingredients. It might be presumed that if a war between India and Nepal is happened, the Shiliguri corridor would be closed and in that case Indian troops would have no other way but to march forward by transit route across Bangladesh. In that hasty moment a great military power like India could be defied.

In 1996 the ULFA leader Poresh Borua has made it clear and said “Bangladesh will be targeted and get attacked if it assists India that goes against our Liberation movement.” so, transit and sovereignty cannot be departed.

What would we get in returns for transit?

Answers of some questions must be come across first if we are to offer transit to India. What would Bangladesh get a hold in exchange of transit? Would Bangladesh get transit through India to dispatch commodities to Nepal? Through India towards China? And transshipment through India to Pakistan? Would Bangladesh have a facility to bring in electricity from Nepal over India? Would Bangladesh have a passage in dispatching cargos?

Nehru Doctrine, Transit and South Asia

Demand for transit or corridor across the territory of Bangladesh and ascertaining of unilateral supremacy of India throughout the South Asia all these are integrally connected and based on Nehru doctrine. Nehru used to dream India to be in the same queue with USA, USSR and China, in the power politics. At the same time, India would be in a state of determinant and chief controller of South Asia is the main theme of Nehru Doctrine. The theory is functioning behind making the South Asian countries dependent on India and ascertaining supremacy of India in this region is the Nehru Doctrine. The comment of Bhobani Sen Gupta in this context is worth mentioning it is as follows- “India will not tolerate an external intervention in a conflict situation in any South Asian country, if the intervention has any implicit or explicit anti Indian implication. No South Asian government must therefore ask for external military assistance with an anti Indian-bias from any country. It a South Asian country genuinely needs to deal with a serious internal conflict situation, it should ask half from neighboring countries including India. The exclusion of India from such a contingency with is considered to be an anti-Indian move on the part of government concerned.

If this is be the latent dream and state character of India, how much it will be the horrifying, awful, dire, calamitous and grim that is comprehensible to all. [11]

BORDER ISSUES

The India-Bangladesh border is unique for several reasons. One such unique characteristic is the close proximity of Indian and Bangladeshi border villages. In the border villages there are houses where the front door is in India and rear opens on the Bangladeshi side. Such instances are the norm and not an exception

In 1947 the Radcliffe Award delineated the boundaries between India and East Pakistan. In 1974, following independence, a comprehensive new boundary agreement, the Indo-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement, was signed by the prime ministers of Bangladesh and India, but it has yet to be ratified.

The 1974 Indo-Bangladesh Agreement. The 4,351-kilometer boundary between India and Bangladesh, of which 180 kilometers runs along river lines, has yet to be fully delineated. A dispute over a 6.5-kilometer stretch of floodplain shared with the Indian state of Tripura has yet to be resolved. Ratification of the boundary agreement has been delayed due to the existence of 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladesh enclaves in India, complicating the process of delineating the boundary line. These enclaves, which were not taken into account by the Radcliffe Award, came into being when the previous rulers of the princely states of Cooch Behar (which merged with India) and Rongpur (which merged with East Pakistan) gambled away portions of their lands to each other. The problem is further complicated by shifting river courses. The locals mistakenly think that the boundary runs in the mid-channel of a river irrespective of subsequent changes in the river course. As a result, border people of either side take possession of land that has fallen on their side as a result of a change in the river course. Heated disputes and exchanges of fire from the border outposts have occurred. A recent conflict between border forces in April 2001 at Pyridwah and Boraibari raised tensions but was handled with restraint by both governments.

Chitmahal is the enclaves between India and Bangladesh border in the Indian state of West Bengal. India has about 92 exclaves of Bangladesh, and 106 exclaves of India are within Bangladeshi soil. The enclaves were part of the high stake card or chess games centuries ago between two regional kings, the Raja of Cooch Behar and the Nawab of Rangpu,] The little territories were the result of a confused outcome of a treaty between the Kingdom of Koch Bihar and the Mughal Empire.

After the partition of India in 1947, Cooch Behar district was merged with India and Rangpur went to then East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in 1971. In 1974, both countries agreed to exchange the enclaves or at least provide easy access to the enclaves, but since then little has materialised. Talks between the two countries on the issue resumed in 2001, but the lack of a concrete time frame has relegated the issue to the back burner.

The residents of the enclaves live in abysmal conditions, with a lack of water, roads, electricity, schools and medicines. Crime also is rampant, as complaining would mean crossing the international boundary due to the lack of law enforcement resources. Residents of the enclaves may only go to their respective countries on the production of an identity card, after seeking permission from the border guards, causing much resentment.

Bangladesh exclaves

Available sources indicate that along the northwestern boundary there are at least 192 enclaves, the political status and exchange protocol of which are yet to be settled. Of the total, 119 enclaves inside India are claimed by Bangladesh while 73 enclaves inside Bangladesh are claimed by India. An account of 75 enclaves in northwestern Bangladesh which are inside India and identified as parts of Bangladesh suggest that 41 of them are in lalmonirhat (2 in hatibandha upazila, 1 in Lalmonirhat Sadar, 4 in kaliganj, 3 in aditmari, 28 in patgram, and 3 in phulbari), 16 in kurigram district (all in bhurungamari upazila) and 18 in panchagarh district (2 in Panchagarh Sadar upazila, 12 in boda and 4 in debiganj

1.Dohogram–Angorpotha (Teen Bigha Corridor)

A Bangladeshi exclave administrated Pathgram upzila in Lalmonirhat zila lies within the Indian province of West Bengal. The exclave has an area of 25 km2 (10 sq mi) with a resident population of 20,000 people. The exclave lacks all facilities. The lone health complex remains virtually useless for lack of power supply as India refused to link the exclave with mainland Bangladesh with power supply lines.

The Tin Bigha Corridor, “no larger than a football field,” is the name of a strip of land measuring 178 mtrs x 85 mtrs in the district of Cooch-Behar in West Bengal, which connects northern Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves with the mainland of Bangladesh.

The corridor has a long and complex background. For a proper appreciation, one needs to go back to the Radcliffe Award, the Berubari dispute and the legal developments that followed. The then East Pakistan was created by dividing the province of Bengal and by adding to the part separated from India some areas of Assam. This division took place on the basis of the report of the Bengal Boundary Commission, known as the Radcliffe Award.

In the agreement signed on 16 May 1974 by Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh, it was decided to put into effect the demarcation of boundaries at selected stretches. Section 14 of the agreement was about handing over of the southern part of South Berubari to India in exchange of a passage in perpetuity linking Angarpota-Dahagram with Patgram in Bangladesh. The Berubari dispute was thus finally resolved by Article 1.14 of the Agreement which stated:
“India will retain the southern half of South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves, measuring an area of 2.64 square miles approximately, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves. India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 metres x 85 metres near ‘Tin Bigha’ to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) of Bangladesh.”

During the Pakistani period, under the 1952 agreement, India agreed to hand over ‘Tin Bigha’ to Pakistan in perpetuity to link Angarpota-Dahagram in exchange of the southern half of South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves. Whereas, in 1974 agreement, India instead of handing over ‘Tin Bigha’ to Bangladesh in perpetuity, only agreed to grant a lease in perpetuity of Tin Bigha to Bangladesh despite the fact that Bangladesh agreed and handed over the sovereignty of half of South Berubari union No. 12 to India in perpetuity. The Bangladeshi draftsmen of the agreement completely ignored this due to which by handing over the sovereignty of South Berubari Union No. 12 to India, Bangladesh in exchange received nothing except a lease in perpetuity of the Tin Bigha from India.

CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS PROBLEM

In terms of ethnic composition, Bangladesh is the most homogenous of the states of South Asia. Almost 98 per cent of the population is made up of Bangalees. Nonetheless, since its independence in 1971, the country was facing considerable problems in integrating its ethnic minorities to the national mainstream. These minorities, primarily, but not exclusively. Chakmas, constitute less than 1 per cent of the total population and are concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) – a hilly, sylvan territory covering about 9 per cent of the total area of Bangladesh backed.

However, a complex webs of reasons, like, relative exposure of the tribal people to education, modernization arid political turmoil during the last years of Pakistani ruler their failure to support the Liberation War. They gradually developed a sense of being alien from the national mainstream and finally, appeared to the political arena with socio-political demands that would end their century old backwardness, thus, giving rise to an ethnic problem in the country.

Lack of mutual understanding, sensitivity to each other’s interests and moderation between the tribal people,the central government coupled with intransigence on the part of both the sides transformed an usual problem of nation building into an ethnic conflict. Since late 1970s, sporadic armed clashes with varied degree of intensity are taking place between government troops and the members of Shariti Bahini (Peace Corps) – the armed wing of the movement called Fahari Jana Sanghaty Samity (PJSS)..

That Bangladesh’s quest for finding out a solution to its ethnic-problem has heen seriously complicated by overt and covert involvement of India in the problem. Indian involvement in the ethnic turmoil in CHT has largely been clandestine while providing the Shanti Bahini insurgents with sanctuary, huge ammunitions, training and military assistanc.It was alleged that the Indian intelligent agencies wre involved. In her official pronouncements, New Delhi confessed only its ‘humanitarian” assistance to the refugees, while persistently denying any assistance rendered to the insurgent.

ROHINGA ISSUE

More serious is the issue of the Rohingyas. The Rohingyas are Muslims who inhabit the Arakan region facing Bangladesh. For their looking like Bangladeshis or ethnicity and their religion, they have been always under harassment by the predominant Burmese people of Myanmar who mainly run that country and form its elites especially among the ruling armed forces. : Myanmar has a poor human rights record for suppressing and depriving its minority communities of basic rights and privileges and as a result of these thousands of Muslim Rohingya refugees cross into Bangladesh territory to escape the atrocities committed by the military junta.

The Rohingyas have been always persecuted in their homeland for their distinctiveness. In 1991, following some incidents, the Burmese border security forces and the army drove out over 250,000 Rohingyas from Arakan and they had to be sheltered by Bangladesh since that time. After some years, talks between the two countries led to the return of a large number of the Rohingyas. But many still remain as the repatriation programme was suspended in 2007. Instead of resuming it, Myanmar authorities seem to be planning to push in afresh on a large scale the Rohingyas into Bangladesh. Press reports quoting different sources indicate that there is the possibility that the Myanmar authorities are plotting to start fresh troubles to create the ground for pushing into Bangladesh some 2 million Rohingyas. In other words, they have plans to push out their entire Rohingya population from Arakan into neighbouring Bangladesh.

Thus, Bangladesh government should be extremely wary from now on to watch these developments to be able to frustrate and defeat them. The Bangladesh-Myanmar borders could soon turn out to be a hotbed of serious troubles. For precluding such an outcome, Bangladesh needs to much increase its vigil in the Bangladesh-Myanmar borders and deploy security forces in adequate number. More important would be launching immediate wide ranging diplomatic activities to be able to prevail on Myanmar authorities to see reason and be restrained from pushing Rohingyas into Bangladesh. Among Myanmar’s neighbors, China has the greatest influence on that country. Therefore, it should be the lookout of Bangladesh to use their Chinese friends to put pressure on Myanmar to hold back from their various adventuristic designs against Bangladesh including the pushing in of the Rohingyas. In sum, Bangladesh has no choice but to be proactive in relation to Myanmar to be able to offset another large scale pouring in of Rohingya refuges from across the borders into its territories.
The numbers of Rohingyas who have remained in Bangladesh for the last two decades, have created serious problems for this country. They have to be sheltered, fed, clothed and taken care of in different ways mainly by Bangladesh notwithstanding that foreign aid or UN assistance also came for their upkeep. But the main responsibility for the looking after of the refugees from Myanmar has been one of Bangladesh and its government. For a long time and before the repatriation of these refugees started, Bangladesh authorities were found too stressed in caring for these uprooted people. Another big wave of Rohingyas coming from across the borders would mean resurrection of huge problems which seemed about to end.
Media reports from various sources indicate that a mass forced migration of the Rohingyas into Bangladesh would be imminent. Already, some thousands of Rohingyas have crossed over into Bangladesh territories during the last couple of weeks. From what they had to say, the authorities here could form an impression that the Myanmar military and para military are once again letting loose a rein of terror on these helpless people so that they get frightened and tortured enough into fleeing their homes leaving their everything behind. So, it is more than high time for Bangladesh government, to wake up from its slumber or to shake off its low key response and to counteract the growing problem while it remains controllable or reasonable. Any delay in this matter could mean a situation where it would have to face up to a sudden flood of refugees which would be much more difficult to control or even try such a thing in view of its purely humanitarian aspects.
Bangladesh government needs to contact Myanmar authorities at the highest level and persuade them to call off the terrorizing of the Rohingyas immediately. Only from an easing of conditions for them–locally– the Rohingyas are likely to get back their confidence and the motivation to stay in their home country. The most effective way to deter this push in of Rohingyas in great number would be contacting countries such as China which have most leverage on Myanmar and the UN with the aim of using their influence to stop the repression of the Rohingya population.

DEFENSE ISSUE

To save sovereignty strong defense is the most important thing. Bangladesh Rifles, newly named Border Guard of Bangladesh and Border Security Force/BSF of India. The role of Former BDR is praise worthy, but BSF killed thousands of Bangladeshi without any reason, they attacked BDR also.

BORDER TRADE

Currently India is the 2nd largest trading partner of Bangladesh, and India’s position is at the top for Bangladesh’s imports trade.Though bilateral trade between the countries has increased after the 1990s, the balance of trade is significantly in favour of India. However, Bangladesh has always been trade deficit with India, and recently it has increased exponentially. Limited export base, backward industries, inadequate infrastructure,lower productivity in Bangladesh, appreciation of Bangladesh’s Taka against Indian Rupee, earlier and faster trade liberalization program in Bangladesh compared to India, tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) imposed by the Indian government, huge illegal trade, diversified exports and technologically advanced

Industrial base of India are identified as the main reasons of this huge trade imbalance. [11]

Structural and policy measures such as sound physical, social and economic infrastructure, superior product quality, export diversification, sufficient institutional facilities for banking, credit and insurance, improved law and order situation, labor unrest free environment, an honest and efficient administration, continuous political stability, huge domestic and foreign investments, joint ventures in Bangladesh with buy back arrangements, competitive devaluation of the Bangladesh currency against the Indian currency, removal of illegal trade, tariff and NTBs- free entry of Bangladesh’s exports to Indian market are suggested to improve this trade deficit. Also cordial and productive cooperation between these two nations is crucial to materialize these. Therefore, an analysis of current trade status between the two nations, obstacles and opportunities for mutual trade expansion is very critical for economic development of both countries, especially of Bangladesh, as Bangladesh has been suffering from historical trade deficit with India since its independence. The trade deficit has been increasing exponentially since the recent past. Official data show that compared to 1983, trade deficit in 2003 is more than 46 times higher1 (IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics). This growing deficit is a cause of serious concern for Bangladesh and has important economic and political implications.

Problems Causing Indo-Bangladesh Trade Imbalance

Although the trade deficit with a particular country is not bad if the over all trade balances satisfactory, yet from the distribution aspect of trade policies (the distribution of Benefits and cots among groups of producers and groups of consumers) the growing trade

Deficit with India is a great concern for Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s fear is that if this Deficit continues, Bangladesh will be dependent only on a few products for its exports, And imports from India displace domestic production to such an extent as to deindustrializeBangladesh. As a result, it is argued, a severe polarization in Bangladesh and High levels of unemployment will occur. Therefore, increasing trade deficit with India is A problem and attempts are made here to find out the causes of this problem.

Bilateral Exchange Rate

Bilateral exchange rates between Bangladesh and India during 1986 to 1999 have been Presented in Table 13 in order to explore the dynamics underlying this expansion of trade Imbalance between these two countries. Available data exhibit that the nominal and real Values of the Bangladesh’s Taka vis-à-vis the Indian Rupee have been appreciating, with Negligible exceptions, over the years. This appreciation of Taka has a significant positive Effect on the increased trade deficit of Bangladesh with India. It is evident from the table that the nominal exchange rate, Taka per Rupee, had been Continuously declining right from 1986 to 1996. In 1997, though it increased slightly, it Started to decline again from 1998. This declining trend of the exchange rate implies that Taka had been appreciating. In nominal term, the exchange rate decreased to 1.140 in 1999 from 2.411 in 1986 indicating a 52.71 percent appreciation of Bangladesh’s Taka Against Indian Rupee during 13 years of time.

Joint Ventures

The trade imbalance can greatly and effectively be reduced by cordial and productive Mutual cooperation. There are still many opportunities that could be exploited for the Greater benefit of both countries and thus reducing the trade deficit of Bangladesh with India. For example, Bangladesh can obtain financial benefits by the greater economic Integration with Indian North-Eastern States (NES), which are geographically situated in A disadvantageous location from the main land.* Dash, K.C. 1996. ‘ The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 69, No.2.

Illegal Border Trade

Being near the notorious ‘golden triangle’–a heaven for illegal drug dealings.Moreover huge amount of Illegal arms dealing, human trafficking, illegal trade of medicine, daily accessories, garments, chemicals, jute, disel, fertilizer, **** Indian books,cds and DVDs, etc. The cattle-smugglers of West Bengal, their knowledge of the border areas, the gaps and the vulnerable areas through which infiltration could happen, their contacts with cattle traders and truckers in the hinterland of India and their contacts with cattle merchants in Bangladesh, all of this combines to form a massive cross-country network.Governments lost huge amount of revenues every year . Bangladesh faces an imminent danger and this cannot be tackled without full cooperation, which is unlikely to be forthcoming, from Myanmar and India.

MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE WITH INDIA, MYANMAR

Maritime boundaries and Talpatty (New Moore) Island

Being surrounded by India and Myanmar, Bangladesh can hardly overemphasize the need to demarcate its maritime boundary on just and equitable basis to assert her sovereignty over its resource rich EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) and beyond through which almost 90% of its external trade is conducted. Failure in delineating maritime border may cause Bangladesh to be reduced to a mere landlocked country and lose its strategic significance and relevance in South Asian context.

Maritime boundary negotiations commenced in 1974 but have stalled because of differing perceptions on the applicability of the principles of international law in delimiting the maritime boundary. According to international practice, territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles into sea. Thereafter, water areas with a depth of 70 fathoms are considered as the continental shelf, after which an EEZ of 200 nautical miles is measured. Nations therefore pay particular attention to the drawing up of a baseline for finalizing maritime boundaries, as it has important effect on the total area of the EEZ.
The continental shelf of Bangladesh is enlarging because of an annual deposit of around 2.2 billion tons of sediment deposited into the sea by its river systems. This not only gives hope for land reclamation but also for exploiting seabed resources of hydrocarbon and mineral deposits.

Talpatty/New Moore Island :is 2 square kilometers of uninhabited offshore island at the mouth of a river flowing between an Indian and a Bangladesh district,12 which is visible only during low water. It emerged in 1970 as a result of a tectonic upheaval of the seabed. There is considerable fishing activity in the area. The island assumes significance because possession of the island provides the potential for offshore exploration of oil. Bangladesh belatedly laid claim to it in 1979. In 1981, a tense situation was calmed through diplomacy and by vacating the island, but resolution of the dispute and delineation of the maritime boundaries are priorities.

A country is supposed to enjoy its rights to fishing and extracting and exploring other marine resources in its 12–24 nautical mile territorial sea from the coastline, 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and 350 nautical mile continental shelf from the baseline.
According to the Law of the Sea, 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic Zone and 350 nautical miles of the continental shelf under the Bay of Bengal is bangladesh’s maritime boundary.

Bangladesh has problems with India and Myanmar on the issue of ‘starting point’ on how to mark the coastline to draw its marine boundary, with apparently overlapping claims of the three neighbouring countries because of the funnel-like coastline of the Bay.

Bangladesh has been preparing its grounds for justifying its claim over the un-delineated maritime boundary, into which neighboring India and Myanmar have reportedly encroached and started initial preparations for hydrocarbon exploration, according to officials at the foreign ministry.

Despite India and Myanmar’s encroachment into Bangladesh’s territorial waters, Dhaka has opted for going for the third round bidding for hydrocarbon exploration in deep water in its claimed 200 nautical miles of territorial water in the Bay of Bengal.

We will go for making new blocks throughout our 200 nautical miles of sea and float international tenders,the energy advisor, Mahmudur Rahman, told INS. He said he had information that India and Myanmar have encroached into 19,000 square kilometers and 18,000 square kilometers into Bangladesh’s maritime territories and floated international tenders for hydrocarbon exploration.

In 2009, Bangladesh registered its objections with the United Nations regarding the claims of India and Myanmar to its territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal.Both the countries want to extract natural resources from the disputed marine territory, with natural prolongation into the continental shelf and the baseline.

The cases have been referred to the international tribunal as ‘fall-back positions’ as a safeguard if no satisfactory results would come out of bilateral negotiations, she said.

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an independent judicial body set up by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the convention.

The government, Dipu Moni said, is scheduled to submit a memorandum to the UN body claiming its legitimate authority over its territorial waters adjacent to Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal by July 1. Myanmar is scheduled to submit its memorandum by December 1.
Bangladesh, she said, is scheduled to submit a memorandum to the UN body claiming its legitimate authority over its territorial waters adjacent to India in the Bay of Bengal by May 31, 2011. India is scheduled to submit its memorandum by May 31, 2012.
The prime ministers of Bangladesh and India, during the visit of the Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, to New Delhi in January, agreed on the need for an amicable demarcation of the maritime boundary between the two countries.
Bangladesh negotiators on maritime boundary held meetings with their counterparts in India and Myanmar early this year .‘But we are yet to get any indication from India and Myanmar regarding meetings in Dhaka,’ the official said.
Experts, however, believe an amicable demarcation of the boundary between the two countries will require ‘strong political commitment at the highest level and its translation into reality through bureaucracy.’
‘The ball is in Delhi’s (and Yangon’s) court. It is not in our court now,’ Professor Imtiaz Ahmed of Dhaka University told New Age on Sunday evening.‘Unfortunately, the problem with Delhi is that its political commitment is not usually delivered to the bureaucracy properly. Another problem with them is that they make the process (of bilateral negotiations) slower,’ Imtiaz, a teacher of international relations, said.
Under the UN provision, no claims submitted by a country will be taken for final consideration before settling the objection raised by a neighbouring country, which might have overlapping claims.

The delay in establishing Bangladesh’s claim to its maritime territory has prompted the other neighbors to encroach, observed another source. The country is now lacking the necessary data even to protest if any of the neighbors make any undue claim, although the government had announced earlier determination of the maritime boundary baseline as per the UN convention, completion of the physical survey, and purchase or charter of necessary equipment for the survey, which is a priority project of the prime minister, with a deadline in June this year.

The move Remain:

Bangladesh should fully concentrate on arbitration, having lost two other options. It would take the issue to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal Dealing in Demarcation of Sea Boundaries.

But India blocked Bangladesh’s access to either ICJ or the other tribunal, by lodging its protest before Bangladesh could take recourse to such an action.Arbitration is, therefore, the lone option left for Bangladesh. Bangladesh should, in no way, neglect its preparations to place its side of the case before the UN Arbitration Tribunal.

CONCLUSION

Bangladesh is a poor country. Its poor due to its lack of knowledge of its resources, lack of appropriate and aggressive national policy on protection of its natural rights, political instability and brainless leader.

Bangladesh and Indai are hugging neighbours. Bangladesh wont get its water right by begging to India, it must follow the rules of arbitration. For the proper share of its sea border she must go to UN court of arbitration. To reduce deficit border trade she must look forward to china and other east asian countries. She must make bond with muslim countries of middle east to keep pressure on India on United Nation and for legal support it must strengthen its relation with China,Japan and Russia. Bangladesh should take the Asian Highway Rout AH-41,instead of AH-1/AH-2 to get connected with all the east asian contries.

REFEERENCES

1. Holiday, Friday,28 March,2009,p1

2. McCaffrey, S.C., “Water, Politics, and International Law”, in Water in

Bhai saab, Kuch TLDR nahi hain?

 

[Banglar Bir]

An excellent thread,where all relevant subjects can be CONVERGED and if the Mods could kindly PIN this thread, thereby all could members would be able to contribute their valuable inputs.

This would also be useful for further research by anyone interested for preparing their THESIS PAPERS, instead of spending hours surfing through the net on different topics. Thanks.

 

[Deadpool]

One of those jamaat oriented articles that blends conspiracy theories with facts to appear 'nationalist'.

A whole lot of trash has been mixed in with some facts.

Bhai saab, Kuch TLDR nahi hain?

Short version of the article-
India bad,
China good ,
Bangladeshi govt. innocent and gullible.

 

[Banglar Bir]

• Home
• Ban

Dhaka, Delhi to sign deals on port use, construction
Online Desk | Update: 14:37, Dec 07, 2016

Bangladesh and India will sign a number of documents on using Chittagong and Mongla seaports apart from building a multipurpose container terminal at Payra seaport.

Officials from both sides are in discussions at shipping secretary-level meeting, being held in Dhaka, on various aspects of separate MoUs (memoranda of understanding), reports UNB.

The meeting will finalise things on these proposed MoUs and those are likely to be signed during prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s forthcoming New Delhi visit.

Officials said India’s state-owned India Port Global and some Indian private companies have shown interest in building a multipurpose container terminal at Payra seaport.

“We’ll finalise four things at the meeting,” said Bangladesh shipping secretary Ashoke Madhab Roy.

They will also discuss a proposed MoU on movement of lighter vessels between the two countries, he said. An agreement also will be signed on carrying passenger on costal routes, UNB said.

Indian shipping secretary Rajive Kumar is leading a nine-member delegation while Madhab Roy a 16-member Bangladesh delegation.

Cabinet secretary Mohammad Shafiul Alam inaugurated the meeting at the conference room of the shipping ministry.

The prime minister is scheduled to pay an official visit to New Delhi in the third week of the current month.

 

[chandrak]

If u keep pinching others ,u cant assume for a warm treatment...
World politics is all about ,i scratch ur back u scratch mine...if u are having so much problems ask ur leaders why their are so much misunderstandings and problems between neighbours ..bcz policies are made by ur government..u cant blame others for everything..
There is never 100%fault from only one side..

 

[Razia Sultana]

CONCLUSION

Bangladesh is a poor country. Its poor due to its lack of knowledge of its resources, lack of appropriate and aggressive national policy on protection of its natural rights, political instability and brainless leader.

Bangladesh and Indai are hugging neighbours. Bangladesh wont get its water right by begging to India, it must follow the rules of arbitration. For the proper share of its sea border she must go to UN court of arbitration. To reduce deficit border trade she must look forward to china and other east asian countries. She must make bond with muslim countries of middle east to keep pressure on India on United Nation and for legal support it must strengthen its relation with China,Japan and Russia. Bangladesh should take the Asian Highway Rout AH-41,instead of AH-1/AH-2 to get connected with all the east asian contries.

REFEERENCES

1. Holiday, Friday,28 March,2009,p1

2. McCaffrey, S.C., “Water, Politics, and International Law”, in Water in

Going by the article I think rejoining Pakistan will solve all the problems of Bangladesh.

 

[Banglar Bir]

PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF ROOPPUR NUCLEAR + OTHER VITAL ISSUES COULD ALSO BE INCLUDED IN THIS THREAD.

China acknowledged as global leader in the field and world’s only nation increasing funding into research to draw energy from ‘artificial sun’


PUBLISHED : Thursday, 08 December, 2016, 8:02am
UPDATED : Thursday, 08 December, 2016, 10:48am

On a quiet, scenic peninsula jutting out into Hefei’s Dongpu Reservoir, physicists recently set a world record, creating hydrogen plasma, hotter than the core of the sun, that burned steadily for more than a minute.

The nuclear fusion researchers kept the ionised gas burning steadily for twice as long as the previous record, set four years ago at the same reactor on Science Island, home to some of China’s largest research facilities.

I have a dream, to see a light bulb lit by the power of fusion within my lifetime
LI JIANGANG
Professor Luo Guangnan, deputy director of the Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak (EAST) facility in Anhui’s provincial capital said some previous fusion experiments had lasted for more than 100 seconds, but they were like “like riding a bucking bronco”, with plasma that was volatile and difficult to control.

However, the experiment conducted at EAST in August was more like a dressage event, with the plasma tamed in a high-performance steady state, known as H-mode, in a donut-shaped chamber shielded by a extremely strong electromagnetic field.

“It is a milestone event, a confidence boost for humanity to harness energy from fusion,” Luo told the South China Morning Post.

Physicists view H-mode as an optimal working scenario for a future fusion power plant, and the one-minute breakthrough owed a great deal to the Chinese government’s heavy investment on fusion research in recent years.



While still a long way short of the duration required to make commercialisation of the technology possible – which would be measured in decades, not minutes – scientists say the breakthrough shows the pace of development on fusion research in China is leaving other nations in the dust.

It could also help accelerate government approval of construction of the world’s first fusion power plant, the proposed Chinese Fusion Engineering Test Reactor (CFETR).

China fires up Hineg generator in Hefei city with goal of making world’s strongest neutron beam using nuclear fusion technology

Fusion occurs when two hydrogen nuclei merge to form an atom of helium. During the process, a small amount of mass is converted into an enormous amount of heat. The challenge is to bring that energy under control.

Many fusion research facilities have been set up around the world in attempts to solve the fusion-control problem, with the largest facility under construction, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) in France, expected to fire its first pulse of plasma by 2025.

But all such facilities are relatively primitive, with none able to turn fusion power to electricity.

The CFETR proposal sees the reactor going into operation in 2030, generating 200 megawatts of power initially, before an upgrade in the following decade that would ramp up output to around a gigawatt, more than is produced by each of the commercial fission reactors at Daya Bay.

“It is hoped that the proposal for CFETR construction can be approved by the government within the next five years,” Wan Yuanxi, a leading fusion research scientist with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, told an international fusion science conference in Kyoto, Japan, last month.

Luo, who is also involved in the CFETR project, said China’s commitment to fusion research stood out when compared to other countries.

“China is the only nation in the world increasing its budget for fusion research,” he said. “The funding in Europe has been dwindling, a proposal for the construction of new research facilities in the US was rejected by Congress, and progress in Japan has also stagnated.”

New dawn: Chinese scientists move step closer to creating ‘artificial sun’ in quest for limitless energy via nuclear fusion

The one-minute H-mode breakthrough at EAST was made possible by financial support from the central government, which allowed the EAST team to undertake a series of major upgrades in the past few years.

In contrast, the Alcator C-Mod tokamak nuclear fusion reactor at America’s Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which set many world records in 23 years of service, shut down in September due to federal government budget cuts in the United States. It set its last world record, for the highest plasma pressure, on its final day of operation.

The funding and opportunities available in China have attracted fusion scientists from around the world, eager to solve the world’s energy shortage and environmental pollution problems once and for all.

Many American researchers were involved in EAST’s one-minute H-mode experiment.

“In each of our experiments in recent years, the number of foreign participants easily exceeded 100,” Luo said, acknowledging that the progress in China would not have been so fast without a collective effort by international community.

The rapid pace of development in China has, however, led to concerns in other countries, worried that if China is the first to commercialise fusion technology it will gain the upper hand economically and geopolitically.

There was even discussion among the other six ITER members – Japan, South Korea, Russia, the US, India and the European Union – about kicking China out of the project because of concerns it would use knowledge gained from ITER to accelerate construction of CFETR.

Blazing at 1 million degrees Celsius, a possible milestone in nuclear fusion quest

But ITER, plagued by years of delay and way over budget, would not survive without China’s support, and the country’s influence in the project has grown significantly in recent years. The number of ITER employees from China has gone from last place among its seven members to second, trailing only the EU.

Professor Steven Cowley, president of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and former head of Britain’s Culham Centre for Fusion Energy, said the best choice for other countries was to embrace, and even support, China’s leadership in fusion research.

“I think that CFETR is a bold and important move – not just for China but for the world,” Cowley said. “It will not undermine ITER but rather move on rapidly from ITER towards full commercial fusion power.

“If China is first that is great since it will really benefit everyone. I would like to see us all help China to accelerate the pace of fusion development. Certainly the EU would also like to be first to commercial fusion power – but the most important thing is that someone does it as soon as possible.”

AS I AM NOT A NUCLEAR SCIENTIST, I CANNOT COMMENT ON SUCH AN ADVANCED TECHNICAL SUBJECT, ITS BETTER FOR EXPERTS ON THESE FIELDS TO SHED SOME OF THEIR SOME LIGHTS, ON WHAT WOULD BE MOST COST EFFECTIVE, SAFE AND ECO FRIENDLY SYSTEM TO BE ADOPTED BY BANGLADESH.

 

[Jugger]

Bangladesh is under the threat of radical organizations like ISIS, the horrific terror attacks on the cafe and minorities are the proof.
Ignoring this threat will cost dearly, the threat from within is the most dangerous.
As one of the few muslim majority secular nation Bangladesh is vital for global peace and harmony.

 

[Major d1]

Bangladesh is under the threat of radical organizations like ISIS, the horrific terror attacks on the cafe and minorities are the proof.
Ignoring this threat will cost dearly, the threat from within is the most dangerous.
As one of the few muslim majority secular nation Bangladesh is vital for global peace and harmony.

So india isn't under the threat of ISIS ?
Muslim Majority
Secular
There is no relationship between muslim majority with the secular prospective.

 

[Banglar Bir]

Global Multidimensional Poverty Index- 2016



http://www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/

· Global MPI 2016

o Country briefings

o Data tables

o Case studies

o Methodology

o Infographics

· Interactive Databank

· MPI Resources

· FAQs

· Background

Global MPI 2016
This page highlights findings from the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) and provides a range of resources. The Global MPI was updated in June 2016 and now covers 102 countries in total, which are home to 75 per cent of the world’s population, or 5.2 billion people. Of this proportion, 30 per cent of people (1.6 billion) are identified as multidimensionally poor.

Briefings – data tables – methodology

Key findings

§ Over half (54%) of people in the African countries analysed suffer from multidimensional poverty: 544 million people endure multidimensional poverty in 46 countries analysed in the region.

§ Among 35 countries where changes to poverty over time were analysed, 30 of them have reduced poverty significantly. Rwanda had stellar performance.

§ The MPI registered impressive reductions in some unexpected places. 19 sub-national regions – regional ‘runaway’ successes – have reduced poverty even faster than Rwanda. The fastest MPI reduction was found in Likouala in the Republic of the Congo.

§ The Sahel and Sudanian Savanna Belt contains most of the world’s poorest sub-regions, showing the interaction between poverty and harsh environmental conditions.

§ Poverty looks very different in different parts of the continent. While in East Africa deprivations related to living standards contribute most to poverty, in West Africa child mortality and education are the biggest problems.

§ The deprivations affecting the highest share of MPI poor people in Africa are cooking fuel, electricity and sanitation.

§ More people tend to suffer from MPI poverty than $1.90/day poverty. Yet nine important exceptions, where income poverty exceeds MPI, are in Africa. The number of people in multidimensional poverty in East Africa outnumbers those in West Africa, but we would not get similar conclusions if we only focus on income poverty.

§ East and West Africa have the largest number of poor people both in terms of income and multidimensional poverty. North Africa is the least poor region.

§ The number of poor people went down in only 12 countries. In 18 countries, although the incidence of MPI fell, population growth led to an overall rise in the number of poor people.

Policy Briefings

Download briefing papers on key findings:

§ 2-page at a glance highlights

§

§ Multidimensional Poverty in Africa: 2016 Special Briefing: download in

Data tables

Detailed MPI data is available to download from the tables below. Tables 1.1 – 7 were updated in June 2015 and are appendices to the Methodological Note – Summer 2016. They include:

§ Detailed MPI results at the country level (102 countries)

§ Breakdown of MPI results by rural and urban areas (100 countries)

§ MPI at the sub-national level for 962 regions of 78 countries

§ Changes to multidimensional poverty over time for 50 countries and their sub-national regions where possible

The tables are divided into sheets to help in navigating through the data. The chart below provides detailed information on what is included in each data table and sheet. You can download the tables by clicking on the icons in the right-hand column.

 

[Banglar Bir]

MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY INDEX 2016

2 June 2016

HIGHLIGHTS ~ SOUTH ASIA

In 2016 we have poverty estimations for seven South Asian countries, and subnational data for 84 regions, covering 94% of the population in South Asia.

We are releasing new MPI estimations using DHS data for Bangladesh (2014) and MICS data for Nepal (2014).

Afghanistan is the poorest country in South Asia, with 66% of people being multidimensionally poor using 2010/11 data; India (2005/6) was the next poorest with 54%, followed by Bangladesh (2014) with 41%, Pakistan (2012/13) at 44%, Nepal (2014) at 29%, Bhutan (2010) at 27%, and Sri Lanka and the Maldives at 5%.

These tend to be higher than the $1.90/day rates, which are 21% for South Asia as a whole.

In Winter 2015/16 we also estimated and released Bangladesh’s Global MPI using the 2012/13 MICS dataset.

The distinctive feature of that dataset was that it permitted us to decompose MPI to the district level, rather than division, so subnational data was available for 64 regions, giving an even more fine-grained view of poverty.

For example, we can see a great deal of variation within the divisions that was previously not visible.

For the first time we release destitution results all South Asian countries including Bhutan and Maldives.

Our measure of destitution identifies a subset of poor people as destitute if they experience extreme deprivations like severe malnutrition, losing two children, having all primary-aged school children out of school, and using open defecation.

In Afghanistan 38% of people are destitute. But interestingly Bangladesh has much lower rate of destitution than Pakistan (12% vs 20% of the populations are destitute), despite having relatively similar headcount ratios, showing that Bangladesh has alleviated the worst forms of deprivations.

Country Year MPI % MPI poor (H) Intensity of MPI (A) % Destitute

Country Year MPI % MPI Intensity of MPI(A) Destitute

Poor (H)



Maldives 2009. 0.018 5.2 35.6 1.5


Bhutan- 2010. 0.119 27.2 43.9 8.3



Nepal- 2014. 0.126 28.6 44.2 10.8



Bangladesh- 2014. 0.196 41.3 47.4 11.6



Pakistan- 2012/13. 0.230 44.2 52.1 20.7



India- 2005/06. 0.283 53.7 52.7 28.5



Afghanistan- 2010/11 0.353 66.2 53.4 37.7


Across our 8 South Asian countries we find that poverty remains higher in rural areas.

For example, in Nepal, only 7% of urban dwellers are poor but 33% in rural areas.

In Afghanistan, 39% of urban dwellers are poor, but 72% of rural inhabitants. Hence rural areas remain the priority for MPI reduction.

Nepal had stellar performance reducing poverty incidence 2006-2011 from 64% to 44%.

The MPI estimations using this survey, by MICS, are not comparable to the others and we cannot yet say definitely what the comparable rates would be.

However it does seem the Nepal may have halved its MPI in less than 10 years which would be a wonderful accomplishment

We decompose India, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan by subnational regions.

The poorest region in South Asia is Bihar, followed by ‘South’ Afghanistan.

The poorest 15 subnational regions in South Asia are all in India or Afghanistan, plus one region (Baluchistan) of Pakistan.

As a region, South Asia’s MPI is dominated by India, whose data are out of date. We are looking to release new estimations using India’s NFHS-IV when the data are released, at which time we will further analyse MPI in this region and over time.

http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/MPI2016-SOUTH-ASIA-HIGHLIGHTS_June.pdf

 

[third eye]

Chitmahal is the enclaves between India and Bangladesh border in the Indian state of West Bengal. India has about 92 exclaves of Bangladesh, and 106 exclaves of India are within Bangladeshi soil.

The residents of the enclaves live in abysmal conditions, with a lack of water, roads, electricity, schools and medicines. Crime also is rampant, as complaining would mean crossing the international boundary due to the lack of law enforcement resources. Residents of the enclaves may only go to their respective countries on the production of an identity card, after seeking permission from the border guards, causing much resentment.

Isnt this information obsolete ?

Link to the article.

 

[Major d1]

In light of the new cooperative water development agreements in South Asia since 1996 and, in particular, the 1996 Ganges Waters Treaty between India and Bangladesh, this paper explores the geopolitical obstacles to cooperation between states in the joint development of large-scale river systems and current opportunities for successful development. The general problems of cooperation faced by the riparian states which share successive rivers are examined with reference to the geopolitical obstacles to cooperation in the Bengal delta since the Partition of the Indian subcontinent through which India and Pakistan gained Independence as separate states in 1947. Against the background of repeated attempts to resolve water-sharing issues between India and East Pakistan and its successor state, Bangladesh, this paper concludes that for cooperation to succeed contemporary large-scale river development has to meet a wide range of criteria which go beyond conventional engineering or economic cost-benefit analyses to include geopolitical criteria. These range from global-scale environmental concerns to micro-scale issues of mutual regional benefit. This paper proposes a major new development on the Brahmaputra and Ganges which the authors argue could break the log-jam of a zero-sum game approach to surface water development in the Bengal delta. Unlike most large-scale dam-building proposals, the barrage construction outlined would cause negligible population displacement, and making maximum use of existing river channels would minimize the environmental impacts associated with the large canal or dam construction envisaged in earlier Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) schemes. Yet the paper also recognizes that while such a proposal could bring economic, environmental and political advantages to all users in the GBM basin, new thinking on the management of international rivers is less in favour of supply-side solutions, and the case would need to be substantiated by detailed evaluation.

Isnt this information obsolete ?

Link to the article.

Yes it is authentic- where i have gave you ref. then why u need link ? by the way i have gave you the link.

http://www.assignmentpoint.com/arts...politics-of-bangladesh-and-neighbourhood.html

 

[Banglar Bir]

in response to Post # 12.

Enclaves between India and Bangladesh
The land that maps forgot

Feb 15th 2011, 16:06 BY T.J. | COOCH BEHAR
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/02/enclaves_between_india_and_bangladesh

(Click here for an enlarged view of the map, courtesy Jan S. Krogh)

THOSE of us who keep an eye out for anomalies in the world's maps have long held a fond regard for what might be called Greater Bengal. A crazed array of boundaries cuts Bangladesh out of the cloth of easternmost India, before slicing up the surrounding Himalayan area and India's north-east into most of a dozen jagged mini-states. But thecrème de la crème, for a student of bizarre geography, is to be found floating along the northern edge of Bangladesh's border with India.

EVER since Bangladesh achieved its independence in 1971, struggles over territory and terrorism, rather than the exchange of goods and goodwill, have dominated its relations with its mega-neighbour. Forty years on, both countries appear to be nearing an agreement to solve the insoluble—by swapping territory.

The planned exchange of parcels of each other's territory is concentrated around some 200 enclaves. These are like islands of Indian and Bangladeshi territory surrounded completely by the other country's land, clustered on either side of Bangladesh's border with the district of Cooch Behar, in the Indian state of West Bengal. Surreally, these include about two dozen counter-enclaves (enclaves within enclaves), as well as the world's only counter-counter enclave—a patch of Bangladesh that is surrounded by Indian territory…itself surrounded by Bangladeshi territory.

Folklore has it that this quilt work of enclaves is the result of a series of chess games between the Maharaja of Cooch Behar and the Faujdar of Rangpur. The noblemen wagered on their games, using villages as currency. Even in the more sober account, represented by Brendan R. Whyte, an academic, the enclaves are the “result of peace treaties in 1711 and 1713 between the kingdom of Cooch Behar and the Mughal empire, ending a long series of wars in which the Mughals wrested several districts from Cooch Behar.”

That was before the days of East India Company rule, before the British Raj and long before the independence of South Asia's modern republics. These places have been left as they were found by both India and Bangladesh: in a nearly stateless state of abandonment. They are today pockets of abject poverty with little or nothing in the way of public services.

In a 2004 paper titled “An historical and documentary study of the Cooch Behar enclaves of India and Bangladesh”, Mr Whyte, in reference to the intractability of the boundary issues at partition, asks whether India is still “waiting for the Eskimo”.

When in 1947 Mr Feroz Khan Noon suggested that Sir Cyril Radcliffe should not visit Lahore for he was sure to be misunderstood either by the Muslims or the Sikhs, The Statesman wrote: “On this line of argument, he [Sir Cyril] would do better to remain in London, or better still, take up residence in Alaska. Perhaps however there would be no objection to his surveying the boundaries of the Punjab from the air if piloted by an Esqimo”.

Apparently the newspaper thought that anyone's sorting this border dispute anytime soon was highly improbable. Sir Cyril's success seemed as implausible—in those waning days of the British empire—as the notion of an Inuit flying an aeroplane. Most of a century later and a flying “Esqimo” seems like no big deal, while progress on the zany borders of Cooch Behar has made no progress at all.

There is now talk that a land swap might be sealed when India's prime minister Manmohan Singh visits Bangladesh later this year. If it goes ahead, India stands to lose just over 4,000 hectares of its territory, or about 40 square kilometres. It has 111 enclaves of land within Bangladesh—nearly 70 square kilometres. Bangladesh has 51 enclaves of its own, comprising 28 square kilometres surrounded by India. The transfer proposed would simplify the messy boundary immeasurably—and entail something like a 10,000-acre net loss for India.

For India's governing Congress party, making a gift of land to Bangladesh—in all an area equivalent to the size of 2,000 test-cricket stadiums—will not come easy. During a time of ideological waffle, it is an issue which India's opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) can use to flaunt its nationalistic (oftentimes pro-Hindu, ie anti-Muslim) credentials and to attack Congress at a weak spot—its perceived softness towards illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, most of them Muslims. By many estimates, more than 15m illegal migrants have entered India from Bangladesh since 1971. The BJP has been trotting out the round figure of 20m for years.

Meanwhile, construction of a border fence, 2.5m high, on India's 4,100km border with Bangladesh, the world's fifth-longest (due to all its zigging and zagging), continues unabated. It is a bloody border, too. Indian soldiers enforce a shoot-to-kill order against Bangladeshi migrants caught making their mundane way from one side of the line to the other.

But what's in it for India? Its broader desire to clarify its fuzzy borders with all its neighbours provides one attraction. The dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir has eluded resolution. China's claim of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh remains an open sore. Drawing one steady borderline in the east looks comparatively easy.

India must also hope that its generous co-operation in the territorial dispute might help Bangladesh's prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, secure popular Bangladeshi support for a rapprochement with India. Her Awami League (AL) government has proven itself a willing partner: working to deny Bangladeshi territory to the insurgent groups who challenge Indian sovereignty in its north-eastern states; and cracking down Bangladesh's homegrown Islamic-extremist fringe. But as many of Sheikh Hasina's fellow citizens see things, India has yet to reciprocate following their government's consent last year to allow India to use Bangladesh's ports and roads. The main opposition party, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), whose leader likes to say that no foreign vehicles should be allowed to use Bangladesh's territory, scents blood.

Indian diplomats know this. A diplomatic cable from the American embassy, leaked to the world by WikiLeaks, summarises discussions held in 2009 between India's then High Commissioner to Bangladesh and the American ambassador. India, the Americans thought, would like to establish a bilateral agreement with Bangladesh on counterterrorism, but was impeded by its understanding “that Bangladesh might insist on a regional task force to provide Hasina political cover from allegations she was too close to India”.

Such international intriguing tends to ignore the people who actually in the enclaves—150,000 by some estimates—who are left waiting. Their chief grievance is a complete lack of public services: with no education, infrastructure for water, electricity etc, they may as well not be citizens of any country. NGOs are barred from working in the enclaves. The question of their citizenship is a major obstacle in resolving the problem: referendums are out of the question, as India does not want to create a precedent which could inspire Kashmiris or north-easterners fighting for independent statehood.

The people who actually live in enclaves (and counter-enclaves) in a certain sense “don't see” the borders. They speak the same language, eat the same food and live life without regard to the politicians in Dhaka, Kolkata and Delhi. Many of them cross the border regularly (the bribe is US$6 a trip from the Bangladeshi side).

A few years ago, away from Cooch Behar, on the eastern border with India, I met a man who lived smack on the border between Tripura state and Bangladesh. His living room was in Bangladesh, his toilet in India. He had been a local politician in India, and was now working as a farmer in Bangladesh. As is typical in such places, he sent his daughters to school in Bangladesh, and his sons to India, where schools, he thought, were much better. To his mind, the fence dividing the two countries was of little value. But, he conceded, “at least my cows don't run away anymore.”

India–Bangladesh enclaves
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


This article needs to be updated. Please update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (August 2016)

A complete map of the exclaves. Top of the map is east, India is orange and Bangladesh is cyan.
The India–Bangladesh enclaves, also known as the chitmahals (Bengali: ছিটমহল chitmôhol) and sometimes called pasha enclaves,[1]were the enclaves along the Bangladesh–India border, in Bangladesh and the Indian states of West Bengal, Tripura, Assam and Meghalaya. Within the main body of Bangladesh were 102 enclaves of Indian territory, which in turn contained 21 Bangladeshi counter-enclaves, one of which contained an Indian counter-counter-enclave – the world's only third-order enclave. Within the Indian mainland were 71 Bangladeshi enclaves, containing 3 Indian counter-enclaves. A joint census in 2010 found 51,549 people residing in these enclaves: 37,334 in Indian enclaves within Bangladesh and 14,215 in Bangladeshi enclaves within India.[2][3]

The prime ministers of India and Bangladesh signed the Land Boundary Agreement in 1974 to exchange enclaves and simplify their international border. A revised version of the agreement was adopted by the two countries on 7 May 2015, when the Parliament of India passed the 100th Amendment to the Indian Constitution.[4][5] Under this agreement, which was ratified on 6 June 2015, India received 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (covering 7,110 acres (2,880 ha)) in the Indian mainland, while Bangladesh received 111 Indian enclaves (covering 17,160 acres (6,940 ha)) in the Bangladeshi mainland.[6] The counter-enclaves, together with Dahagram-Angarpota, will not be exchanged when the Indira-Mujib agreement of 1974 is finally implemented.[2] The enclave residents are to be allowed to either reside at their present location or move to the country of their choice.[7] The physical exchange of enclaves will be implemented in phases between 31 July 2015 and 30 June 2016.[8] The enclaves stand exchanged on the midnight of 31 July 2015 and the transfer of enclave residents is expected to be completed by 30 November 2015.[9] After the Land Boundary Agreement, India lost around 40 square kilometres (15 sq mi) to Bangladesh.[10][11]



Contents
[1History

• 1.1Agreement

• 2Notable enclaves
  • 2.1Bangladesh
  • 2.2India

• 3List of former enclaves and exclaves
  • 3.1Bangladesh
  • 3.2India

• 4See also

• 5References

• 6Further reading

History[edit]
According to a popular legend, the enclaves were used as stakes in card or chess games centuries ago between two regional kings, the Raja of Koch Bihar and the Maharaja of Rangpur.[2] As far as historical records are concerned, the little territories were apparently the result of a confused outcome of a 1713 treaty between the Kingdom of Koch Bihar and the Mughal Empire. Possibly, the Kingdom and the Mughals ended a war without determining a boundary for what territories had been gained or lost.[12]

After the partition of India in 1947, Rangpur was joined to East Pakistan, and Cooch Behar district was merged in 1949 with India. The desire to "de-enclave" most of the enclaves was manifested in a 1958 agreement between Jawaharlal Nehru and Feroz Khan Noon, the respective Prime Ministers, for an exchange between India and Pakistan without considering loss or gain of territory. But the matter then worked into a Supreme Court case in India, and the Supreme Court ruled that a constitutional amendment was required to transfer the land. So the ninth amendment was introduced to facilitate the implementation of the agreement. The amendment could not be passed because of an objection to transfer of southern Berubari enclave.[2][13] Because of India's deteriorated relations with Pakistan, the issue remained unsolved. With that agreement not ratified, negotiations restarted after East Pakistan became independent as Bangladesh in 1971 following the Bangladesh Liberation War.[citation needed]

Agreement[edit]


The diagramatic sketch of Cooch Behar district of West Bengal marking enclaves
The Land Boundary Agreement was signed on 16 May 1974 between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which provided for the exchange of enclaves and the surrender of adverse possessions. Under the agreement, India retained the Berubari Union No. 12 enclave while Bangladesh retained the Dahagram — Angorpota exclaves with India providing access to it by giving a 178-by-85-metre (584 ft × 279 ft) corridor, called the Tin Bigha Corridor. Bangladesh quickly ratified the agreement in 1974 but India failed to do so. The issue of the undemarcated land boundary of approximately 6.1 kilometres (3.8 mi) in three sectors — Daikhata-56 in West Bengal, Muhuri River-Belonia in Tripura and Lathitila-Dumabari in Assam — also remained unsolved. The Teen Bigha Corridor was leased to Bangladesh in 1992 amid local opposition.[2]

The list of enclaves was prepared in 1997 by the two countries. Two Joint Boundary Working Groups were formed to work out the details of enclaves in 2001. A joint census was carried out in May 2007. In September 2011, India signed the Additional Protocol for the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh.[14] Both nations announced an intention to swap 162 enclaves, giving residents a choice of nationality.[15][16][17]

Under the agreement, India received 51 of the 71 Bangladeshi enclaves (from 51 to 54 of the 74 chhits) that are inside India proper (7,110.2 acres, 2,877.4 ha), while Bangladesh received 95 to 101 of the 103 Indian enclaves (111 out of 119 chhits) that are inside Bangladesh proper (17,160.63 acres, 6,944.66 ha).[2][6]Apparently Bangladesh retained the 4,617 acres (1,868 ha) of its Dahagram-Angarpota exclave. India acquired 2,777.038 acres (1,123.827 ha) adverse possession areas and transferred 2,267.682 acres (917.698 ha) adverse possession areas to Bangladesh. After the exchange enclaves, India lost around 40 km²(10,000 acres) to Bangladesh. According to July 2010 joint census, there were 14,215 people residing in Bangladeshi enclaves in India and 37,269 people residing in Indian enclaves in Bangladesh.[18] The people living in these enclaves without a nationality will be allowed to choose their nationality.[19]

The Constitution (119th Amendment) Bill, 2013 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha, the Upper House of Parliament of India, on 18 December 2013.[7][20][not in citation given][21][22][23][24] The parliament panel, Standing Committee on External Affairs, approved the bill in November 2014.[25][26] The Rajya Sabha approved the constitutional amendment on 6 May 2015, and the Lok Sabha approved it the following day.[4] President of India Pranab Mukherjee gave his assent to the Act on 28 May 2015.[5]

On 6 June 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi ratified the agreement during his visit to the Bangladesh capital Dhaka. In the presence of Modi and Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the foreign secretaries of the two countries signed the instruments of the land exchange.[27] The physical exchange of enclaves and land parcels in adverse possession, and the boundary demarcation, will be implemented in phases between 31 July 2015 and 30 June 2016. The enclaves were to be exchanged at midnight on 31 July 2015 and the boundary demarcation is to be completed by 30 June 2016 by Survey Departments of the respective countries. The transfer of enclave residents is expected to be completed by 30 November 2015.[9]

Indian and Bangladeshi officials conducted a field survey of enclave residents between 6 July 2015 and 16 July 2015. Seventy-five teams, made up of one Indian and one Bangladeshi member each, were tasked with conducting the enumeration. Twenty-five teams surveyed the Bangladeshi enclaves which would be transferred to India, while 50 worked on the Indian enclaves that would be transferred to Bangladesh. As the enclave residents were allowed to choose citizenship of either nation, by 13 July 2015, 100 families residing in the Indian enclaves applied for Indian citizenship, while none of the residents of the Bangladeshi enclaves chose to go to Bangladesh. New citizenship, if chosen, took effect from 1 August 2015. Nearly 14,000 people living in the former Bangladeshi enclaves became Indian citizens, while about 36,000 people living in the former Indian enclaves became Bangladeshi citizens. Some 1,000 people in the former Indian enclaves chose Indian citizenship and will be relocated to India by December 2015.[15][28][29][30]

Notable enclaves[edit]

Enclave #51, Dahala Khagrabari, was the world's only third-order enclave before India ceded it to Bangladesh in 2015. It was a piece of India within Bangladesh, within India, within Bangladesh. Less than 7,000 square metres (0.70 ha; 1.7 acres), in area and was the site of a jute field. 28 smaller enclaves existed within the overall complex. (Maps)
Bangladesh[edit]
Dahagram–Angarpota: The largest Bangladeshi composite enclave (combining the first- and third-largest Bangladeshi chhits by area), administered as part of Patgram Upazila in Lalmonirhat zila, lies within the Indian province of West Bengal. It is separated from the contiguous area of Bangladesh at its closest point by 178 metres (584 ft). The enclave has an area of 25.95 km2 (10.02 sq mi) with a resident population of 20,000 people. The enclave lacks basic facilities. The lone health complex remains virtually useless because of lack of power supply, as India refused to allow Bangladesh to run power lines to the enclave.[2] After the exchange of enclaves in July 2015, Bangladesh retained it as an exclave.

The Tin Bigha Corridor, a strip of Indian territory 85 metres (279 ft) wide running from the Dahagram–Angarpota composite enclave to the Bangladeshi mainland at their nearest approach, was leased to Bangladesh for 999 years for access to the enclave. It is available for use by the residents of Dahagram–Angarpota.[2][31][32]

India[edit]
Dasiar Chhara, the fourth largest Indian chhit by area, was the largest stand-alone Indian enclave (i.e., not a composite of adjoining chhits). It lies 3 km (1.9 mi) from the main part of India and has an area of 6.65 km2 (2.57 sq mi). Dahala Khagrabari was the world's only third-order enclave, being Indian territory inside a Bangladeshi territory which is itself inside an exclave of India in Bangladesh, before being ceded to Bangladesh in 2015.

List of former enclaves and exclaves[edit]
Some individual enclaves were composed of several administrative units (chhits and/or mauzas). These administrative units must be differentiated from the enclave as a whole. "This is particularly important for the Cooch Behar enclaves, where the several administrative units which together form some of the larger enclaves are commonly, but wrongly, termed enclaves themselves, or where one component unit commonly lends its name to the whole enclave. ... [T]he official Indo–Bangladesh Boundary Commission figure of 111 Indian and 51 Bangladeshi exchangeable enclaves would appear to count only individual mauzas, even when these consisted of more than one enclave."[2] There is not a one-to-one relationship between enclaves, chhits and mauzas.[2]

All of the information shown in the following two tables has been assembled from Whyte.[2]

Bangladesh[edit]
In order to distinguish chhits having the same names, serial numbers established by Banerjee (1966)[33] are shown in parentheses, as (#). The Bangladesh series is separate from the India series.

With 4 exceptions (Chhat Tilai, Baikunthapur Teldhar (#3, #4, #5)), the first-order enclaves, including the 3 composite enclaves, lie entirely within the Cooch Behar District of West Bengal state, India. All 21 counter-enclaves lie within the Rangpur Division of Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi enclaves had an estimated population of 14,215 in 2015.[28]

Bangladeshi Chhits Within Indian Territory[2][5] Area (km2) Area (mi2) Notes
Dahagram-Angarpota 18.684 7.214 Largest composite exclave of Bangladesh within India, comprises the contiguous Dahagram and Angarpota chhits.
Dahagram❋ 15.690 6.058 Largest chhit of Bangladesh, part of the Dahagram-Angarpota composite exclave within India.
Nalgram 7.705 2.975 Composite exclave of Bangladesh within India, comprises the contiguous Falnapur and Nalgram (#52) chhits.
Nalgram (#52)❋ 5.655 2.183 Part of the Nalgram composite exclave within India (area includes 2 other smaller chhits, each itself an exclave and true enclave, each also named Nalgram (#53, #54)). Surrounds the Indian counter-enclave, Nalgram Chhit (#111).
Nalgram (#53) see #52 see #52 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Nalgram (#52).
Nalgram (#54) see #52 see #52 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Nalgram (#52).
Angarpota❋ 2.994 1.156 Part of the Dahagram-Angarpota composite exclave within India.
Dakshin Masaldanga <2.797 <1.080 Composite exclave of Bangladesh within India, comprises the contiguous Kachua and Dakshin Masaldanga (#74) chhits.
Poaturkuthi 2.387 0.922 First-order enclave within India.
Batrigach (#59) 2.337 0.902 First-order enclave within India (area includes the smaller Batrigach (#60), itself an exclave and true enclave). Surrounds the Indian counter-enclave, Madnakura Chhit in Bhoti Nath Batrigach.
Batrigach (#60) see #59 see #59 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Batrigach (#59).
Dakshin Masaldanga (#74)❋ 2.312 0.893 Part of the Dakshin Masaldanga composite exclave (along with Kachua chhit) within India; area includes 6 other smaller chhits, each also named Dakshin Masaldanga (#73, 75, 76, 77, 78 & 90), each itself an exclave and true enclave.
Dakshin Masaldanga (#73) see #74 see #74 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Dakshin Masaldanga (#74).
Dakshin Masaldanga (#75) see #74 see #74 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Dakshin Masaldanga (#74).
Dakshin Masaldanga (#76) see #74 see #74 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Dakshin Masaldanga (#74).
Dakshin Masaldanga (#77) see #74 see #74 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Dakshin Masaldanga (#74).
Dakshin Masaldanga (#78) see #74 see #74 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Dakshin Masaldanga (#74).
Dakshin Masaldanga (#90) see #74 see #74 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Dakshin Masaldanga (#74).
Falnapur❋ 2.050 0.792 Part of the Nalgram composite exclave within India.
Sibprasad Mustafi (#67) 1.510 0.583 First-order enclave within India (area includes the smaller Sibprasad Mustafi (#68), itself an exclave and true enclave).
Sibprasad Mustafi (#68) see #67 see #67 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Sibprasad Mustafi (#67).
Chhit Kuchlibari 1.500 0.579 First-order enclave within India.
Bala Pukhari 1.342 0.518 First-order enclave within India.
Karala (#63) 1.092 0.422 First-order enclave within India (area includes 2 other smaller chhits, each itself an exclave and true enclave, each also named Karala (#64, #65)).
Karala (#64) see #63 see #63 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Karala (#63).
Karala (#65) see #63 see #63 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Karala (#63).
Kismat Batrigach 0.850 0.328 First-order enclave within India.
Dhabalsati Mirgipur 0.704 0.272 First-order enclave within India.
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 111 0.685 0.264 Counter-exclave surrounded by and sharing borders with two contiguous Indian chhits, Balapara Khagrabari (#42) and Kothajni (#43) (both within the composite exclave named "Balapara Khagrabari" in the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh).
Purba Masaldanga (#87) 0.623 0.241 First-order enclave within India (area includes the smaller Purba Masaldanga (#86), itself an exclave and true enclave). A map from the 1930s and a 1940 source[34]imply that Purba Masaldanga (#86) and (#87) form a single enclave. However, topographic mapping and other sources suggest two enclaves, as listed here, but if joined, they are connected across the narrowest gap separating them, along a beel (marshy former river course).[2]
Purba Masaldanga (#86) see #87 see #87 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Purba Masaldanga (#87).
Paschim Bakalir Chhara 0.615 0.237 First-order enclave within India.
Madhya Masaldanga 0.553 0.214 First-order enclave within India. Surrounds the Indian counter-enclave, Chhit Seoruguri.
Mahishmari 0.497 0.192 First-order enclave within India.
Kachua❋ 0.485 0.187 Part of the Dakshin Masaldanga composite exclave (along with Dakshin Masaldanga #74) within India.
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 110 0.449 0.173 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Dahala Khagrabari (#47), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh. It surrounds the only counter-counter-enclave in the world, Dahala Khagrabari (#51).
Chhit Panbari 0.439 0.169 First-order enclave within India.
Jote Nijjama 0.354 0.137 First-order enclave within India; although not definite, it possibly forms an international quadripoint (one point in common with four different areas) of Bangladesh and India: two parts of Patgram thana (main part and the Jote Nijjama enclave itself) in Lalmonirhat District and two parts of Mekhliganj thana in Mekhliganj subdivision, Cooch Behar District, India.
Chhat Tilai 0.330 0.127 First-order enclave within India, straddling the border of Cooch Behar District (West Bengal) and Dhubri District (Assam).
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 22 0.292 0.113 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Dahala Khagrabari (#47), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Chhit Land of Jagatber No. 3 0.283 0.109 First-order enclave within India.
Chhit Dhabalsati 0.269 0.104 First-order enclave within India.
Dhabalsati (#32) 0.245 0.095 First-order enclave within India.
Baikunthapur Teldhar (#4) 0.210 0.081 First-order enclave within Jalpaiguri District, West Bengal, India (area includes 2 other smaller chhits, each itself an exclave and true enclave, each also named Baikunthapur Teldhar (#3, #5)).
Baikunthapur Teldhar (#3) see #4 see #4 First-order enclave within Jalpaiguri District, West Bengal, India (area combined with that shown for the larger Baikunthapur Teldhar (#4)).
Baikunthapur Teldhar (#5) see #4 see #4 First-order enclave within Jalpaiguri District, West Bengal, India (area combined with that shown for the larger Baikunthapur Teldhar (#4)).
Chhit Nalgram (#55) 0.200 0.077 First-order enclave within India (area includes Chhit Nalgram (#56), itself an exclave and true enclave).
Chhit Nalgram (#56) see #55 see #55 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for Chhit Nalgram (#55).
Uttar Bansjani 0.191 0.074 First-order enclave within India.
Chhit Bhandardaha 0.162 0.063 First-order enclave within India.
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 113 0.148 0.057 Counter-exclave surrounded by and sharing a border with two contiguous Indian exclaves, Balapara Khagrabari (#42) and Kothajni (#43) (both within the composite exclave named "Balapara Khagrabari" in the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh).
Purba Chhit Masaldanga (#84) 0.142 0.055 First-order enclave within India (area includes the smaller Purba Chhit Masaldanga (#83), itself an exclave and true enclave).
Purba Chhit Masaldanga (#83) see #84 see #84 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Purba Chhit Masaldanga (#84).
Bara Saradubi 0.141 0.054 First-order enclave within India; forms an international quadripoint (one point in common with four different areas) of Bangladesh and India: two parts of Hatibandha thana (main part and the Bara Saradubi enclave itself) in Lalmonirhat District and two parts of Sitalkuchi thana in Mathabhanga subdivision, Cooch Behar District, India.
Chandrakhan 0.140 0.054 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian true enclave/exclave, Dasiar Chhara (#117), located within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Madhya Bakalir Chhara 0.132 0.051 First-order enclave within India.
Chhit Land of Jagatber No. 1 0.124 0.048 First-order enclave within India.
Chhit Kokoabari 0.1193 0.0461 First-order enclave within India.
Paschim Masaldanga (#79) 0.1193 0.0461 First-order enclave within India (area includes Paschim Masaldanga (#80), itself an exclave and true enclave).
Paschim Masaldanga (#80) see #79 see #79 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for Paschim Masaldanga (#79).
Uttar Masaldanga 0.1104 0.0426 First-order enclave within India.
Chhit Land of Jagatber No. 2 0.1096 0.0423 First-order enclave within India.
Chhit Land of Dhabalguri No. 2 0.1086 0.0419 First-order enclave within India.
Bansua Khamar Gitaldaha 0.0993 0.0383 First-order enclave within India.
Uttar Dhaldanga (#93) 0.0966 0.0373 First-order enclave within India (area includes 2 other smaller chhits, each itself an exclave and true enclave, each also named Uttar Dhaldanga (#92, #94)).
Uttar Dhaldanga (#92) see #93 see #93 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Uttar Dhaldanga (#93).
Uttar Dhaldanga (#94) see #93 see #93 First-order enclave within India, area combined with that shown for the larger Uttar Dhaldanga (#93).
Chhit Dhabalguri 0.0903 0.0349 First-order enclave within India.
Durgapur 0.0848 0.0327 First-order enclave within India.
Nazirganj (#10) 0.0799 † 0.0308 † Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Bewladanga (#39), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Teldhar (#1) 0.0586 0.0226 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian true enclave/exclave, Garati (#1), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh (area includes the smaller Teldhar (#2), itself an exclave and true enclave).
Teldhar (#2) see #1 see #1 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian true enclave/exclave, Garati (#1), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh, area combined with that shown for the larger Teldhar (#1).
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 112 0.0571 0.0220 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Kothajni (#43), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Chhit Land of Dhabalguri No. 1 0.0565 0.0218 First-order enclave within India.
Dhabalguri 0.0506 0.0195 First-order enclave within India.
Purba Bakalir Chhara 0.0495 0.0191 First-order enclave within India.
Madhya Chhit Masaldanga 0.0480 0.0185 First-order enclave within India.
Jongra 0.0334 0.0129 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian true enclave/exclave, Banskata (#93), located within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Paschim Chhit Masaldanga 0.0308 0.0119 First-order enclave within India.
Debi Doba 0.0302 0.0117 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Dahala Khagrabari (#47), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Nazirganj −29 0.0265 0.0102 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian true enclave/exclave, Nazirganj (#27), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Debottar Saldanga 0.0247 0.0095 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Bewladanga (#39), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Chhit Land of Dhabalguri No. 4 0.0184 0.0071 First-order enclave within India.
Chhit Land of Dhabalguri No. 5 0.0167 0.0064 First-order enclave within India.
Bamandal 0.0089 0.0034 First-order enclave within India.
Chhit Land of Kuchlibari 0.0074 0.0029 First-order enclave within India.
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 99 0.0071 0.0027 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Kothajni (#43), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Dhabalsati (#33) 0.0065 0.0025 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Bara Khangir (#66), located within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Nazirganj (#8) 0.0062 † 0.0024 † Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Shalbari (#35), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 13 0.0054 0.0021 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Kothajni (#43), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Chhit Land of Dhabalguri No. 3 0.0054 0.0021 First-order enclave within India.
Amjhol 0.0051 0.0020 First-order enclave within India.
Chhit Land of Panbari No. 2 0.0046 0.0018 First-order enclave within India.
Nazirganj −30 0.0046 0.0018 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian true enclave/exclave, Nazirganj (#19), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Srirampur 0.0042 0.0016 First-order enclave within India.
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 15 0.0041 0.0016 Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Dahala Khagrabari (#47), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Nazirganj (#9) 0.00291 † 0.00112 † Counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Shalbari (#35), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 24 0.00287 0.00111 Smallest known chhit of Bangladesh, a counter-enclave surrounded by an Indian exclave, Kothajni (#43), located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
❋ This chhit is part of a composite enclave and by itself is neither an enclave nor an exclave.
† Stated size may not be exact.[2]
India[edit]
The 102 first-order enclaves (including the 6 composite enclaves) and the 1 counter-counter enclave lie within the Rangpur Division of Bangladesh. The 3 counter-enclaves lie within the Cooch Behar District of West Bengal state, India. In order to distinguish chhits having the same names, serial numbers established by Banerjee (1966)[33] are shown in parentheses, as (#). The India series is separate from the Bangladesh series. There were 37,334 people living in the Indian enclaves in 2015.[28]

Indian Chhits Within Bangladeshi Territory[2][5] Area (km2) Area (mi2) Notes
Balapara Khagrabari 25.952 10.020 Composite exclave of India, bordering the Panchagarh and Nilphamari Districts, Bangladesh, comprises the contiguous Dahala Khagrabari (#47), Kothajni (#43) and Balapara Khagrabari (#42) chhits (area includes 6 other smaller chhits, each itself an exclave and true enclave: 3 also named Dahala Khagrabari (#48, #49, #50) and 3 also named Kothajni (#44, #45, #46)).
Shalbari 14.091 5.441 Composite exclave of India within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh, comprises the contiguous Shalbari (#35), Bewladanga (#39), Kajal Dighi, Daikhata Chhat, Nataoka (#37) and Nataoka (#38) chhits.
Dahala Khagrabari (#47)❋ 10.717 4.138 Largest chhit of India, part of Balapara Khagrabari composite exclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh (area includes 3 other smaller chhits, each itself an exclave and true enclave, each also named Dahala Khagrabari (#48, #49, #50)).
Dahala Khagrabari (#48) see #47 see #47 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh, area combined with that shown for the larger Dahala Khagrabari (#47).
Dahala Khagrabari (#49) see #47 see #47 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh, area combined with that shown for the larger Dahala Khagrabari (#47).
Dahala Khagrabari (#50) see #47 see #47 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh, area combined with that shown for the larger Dahala Khagrabari (#47).
Kothajni (#43)❋ 8.143 3.144 Part of Balapara Khagrabari composite exclave, bordering the Panchagarh and Nilphamari Districts, Bangladesh (area includes 3 other smaller chhits, each itself an exclave and true enclave, each also named Kothajni (#44, #45, #46)).
Kothajni (#44) see #43 see #43 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh, area combined with that shown for the larger Kothajni (#43).
Kothajni (#45) see #43 see #43 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh, area combined with that shown for the larger Kothajni (#43).
Kothajni (#46) see #43 see #43 First-order exclave bordering the Panchagarh and Nilphamari Districts, Bangladesh, area combined with that shown for the larger Kothajni (#43).
Balapara Khagrabari (#42)❋ 7.092 2.738 Part of Balapara Khagrabari composite exclave, bordering the Panchagarh District and Nilphamari Districts, Bangladesh.
Dasiar Chhara 6.651 2.568 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Shalbari (#35)❋ 4.811 1.858 Part of Shalbari composite exclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Garati (#1) 3.920 1.514 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Bewladanga (#39)❋ 3.479 1.343 Part of Shalbari composite exclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Kajal Dighi❋ 3.122 1.205 Part of Shalbari composite exclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Daikhata Chhat❋ 2.020 0.780 Part of Shalbari composite exclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#33) 1.758 0.679 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#93) 1.675 0.647 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Kamat Changrabandha 1.626 0.628 Composite exclave of India within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh, comprises the contiguous Bhotbari (#74), Panisala (#77) and Kamat Changrabandha (#75, #76) chhits.
Banskata (#97) 1.275 0.492 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Lotamari (#83) 1.147 0.443 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Kharkharia 0.904 0.349 Composite exclave of India within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh, comprises the contiguous Lotamari (#73), Kharkharia (#71) and Kharkharia (#72) chhits.
Bans Pachai 0.879 0.339 First-order exclave bordering the Lalmonirhat and Kurigram Districts, Bangladesh.
Bhotbari (#74)❋ 0.831 0.321 Part of Kamat Changrabandha composite exclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Natatoka (#37)❋ 0.657 0.254 Part of Shalbari composite exclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Panisala (#77)❋ 0.557 0.215 Part of Kamat Changrabandha composite exclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Bara Khangir 0.523 0.202 Composite exclave of India within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh, comprises the contiguous Bara Khangir (#66) and Chhat Bagdokra chhits.
Gotamuri Chhit (#112) 0.512 0.198 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Putimari 0.497 0.192 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Lotamari (#73)❋ 0.449 0.173 Part of Kharkharia composite exclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Lotamari (#84) 0.400 0.154 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Bara Khangir (#66)❋ 0.354 0.137 Part of Bara Khangir composite exclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Bans Pachai Bhitarkuthi 0.331 0.128 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja 0.309 0.119 Composite exclave of India within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh, comprises the contiguous Najirgonja (#28, #29, #30, #31) chhits.
Garati (#3) 0.298 0.115 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#27) 0.297 0.115 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Panisala (#81) 0.262 0.101 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Kharkharia (#71)❋ 0.246 0.095 Part of Kharkharia composite exclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Ratanpur 0.238 0.092 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#32) 0.236 0.091 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Garati (#6) 0.236 0.091 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#96) 0.234 0.090 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Chhat Bhothat 0.227 0.088 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Balapukhari 0.226 0.087 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#19) 0.219 0.085 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#31)❋ 0.216 0.083 Part of Najirgonja composite exclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Kharkharia (#72)❋ 0.209 0.081 Part of Kharkharia composite exclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Panisala (#82) 0.208 0.080 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Bara Khangir (#65) 0.204 0.079 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#25) 0.198 0.076 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh. Najirgonja (#25) and (#26) are shown joined as one in pre-1947 maps, but as separate in 1991 Indian census maps.[2][35]
Dwarikamari (#86) 0.185 0.071 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Seotikursa 0.185 0.071 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Uponchowki Kuhlibari (#62) 0.178 0.069 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Kamat Changrabandha (#75)❋ 0.173 0.067 Part of Kamat Changrabandha composite exclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Chhat Bagdokra❋ 0.169 0.065 Part of Bara Khangir composite exclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Bara Gaochulka 0.162 0.063 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Dwarikamari (#85) 0.160 0.062 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Bhotbari (#63) 0.149 0.058 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Bara Khanki Kharija Gitaldaha (#54) 0.149 0.058 First-order enclave within the Nilphamari District of Bangladesh.
Dwarikamarikhasbash 0.148 0.057 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Chhoto Guraljhara I 0.145 0.056 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Madnakura Chhit in Bhoti Nath Batrigach 0.144 0.056 Counter-enclave surrounded by a Bangladeshi true enclave/exclave, Batrigach (#59), located within Cooch Behar District of West Bengal state, India.
Nagarjikabari 0.135 0.052 First-order enclave within the Nilphamari District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#100) 0.134 0.052 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Shahebganj 0.128 0.049 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#104) 0.125 † 0.048 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#94) 0.1244 0.0480 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Barakhangir 0.1236 0.0477 First-order enclave within the Nilphamari District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#99) 0.1182 0.0456 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Bagdokra 0.1032 0.0398 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#109) 0.0986 † 0.0381 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#88) 0.0904 0.0349 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Kalamati 0.0858 0.0331 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#90) 0.0853 0.0329 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Gotamuri Chhit (#113) 0.0810 0.0313 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Panisala (#80) 0.0729 0.0281 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Garati (#4) 0.0728 0.0281 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh. Garati (#4) and (#5) are shown joined as one enclave in pre-1947 topographic maps, in which the smaller (#5) adjoins the northern boundary of the larger (#4). Later sources (1991 Indian census maps[35] and Banerjee, 1966[33]) depict them as separate.[2]
Najirgonja (#29)❋ 0.0726 0.0280 Part of Najirgonja composite exclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Chhoto Guraljhara II 0.0722 0.0279 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#108) 0.0686 † 0.0265 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Kamat Changrabandha (#76)❋ 0.0648 0.0250 Part of Kamat Changrabandha composite exclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Dakurhat Dakinir Kuthi 0.0577 0.0223 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#16) 0.0575 0.0222 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#101) 0.0515 † 0.0199 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Dighaltari I 0.0498 0.0192 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#26) 0.0493 0.0190 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh. Najirgonja (#25) and (#26) are shown joined as one in pre-1947 maps, but as separate in 1991 Indian census maps.[2][35]
Banskata (#95) 0.0492 0.0190 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#89) 0.0484 0.0187 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Gaochulka I 0.0361 0.0139 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Dighaltari II 0.0357 0.0138 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#17) 0.0335 0.0129 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Chenakata 0.0316 † 0.0122 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Bara Khanki Kharija Gitaldaha (#53) 0.0312 0.0120 First-order enclave within the Nilphamari District of Bangladesh.
Shingimari Part I 0.0246 ± 0.0013 0.00950 ± 0.00050 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Kuchlibari (#57) 0.0234 0.0090 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Jamaldaha Balapukhari 0.0212 † 0.082 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#24) 0.0204 † 0.0079 † First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Nalgram Chhit 0.0191 0.0074 Counter-enclave surrounded by a Bangladeshi exclave, Nalgram (#52), located within Cooch Behar District of West Bengal state, India.
Bara Kuchlibari 0.0176 † 0.0068 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#28)❋ 0.01574 0.00608 Part of Najirgonja composite exclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#20) 0.01566 † 0.00605 † First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Bewladanga (#40) 0.01097 0.00424 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#103) 0.01032 † 0.00398 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Chhit Seoruguri 0.01016 0.00392 Smallest Indian counter-enclave, surrounded by a Bangladeshi true enclave/exclave, Madhya Masaldanga, located within Cooch Behar District of West Bengal state, India.
Banskata (#102) 0.00943 † 0.00364 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Kuchlibari (#58) 0.00826 0.00319 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Garati (#2) 0.00704 0.00272 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Dahala Khagrabari (#51) 0.00688 0.00266 Dahala Khagrabari (#51) is the only counter-counter enclave in the world. It is surrounded by Upanchowki Bhajni 110, a Bangladeshi counter-enclave within the Indian composite exclave named Balapara Khagrabari, which is surrounded by the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh. Dahala Khagrabari (#51) is not part of the Balapara Khagrabari composite exclave, as it is not contiguous to it and borders only Bangladesh.
Bhogramguri 0.00583 † 0.00225 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#106) 0.00563 † 0.00217 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#107) 0.00554 † 0.00214 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja Chhit (#30)❋ 0.00433 0.00167 Part of Najirgonja composite exclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#22) 0.00421 † 0.00163 † First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#21) 0.00413 † 0.00159 † First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Gaochulka II 0.00364 0.00141 First-order enclave within the Kurigram District of Bangladesh.
Fulker Dabri 0.00356 † 0.00137 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Bewladanga Chhat (#41) 0.00336 † 0.00130 † First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Garati (#5) 0.00320 0.00124 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh. Garati (#4) and (#5) are shown joined as one enclave in pre-1947 topographic maps, in which the smaller (#5) adjoins the northern boundary of the larger (#4). Later sources (1991 Indian census maps[35] and Banerjee, 1966[33]) depict them as separate.[2]
Najirgonja (#23) 0.00312 † 0.00120 † First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#98) 0.00312 0.00120 First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#105) 0.00259 † 0.00100 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Najirgonja (#15) 0.00210 0.00081 † First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Dahala Khagrabari (#52) 0.00178 0.00069 First-order enclave within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh.
Uponchowki Kuchlibari (#61) 0.00129 † 0.00050 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Banskata (#110) 0.00113 † 0.00044 † First-order enclave within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Panisala (#79) 0.00109 † 0.00042 † The smallest Indian true enclave; located within the Lalmonirhat District of Bangladesh.
Natatoka (#38)❋ 0.00105 0.00041 Smallest known chhit of India, part of Shalbari composite exclave; located within the Panchagarh District of Bangladesh; borders Bangladesh and Shalbari (#35).
❋ This chhit is part of a composite enclave and by itself is neither an enclave nor an exclave.
† Stated size may not be exact.[2]
See also[edit]

• List of enclaves and exclaves
• Baarle-Hertog in Belgium
• Baarle-Nassau in the Netherlands
• Büsingen in Switzerland
• Campione d'Italia in Switzerland
• Vennbahn in Belgium

References

1. Jump up^ "India and Bangladesh discuss 'pasha' enclaves: Recognition of landlocked areas won in card games to be raised during India PM's visit". Al Jazeera. 6 September 2011. Retrieved 15 July 2014.
2. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Whyte, Brendan R. (2002). "Waiting for the esquimo: An historical and documentary study of the Cooch Behar enclaves of India and Bangladesh" (PDF). The School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, The University of Melbourne. Retrieved 11 September 2011. (registration required)
3. Jump up^ Roy, Shubhajit (2 December 2014). "Everything you need to know: Land swap in offing with Bangladesh to end disputes". The Indian Express. Retrieved 29 May 2015.
4. ^ Jump up to:a b "The Constitution (119th Amendment) Bill, 2013" PRS India. Accessed 10 May 2015.[1]
5. ^ Jump up to:a b c d "Prez assents: Constitution (One Hundredth Amendment) Act, 2015". 1, Law Street. 30 May 2015. Retrieved 30 May 2015.
6. ^ Jump up to:a b Nagchoudhury, Subrata (7 June 2015). "I've got a nation. It comes at the end of my life, still it comes: resident of a Bangladeshi enclave". The Indian Express. Retrieved 7 June 2015.
7. ^ Jump up to:a b Mukhopadhyay, Sougata (7 September 2011). "India-Bangladesh sign pact on border demarcation". CNN-IBN. Archived from the original on 22 June 2012. Retrieved 20 September 2011.
8. Jump up^ Taylor, Adam (1 August 2015). "Say goodbye to the weirdest border dispute in the world". Washington Post.
9. ^ Jump up to:a b Bagchi, Suvojit (13 June 2015). "Land pact rollout in next 11 months". The Hindu. Retrieved 15 June 2015.
10. Jump up^ Daniyal, Shoaib (8 May 2015). "India-Bangla land swap: was the world's strangest border created by a game of chess?". Scroll.in.
11. Jump up^ Roy, Indrani (5 June 2015). "'Border deal will control infiltration from Bangladesh'". Rediff.com.
12. Jump up^ Evgeny Vinokurov, "Theory of Enclaves" (2005) – Chapter 6: Enclave stories and case studies, page 117: Cooch Behar
13. Jump up^ "Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves". 1, Law Street. Supreme Court of India. 14 March 1960. Retrieved 30 May 2015.
14. Jump up^ "India & Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement" (PDF). Ministry of External Affairs Government of India. Retrieved 1 March 2015.
15. ^ Jump up to:a b "The land that maps forgot". The Economist. 15 February 2011.
16. Jump up^ "Bangladesh, India to swap 162 land parcels". Google News. AFP. 30 August 2011. Archived from the original on 21 February 2014. Retrieved 30 August 2011.
17. Jump up^ "Hope for Indo-Bangladesh enclaves". NDTV. 12 September 2011. Retrieved 12 September 2011.
18. Jump up^ "Proposed enclave exchange with Bangladesh will be national loss: BJP". Yahoo News. IANS. 11 March 2013. Retrieved 17 August 2013.
19. Jump up^ "Thousands Celebrate Historic India-Bangladesh Border Pact". NDTV. 7 June 2015. Retrieved 7 June 2015.
20. Jump up^ Bagchi, Indrani (15 August 2013). "India-Bangladesh border pact constitutional amendment bill to be tabled in Parliament next week". Times of India. Retrieved 17 August 2013.
21. Jump up^ Chakrabarty, Rakhi (15 August 2013). "Mahanta canvassing support to stall exchange of enclaves bill in Parliament". Times of India. Retrieved 17 August 2013.
22. Jump up^ "Bangladesh land swap bill tabled in Rajya Sabha". Times of India. 19 December 2013. Retrieved 19 December 2013.
23. Jump up^ "AGP plea to Modi on land-swap deal". The Telegraph. 29 May 2014. Retrieved 19 June 2014.
24. Jump up^ "Why Narendra Modi made a U turn on Land Boundary Agreement?". dna. 2 December 2014. Retrieved 19 December 2014.
25. Jump up^ "Bring bill without delay to ratify Indo-Bangla Land Boundary Agreement: Panel to House". The Indian Express. 19 December 2014. Retrieved 19 December 2014.
26. Jump up^ "Par panel approves bill on Indo-Bangla agreement". Business Standard. 26 November 2014. Retrieved 19 December 2014.
27. Jump up^ "India, Bangladesh ratify historic land deal, Narendra Modi announces new $2 billion line of credit to Dhaka". Times of India. 6 June 2015. Retrieved 7 June 2015.
28. ^ Jump up to:a b c "Land exchange deal: Will you go to Bangladesh? Not many Yes in enclaves". The Indian Express. 12 July 2015.
29. Jump up^ "Modi in Bangladesh to conclude land swap agreement". Dawn. Karachi.
30. Jump up^ Bose, Pratim Ranjan (31 July 2015). "Freedom at midnight on India-Bangladesh border". The Hindu Business Line.
31. Jump up^ "Tin Bigha corridor to remain open 24 hours". Bangla News 24. 6 September 2011. Retrieved 7 September 2011.
32. Jump up^ "Transit tumbles into Teesta abyss". bdnews24.com. 6 September 2011. Retrieved 7 September 2011.
33. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Banerjee, R. (1966). "An Account of Exclaves – Origin and Development". Census 1961, West Bengal, District Census Handbook, Cooch Behar. West Bengal Government, India.
34. Jump up^ Hartley, A. C. (1940). Final Report of the Rangpur Survey and Settlement Operations, 1931–1938. Bengal Govt.
35. ^ Jump up to:a b c d "Census of India District Census Handbooks, for Cooch Behar and Jalpaiguri, for 1991 census". West Bengal Government, India.

Further reading[edit]

• van Schendel, Willem. "Stateless in South Asia: The Making of the India-Bangladesh Enclaves". The Journal of Asian Studies. 61 (1): 115–147. JSTOR 2700191.

Territorial disputes in East, South, and Southeast Asia
Categories:

• Bangladesh–India border
• Territorial disputes of Bangladesh
• Territorial disputes of India
• Bangladesh–India relations
• Geography of West Bengal
• Former enclaves

• This page was last modified on 13 November 2016, at 20:17.