wrong poll with wrong questions
he was not a traitor and not a hero
he was a failed general of a failed state following a failed policy and trying to defend a part of the country against the Indian army and Mukti Bahni when the population wanted it out.
That seems to sum it all up and quite accurately at that.
There has been some discussion about Niazi's competence, courage etc before the circumstances that led to final surrender at the Dhak Racecourse. Some of that may even be valid. However as some here have said he should have fought to the "last man, last bullet" or to the "bitter end of a scorched earth"; that line of argument is fallacious and even foolish.
The concept of "last man, last bullet" is actually meant for individuals or even some small formations; in order to stave off immediate danger or risk to a larger formation or larger aim/cause. It cannot be extrapolated onto a larger formation and then hope or permit an entire Army to be allowed to wiped away.
A-La "Charge of the Light Brigade"; very romantic but foolish!
That is the reason why Niazi ordered his men to lay down arms. And the "rules of the conduct of war" permitted him to do so. In the process he 'preserved' a large part of the Pakistani Army from annhilation and they lived to fight another day. One of the POWs rose to become CAS of the PAF during the Kargil Conflict. Should he have been expended away in 1971 just because it suits somebody's ideas of 'jingoism' here?
Should he (or more correctly speaking;
could he) have held out longer? To start with; his plan of holding out in some Cantonments fortified as "fortresses" came unstuck. Largely because the attacking IA and Mukti Bahini Forces simply bypassed them and pushed on ahead. So the prospects of holding out was increasingly dim and would be attended with grave casualties. That had become an option that rapidly evaporated. So he had come onto a very hard
fait accompli situation.
Another thing to remember, was: Niazi by surrendering in the East may have played a role in preserving the West. Now this goes against that old and absurd adage of "The Defence of the East lay in the West" so much so that it turns that idea on its very head.
To explain: When the fall of the East was looking fairly imminent, the Indian Army's attention had already turned Westwards. So much so that Ground Forces and Air Assets were being rapidly re-mobilised to the West. Pressure on that front would have been increased. Though there would have not been any final
denouement there, the mayhem would have increased exponentially. It is another matter that the Indian Political Leadership of that time, i.e. Indira Gandhi was not too "gung-ho" about that plan and the then Foreign Minister Swaran Singh was against it. But there was a section of the IA Command that had considered extending the Ops there. It was the surrender of the Pakistani Army in the East that conclusively tilted the balance of opinion in the Indian Leadership, coupled with lack of Soviet Union support for the idea which was necessary to keep the UN out of action. If at all Soviet Union support was forthcoming, the ops in the West would have been extended. This could not have led to the annexation of West Pakistan but could have been used to "rationalise the borders"; i.e. occupy chunks of strategic land notably in Jammu and Kashmir. That is as far as it could have gone. So the surrender in the East shortened the War in the West. The defence of the West was ensured by the surrender in the East.
In the light of all the facts; Niazi cannot be faulted for surrendering the Pakistani Army under his command when he did. That bears to be thought about seriously.
