Brigadier Aslam Khan Afridi
'Colonel Pasha'
Military Cross
Hilal-e-Jurat
Fakhr-e-Kashmir
Commissioned in the State Army, he won an MC at the Burma Front, and took command of the Scouts from Major Brown in early 1948.
Played an instrumental role in the liberation of Baltistan.
https://t.co/CPZn3RdxOn
View attachment 679374
Brigadier Muhammad Aslam Khan( Code Name: Col. Pasha) history -
Back in Gilgit, where Col. Pasha established his headquarter, he raised the strength of the combined force about 2000 men, equipped them with whatever arms that were captured from the Kashmir State force and trained the rest with dummy wooden rifles. Four wings were organized as given below:-
‘A’ Wing of ex 6 J and K infantry Battalion under Captain Mohammad Khan Jarral at Bunji.
‘B’ Wing of ex-Gilgit Scouts under Captian Hassan Khan at Chilas,
‘C’ Wing of ex-Gilgit Scouts under Lt. Babar at Gilgit.
‘D’ Wing of ex-Gilgit Scouts under Major Ehsan Ali at Gilgit.
A quick survey of the area revealed a total military blank south of Astor and Burzil Pass right upto Gurez in one direction and across Deosai plain upto the vicinity of Zojila on the other. These were the two passes through which the enemy could re-enter Northern Areas as the Bandipur-Astor road and Kargil-Skardu road were the most frequented routes followed in time of the Maharaj’s rule.
But close at hand at Skardu the enemy force were still sitting strong and they could advance with some re-enforcements along the Indus river right into Gilgit. The plan that Col. Pasha made converted the immediate objective-to advance into the blank area and occupy as much territory as possible during the winter before the enemy had chance to re-enter; to hold the enemy at the two passes at the south-east and south-west and stop their passage with strong force so that in the next summer season there was no possibility of the enemy to retake possession of the ground so conquered; and finally to neutralize enemy’s strength in Skardu and conquered the whole of Baltistan and integrate it into Northern Areas. The entire plan, as it appears, covered those “frontier” areas which fell outside the main valley of Kashmir from this northerly direction as he had no means to do so. If he could hold Zojila pass, the only other direction where he could advance was Ladakh and cut it away from Jammu and Kashmir. This aim of conquering Baltistan and pushing the border to the very gates of Kashmir was a scheme of no mean order and this perhaps was the mission for which he was sent to Gilgit. Col. Pasha was a man of steel frame to achieve his objective in the most unfavorable season of the year. To impute to him any personal jealousy for not helping his commander, Captain Hassan Khan, in the Gurez-Bandipur sector to advance towards Srinagar will be defeated the very purpose of the original plan which did not include the conquest of Kashmir.
In accordance with the original scheme discussed in Gilgit, Col. Pasha gave a new shape to two forces, the first he significantly named Tiger Force to be commanded by Col. Hassan Khan, the second was called Ibex force to be commanded by Major Ehsan Ali.
The task of the Tiger force was to advance to Tragbal and GUREZ and continue striking at Bandipur with a growling noise of a tiger to keep the Indian force away from approaching the boundary of Northern Areas. The task of the ibex force was to hop, like an ibex of this area, over high ranges along the Indus River , first meet with the Indian detachment at Rondu, occupy Skardu and advance onward towards Kargil and Ladakh so as to stop Indian army advancing from the valley of Kashmir into this direction. The greatest hurdle was the most unfavorable winter season with deep snow obstructing the path of advance which could only be braved by the hardy soldiers of this region. But there was the hard task-master, the Commandant, who directed every step of the move and was ready to change plan in response to the changing circumstances. When the ibex force was stuck at Skardu and there was hardly any chance of that force advancing towards Kargil in winter. Col Pasha moved his headquarter to Chilam and began to train another force there in the snow fields around Burzil. Even when the training was on, these snow-fed soldiers from Hunza and Yasin were asked to wrap their feet and legs with rags and ordered to march across the Deosai Plain wading through fifteen feet thick snow and reach Kargil, Dras and Zojila in three days. Commanded by another icy cold-proof soldier, Lt. Shah Khan of hunza, the force was literally and operationally called Eskimo force as they had a challenge the ice- sheets of 12000 feet high plateau of deosai, sit and sleep on snow-capped high peak And hammer surprise attacks on the enemy to snatch food, clothing and weapons from then.
It is in this scheme of offensive action during the worst season of the year with weather-worn soldiers of steel physique and inexhaustible energy, driven by Col. Pasha, to achieve the objective without fail, they lay the real defense of the Northern Areas.
Within the scheme outlined Col. Pasha gave enough freedom to his commanders to use their intelligence and initiative to go ahead with their force, create confusion in the enemy ranks by their surprise move and destroy the possibility of any advance by Maharaja’s soldiers. The tactic that he adopted suited to the genius of the local soldiers who were proficient in holding their own on hill tops and ambushing the enemy in the valleys by a volley of concentrated fire that would surely lead to either utter destruction of the enemy or their confused escape for life.Such moves were possible because the commandant knew the land inch by inch and he could issue instructions and send supplies of men and material and even divert platoons and companies from one sector to another.The best example of such a diversion was the despatch of a batch of 60 men to Thurgo Pari under the command of Subedar Mohammad Ali to ambush the advance of an Indian battalion along the Indus under Col. Kirpal Singh. The Subedar divided his platoon in two sections, one posted on the northerly hill and another on the southern but men were disposed in such a fashion that in groups of three, they hid behind separate boulders. When the enemy was down in the valley shots were fired from north to south and it appeared as if all the boulders on the top were angrily falling on the heads of the enemy. There could hardly be any protection from the volley of fire. The whole battalion was routed. The scheme was well designed and the command was well executed to its successful end.
Another example is of the delayed capture of Dras, where a platoon was led by Subedar Sher Ali of Yasin. In the right old Islamic tradition the Subedar did not like to kill the enemy by surprise. He gave a challenge to the resting enemy of soldiers in the valley and did not open fire till the enemy was allowed to hold their weapons and meet the invaders face to face. This old tactic of fighting between swords men were all right when the two soldiers had similar equipments but in the present case disparity in equipment put the Subedar in the most disadvantageous position. The result was considerable delay in the occupation of Dras. Here the commandant came to the help and he sent re-enforcements of four platoons from the Tiger Force in Gurez Sector, which finally helped in routing the enemy in this sector and occupying the strategic place of Dras and advancing towards Zojila for its capture. This military move of the commandant has been criticized by some 109 out of their ignorance but Col. Pasha knew the significance of his strategy very well. He had deployed the Eskimo Force in this direction with the sole purpose of closing to Zojila route before summer set in and to achieve that end it was he who alone knew how best to use the soldiers fighting in different sectors.
After Col. Hasan Khan had achieved in winning control over Gurez-Astor route and was well placed on Tragbal pass, the other most important objective was to push ahead towards Kargil, Dras and Zojila because it was along this direction that the enemy had been trying to break through and send Re-enforcements for the relief of the besieged men in Skardu. With that aim in view Col. Pasha had instructed Major Ehsan Ali to occupy Skardu as quickly as possible and advance ahead along the Indus valley route towards Parkuta, Kharmong and Ladakh. When Major Ehsan was stuck up in Skardu, Col. Pasha dispatched the reserve force under the name of Eskimo Force towards Kargil and Zojila to do the job earlier entrusted to Major Ehsan Ali. And for the objective he mobilized all the soldiers that he could lay hold on in any sector where fighting was going on. Even from Skardu some platoons were sent to this direction for finishing the job as quickly as possible. Later even Ehsan Ali was ordered to move even before the actual fall of Skardu, leaving this job to others, and command the forces in this most difficult sector, where the enemy was up with his re-enforcements. Some of the most important battles were fought later in this sector and it goes to the credit of Col. Pasha that he evolved a plan not only to close this route for the Indians but also to deploy his soldiers according to his policy of offensive action throughout the area of Ladakh. Although the main headquarter was not occupied because of Indian superiority of air supplies, yet his men surrounded the capital and they moved forward far ahead in the south upto Padam towards Jammu. In fact he was on the point of crossing the boundary of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and enters Indian Territory in Himachal Pradesh when he sent a wireless message to the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi consisting of three words “attacking Himachal Pradesh”. This position of Col. Pasha, achieved in six months by the end of June 1948, was much more than what was expected of him. The General Headquarters, then under a British C-in-C, was not interested in snatching any Indian territory. They were more than satisfied with the splendid work so far done by Col. Pasha. In early July 1948 Col. Pasha was recalled to Rawalpindi and posted as Private Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army Head. Col Pasha had the satisfaction of extending the boundary of Gilgit to the very gates of Kashmir and for this achievement he was awarded Hilal-e-Jurat by Government of Pakistan and later promoted to the rank of Brigadier in 1953 at the young age of 36 years. After retirement Brigadier Aslam Khan has chosen to remain in this area away from politics quietly remembering his older days of gallantry but at the same time adding to develop Tourist Industry in the form of Shangrila hotels in this isolated trans- Himalayas Zone.
