The Tirah Valley Expedition
Although outside the scope of this study but very much related to it as an offshoot of the uprising of 1897, the Tirah Valley Expedition comes as the next important episode after the uprising itself.
Tirah Valley in 1897 was, as it still is, the common home and ultimate refuge of all the Khyber tribes. It was also used as a base for the Afridi raids into the settled territories of the plains to terrorize the plain dwellers and to plunder their property. To teach the Afridis a lesson, Tirah was attacked by the British in 1897. During the expedition, a number of houses were demolished, including the extravagant house of Mullah Said Akbar, which had been constructed lavishly in three years time. Herds of cattle and pack animals and other household property were confiscated in the Aka Khel area in Tirah proper. Offering little or no opposition, the tribesmen simply vacated their homes and disappeared in the thick forest of alpine trees on the hills around their homes. However, it does not mean that there was absolutely no resistance from the tribesmen.
A British officer Colonel Grace Younghusband recalls the Tirah expedition in these words:
The Afridis may be driven all day like mountain sheep but when the night begins to fall and their tired pursuers commence of necessity to draw back to lower levels for food and rest, this redoubtable foe rises in all his strength, with swords and guns and huge boulders hurls himself like a demon on his retiring enemy.
The fact that the Afridis were one of the best guerrilla fighters in the world was also recognized by Sir William Lockhart in a memorandum for guidance of troops campaigning in Tirah issued from his Camp in Maidan area on November 18, 1897. He warned his men that the British force was opposed to perhaps the best skirmishers and best natural rifle shots in the world and that the country they inhabited was the most difficult on the face of the globe.
But with tact and diplomacy, the British were able to impress the tribes. By the end of February 1898, nearly all Afridi clans had either submitted or were approaching the British authorities for submission and settlement. The Khyber Pass had been re-opened but the Zakha Khels, the most dangerous and notorious of all the Afridis, were still resilient and unwilling to give in. In March, preparations were made for a spring campaign against them. The British troops under General Sir William Lockhart returned to Jamrud after the Tirah Expedition. Fresh transport (mules and horses) was distributed among the troops and one of the British army brigades was sent towards the Bara Valley. The movement of the British troops had an immediate effect upon the Zakha Khels. Almost all the clans had submitted by April 3rd and had given hostages for fines still not paid. At the Peace Durbar of Afridi Chiefs in 1898, the Afridis, notably the irreconcilable Zakha Khels, demonstrated their submission by taking the horses out of General Sir William Lockharts carriage and drawing it themselves.
The Afridis paid 50 thousand rupees and 800 rifles as reparation. This amount was far less than the British losses because all the weapons and ammunitions at Landi Kotal, Shahgai, and other forts in the Khyber Pass had fallen into the hands of the Afridis during the uprising, which obviously amounted to lacs of rupees. In December 1899, the British regular forces were withdrawn from Khyber and the Pass was placed under the control of the Khyber Rifles. By November 1898, the situation returned to normalcy and the normal arrangements for the administration of Khyber previously in force were practically re-established.
The British forces did not permanently occupy Tirah because what they wanted had been achieved and permanent occupation was not desirable. Their longer stay in the area could lead to guerrilla warfare of the most difficult and organized nature against them. But the British had certainly succeeded in lifting the purdah (veil) of Tirah, which had so far guarded it against the invaders gaze.
The expedition, however, proved a great financial burden to the British. Several million pounds had been spent and a large number of casualties sustained. Some of the British officers had even started questioning the purpose and worth of the expedition and many of them believed that it was not worth what it cost to them
The Lessons
The results of the Tirah Campaign can be disputed and there are those who opine that the campaign failed to achieve any permanent results but the psychological effects of this expedition cannot be ignored. The British at least broke the myth of Tirahs inaccessibility by lifting the curtain that had veiled Tirah for centuries. The total casualties during the campaign amounted to 287 killed, 853 wounded and 10 missing. The cost was huge, but it was hoped that the Afridis would realize that no part of their country was inaccessible to British troops. It was noticed as a favorable sign that the enlistment of the Pathans, especially of the Afridis, in the British forces had accelerated after the end of the hostilities. Although acts of individual raids and outrages did not cease but there were no large scale efforts to challenge British authority in the Khyber and for some years no need was felt of sending military expeditions against any of the Afridi tribes.
Though the Khyber Pass was reopened for caravan traffic on March 7, 1898 but the rising of 1897 once again highlighted the importance of the Khyber Pass as the main line of communication and trade route. The British realized that they had to give due consideration to the maintenance of the Khyber Pass for safe communication and trade in any future revision and reorganization of the frontier policy.
After the conclusion of the Tirah Valley expedition, the reconstruction of the forts was started at once. The forts were not in as bad shape as was feared by the British. The interior of the forts had been badly damaged but the walls were intact and the water tanks about a mile and half below Landi Kotal were in good shape. Before peace was fully restored, small skirmishes frequently took place in which three British soldiers were killed and fourteen wounded. The troops in the Khyber Pass at Landi Kotal, Ali Masjid and Jamrud had to be reinforced. At the beginning of the year 1898, three British brigades had been sent to hold the Khyber Pass from Jamrud to Landi Kotal and two more were stationed along the northeastern boundary of the Afridi territory. Later on, under Curzons Scheme of Frontier defense, the jezailchis were renamed as the Khyber Rifles and its strength was increased to two battalions of 600 men each, placed under British officers and supported by a Mobile Column at Peshawar. This was a part of the British effort to beef up security in the Khyber Pass.
After an year of arduous and costly fighting, the uprising apparently subsided but the British outposts and isolated forts were still in constant danger. From then onward, the activities of Mullahs were kept under vigilance and the maintenance of the Khyber Pass for safe communication and trade was given due consideration in the reconstruction of the Frontier Policy. The communication lines through the Khyber Pass were improved. The need for the construction of roads and a railway line was felt for the unhindered, swift and convenient movement of the troops to the troubled spots.
The Tirah Valley expedition was well-planned and accurately executed with full force and the objective to create an awe into the hearts of the Afridis. A half hearted effort like the operations that the Pakistani authorities are conducting in FATA and other troubled areas along the Pak-Afghan border, might have produced an altogether adverse effect. Negotiations with the tribes were held at the terms of the British and violations of the terms of the treaty were timely and severely punished.
Temporarily subduing the Afridis was not the real objective of the British. They wanted to eliminate the source of trouble and one such source was the preaching of the Mullahs. To weaken the Mullahs, the British patronized and strengthened the local maliks and chieftains of the tribes.
The most important aspect of the British handling of the uprising and the Tirah Valley expedition was its follow-up in the shape of improvement and development in the fields of logistic facilities and lines of communication. The expedition was not left incomplete. The improvement of communication lines and the constant vigilance and watch over the activities of the potential miscreants ensured the durability of peace and firm British control.
Another lesson that we have to learn from the Tirah expedition in particular is the fact that military operations should be brief and target specific. Randomly targeting constructions and people might not help in eliminating the real target and it might also increase the sympathizers of the adversaries. The British had precise targets in mind and they did not unnecessarily prolong their stay in Tirah after achieving their objectives.
One other factor that the authorities at present must keep in mind is that the hill-abode of the tribesmen is their greatest strength and biggest weakness at the same time. It is hard to gain access to their territory but it is easy to impose an effective blockade against them, compelling them to come to terms and agree to a settlement through negotiations.
In short, the success of British policy in the Khyber hills was because of their tact and diplomacy supplemented by effective use of force when necessary. This is what our present authorities and tribal administration should learn from history, if at all they are willing to learn.
