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India’s defence pact with Qatar | Pragmatic Euphony

During the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Qatar earlier this week, India and Qatar signed a defence cooperation pact. One of the top Indian officials there labelled the agreement on — Joint training exercises, training of personnel and maritime cooperation — as “just short of stationing troops (in the region)”. The significance of this pact has not been grasped by the Indian media, which has left this landmark agreement unexplored.

“The defence and security cooperation agreements are the only one of the kind that India has signed with any country,” he [government official] said.

Under the agreements, New Delhi has committed to protect assets and interests of Qatar from external threats. “The agreements are short of stationing troops,” the official said but did not elaborate the form in which India will go to Qatar’s rescue in case of a threat.

Qatar has a large US troops stationed on its soil but wanted more “comfort” and had been pursuing the deal with India since 2005.[PTI]

This means that India has actually vowed to protect Qatar’s considerable assets — petroleum and gas fields and sea lanes — if the need arises. India and Qatar had earlier agreed in June 2007 to jointly produce weapons and military equipment. This defence cooperation pact signed now will also pave the way for joint production of weapons at Indian facilities.

New Delhi has added Qatar to the list of countries with which India has inked defence cooperation agreements — United States, United Kingdom, France, South Africa, Australia, Singapore, Germany and lately, Japan. Qatar become the first country in the Middle East to sign such a pact with India. Why is Qatar so important to India?

Qatar is of immense strategic importance due to its geographical location in central Persian Gulf near major petroleum deposits and its own enormous energy reserves. Qatar is surrounded by a neighbourhood – Iran, Iraq and even Saudi Arabia – that it can hardly trust. It has been concerned about its own security, despite a large US base, strategically placed at the narrow mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. It is from this Al-Udeid base, where the operational headquarters of US Central Command were located during the Second Gulf War, that the US monitors a potentially-nuclear Iran, an unstable Iraq and China’s growing footprint in the region, especially activity in the Pakistani port of Gwadar.

Qatar is the richest country in the world by World Bank per-capita estimates. The stalled round of WTO talks is named after Qatar’s capital, Doha. The Al Jazeera television network, which has become the main outlet for the political views of the Middle East, is based there. Al Jazeera has ruffled many feathers with its unique brand of lively reportage and critical commentary. This includes, not only Israel and the United States, but many Islamic regimes including Saudi Arabia.

Qatar has had a vexed relationship with the US in the recent past. Relations between Qatar and the US took a nosedive over the issue of Al Jazeera. The US felt Al Jazeera was promoting radical view points and supporting terrorism. As host of the annual summit of Gulf Arab leaders this year, Doha invited Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to attend. Following Hamas’s election victory in 2006, Qatar publicly rebuked the US for working to undermine the results of the democratic process in Palestine.The relations soured further when the US found it difficult to convince Qatar to vote on some sensitive subjects during the latter’s tenure as a member of the UN Security Council. However, there are signs that the ties between Qatar and the US are again warming up now.

The difficult relationship between Qatar and Saudi Arabia has also been repaired in the recent months. Besides objections to the portrayal of the Saudi ruling family by Al Jazeera, Saudi Arabia had earlier taken offence to Qatar’s relationship with Israel. Qatar, on the eve of accepting the chairmanship of the OIC in November 2000, closed the Israeli trade office in Doha. Many observers have noted that Saudi Arabia also did not like the special security relationship Qatar had developed with the United States. It meant that the US had acquired more flexibility for launching military operations in the region, thereby undermining Saudi Arabia’s key strategic importance in the region. However, a three-day visit of the Saudi Crown Prince earlier this year has suggested a normalisation of relations between Qatar and Saudis. The normalisation of their relationship also indicates the normalisation of relations between Qatar and the US.

Qatar, with the third-largest reserves of natural gas in the world, has identified India as a big market for its natural gas. RasGas of Qatar has signed a 25-year deal for shipping 7.5 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas annually to terminals in Dahej in Gujarat and in Kochi. The ex-ship price of $2.53 million British thermal unit (mmBtu) is considered a steal in current times of LNG prices breaching $20 per mmBtu. Earlier, Qatar had rescued India by supplying 1.5 million tons of more LNG on a short-term contract basis to recommence the beleaguered Dabhol power plant in Maharashtra, when other nations sought review of gas price due to increase in prices of crude oil. This favourable gesture of the Qatar government has underpinnned the burgeoning economic and staretgic relationship between New Delhi and Doha.

The maritime cooperation agreement provides India with a strategic naval base in the Gulf region. It is to be noted that the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), including the US, UK, France, Germany, Australia and Pakistan has been operating from bases in Djibouti and Bahrain. The CTF-150 has been the dominant naval presence in the area surrounding the Gulf of Aden, wheras Indian Navy gets a foothold in the region only now.

India has a distinct stake in West Asia particularly in the Gulf region because 60% of its energy imports originate from this area. As India meets nearly 80% of its oil demands from imports, the Gulf region has great strategic importance for India. Moreover, as India (along with China) constitutes the leading component of Asian demand from the region, it becomes an important destination for the Gulf countries too.

In fact, the shift of global energy trade towards Asian economies has its own geostrategic implications as energy relations, despite driven by market theory, are still governed by geopolitical concerns. Nearly 15% of the world’s super tanker capacity transits from the Gulf to South East Asian waters. The US has been the custodian of the energy security regime in the region so far. With India and China emerging as a major constituent of the global energy market, this Indo-Qatar pact is the first step in redesigning the energy security architecture in Asia.

This maritime security initiative will provide India and Qatar with a capacity to act against maritime threats against their commercial interests. India with a stronger and professional Navy will have a dominant role to play in mobilising responses against risks associated with energy transaction, be it safety of trade route or repelling attacks by terrorists. This is a clear declaration of the Indian intent to be the preeminent power between the Persian Gulf and the Malacca Strait.

Interestingly, this not only provides a greater opportunity for much closer cooperation but also indicates a strengthening relationship between India and the US. The greater Indian naval presence in the Gulf will in fact allow the US to shift its military focus to its real concern areas — Afghanistan and Pakistan.

After a similar landmark pact with Japan, India’s signing of a defence pact with Qatar is indicative of the growing importance and trust reposed by US in India as a strategic partner. Both these pacts with staunch US allies could not have been signed without the blessings of the US. Unlike the pact with Japan, which was dismissed by many as a US scheme of a Indo-Japan alliance to strategically contain China, the Indo-Qatar pact is unrelated to China. This should counter the argument that the US was propping up India only as a countervailing force to a rising China.

However there is a big downside to the Indo-Qatar pact. India’s relationship with Iran, which had weakened considerably after the Indian vote against Iran at the IAEA, has now hit a nadir. There has never been and is even now, no real clash of interests between India and Iran in the region. With a new US administration keen on engaging Tehran, India would have had a great opportunity to play the role of a facilitator between the US and Iran.

New Delhi needs to deftly navigate the relationship with Iran, despite the robust growth of its ties with the US on a parallel track. The most visible effort that India can make to signal the revival of its strong ties with Iran is to resume serious discussions on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. An improved relationship with Iran would allow India to align its geostrategic interests with those of Iran [and the US] in stabilising Afghanistan.

Indian sovereign rights are best served by maintaining an independent foreign policy, which allows New Delhi to retain its autonomy of action and thinking on various regional issues. As far as the Gulf region is concerned, the Chairman of the IISS had read the signs correctly –
- See more at: India’s defence pact with Qatar | Pragmatic Euphony

http://pragmatic.nationalinterest.in/2008/11/13/indias-defence-pact-with-qatar/

During the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Qatar earlier this week, India and Qatar signed a defence cooperation pact. One of the top Indian officials there labelled the agreement on — Joint training exercises, training of personnel and maritime cooperation — as “just short of stationing troops (in the region)”. The significance of this pact has not been grasped by the Indian media, which has left this landmark agreement unexplored.

“The defence and security cooperation agreements are the only one of the kind that India has signed with any country,” he [government official] said.

Under the agreements, New Delhi has committed to protect assets and interests of Qatar from external threats. “The agreements are short of stationing troops,” the official said but did not elaborate the form in which India will go to Qatar’s rescue in case of a threat.

Qatar has a large US troops stationed on its soil but wanted more “comfort” and had been pursuing the deal with India since 2005.[PTI]

This means that India has actually vowed to protect Qatar’s considerable assets — petroleum and gas fields and sea lanes — if the need arises. India and Qatar had earlier agreed in June 2007 to jointly produce weapons and military equipment. This defence cooperation pact signed now will also pave the way for joint production of weapons at Indian facilities.

New Delhi has added Qatar to the list of countries with which India has inked defence cooperation agreements — United States, United Kingdom, France, South Africa, Australia, Singapore, Germany and lately, Japan. Qatar become the first country in the Middle East to sign such a pact with India. Why is Qatar so important to India?

Qatar is of immense strategic importance due to its geographical location in central Persian Gulf near major petroleum deposits and its own enormous energy reserves. Qatar is surrounded by a neighbourhood – Iran, Iraq and even Saudi Arabia – that it can hardly trust. It has been concerned about its own security, despite a large US base, strategically placed at the narrow mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. It is from this Al-Udeid base, where the operational headquarters of US Central Command were located during the Second Gulf War, that the US monitors a potentially-nuclear Iran, an unstable Iraq and China’s growing footprint in the region, especially activity in the Pakistani port of Gwadar.

Qatar is the richest country in the world by World Bank per-capita estimates. The stalled round of WTO talks is named after Qatar’s capital, Doha. The Al Jazeera television network, which has become the main outlet for the political views of the Middle East, is based there. Al Jazeera has ruffled many feathers with its unique brand of lively reportage and critical commentary. This includes, not only Israel and the United States, but many Islamic regimes including Saudi Arabia.

Qatar has had a vexed relationship with the US in the recent past. Relations between Qatar and the US took a nosedive over the issue of Al Jazeera. The US felt Al Jazeera was promoting radical view points and supporting terrorism. As host of the annual summit of Gulf Arab leaders this year, Doha invited Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to attend. Following Hamas’s election victory in 2006, Qatar publicly rebuked the US for working to undermine the results of the democratic process in Palestine.The relations soured further when the US found it difficult to convince Qatar to vote on some sensitive subjects during the latter’s tenure as a member of the UN Security Council. However, there are signs that the ties between Qatar and the US are again warming up now.

The difficult relationship between Qatar and Saudi Arabia has also been repaired in the recent months. Besides objections to the portrayal of the Saudi ruling family by Al Jazeera, Saudi Arabia had earlier taken offence to Qatar’s relationship with Israel. Qatar, on the eve of accepting the chairmanship of the OIC in November 2000, closed the Israeli trade office in Doha. Many observers have noted that Saudi Arabia also did not like the special security relationship Qatar had developed with the United States. It meant that the US had acquired more flexibility for launching military operations in the region, thereby undermining Saudi Arabia’s key strategic importance in the region. However, a three-day visit of the Saudi Crown Prince earlier this year has suggested a normalisation of relations between Qatar and Saudis. The normalisation of their relationship also indicates the normalisation of relations between Qatar and the US.

Qatar, with the third-largest reserves of natural gas in the world, has identified India as a big market for its natural gas. RasGas of Qatar has signed a 25-year deal for shipping 7.5 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas annually to terminals in Dahej in Gujarat and in Kochi. The ex-ship price of $2.53 million British thermal unit (mmBtu) is considered a steal in current times of LNG prices breaching $20 per mmBtu. Earlier, Qatar had rescued India by supplying 1.5 million tons of more LNG on a short-term contract basis to recommence the beleaguered Dabhol power plant in Maharashtra, when other nations sought review of gas price due to increase in prices of crude oil. This favourable gesture of the Qatar government has underpinnned the burgeoning economic and staretgic relationship between New Delhi and Doha.

The maritime cooperation agreement provides India with a strategic naval base in the Gulf region. It is to be noted that the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), including the US, UK, France, Germany, Australia and Pakistan has been operating from bases in Djibouti and Bahrain. The CTF-150 has been the dominant naval presence in the area surrounding the Gulf of Aden, wheras Indian Navy gets a foothold in the region only now.

India has a distinct stake in West Asia particularly in the Gulf region because 60% of its energy imports originate from this area. As India meets nearly 80% of its oil demands from imports, the Gulf region has great strategic importance for India. Moreover, as India (along with China) constitutes the leading component of Asian demand from the region, it becomes an important destination for the Gulf countries too.

In fact, the shift of global energy trade towards Asian economies has its own geostrategic implications as energy relations, despite driven by market theory, are still governed by geopolitical concerns. Nearly 15% of the world’s super tanker capacity transits from the Gulf to South East Asian waters. The US has been the custodian of the energy security regime in the region so far. With India and China emerging as a major constituent of the global energy market, this Indo-Qatar pact is the first step in redesigning the energy security architecture in Asia.

This maritime security initiative will provide India and Qatar with a capacity to act against maritime threats against their commercial interests. India with a stronger and professional Navy will have a dominant role to play in mobilising responses against risks associated with energy transaction, be it safety of trade route or repelling attacks by terrorists. This is a clear declaration of the Indian intent to be the preeminent power between the Persian Gulf and the Malacca Strait.

Interestingly, this not only provides a greater opportunity for much closer cooperation but also indicates a strengthening relationship between India and the US. The greater Indian naval presence in the Gulf will in fact allow the US to shift its military focus to its real concern areas — Afghanistan and Pakistan.

After a similar landmark pact with Japan, India’s signing of a defence pact with Qatar is indicative of the growing importance and trust reposed by US in India as a strategic partner. Both these pacts with staunch US allies could not have been signed without the blessings of the US. Unlike the pact with Japan, which was dismissed by many as a US scheme of a Indo-Japan alliance to strategically contain China, the Indo-Qatar pact is unrelated to China. This should counter the argument that the US was propping up India only as a countervailing force to a rising China.

However there is a big downside to the Indo-Qatar pact. India’s relationship with Iran, which had weakened considerably after the Indian vote against Iran at the IAEA, has now hit a nadir. There has never been and is even now, no real clash of interests between India and Iran in the region. With a new US administration keen on engaging Tehran, India would have had a great opportunity to play the role of a facilitator between the US and Iran.

New Delhi needs to deftly navigate the relationship with Iran, despite the robust growth of its ties with the US on a parallel track. The most visible effort that India can make to signal the revival of its strong ties with Iran is to resume serious discussions on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. An improved relationship with Iran would allow India to align its geostrategic interests with those of Iran [and the US] in stabilising Afghanistan.

Indian sovereign rights are best served by maintaining an independent foreign policy, which allows New Delhi to retain its autonomy of action and thinking on various regional issues. As far as the Gulf region is concerned, the Chairman of the IISS had read the signs correctly –
- See more at: http://pragmatic.nationalinterest.in/2008/11/13/indias-defence-pact-with-qatar/#sthash.bYrvfXlz.dpuf
 
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@S-DUCT

Ok I went through the ASR, its a pile of DOG $HIT!

1) De-link the requirement for fly by light, ab initio development of a revolutionary system should not become an integral part of the AMCA project given that even the basic requirements of the project require a lot of R&D and a complete generational leap. We can develop it, but do not follow the concurrent development module, let it be a stand alone thing- if it works then the later production batches can incorporate it.

2) Merge HAL and ADA on this project, the production capacity lies with HAL and as long as they are not involved in the project as equal partners we will end with the LCA scenario of "IT'S NOT OUR BABY!".

3) Drop the ultra/uber requirements, at the moment the AMCA does not need full 3D TVC or even 2D TVC, let there be a growth potential for it.

4) Concentrate on basics-

a) Airframe, combining kinematic performance with VLO/LO shaping.

b) LO/VLO rated radomes, housings and farings. Leveraging work done in the selective frequency bypass material field and RAM/RAS field along with composite and alloy employment.

c) Developing IMA architecture for avionics and fully digital fly by wire (the latter will allow integration of components like non-OEM weapons without any issues- an underrated attribute)

d) Keep an eye out for the essentials, Rafael is developing a 5th gen EO pod which can be internally embedded like the EOTS. Passive self protection suites should be kept as either COTS or foreign procurement items.

e) The core enabling tech is important, not the superficial. A LCA Mk.2 cockpit will do, LRUs which lend themselves to IMA will do. Cut down on the design load- keep things simple.

There is more but the above is doable- anything more is asking for ad hoc generational leaps in far too many sectors which will lead to failure and delays.
 
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@Dillinger:
1) De-link the requirement for fly by light, ab initio development of a revolutionary system should not become an integral part of the AMCA project given that even the basic requirements of the project require a lot of R&D and a complete generational leap. We can develop it, but do not follow the concurrent development module, let it be a stand alone thing- if it works then the later production batches can incorporate it.
But sometimes I wonder why IAF wants Fly-by-light FCS.FBW FCS is good enough for atleast 2 decades.F-22,F-35,J-XX all have FBW.Though production variant of ATD-X will have FBL,but again nippos are ahead of us in this field.
IIRC,HAL has developed Fly by light rotor control system way back in 2003.
2) Merge HAL and ADA on this project, the production capacity lies with HAL and as long as they are not involved in the project as equal partners we will end with the LCA scenario of "IT'S NOT OUR BABY!".
It happens only in incredible india where designer and manufacturer of the same product are in different companies.
With HAL currently focusing in FGFA,there are very slim chances that these DPSUs will stop fighting with each other for the share of contract.
My solution is either merge ADA with HAL or Drop AMCA project all-together and merge ADA with ADE so that they can develope Future unmanned strike fighters.
3) Drop the ultra/uber requirements, at the moment the AMCA does not need full 3D TVC or even 2D TVC, let there be a growth potential for it.
Or select RD-33 turbofan engines from the day one,if they want TVC.Only Ruskies have the required experience in designing FCS with TVC.
4) Concentrate on basics-

a) Airframe, combining kinematic performance with VLO/LO shaping.

b) LO/VLO rated radomes, housings and farings. Leveraging work done in the selective frequency bypass material field and RAM/RAS field along with composite and alloy employment.

c) Developing IMA architecture for avionics and fully digital fly by wire (the latter will allow integration of components like non-OEM weapons without any issues- an underrated attribute)

d) Keep an eye out for the essentials, Rafael is developing a 5th gen EO pod which can be internally embedded like the EOTS. Passive self protection suites should be kept as either COTS or foreign procurement items.

e) The core enabling tech is important, not the superficial. A LCA Mk.2 cockpit will do, LRUs which lend themselves to IMA will do. Cut down on the design load- keep things simple.

There is more but the above is doable- anything more is asking for ad hoc generational leaps in far too many sectors which will lead to failure and delays.
I second on that.!
 
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@Dillinger:

But sometimes I wonder why IAF wants Fly-by-light FCS.FBW FCS is good enough for atleast 2 decades.F-22,F-35,J-XX all have FBW.Though production variant of ATD-X will have FBL,but again nippos are ahead of us in this field.
IIRC,HAL has developed Fly by light rotor control system way back in 2003.

It happens only in incredible india where designer and manufacturer of the same product are in different companies.
With HAL currently focusing in FGFA,there are very slim chances that these DPSUs will stop fighting with each other for the share of contract.
My solution is either merge ADA with HAL or Drop AMCA project all-together and merge ADA with ADE so that they can develope Future unmanned strike fighters.

Or select RD-33 turbofan engines from the day one,if they want TVC.Only Ruskies have the required experience in designing FCS with TVC.

I second on that.!

Shelving the AMCA is dicey albeit attractive. UCAVs will not replace manned platforms entirely or even overwhelmingly- proof being that even the concepts being bandied about for the next gen (speculative 6th gen) are optionally un-manned platforms and the current cop of 5th gen platforms are slated to serve till 2050 and beyond.

The FGFA project does not involve ToT for vital elements and will simply serve as a masterclass imparting project experience to HAL. As such the core 5th gen techs need to be worked out independently, that cannot be done through UCAVs. Bare in mind that even the latest and projected UCAVs run on existing low (relatively) thrust engines, do not involve the sort of VLO shaping and high maneuverability challenges of a manned platform. So if we drop the ball then we might have to make another multiple generation leap from a 4th gen LCA to the 5th gen successors. So as attractive as relegating ADA to a primarily unmanned platform design role seems, and it has been talked of even by PSK, it will not serve us well if we have ambitions.

The structural and organisational issues and frictions between our DPSUs (primarily HAL and ADA) need to be resolved and fresh impetus brought in or else we are looking at another Marut like scenario with the difference that the LCA will be inducted one way or the other but just like in the aftermath of the Marut project we will end up losing significant skills/experience/industrial setup accrued due to stagnancy.

The problem remains in finding the viable mix which can be achievable.

The IAF will not be too enthusiastic about the current design. It has some definite strong points but there are some design gaps, specially how they have adapted certain LCA inlet design features even in the AMCA. The ADA needs to rationalize the ASR, needs to mend fences with HAL. Provisions will have to be made to involve manpower from HAL despite the FGFA project, which might happen if we decide to expedite the Rafale acquisition- but that's HIGHLY speculative.

Dropping some of the relatively frivolous requirements would be a start. We must remember that certain things can't be altered once the design is actually translated into a product/prototype. By then it is too late to change the airframe, too late to drastically alter weight and payload parameters, too late to then start fiddling with alternate engines. In short the core sectors cannot be made subject to last minute alterations or ad-hoc decisions. And let us remember that these last minute complications don't just happen because something has to be altered in the prototype stage but often crop up as a result of constant requirement changes in the design phase itself. When you are engaged in R&D with certain specific parameters in mind then any drastic or significant number of changes to said parameters can translate into complications that acquire an aggravated form down the line in later stages.

There are things we cannot develop concurrently while undertaking such a project- we must admit that and work accordingly. To the best of our knowledge not even basic research had been undertaken in country in terms of IRST and EOTS, such select products should most definitely be procured either off the shelf or adapted with the OEM's help, in either case candidates must be selected in the preliminary stages itself so that the integration is seamless and not a last minute add-on which can very well throw up complications. Cockpit avionics and displays too are not articles which cannot be upgraded and/or altered unlike the primary mission avionics or primary fire control radar. Ergo as I had stated, for the prototype phase and early production phase at least an off the shelf cockpit package should be utilized- the same setup used in the LCA mark.2 will do splendidly. Taking away these non-essential albeit challenging design requirements will cut dead weight and the nature of these specific components will ensure that they can be altered without any issues pertaining to the air frame, engine, radar (the untouchable trinity which should be left alone and factors effecting them should always be treated with caution) etc.

Rationalization is key. If the ADA must push itself then it would find itself served better by refining the LO parameters of the platform, investing in areas such as DSI employment. An accelerated testing and validation of concepts regime can be followed by using LCA demonstrator vehicles as test beds, from the IMA architecture to an airborne ESA sensor. Mitigate and write-off the risks in the early stages of the project, this allows feedback to be incorporated since its not too late and you're not encountering hitherto unforeseen feedback at the 12th hour. We didn't have the privilege of test-vehicles and assorted facilities in the early 90s when the preliminary stages of the LCA project were ongoing. Lets leverage what we have and try and design an attractive but achievable product for the end-user.
 
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@Dillinger @sancho I know you'll get a kick out of this:
KXu7P5s.jpg

PG Kit for HSLD Bomb


The aim of PG kit is to convert dumb bomb in to a precision strike weapon which increases range of weapon manifold by aerodynamics manoeuvering. The kit is in the form of tail cone and nose cone and can be fitted easily around the bomb body. The tail cone houses mainly electromechanical fin actuation system, INS-GPS module, and a guidance on-board computer. The nose cone comprises of laser seeker module along with electronics.


Flight Control and Interface Electronics Unit


The purpose of flight control and interface electronics unit (FCIEU) is to implement guidance, navigation and control algorithms, interface with aircraft and GPS/INS unit, and issue control surface deflection commands to ACEU. It is required for real-time computing and sufficient I/O capabilities. FCIEU integrates with navigation sensors and implements three-loop autopilots and the trajectory control guidance algorithm. It implements the algorithms, which are computationally intensive and will have constraints of three-loop response time of few millisecond. Unit is also responsible for communicating with all sub-systems with pre-defined protocols on different serial interfaces. It has power source and regulation unit which generates different voltages required by different components on FCIEU and GPS/INS integrated module.


Salient Features
-Interfaces with USB memory for reading mission data
-Interfaces with aircraft over data bus for mission data reading and INS initialisation/ alignment
-Senses the release of the bomb from the aircraft and after pre-defined delay initiates the thermal battery
-Sends control signal to RF switch for correct GPS antenna selection
-Interface with GPS/INS unit for control and navigation Implements guidance and control laws (roll and lateral autopilots)
-Interfaces with ACEU for tail fin control
-Transfers laser code to homing head
-Sends start of scan command to homing head
-Interfaces with homing head for getting line-ofsight (LOS) rate
-Senses impact event/proximity and issue warhead initiation command

Said to be the Sudaeshan's precision guided kit with GPS -aided navigation.


From DRDO's Techfocus Mag.
 
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@Dillinger @sancho I know you'll get a kick out of this:
KXu7P5s.jpg



Said to be the Sudaeshan's precision guided kit with GPS -aided navigation.


From DRDO's Techfocus Mag.

http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/techfocus/2012/TF_August_2012_WEB.pdf

The whole thing- interesting stuff.

FOB/MEMS based IMUs and the FCIEU and ACEU complex isn't just used in PGMs but can be used in stand-off powered munitions along with the INS/GPS systems. Furthermore with the DRDO developed radar altimeter on the Nirbhay you get terrain-matching/following capabilities. Also the SAR seeker for the Nirbhay ALCM and Prahaar under advanced stage of development adds it all up to the ability to now develop a whole family of glide-PGMs and powered stand-off AGMs/ALCMs. :tup: Interesting times ahead.
@S-DUCT @kurup
 
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Very informative files from CRISIL/Astra Microwave and DRDO Techfocus -

nw22.png


http://crisil.com/capital-markets/CRISIL-Research_ier-report-astra-microwave-2012.pdf

^^It seems according to the data on the chart above that LSTAR/AEW&CS radar has a total 1,244 T/R elements, packed away in approximately 155 TRMM multi-module packages (each package containing 8 modules), and, as per 2010 terms, seems each module (or I guess each TRMM) can develop 100W of power output.

That means a combined output of 15,500 W or 15.5kW.

I think this is how it is calculated because if we give 100W output for each T/R module, it will calculate to 124,000W (124kW), that is exorbitant because even E-3 Sentry has an average output of around 60kW only.

--

Case in point, this is the latest development from earlier this year -

New technologies for 200 W transmit receive modules, active array antennas, distributed beam steering network and digital receiver/Exciter have been developed and demonstrated.

http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/techfocus/2013/TF_April_2013_WEB.pdf

It seems the power output of the modules (or rather the TRMMs) has been doubled to 200W in 3
years.

So now 200W modules means a combined output of 31kW which makes it halfway through to the likes of E-3 Sentry...which have dome radars anyway so LSTAR cannot really compare with Sentry/Phalcon.

But for one I am impressed with DRDO's progress in this field.

@Abingdonboy @Dillinger @sancho @Water Car Engineer

@gambit Hi sir, can you analyse the data and tell us if there are any misunderstandings or misinterpretations out there? Thanks in advance!
 
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Very informative files from CRISIL/Astra Microwave and DRDO Techfocus -

nw22.png


http://crisil.com/capital-markets/CRISIL-Research_ier-report-astra-microwave-2012.pdf

^^It seems according to the data on the chart above that LSTAR/AEW&CS radar has a total 1,244 T/R elements, packed away in approximately 155 TRMM multi-module packages (each package containing 8 modules), and, as per 2010 terms, seems each module (or I guess each TRMM) can develop 100W of power output.

That means a combined output of 15,500 W or 15.5kW.

I think this is how it is calculated because if we give 100W output for each T/R module, it will calculate to 124,000W (124kW), that is exorbitant because even E-3 Sentry has an average output of around 60kW only.

--

Case in point, this is the latest development from earlier this year -



http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/techfocus/2013/TF_April_2013_WEB.pdf

It seems the power output of the modules (or rather the TRMMs) has been doubled to 200W in 3
years. Thanks, probably, to the inclusion of Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) tech, which greatly increases power and range, as is the common understanding even in civilian circles -

GaN and GaAs Microwave Transistors and Amps Extend Power and Frequency Range

The reason why the DRDO-developed modules have much higher power outputs than the ones designed by Astra Microwave, is because I think only DRDO has access to the higher-end GaAs and other advanced platforms from companies like GAETEC.

So now 200W modules means a combined output of 31kW which makes it halfway through to the likes of E-3 Sentry...which have dome radars anyway so LSTAR cannot really compare with Sentry/Phalcon.

But for one I am impressed with DRDO's progress in this field.

@Abingdonboy @Dillinger @sancho @Water Car Engineer

@gambit Hi sir, can you analyse the data and tell us if there are any misunderstandings or misinterpretations out there? Thanks in advance!

Only one thing, the inclusion of GaAs didn't increase the output, the TRMs were always GaAs TRMs without which it wouldn't be possible to get the ESA up and running at that size.
 
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Only one thing, the inclusion of GaAs didn't increase the output, the TRMs were always GaAs TRMs without which it wouldn't be possible to get the ESA up and running at that size.

Thanks, edited my post accordingly.
 
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Asias silent game of military supremacy


While Japans tense relationship with China dominates headlines worldwide, the strategic rivalry between Beijing and India is more likely to shape Asian power dynamics in the coming decades
By Jaswant Singh | Special to Gulf News
Published: 20:00 September 22, 2013
Gulf News



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Image Credit: Niño Jose Heredia/©Gulf News




Nowadays, many people seem to be more relaxed than ever about nationality, with the internet enabling them to forge close connections with distant cultures and people. But states remain extremely sensitive about their borders inviolability. After all, territory, including land, oceans, air space, rivers, and seabeds, is central to a countrys identity, and shapes its security and foreign policy.


States can respond to territorial disputes either by surrendering some aspects of sovereignty, thus weakening their power and influence, or by adopting a more robust national-defence strategy aimed at fending off current challenges and precluding future threats. Today, many Asian countries are choosing the latter option.


Consider the territorial disputes roiling the Indian Ocean and other East Asian regions, sparked by Chinas repeated and increasingly assertive efforts to claim sovereignty over vast maritime areas. As Chinas incursions reignite long-smouldering disagreements and threaten to destabilise the regional status quo, countries throughout Asia are reconsidering their strategic positions.


For example, the Philippines is revamping its security strategy by enhancing cooperation with the US Chinas counterweight in the region only two decades after it closed two major American military installations, the naval base at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. Vietnam, too, has strengthened its ties with the US. And, after decades of absence, America has resumed training programmes for Indonesias military.




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More significant, Japans leaders are now openly debating ways to transform the countrys post-Second World War pacifism into a much more assertive nationalism. In fact, in August, the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force unveiled the helicopter destroyer Izumo, whose structure and capabilities resemble those of an aircraft carrier, with possible offensive applications.


This emerging strategic shift will likely have far-reaching consequences, raising the stakes of Sino-Japanese sparring over islands in the East China Sea.


But, while Japans tense relationship with China dominates headlines worldwide, the strategic rivalry between China and India is more likely to shape Asian power dynamics in the coming decades. And recent events suggest that China knows it.


In April, a platoon of Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) border-security personnel crossed the so-called line of actual control; into Indias Depsang Valley in Ladakh to erect an encampment, where they remained for almost three weeks. Chinas leaders have yet to explain what prompted the incursion but there is no shortage of speculation.


Some claim that the local PLA commander initiated the stand-off, while others contend that Chinas new president, Xi Jinping, was using the transgression to assert his authority over the PLA. The incursion has even been linked to the scandal surrounding Chongqings disgraced former Communist Party chief, Bo Xilai, who had close ties with high-ranking PLA and security-services officers. But the most likely explanation is the simplest one: China was deliberately asserting its authority over the disputed border.


As it stands, India and China are openly competing for influence in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh. So far, they have largely relied on economic and commercial mechanisms, especially rival port and pipeline projects, to secure their positions.


China is not allowing its economic slowdown to derail its efforts to enlarge and modernise its navy and expand its commercial interests around Eurasias southern rim. It has been investing or demonstrating interest in deep-water port projects in Kenya, Tanzania, and Bangladesh, and it has been directly involved in financing and constructing Indian Ocean ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan.


Just as China is helping to develop Pakistans port of Gwadar, India is helping to develop Irans Chabahar port 70 kilometres away. Chabahar is not useful only to counter China; it will serve as a vital link for India to transport goods to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and beyond. India could even develop a major communication hub with the port as its nexus.


Moreover, India is working to safeguard its naval superiority over China. In August, the reactor aboard Indias first indigenously built nuclear submarine, INS Arihant, was activated, bringing the country one step closer to realising its long-sought goal of a nuclear triad the capability to launch nuclear weapons from land, air, and sea. Just three days later, India launched the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant.


But, as The Economist observed, rarely does nemesis follow hubris so quickly. Indeed, just two days after the Vikrants launch, explosions at the naval dockyard in Mumbai sank INS Sindhurakshak one of the ten Kilo-class submarines that form the backbone of Indias aging conventional-submarine fleet killing 18 crew members.


Perhaps Chinas apparent economic, strategic, and military advantages will prove less significant than many believe, especially given continuing uncertainty over the terms of Americas strategic pivot towards Asia. Indeed, with the US on their side, either Japan or India could conceivably tip the scales in its own favour. But one thing is clear: A great game is beginning among Asias great powers, and there are scant rules in place to manage how it will be played.


Project Syndicate, 2013





Jaswant Singh, a former Indian finance minister, foreign minister, and defence minister, is the author of Jinnah: India Partition Independence.
 
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@Gessler @Abingdonboy @S-DUCT Does anyone here have news on the SAR x-band monopulse sensor for the Nirbhay ALCM? That is going to be the real catch.
 
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