Frontier Revolt of 1897

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

Khyber during the Frontier Uprising of 1897


Introduction

Frontiers are like ‘razor’s edge’, a phrase very accurately and appropriately used by Lord Nathaniel Curzon in a lecture at Oxford. But the North West Frontier of the British Empire in India was perhaps more than a ‘razor’s edge’, hard to bring under control and yet harder to retain control over it.

In 1897, a serious uprising against the British on the North West Frontier, spreading to the entire tribal belt between the then British India and Afghanistan, shook the British hold in the area and caused a lot of concern to the British authorities. A number of factors were responsible for the uprising but important among them were the discontent among the tribesmen due to the actual demarcation of the Durand Line, the instigation of some formidable Mullahs like Hadda Mullah in the Mohmand area, Mastana Mullah in Swat and Mullah Said Akbar Aka Khel in Khyber, and the instigation by the Afghan authorities. The uprising was concentrated in the Mohmand and Malakand areas but Khyber Pass and the areas around it also felt the tremors of this first large scale revolt against the British.



In the Khyber, Afridis attacked the British positions and posts and after setting some of the British forts on fire, they also extended helping hand to the Orakzais in besieging the Samana posts. The control of the Khyber Pass was completely lost and it took quite a while for the British to restore their authority in the Khyber. The Afridis later on had to face a British punitive expedition in the Tirah Valley. However, the expedition had to be ended inconclusively due to the climatic conditions and the strain on the British transport resources due to campaigns in other parts of the tribal belt. However, eventually the British did succeed to extract a favorable agreement from the Afridi tribes resulting into a truce that restored British prestige to an extent.



The Gathering Storm: Beginning of the Problem

From 1890 onward to the sudden uprising of 1897, apparently the Afridis had no grievances against the British. The British claimed that the uprising was mainly caused by the activities of ‘Mullahs of an extremely ignorant type’ who dominated the tribal belt, supported by many disciples who met at shrines and were susceptible to all intrigues and evils, inciting the tribesmen constantly against the British. But this is too simple an explanation for the causes of this uprising. In fact, the uprising of 1897 was caused by a combination of three important factors. The first factor was the rising sense of distrust and uneasiness among the tribesmen after the Durand Line Agreement and the actual demarcation process, which was considered by the tribesmen as ‘annexation of their country’ and a ‘menace to their independence’. The second factor was the religious fanaticism and the activities and propaganda of the Mullahs, which undoubtedly gave an impetus to the rising tide of resentment against the Durand Line Agreement and the demarcation of the boundaries. The third factor was the exaggerated expectations of moral and material support from the Amir of Afghanistan, which further emboldened the tribesmen to rise against the British. But the British authorities mainly held the Mullahs and their activities responsible for this large-scale uprising.

Between the years 1890 and 1898, there were three Mullahs of note having great influence among the Afridis. They included Mullah Said Akbar Aka Khel, The Malik Din Khel Mullah, and the Mullah of Kambar Khels. Said Akbar was young, termed as avaricious, and energetic by Warburton. The Malik Din Khel Mullah was an old, God fearing man, full of good advice to others, and highly loved and respected according to British reports. The Kambar Khel Mullah was of lesser note, but he also was not vicious. According to Robert Warburton, Said Akbar played a very important role in organizing the revolt among the Afridis. He was in contact with the Afghan Sipah Salar Ghulam Haider Khan Charkhi, who was well known for his anti-British character. He also had contacts with two other Mullahs, the Mullah of Hadda and the ‘Mad Fakir’ of Swat (Mullah Mastan). Said Akbar had regular communication with Ghulam Haider Khan Charkhi, Mullah of Hadda and the Mad Fakir during June and July and the greater part of August 1897.

Mullah said Akbar was also in contact with an Afridi Jirga at Kabul, comprised of some Adam Khel Afridis, led by Kazi Mira Khan. However, one of the letters from Kazi Mira Khan suggests that the Amir of Afghanistan was not interested in the tribesmen uprising against the British. He reported to Mullah Said Akbar that the Amir had advised them before the Uprising of 1897 not to fight with the British Government and that the Amir held the same view after the uprising. The Amir had rather asked the Afridis to record their grievances against the British and he promised that he himself would submit them to the British Government.

The uprising did not originate in the Khyber but when the news was received that the excitement was spreading to the Khyber, the Government of India showed great concern and did its best to avoid a war with the Afridis because they were armed to the teeth. Up to the end of the 19th century, their weapons were the curved sword, a long straight knife and the jezail, a long barreled matchlock, better than the musket with which the army was armed until mid-nineteenth century, but not as good as the Snider, the Martini-Henry or Lee Metford rifles. By the end of the century, they had acquired a fair number of modern rifles by theft, capture or purchase from Afghan soldiers. Later on, the Afridis of the Khyber Pass got in touch with a band of arms smugglers and invested some of their tribal money into their organization to buy Martini-Henry rifles in the ports of Persian Gulf and move them secretly to Khyber via Persia and Afghanistan. The British Royal Navy intercepted and caught several consignments of arms of this nature.

The Afridis were also good at making their own guns in different parts of the tribal belt. They had started making exact replicas of Martini-Henry rifles at local workshops, mostly made of the scrap material auctioned at the military stores of British Indian Government, and then sending to other parts of tribal and settled areas. The matter was first revealed in April 1892 by Herald Deane, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat District, in a letter to the District Superintendent of Police Peshawar. The Peshawar police had captured five Mohmands with one Martini-Henry Rifle and five Martini-Henry Carbines at Shabqadar. During investigation, they admitted that they had purchased these arms from one Hussain, a gunsmith of Kohat Pass, most probably at the notorious Darra Adam Khel gun market. These weapons were made entirely from material obtained from the scraped parts of guns auctioned at different arm stores in Pujab. Two Peshawari Hindus, Amir Chand and Bhagwan Das, purchased the material, which was disposed off by the Ferozpur Ordnance Store, and sold it to the gunsmiths in the Kohat Pass. Mostly the barrels of the disposed off English guns were utilized by the Kohat Pass gunsmiths in manufacturing their own local made guns.

In those days, Khyber Pass was held and controlled by the Khyber Rifles – an irregular military corps made up of young men provided by various Khyber clans at British expense – and in case of a need for reinforcement, the nearest troops were available at Peshawar. Captain Barton was then the Political Officer in the Khyber who was also in-charge of the Khyber Rifles. When he heard the news of trouble at Shabqadar, he moved to the biggest and the strongest post of the Khyber Rifles at Landi Kotal. There he gathered about 350 Rifles, 50,000 rounds of ammunition and made sure that all the forts in the Khyber Pass had ample supply of reserved water.


The Rising

In August, 1897, the British Government had got the news that the Afridis and the Orakzais had planned a simultaneous rising in Khyber and Kurram – Afridis were to rise and take possession of the British posts in Khyber Pass while the Orakzais would rise and massacre the Sikhs and other troops garrisoning the British outposts in Samana and other parts of the Kurram Valley. Accordingly, the first to rise were the Afridis, playing the role assigned to them in the pre-planned plot towards the end of August 1897. On August 21, the Afridi clans of Aka Khel, Malik Din Khel and Zakha Khel had started their march from Tirah to the Khyber Pass in order to take possession of the forts up to Bara and Jamrud. The British forces sent in large numbers from all parts of India to deter the Afridis and Orakzais from attacking the British posts had no effect on the Afridis. On August 23, the Afridis attacked the Khyber Pass in great force, their line extending a mile and a half, and occupied the whole length of the Pass, from Ali Masjid to Landi Khana, on the same day.

Fort Maude was captured and burnt by the Afridis. The British sent forces from Jamrud under Brigadier General Westmacott to render assistance to the beleaguered garrison at the Fort but they were repulsed two or three miles away from the Fort while the Fort was set on fire by the Afridis. The garrison there, however, took advantage of the advance of the British troops and made an orderly retreat to Jamrud. On the same day, Ali Masjid had been burnt, while the Landi Kotal Fort had been besieged by the gathering Afridis.

From Ali Masjid, the tribesmen marched to Landi Kotal on the morning of 24th August. Their number increased en route and their passage was nowhere blocked by any British force since the garrison at Katta Kushta and Gurgura had already abandoned their posts and taken to the hills. In the meanwhile, Captain Barton, Commandant of the Khyber Rifles, had been ordered by Mr. Udney, The Commissioner of Peshawar, on August 18 to forsake his men and retire to Jamrud , leaving Subadar Mursil Khan in charge of the garrison at the Landi Kotal Fort. The attack on the fortified serai at Landi Kotal began at 8.00 A.M and during the whole of that day and the night that followed, the defense was resolutely maintained by Subadar Mursil Khan and his brave men of the Khyber Rifles. Captain Barton was not allowed to return to Landi Kotal despite of his willingness and desire to be with his men. Barton had actually asked for reinforcement but instead he was called to Peshawar. Captain Barton was one of the finest frontier officers the British had ever had and the orders from Udney to abandon his post and his men was hard to accept for him. His men (Khyber Rifles) were to fight for the British without his presence among them and he considered it a shame for himself and for the entire British nation. He believed it would blacken the face of the British before all the tribesmen who supported him against their own kith and kin. Despite his absence, the Khyber Rifles fought for the British against their own brethren because ‘they had eaten the White Queen’s salt’.

Subadar Mursil Khan, who was commanding the Khyber Rifles in absence of Captain Barton, had two sons in the attackers and one with him in the Khyber Rifles. The garrison at Landi Kotal consisted of five native officers and 369 men. Of these, 120 belonged to the miscellaneous clans; Shilmanis, Mohmands, Peshawaris and the Kohat Pass Afridis; and of the remaining 249, seventy were Lowargi Shinwaris, 50 were Mullagoris, and the rest were from Zakha Khel and Malik Din Khel Afridis. Mursil Khan and his men held on till 25th of August when finally Mursil Khan was killed at 11.00 A.M. and the gate was opened from inside by treacherous hands. The Mullagori and Shinwari sepoys fought their way out and escaped, instead of switching over loyalties or surrendering before the tribesmen. A native officer of the Mullagori Company brought his men back to Jamrud without the loss or theft of a single rifle. But before their retreat, they had killed about a hundred of the attackers, while ten of the Khyber Rifles men were killed and two native officers were wounded.

While all this deadly game was being contested at Landi Kotal, a large British force was present at the mouth of the Khyber Pass at Jamrud but was not permitted by the British authorities to lend a helping hand to the men of Khyber rifles fighting for the British against their own people. When the garrison finally succeeded in reaching Jamrud with their dead and wounded, the angry, disdainful and helpless troops stationed there cheered and applauded them wildly. But some of the Khyber Rifles men, resentful as they were, spat in anger as they passed the British troops. “It was a day of shame and humiliation for every Briton”, writes Macmunn, “and loud were the curses called down on Lord Elgin and his two penny Council, and on Udney, the unready, as the troops dubbed the Chief civil authority.”

The Pass fell completely into the hands of the Afridis after the fall of Ali Masjid on 23rd and Landi Kotal on 24th and the British then feared an attack on Jamrud. They were preparing themselves to face it. The Afridis, however, after burning the posts in the Khyber Pass found the Peshawar Valley too strong to be lightly attacked. Instead, they decided to assist the Orakzais in Tirah and to proceed to the Kurram to capture the Samana Fort. Kohat was also under a strong threat of attack by the Afridis and Orakzais. There they were effectively checked by the British and by 1898, peace was restored. The tribesmen lost 12 of their men at Ali Masjid, 34 at Fort Maude, and 200 at Landi Kotal in the Khyber Pass during the entire duration of the Uprising of 1897.

In the uprising, both the Afridis and the Orakzais were led by Mullah Said Akbar Akhundzada of the Aka khel tribe. Warburton narrates in his book that at one point during the attack on Landi Kotal, Said Akbar came close to the wall of the fort. At that time, a young Zakha Khel in the Khyber Rifles turned to the son of Zakha Khel Chief, Malik Khwas Khan and said, “Here is Said Akbar; let me shoot him and end this business for good and ever.” But Malik Khwas Khan’s son abused him and struck the soldier, calling out, “Would you destroy the light of Islam?” This incident suggests that Mullah Said Akbar was highly respected by the Afridis and even the men in the Khyber Rifles had respect for him. While Warburton writes that he commanded little respect among the Afridis and due to his avarice and greed for money and power, the Afridis called him a ‘Loe Shaitan’ (A big devil) behind his back. Irrespective of the dispute about his position among the Afridis, it’s a fact that he succeeded in securing a joint rising of the Afridis and Orakzais against the British.


Restoring British Authority in the Khyber Pass
On December 18, 1897, the British forces recovered the Khyber Pass as far as Fort Maude; on the 23rd, Ali Masjid was reoccupied, and on the 26th they marched to Landi Kotal. On their way, they found villages deserted, barracks destroyed and damage done to Government property. The Shinwaris of Landi Kotal, who had assisted in the early attacks on the Khyber posts, had by then submitted and paid up their fines. To prove their repentance, they assisted in picketing the hills and keeping off the Zakha Khel raiders. They even restored some of the property taken away by their men when the serai at Landi Kotal was attacked and plundered.

In the attacks on the Khyber posts, the Afridi tribesmen had sustained some 250 casualties and immediately after the fall of Landi Kotal, they had dispersed to their homes, promising to re-assemble on September 15. The most worrying aspect of the capture of Landi Kotal serai by the tribesmen was that fifty thousand rounds of ammunition had fallen into their hands and it could be used against the British in any future encounter.

Assessment of British Performance in the Khyber Pass during the Uprising
After receiving news of Afridis attack on the British posts in the Khyber on the 23rd of August, the British had taken some precautionary measures. Ali Masjid and Fort Maude were reinforced by 100 tribesmen each; the Zakha Khel and Shinwari maliks were reminded of their obligations but at the same time, the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles was recalled from Landi Kotal to Peshawar as the Commissioner of Peshawar thought his presence there might hamper the actions of the Indian Government. This might have been very demoralizing for the Khyber Rifles men but the Commissioner’s concern was also justified.


Despite of the fact that the British got definite information on August 17, news reaching from Khyber to Peshawar that an Afridi force of about 10,000 men had left Bagh in Tirah on the 16th with the intention to attack the Khyber posts on 18th, both the General Officer Commanding and the Commissioner of Peshawar decided not to garrison the Khyber forts by regular troops for the reason that it would raise unnecessary suspicions and concerns among the tribesmen still holding to their treaty obligations. This decision and the resultant abandonment of the Khyber and the failure to assist the Khyber Rifles holding their posts were later widely criticized and greatly condemned by the British themselves. Colonel Sir T. Holdich remarked, “But alas! Whilst the Afridi fought for us, we failed to fight for ourselves; 9,500 troops about the Peshawar frontier looked on, whilst 500 Afridis maintained British honor in the Khyber.”

In a lecture given at Simla in 1898 on “The Campaign in Tirah”, a prominent British civilian officer in the Punjab said, “The 23rd of August was a day of pain and humiliation for every Englishman in India. We had 12,000 troops at the mouth of the Pass (Khyber) or within easy reach of Ali Masjid, marking time as it were, or held in leash, and we allowed these forts to fall one after the other.”



http://www.asc-centralasia.edu.pk/Issue_64/06_Khyber_during_the_Frontier.html

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

The Tirah Valley Expedition

Although outside the scope of this study but very much related to it as an offshoot of the uprising of 1897, the Tirah Valley Expedition comes as the next important episode after the uprising itself.

Tirah Valley in 1897 was, as it still is, the common home and ultimate refuge of all the Khyber tribes. It was also used as a base for the Afridi raids into the settled territories of the plains to terrorize the plain dwellers and to plunder their property. To teach the Afridis a lesson, Tirah was attacked by the British in 1897. During the expedition, a number of houses were demolished, including the extravagant house of Mullah Said Akbar, which had been constructed lavishly in three years time. Herds of cattle and pack animals and other household property were confiscated in the Aka Khel area in Tirah proper. Offering little or no opposition, the tribesmen simply vacated their homes and disappeared in the thick forest of alpine trees on the hills around their homes. However, it does not mean that there was absolutely no resistance from the tribesmen.

A British officer Colonel Grace Younghusband recalls the Tirah expedition in these words:

“The Afridis may be driven all day like mountain sheep but when the night begins to fall and their tired pursuers commence of necessity to draw back to lower levels for food and rest, this redoubtable foe rises in all his strength, with swords and guns and huge boulders hurls himself like a demon on his retiring enemy.”



The fact that the Afridis were one of the best guerrilla fighters in the world was also recognized by Sir William Lockhart in a memorandum for guidance of troops campaigning in Tirah issued from his Camp in Maidan area on November 18, 1897. He warned his men that the British force was ‘opposed to perhaps the best skirmishers and best natural rifle shots in the world’ and that the country they inhabited was the most difficult on the face of the globe.

But with tact and diplomacy, the British were able to impress the tribes. By the end of February 1898, nearly all Afridi clans had either submitted or were approaching the British authorities for submission and settlement. The Khyber Pass had been re-opened but the Zakha Khels, the most dangerous and notorious of all the Afridis, were still resilient and unwilling to give in. In March, preparations were made for a spring campaign against them. The British troops under General Sir William Lockhart returned to Jamrud after the Tirah Expedition. Fresh transport (mules and horses) was distributed among the troops and one of the British army brigades was sent towards the Bara Valley. The movement of the British troops had an immediate effect upon the Zakha Khels. Almost all the clans had submitted by April 3rd and had given hostages for fines still not paid. At the Peace Durbar of Afridi Chiefs in 1898, the Afridis, notably the irreconcilable Zakha Khels, demonstrated their submission by taking the horses out of General Sir William Lockhart’s carriage and drawing it themselves.

The Afridis paid 50 thousand rupees and 800 rifles as reparation. This amount was far less than the British losses because all the weapons and ammunitions at Landi Kotal, Shahgai, and other forts in the Khyber Pass had fallen into the hands of the Afridis during the uprising, which obviously amounted to lacs of rupees. In December 1899, the British regular forces were withdrawn from Khyber and the Pass was placed under the control of the Khyber Rifles. By November 1898, the situation returned to normalcy and the normal arrangements for the administration of Khyber previously in force were practically re-established.

The British forces did not permanently occupy Tirah because what they wanted had been achieved and permanent occupation was not desirable. Their longer stay in the area could lead to guerrilla warfare of the most difficult and organized nature against them. But the British had certainly succeeded in lifting the purdah (veil) of Tirah, which had so far guarded it against the invaders’ gaze.

The expedition, however, proved a great financial burden to the British. Several million pounds had been spent and a large number of casualties sustained. Some of the British officers had even started questioning the purpose and worth of the expedition and many of them believed that it was not worth what it cost to them

The Lessons
The results of the Tirah Campaign can be disputed and there are those who opine that the campaign failed to achieve any ‘permanent results’ but the psychological effects of this expedition cannot be ignored. The British at least broke the myth of Tirah’s inaccessibility by ‘lifting the curtain’ that had veiled Tirah for centuries. The total casualties during the campaign amounted to 287 killed, 853 wounded and 10 missing. The cost was huge, but it was hoped that the Afridis would realize that no part of their country was inaccessible to British troops. It was noticed as a favorable sign that the enlistment of the Pathans, especially of the Afridis, in the British forces had accelerated after the end of the hostilities. Although acts of individual raids and outrages did not cease but there were no large scale efforts to challenge British authority in the Khyber and for some years no need was felt of sending military expeditions against any of the Afridi tribes.

Though the Khyber Pass was reopened for caravan traffic on March 7, 1898 but the rising of 1897 once again highlighted the importance of the Khyber Pass as the main line of communication and trade route. The British realized that they had to give due consideration to the maintenance of the Khyber Pass for safe communication and trade in any future revision and reorganization of the frontier policy.

After the conclusion of the Tirah Valley expedition, the reconstruction of the forts was started at once. The forts were not in as bad shape as was feared by the British. The interior of the forts had been badly damaged but the walls were intact and the water tanks about a mile and half below Landi Kotal were in good shape. Before peace was fully restored, small skirmishes frequently took place in which three British soldiers were killed and fourteen wounded. The troops in the Khyber Pass at Landi Kotal, Ali Masjid and Jamrud had to be reinforced. At the beginning of the year 1898, three British brigades had been sent to hold the Khyber Pass from Jamrud to Landi Kotal and two more were stationed along the northeastern boundary of the Afridi territory. Later on, under Curzon’s Scheme of Frontier defense, the jezailchis were renamed as the Khyber Rifles and its strength was increased to two battalions of 600 men each, placed under British officers and supported by a Mobile Column at Peshawar. This was a part of the British effort to beef up security in the Khyber Pass.

After an year of arduous and costly fighting, the uprising apparently subsided but the British outposts and isolated forts were still in constant danger. From then onward, the activities of Mullahs were kept under vigilance and the maintenance of the Khyber Pass for safe communication and trade was given due consideration in the reconstruction of the Frontier Policy. The communication lines through the Khyber Pass were improved. The need for the construction of roads and a railway line was felt for the unhindered, swift and convenient movement of the troops to the troubled spots.

The Tirah Valley expedition was well-planned and accurately executed with full force and the objective to create an awe into the hearts of the Afridis. A half hearted effort like the operations that the Pakistani authorities are conducting in FATA and other troubled areas along the Pak-Afghan border, might have produced an altogether adverse effect. Negotiations with the tribes were held at the terms of the British and violations of the terms of the treaty were timely and severely punished.

Temporarily subduing the Afridis was not the real objective of the British. They wanted to eliminate the source of trouble and one such source was the preaching of the Mullahs. To weaken the Mullahs, the British patronized and strengthened the local maliks and chieftains of the tribes.

The most important aspect of the British handling of the uprising and the Tirah Valley expedition was its follow-up in the shape of improvement and development in the fields of logistic facilities and lines of communication. The expedition was not left incomplete. The improvement of communication lines and the constant vigilance and watch over the activities of the potential miscreants ensured the durability of peace and firm British control.

Another lesson that we have to learn from the Tirah expedition in particular is the fact that military operations should be brief and target specific. Randomly targeting constructions and people might not help in eliminating the real target and it might also increase the sympathizers of the adversaries. The British had precise targets in mind and they did not unnecessarily prolong their stay in Tirah after achieving their objectives.

One other factor that the authorities at present must keep in mind is that the hill-abode of the tribesmen is their greatest strength and biggest weakness at the same time. It is hard to gain access to their territory but it is easy to impose an effective blockade against them, compelling them to come to terms and agree to a settlement through negotiations.

In short, the success of British policy in the Khyber hills was because of their tact and diplomacy supplemented by effective use of force when necessary. This is what our present authorities and tribal administration should learn from history, if at all they are willing to learn.

 

[chauvunist]

you know what in KPK no one gives a $hit to your Afghanistan and durand line...All we want the afghans to happily settle in their afghanistan and leave us alone...

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

Mohmand uprising 1987

The Mohmands are a Pashtun tribe who inhabit the hilly country to the north-west of Peshawar, in the North-West Frontier Province of India, now Pakistan. British punitive expeditions had been sent against the Mohmands in 1851-1852, 1854, 1864, 1879, 1880, but the principal operations were those of 1897-1898.

The year 1897 witnessed an almost general outbreak among the tribes on the north-west frontier of India. The tribes involved were practically independent, but the new frontier arranged with the amir of Afghanistan, and demarcated by Sir Mortimer Durand's commission of 1893-1894 (the Durand Line), brought them within the British sphere of influence.

The fear of these tribes was annexation, and the hostility shown during the demarcation led to the Waziri expedition of 1894


Early in the year 1897 it was reported that The Hadda Mullah was the inciting the Mohmands to acts of hostility. On the 3rd August reports reached Peshawar that the Hadda
Mulla had started for the Swat valley with a small following, and had summoned the Shinwaris, Ningraharis, and other clans
to join him in a jehad against the British. The Mulla's call to arms was sounded in the following proclamation ;

Help from God awaits us and victory is at hand. Let it, after compliments, be understood by, and known to, the followers of the greatest of the prophets, viz., all the people of Ningrahar, the Shinwaris and others, that the people of Swat, Bajaur and Buner have all united together and succeeded in annihilating the troops of the infidels stationed in Swat, and have
lered their property. All the Muslims are hereby informed that the Mohmands as a body have joined me in advancing upon Dheri (Shankargarh) vid Gandab, for the purpose of carrying on a jehad. It is hoped that you on the receipt of this letter will rise up if sitting and start if standing. Taking the necessary supplies with you, come without fail as soon as possible. God
be willing the time has come when the kafirs shall disappear. Be not idle, what more should I insist upon. Peace be upon you.


The Malakand Field Force commanded by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood was assembled at Nowshera. The post at Malakand was reached on 1 August, and on the following day Chakdara was relieved. The punishment of the Afridis was deferred till the preparations for the Tirah campaign could be completed. The Mohmands, however, could be immediately dealt with, and against them the two brigades of Sir Bindon Blood's division advanced from Malakand simultaneously with the movement of another division under Major-General Edmond Elles from Peshawar; it was intended that the two columns should effect a junction in Bajour.

About 6 September the two forces advanced, and Major-General Blood reached Nawagai on 14 September, having detached a brigade to cross the Rambat Pass. This brigade being sharply attacked in camp at Markhanai at the foot of the pass on the night of the 14th, was ordered to turn northwards and punish the tribesmen of the Mamund valley. On the 15th Brigadier-General (afterwards Major-General) Jeffreys camped at Inayat Killa, and on the following day he moved up the Mamund valley in three columns, which met with strong resistance. A retirement was ordered, the tribesmen following, and when darkness fell the general, with a battery and a small escort, was cut off, and with difficulty defended some buildings until relieved. The casualties in this action numbered 149. This partial reverse placed General Blood in a position of some difficulty. He determined, however, to remain at Nawagai, awaiting the arrival of General Elles, and sent orders to General Jeffreys to prosecute the operations in the Mamund valley.

From the 18th to the 23rd these operations were carried on successfully, several villages being burned, and the Mamunds were disheartened. Meanwhile, the camp at Nawagai was heavily attacked on the night of the 20th by about 4000 men belonging to the Hadda Mullah's following. The attack was repulsed with loss, and on the 21st Generals Blood and Elles met at Lakarai. The junction having been effected, the latter, in accordance with the scheme, advanced to deal with the Upper Mohmands in the Jarobi and Koda Khel valleys, and they were soon brought to reason by his well-conducted operations. The work of the Peshawar division was now accomplished, and it returned to take part in the Tirah campaign. Its total casualties were about 30 killed and wounded.

On the 22nd General Blood joined General Jeffreys, and on the 24th he started with his staff for Panjkora. On the 27th General Jeffreys resumed punitive operations in the Mamund valley, destroying numerous villages. On the 30th he encountered strong opposition at Agrah, and had 61 casualties. On 2 October General Blood arrived at Inayat Killa with reinforcements, and on the 5th the Mamunds tendered their submission. The total British loss in the Mamund valley was 282 out of a force which never exceeded 1,200 men. After marching into Buner, and revisiting the scenes of the Umbeyla Campaign of 1863, the Malakand field-force was broken up on the 21st of January. The objects of the expedition were completely attained, in spite of the great natural difficulties of the country. The employment of imperial service troops with the Peshawar column marked a new departure in frontier campaigns.

you know what in KPK no one gives a $hit to your Afghanistan and durand line...All we want the afghans to happily settle in their afghanistan and leave us alone...

Stop trolling

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

The Tochi uprising 1897

The Tochi Expedition was a punitive visit by Anglo-Indian troops to the Tochi Valley in 1897 to put down a rebellion there.[1]

The rebellion started with an attack by the Madda Khel section of the Waziris in June 1897.[2] The Tochi Valley Field Force assembed in response was commanded by General Corrie Bird[3] and included the 1st Brigade under the command of Brigadier-General Charles Egerton.[4] The rebellion was finally put down in October 1897

The Rifle Brigade Chronicle

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

Mullah pawandah revolt 1894-1913

In 1893 the British persuaded the Amir to agree to a commission comprising officers from Afghanistan and British India to establish the border between Afghanistan and the independent tribal areas. The Amir agreed with considerable reluctance. The border, known to the British as the ‘Durand Line’ after their commissioner Sir Mortimer Durand, was to be marked along its length with white posts. Correctly assuming the marking of the border in this way to be a sign of a British intention in due course to annex all the tribal areas the putting up of border posts was highly objectionable to the Pathan population of Waziristan.

On 28th October 1894 information was received that a Mullah Powindah was leading a group of Mahsuds attempting to stir up resistance to the British incursion into Waziristan and trying to prevent the jirgas from going in to negotiate with the British. Mullah Powindah was a cleric of the Shabi Khel clan and had set himself in opposition to the lay maliks of the Mashuds. The information was that Mullah Powindah was approaching Kaniguram to the north-east of Wana with some 800 Mahsuds of various clans with the intention of recruiting more members of the tribe and carrying out hostile action against the British.
On receipt of this information General Turner withdrew the Gurkhas and sappers and miners from Karab Kot and telegraphed for a battalion and 2 guns from the designated reserve to move to Jandola in the foothills on the Tank River.
On 30th October 1894 a reconnaissance was conducted up the Tiarza Nala, the direction from which Mullah Powindah was said to be approaching. On the party’s return they were fired on.
On 1st November 1894 information came in to the British that the Mullah Powindah was at Torwam on the upper reaches of the Tank River near to the Tiarza Nala with around 1,000 tribesmen. The Government of India record states that the camp’s picquets were doubled and all ranks ordered to be under arms in their tents by 4am. This precaution in the event was far from sufficient.
On 2nd November 1894 a further reconnaissance was conducted in the mountains directly to the north of the camp in the direction of the Inzar Narai peak. Some shots were fired but nothing significant encountered. On the same day messages came in from the Mullah Powindah and he was given the answer that all negotiations had to be through tribal jirgas and that he should disperse his lashkar and return home.
It is recorded that the same precautions were maintained in the camp as on the previous night. The camp was not suitable for defence due to its size and position and had not been fortified. Outside the perimeter was a system of support positions and beyond them 12 picquets. To the north-east of the camp was a breastwork held by 40 men. In the event of attack the picquets were to fall back on the support positions and all the outlying troops were to retire to the main perimeter. The one exception was Picquet Hill to the south-west of the camp where the support position with its 2 picquets were ordered in the event of attack to hold and defend their posts. The reason for this order was that Picquet Hill overlooked the camp. Nevill comments that the orders for the picquets were contrary to usage on the frontier and the requirements of the regulations. Picquets should have been strong enough to maintain their posts when under attack and not to withdraw.
A deserted fort lay 500 yards to the north-east of the camp. This position was held by 100 Gurkhas. Their role in the event of an attack on the camp was to take the attackers in the rear and to cut off their retreat.
At 5.30am on 3rd November 1894 in the pitch dark the camp at Wana was attacked by around 2,000 tribesmen in one of the most dramatic episodes on the North West Frontier. 3 rifle shots rang out (some authorities claim that these shots were a signal for the tribesmen and some a signal from a picquet. Perhaps they were just the first shots). These shots were immediately followed by wild yells and frenzied drum beating as tribesmen poured out of the nullahs concealing their approach to the camp perimeter. Many of the picquets and support posts raced back to the perimeter as instructed and the wave of tribesmen struck the camp just 3 minutes after the first warning shots.
The attack fell on the west face of the camp, the encampment of the 1st Gurkhas. The battalion had 4 ½ companies in camp, the remainder being disposed: 1 ½ companies dispersed in the picquets and supports, ¾ company guarding the hospital and 1 ¼ companies in the old fort at the north-eastern approach.
In view of the information received about Mullah Powindah’s group the expectation was that any hostile approach would be from the north-east. The suggestions in the authorities are that the British force had begun to build a breastwork at the north-eastern corner of the camp. Even if this is so the work was inadequate, too late and in the wrong place.
That night the Mahsuds demonstrated the extraordinary ability of the Pathans to move across mountainous terrain at night and at speed without being detected. The lashkar on reaching the area circled round to the west of the camp and approached it in the pitch dark by way of 2 dry nullahs. The assault appears to have been headed by a group of particularly fanatical tribesmen, around 800 in number.
A report in the Pioneer Magazine of 9th November 1894 claims to have identified 3 separate attacks. It seems more likely that the rate of the charge was dictated by the geography of the nullahs, the enthusiasm of individual tribesmen for battle and their capabilities, rather than any intention to form separate attacks. There seems to have been the initial attack against the western face of the camp, a secondary flow of tribesmen around to the south face of the camp and into the area of the hospital, commissariat and cavalry lines and another flow around the north face that did not lead to a direct assault but confined itself to shooting into the camp.

Waziristan 1894 - North West Frontier India

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

Malakand uprising 1897

The Siege of Malakand was the 26 July – 2 August 1897 siege of the British garrison in the Malakand region of colonial British India's North West Frontier Province.[8] The British faced a force of Pashtun tribesmen whose tribal lands had been bisected by the Durand Line,[9] the 1,519 mile (2,445 km) border between Afghanistan and British India drawn up at the end of the Anglo-Afghan wars to help hold the Russian Empire's spread of influence towards the Indian subcontinent.

The unrest caused by this division of the Pashtun lands led to the rise of Saidullah, a Pashtun fakir who led an army of at least 10,000[3][10] against the British garrison in Malakand. Although the British forces were divided amongst a number of poorly defended positions, the small garrison at the camp of Malakand South and the small fort at Chakdara were both able to hold out for six days against the much larger Pashtun army.

The siege was lifted when a relief column dispatched from British positions to the south was sent to assist General William Hope Meiklejohn, commander of the British forces at Malakand South. Accompanying this relief force was second lieutenant Winston Churchill, who later published his account as The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War.

Background
The rivalry between the British and the Russian Empires, named "The Great Game" by Arthur Conolly,[11] centred on Afghanistan during the late 19th century. From the British perspective, Russian expansion threatened to destroy the so-called "jewel in the crown" of the British Empire, India. As the Tsar's troops in Central Asia began to subdue one Khanate after another, the British feared that Afghanistan would become a staging post for a Russian invasion.[12] Against this background the British launched the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1838, and attempted to impose a puppet regime under Shuja Shah. The regime was short-lived, however, and unsustainable without British military support. After the Russians sent an uninvited diplomatic mission to Kabul in 1878, tensions were renewed and Britain demanded that the ruler of Afghanistan (Sher Ali Khan) accept a British diplomatic mission.[13] The mission was turned back and, in retaliation, a force of 40,000 men was sent across the border by the British, launching the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

After reaching a virtual stalemate with these two wars against the Afghans, the British imposed the Durand Line in 1893, which divided Afghanistan and British India (now the North-West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (F.A.T.A.) and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan).[14] Named after Sir Mortimer Durand,[15] the foreign secretary of the British Indian government, it was agreed upon by the Emir of Afghanistan (Abdur Rahman Khan) and the representatives of the British Empire but deeply resented by the Afghans. Its intended purpose was to serve as a buffer zone to inhibit the spread of Russian influence down into British India

Malakand Field Force
The British Malakand Field Force used the town of Nowshera[8] as a base of operations. Nowshera was located south of the Kabul River "six hours by rail from Rawal Pindi".[16] Commanded by Colonel Schalch, the base served as a hospital while the normal garrison was serving 47 miles (76 km) away at Malakand Pass in what was known as the Malakand South Camp.[16] This force consisted of one British cavalry regiment,one Indian cavalry regiment and one Indian infantry battalion.[17] Winston Churchill, who would accompany the relief force as a second lieutenant and war correspondent,[18] described the camp as "...a great cup, of which the rim is broken into numerous clefts and jagged points. At the bottom of this cup is the 'crater' camp."[19] Churchill goes on to state that the camp was viewed as purely temporary and was indefensible, as a result of its cramped conditions and the fact that it was dominated by the surrounding heights.[19] A nearby camp, North Malakand, was also established on the plains of Khar, intended to hold the large number of troops that were unable to fit into the main camp. Both of these positions were garrisoned for two years with little fear of attack by a 1,000 strong force.[10][19] Officers brought their families, and the camp held regular polo matches and shooting competitions.

Outbreak of the battle
Towards 1897, news of unrest in the nearby Pashtun villages had reached the British garrisons in Malakand. Major Deane, the British political agent, noted the growing unrest within the Pashtun sepoys[21] stationed with the British. His warnings were officially distributed to senior officers on 23 July 1897; however, nothing more than a minor skirmish was expected.[21][22] Rumours of a new religious leader, Saidullah the Sartor Fakir (also known as Mullah of Mastun),[23][24] arriving to "sweep away" the British and inspire a jihad,[25][26] were reportedly circulating the bazaars of Malakand during July. Saidullah became known to the British as "The Great Fakir", "Mad Fakir"[27] or the "Mad Mullah",[25] and by the Pashtuns as lewanai faqir, or simply, lewanai, meaning "god-intoxicated".[24]

On July 26, while British officers were playing polo near camp Malakand North, indigenous spectators who were watching the match learned of an approaching Pashtun force and fled. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, commander of the Malakand forces, was informed by Deane that "matters had assumed a very grave aspect" and that there were armed Pashtuns gathering nearby. Reinforcements from Mardan (32 miles (51 km) away) were requested, and Lieutenant P. Eliott-Lockhart departed at 1.30am.[28] At 9.45pm, a final telegram was received informing the garrison that the Fakir had passed Khar and was advancing on Malakand. The telegram also stated that neither the levies nor the people would act against him, and that the hills to the east of the camp were covered with Pathans.[29] Shortly after, the communication wire was cut.


Read further here Siege of Malakand - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

Young winston churchil fought in 1897 revolt in pakhtunkhwa.

@Hyperion, @Armstrong, @Spring Onion, @Abu Zolfiqar, @RescueRanger, @haviZsultan

 

[RescueRanger]

^

Another good read is The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War (1898) by Sir Winston Churchill.

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

@Aeronaut, @Awesome , kindly change the title of thread to "frontier revolt of 1897".....the rebellion was not just limited to khyber, it was from swat to quetta....i dont know which mod changed the title without consulting me

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

Afridi warriors of khyber

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

dargai heights 1897

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

British soldiers at dargai 1897

 

[Truth Finder]

People of the Afghan Province(as it is known in India) have a history of doing revolts. It dates back to the 3rd century B.C. when Ashoka was the young prince. He had to rush from central India to the north west to stop the revolt. It was just the start and it is now continuing for almost 2500 years.

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

When britishers moved into the vacuum of the Mughal Empire collapse, they studied carefully the history of the region (today's Pakistan, Afghanistan and india); they always kept in mind the constant threat of Russian invasion and they were very sensitive about the approach towards NWFP and beyond -- especially Pakhtun areas in which the latter gave the former a resistance they would never forget!

britishers were constantly unable to find a proper "model" for a viable security system/approach towards the region. Their attempts to occupy the region were always thwarted by Tajiks and Pakhtuns......there was fierce resistance and ferocity by both Tajiks (of hindu kush) and Pakhtuns of eastern/southern Afghanistan including areas that today belong to Pakistan.

britishers were considered Ahl-e-Kitab (people of the Book) but even then these people considered them as invaders....kaffirs. etc.

the independence of Pakistani nation in 1947 marked a new era, not only in the history of Pak-indo sub-continent but also for the tribes who are assuming greater and greater responsibility for the defence of the Western frontier of Pakistan

Time and time again it withstood and resisted the first impacts of invasions from across the present frontier and it is there that a great fusion of races resulted in producing differentiation between what are today all considered Pakhtun tribes

the strip of tribal territory varies in width from about only 48 kilometer @ Khyber agency to over 300 km @ Sibi; tribes of the middle section of frontier (between kabul & gomal rivers) was divided into the agencies that we have today in Pakistan FATA region --- this area was always like a kind of a buffer sort of thing; between Persian and ****** empire. Despite this pull from both sides (and despite meddling from britishers) the Pakhtuns held their ground and any sign of aggression was responded to with ruthless aggression

in that sense as far as enemy/kaffir/etc invaders was concerned, not a lot has changed years later (on either side of Durand Line)