For Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, US helped create a nuclear Pakistan? - The Times of India
NEW DELHI: In July 1987, a Pakistani, Arshad Pervez, was arrested by US authorities when he was trying to bribe a Customs official to get an export license to buy high strength maraging steel — mainly used for building centrifuges to enrich uranium — and large amounts of beryllium that could be used only for Islamabad's still covert nuclear weapons programme. Around the same time, a Chinese national and two US citizens were indicted for illegal exports of advanced computers and similar technology to Pakistan.
According to newly-declassified documents by the National Security Archive, the arrest led to a huge debate within the Reagan administration. Ken Adelman, the chief of Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA), according to the documents, wanted to come down hard on Pakistan. But the State Department hesitated, unwilling to jeopardize US-Pakistan relations, particularly as General Zia-ul-Haq was supporting the Afghan mujahideen. "We are particularly concerned about weakening the President's hand in discussions with the Soviets on Afghanistan, which [are] at a critical stage."
The documents show the indictment of Pervez and Inam ul-Haq, a key figure in the A Q Khan nuclear procurement network, were important because they provided vital links to Pakistan's nuke programme. The key element in the case was the illegal effort to acquire 350 tonnes of maraging steel that would be "used in a uranium enrichment plant to manufacture nuclear weapons," and beryllium, used specifically for the neutron initiator in a nuclear weapon, the export of which was controlled in the US government's Commodity Control List.
In its report, the National Security Archive says, "For the Reagan administration, aiding the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan trumped nonproliferation policy interests. The high priority given to a close US-Pakistan relationship may have encouraged, as some journalists have alleged, State Department officials to warn the Pakistanis of the imminent arrest of their agents. Indeed, Haq, who was working closely with Pervez, evaded arrest by slipping out of the United States at the last minute." To ensure a Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, the US watched and indirectly helped to create a nuclear weapons state in Pakistan. Adelman is on record in the new documents, protesting "Zia will conclude once again that he need do nothing about his bomb program." The Americans spent many months trying to locate Haq, who, a later telegram stated, was being moved around between locations in Azad Kashmir (Azad Kashmir).
Another ACDA memo concluded, "there is no plausible end-use for 25 tonnes of grade 350 maraging steel other than in the manufacture of centrifuges" for producing highly-enriched uranium and "for which Pakistan has no use except in nuclear explosives." Even the indulgent State Department balked at what was happening inside Pakistan. The undersecretary Michael Armacost even travelled to Pakistan to ask Zia to control his illegal nuclear programme. Armacost is quoted as saying that US government "information" indicated that "enrichment levels above 90[percent] have been achieved at Kahuta," the site of a secret gas centrifuge facility. Pakistan was openly violating a commitment to keep to a 5% ceiling, by producing weapons-grade material.
NEW DELHI: In July 1987, a Pakistani, Arshad Pervez, was arrested by US authorities when he was trying to bribe a Customs official to get an export license to buy high strength maraging steel — mainly used for building centrifuges to enrich uranium — and large amounts of beryllium that could be used only for Islamabad's still covert nuclear weapons programme. Around the same time, a Chinese national and two US citizens were indicted for illegal exports of advanced computers and similar technology to Pakistan.
According to newly-declassified documents by the National Security Archive, the arrest led to a huge debate within the Reagan administration. Ken Adelman, the chief of Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA), according to the documents, wanted to come down hard on Pakistan. But the State Department hesitated, unwilling to jeopardize US-Pakistan relations, particularly as General Zia-ul-Haq was supporting the Afghan mujahideen. "We are particularly concerned about weakening the President's hand in discussions with the Soviets on Afghanistan, which [are] at a critical stage."
The documents show the indictment of Pervez and Inam ul-Haq, a key figure in the A Q Khan nuclear procurement network, were important because they provided vital links to Pakistan's nuke programme. The key element in the case was the illegal effort to acquire 350 tonnes of maraging steel that would be "used in a uranium enrichment plant to manufacture nuclear weapons," and beryllium, used specifically for the neutron initiator in a nuclear weapon, the export of which was controlled in the US government's Commodity Control List.
In its report, the National Security Archive says, "For the Reagan administration, aiding the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan trumped nonproliferation policy interests. The high priority given to a close US-Pakistan relationship may have encouraged, as some journalists have alleged, State Department officials to warn the Pakistanis of the imminent arrest of their agents. Indeed, Haq, who was working closely with Pervez, evaded arrest by slipping out of the United States at the last minute." To ensure a Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, the US watched and indirectly helped to create a nuclear weapons state in Pakistan. Adelman is on record in the new documents, protesting "Zia will conclude once again that he need do nothing about his bomb program." The Americans spent many months trying to locate Haq, who, a later telegram stated, was being moved around between locations in Azad Kashmir (Azad Kashmir).
Another ACDA memo concluded, "there is no plausible end-use for 25 tonnes of grade 350 maraging steel other than in the manufacture of centrifuges" for producing highly-enriched uranium and "for which Pakistan has no use except in nuclear explosives." Even the indulgent State Department balked at what was happening inside Pakistan. The undersecretary Michael Armacost even travelled to Pakistan to ask Zia to control his illegal nuclear programme. Armacost is quoted as saying that US government "information" indicated that "enrichment levels above 90[percent] have been achieved at Kahuta," the site of a secret gas centrifuge facility. Pakistan was openly violating a commitment to keep to a 5% ceiling, by producing weapons-grade material.
