For peace with Pak, India has to be strong

[Flintlock]

For peace with Pak, India has to be strong
24 Aug 2008, 0148 hrs IST, M J Akbar


The oddest fallacy within Delhi's current establishment is the conviction that Pakistan's India policy is leader-centric rather than a projection of national interest, which those in power might tinker with here, or twist there, but cannot shift from a fundamental axis: the belief that the Kashmir valley should be a part of Pakistan. Definitions of national interest take much longer to change than leaders.

The public lament of national security adviser M K Narayanan at the impending departure of Pervez Musharraf may have been well-intentioned but was ill-advised. It certainly did not help Musharraf, and may even have hurt him with his core constituency, the army and the ISI. If it is the prevailing view in the Manmohan Singh government that Islamabad's promotion of violence in Kashmir, either through directly sponsored terrorism, or encouragement of mass displays of disaffection, varies with the inclinations of individuals, then it is time to outsource Pakistan policy to less naive professionals.

Islamabad's policy towards Kashmir is calibrated on a sensitive thermometer that measures the fever between circumstance and opportunity. This was true of October 1947, when Jinnah launched a war for the Valley after the peaceful resolution of Kashmir through negotiations with Nehru and the Maharaja, with Britain as the fourth party at the table, became inevitable. All three, India, Pakistan and Britain, were agreed that independence was not on offer. Jinnah was convinced that Nehru's inexperienced government, unable to control a raging Hindu-Muslim civil war, would be incapable of fighting back a "tribal incursion" and he would be able to join the congregation on the first Friday prayers at the grand mosque in Srinagar within days of the Pak-sponsored "uprising".

In 1965, Ayub Khan saw an opportunity in three critical facts: the humiliation of the Indian Army on the China border three years before; a Congress bereft of Nehru, who died in 1964; and a Kashmir still in the tremors of an unprecedented upsurge over the mysterious disappearance (and even more mysterious reappearance) of the mo-e-muqaddas, a strand of hair from the beard of the Holy Prophet of Islam.

There is still some dispute as to who launched Kargil, but the evidence points to a still-unknown general, Pervez Musharraf. He saw a fragile coalition in Delhi led by BJP, and became convinced that he could creep up and take up impregnable positions astride vital communication lines while his prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, twiddled his hamburgers in Islamabad. The Pak army did not envisage a larger conflict because it had realized, as early as the early 1980s, that a conventional war with India was no longer winnable.

The despot who ruled the country then, General Zia-ul Haq, therefore stabilized relations on the surface and undermined them below eye-level through blatant support for secessionism in Punjab and Kashmir. The background and character of each man, whether democrat or dictator, had less to do with what he did than circumstance and opportunity. If India provides the opening, a Pakistani leader will seize the chance to change the status of the Kashmir valley. The latest Pakistani threat to take Kashmir back to the top of the agenda at the United Nations has come not from a dictator but a democrat.

War and peace are not open-ended options; both are framed by specifics. The good news for peaceniks (among whom I count myself) is that the bomb has ended the possibility of formal war. The bad news is that no one knows what peace means.

Can there be peace until Pakistan renounces its deeply held objective that the Kashmir valley cannot remain an integral part of India? Can any government in Delhi purchase peace by any compromise on the legal and territorial status quo?

We have elided Kargil from Musharraf's CV and replaced it with Agra and his periodic hints about an "out-of-the-box settlement" on Kashmir. To be fair, Musharraf always made it clear that the status quo was not acceptable as the solution. What precisely did Musharraf mean?

Musharraf's peace-drive was running at least partly on an American gear. With the Manmohan Singh government itching for its own American embrace, it made sense for Washington to have both South Asian nations on its side. The best American formula for Kashmir is obviously one that would guarantee trilateral benefits, the third interest being the American.

A model often proposed at Washington-encouraged conferences has been a Kashmir delinked from Jammu and Ladakh, over which India might enjoy at best a face-saving, limited sovereignty. Trifurcation is the first step towards an "autonomous" or "quasi-independent" Kashmir, while Jammu and Ladakh, unleashed from Article 370, integrate fully with India.

To create the psychological conditions for such an option, we need the same mindset that persuaded enough Indian Hindus to agree to partition in 1947. On one margin today is the radical-soft, human rights view that Kashmiris should be given their "azadi" because they want it. (It would be equivalent to the CPI position before 1947.) This argument is indifferent to two potential consequences. Indian Muslims, who have already paid a heavy price for the "guilt" of 1947, would be condemned to generations of discrimination for a second betrayal of the motherland by some of their co-religionists; and there would be a collateral rise in other "independence" movements in Punjab, Gorkhaland, the North-East and the South. Welcome to Balkan India. Kosovo could seem a large country compared with Gorkhaland.

On the obverse, this scenario needs a growing "enough-is-enough, to-hell-with-Kashmiris" attitude among Hindus, aggravated by anger against ingratitude - after all secular India provided Kashmiris not only the chance to join a rising economy, but also a modern education and the freedom of a multicultural society, and they rejected it. The two points of view would coalesce from different directions. Impossible? This is precisely what happened in 1947, leaving Gandhi and Maulana Azad distraught but utterly helpless. Sixty one years later, some opinion-builders in English newspapers have begun to articulate the "enough-is-enough" argument.

Dr Manmohan Singh spoke a few days ago of finding a permanent settlement to Kashmir. Implicit in the use of "permanent" is the belief that the status quo is unsatisfactory and needs alteration. The official position of India lies in a Parliament resolution, binding on all governments, that Kashmir's status cannot be diluted. The pragmatic position, which would find acceptance if ever put to the test, is that the ceasefire line should be converted into the international border. Even peace-loving Musharraf, who did not have to worry about a popular vote, was not in a position to accept the ceasefire line as the final destiny. His successors will not sign on either, when they get time from their increasingly vicious internecine battles for political supremacy. So what "permanent" solution does Dr Singh have in mind?

Peace with Pakistan is possible, but it can only come when India looks strong, not when it seems vulnerable. The health of India is what Delhi should worry about, not the health of Pervez Musharraf.

For peace with Pak, India has to be strong-Special Report-Sunday Specials-Opinion-The Times of India

 

[jaison]

nice find.

 

[gpit]

It's a joke that Kashmir issue would be solved if India were strong. Instead, it may be annexed by India as history shows.

For peace with India, Pak must be strong.

 

[Flintlock]

It's a joke that Kashmir issue would be solved if India were strong. Instead, it may be annexed by India as history shows.

For peace with India, Pak must be strong.

Tis nice to hear that India has been annexing Pakistan throughout history for a change.

Usually, its Pakistanis who gloat that they annexed India.

 

[jaison]

all the major wars 1965,1971 were fought when pakistan was strong..............they had more modern equipment more armour.....Institute of Defence Analysis, USA in 1965 predicted that in the event of war pak would win swiftly but 1965 stalemate came as a shock.now strategic equation has changed dramatically.

 

[EagleEyes]

all the major wars 1965,1971 were fought when pakistan was strong..............they had more modern equipment more armour.....Institute of Defence Analysis, USA in 1965 predicted that in the event of war pak would win swiftly but 1965 stalemate came as a shock.now strategic equation has changed dramatically.

Pakistan and the world doesn't recognize 1965 as a stalemate (or) Pakistan losing the war as many Indian trolls describe it. It was war which Pakistan fought and won bravely with numerous odd and numbers against it.

As far as India has to be strong for peace. It is NEVER going to be tolerated by Pakistan. Pakistan will keep a balance equation for the peace in the region, as it has the experience of being threatened by the nuclear and conventional weapons in the past.

 

[Contrarian]

1965 War: A Different Legacy

Today, over a hundred and fifty million Pakistanis celebrate the 42nd Defense of Pakistan Day. It was 6th of September 1965 when Pakistan’s armed forces faced off against India’s in the first full-scale war between the two countries. Much to the credit of the brave men (and women) in uniform that day–and for next 2-3 weeks following that–the enemy attack on the City of Lahore was repulsed and the General J. N. Chaudhary’s dream of having his drink at Lahore Gymkhana on the evening of September the 6th was squashed.

Tomorrow, the country celebrates the Airforce Day to pay tribute to the defenders of the country’s air space. PAF’s performance during the 1965 War was truly remarkable given the comparative state of balance between the two airforces. It managed to shoot down 110 of India’s aircrafts while itself incurring the loss of only 18 of its own. Not only did PAF establish itself as a qualitatively superior airforce in the 1965 War but also established its credentials as one of the best airforces of the world.

While much has been written, by official and unofficial quarters, on the history of the 1965 War and a lot more continues to be written every year, there are several gross misconceptions about this event in Pakistan’s history that need to be tackled with and addressed. In Pakistan, ever since (or soon after) its creation in 1947, the writing of history has been an almost exclusive domain of the establishment whereby an official “doctrine” or “mythology” is often disseminated to ensure a homogeneity of thought and conformity of actions.

Noted historian, K. K. Aziz, in his “Murder of History: A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan” (1998) notes that:

“In Pakistani schools and colleges what is being taught as history is really national mythology, and the subjects of Social Studies and Pakistan Studies are nothing but vehicles of political indoctrination. Our children don’t learn history. They are ordered to read a carefully selected collection of falsehoods, fairy tales and plain lies.”

The myth and mystery around the 1965 War is no exception. One would not be surprised that a normal–perhaps even average college educated–Pakistani believes–or is led to believe–that on Sept 6th 1965, India invaded Pakistan (specifically Lahore) and that once thrust into this battle, Pakistan came out to be victorious over its archrival. Both of these facts, on close examination, are quite far from reality. True, India did attack Lahore on September 6th 1965, but it was not the one to force a war on Pakistan in the first place. It was Pakistan’s provocation in the form of Operation Gibralter that led India towards opening the Western front in Pakistan.

It is also true that by the end of the 3rd week of war, both countries had found themselves in a virtual military stalemate. While Pakistan’s armed forces had successfully defended Lahore–thanks, primarily to men like Raja Aziz Bhatti who, despite the failure of leadership at the top-most levels, gave up their lives but not inch of the country’s territory, but also due to the strategic position of the BRB Canal that formed a natural defense for Lahore–all of Pakistan’s offensive maneuvers had come to a naught.

The Operation Gibralter that began in May-June of 1965 to take Indian territory in Kashmir and create an insurgency and popular uprising in the region was frustrated. This launched Operation Grand Slam that was aimed at cutting the Jammu-Rajouri road at Akhnur and to ultimately capture the latter. This operation was unnecessary delayed because of a change in top-military commander–a change widely perceived as unwarranted at that time. Despite these delays, however, as Pakistani troops gained some territory, India launched a full-scale offensive aimed at Lahore (0530 hrs on the 6th) and Sialkot (night between 7th and 8th). The rest as they say is history.

In the ground war itself, there was a military stalemate on virtually all, northern (Kashmir), central ( Lahore), and southern, axes. At the time of the ceasefire, India held 450 square miles of Pakistan’s territory and Pakistan held 1600 square miles of Indian territory. General K. M. Arif, in his book Khaki Shadows, though, highlights that the Indian land gains were mainly in the fertile Sialkot and Kashmir sectors while Pakistani land gains were primarily in deserts opposite Sindh. While Pakistan came out with better numbers in terms of casualties (dead, injured, and missing) and equipment losses, it hardly was victorious as is often claimed by the establishment. Unless you define victory as being able to defend oneself during an offensive operation — hardly a definition indeed.

Apart from the unfortunate myth about who actually started the war itself, another factor that has received much less attention, and for obvious reasons, is why it was started in the first place. At the time of the 1965 War, Pakistan did not really have a full-time Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. General Ayub Khan was, at best, a part-time military commander, as he was too engaged in political affairs of the country. He had chosen General Musa Khan as his full-time Chief of Army Staff but only on the basis of his loyalty to the former rather than merit, competency or professionalism. This lack of leadership and competency at the highest levels of Pakistan’s military during the 1965 became legendary and is well-documented.

This was also something that was consequently taken advantage of by none other that Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto was, at the time of the 1965 war, at the peak of his power as Ayub’s foreign minister and a foreign policy hawk, par excellence. He single handedly molded the opinion of the foreign office and his friends at the GHQ to plan operation Gibralter. Ayub was informed about the plans but only to an extent.

Most importantly, Bhutto and his colleagues at the GHQ were able to dupe everyone who mattered into believing that capturing Kashmir was in sight, that an insurgency would immediately create an uprising, and that India would never declare full-scale war on Pakistan. Ayub’s indifference to this whole affair can be estimated from the fact that the Supreme Commander was vacationing in Swat during the last week of August 1965 when Pakistani troops were dying in Kashmir.

Each one of the above assumptions was grossly incorrect and both Ayub and Pakistan paid a heavy price for it. For his part, Bhutto was able to walk away from his created mess and managed to turn the tide against Ayub and actually benefit from the situation. The 1965 War was the turning point of Ayub’s career at the helm. Bhutto rode this wave of dissatisfaction with the war as well as the Tashkent Agreement to power in 1970.

Setting the record straight on what the 1965 War was all about, who started it, and why did it get started is not only a important constitutional right of Pakistani citizens but also is critical to learning from our own mistakes. Unfortunately, that is something that Pakistan has never been good at. General K. M. Arif in Khaki Shadows writes that in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 War “Pakistan suffered a loss of a different kind…Soon after the War the GHQ ordered all the formations and units of the Pakistan Army to destroy their respective war diaries and submit completed reports to this effect by a given date. This was done?Their [the war diaries'] destruction, a self-inflicted injury and an irreparable national loss, was intellectual suicide.”

Clearly, the political-military nexus had an interest in ensuring that nobody should find out what actually happened during the 1965 War — the former because of its incompetence and lack of leadership and the latter because of its culpability in taking Pakistan to war. While considerable second-hand material has become available since then, first hand information and accounts of the war remain a national secret whose disseminator could be charged under the Official Secrets Act. The organizational and legal paraphernalia to ensure that nobody ever learns from this tragic event in Pakistan’s history is complete and foolproof.

What could have happened differently if Pakistanis had actually learnt from what happened before, during, and after the 1965 War?

One, Mr. Bhutto would probably have found it difficult to ride the wave of anti-Ayub discontent as easily as he did for he was equally, if not more, culpable for what was solely blamed on Ayub Khan.

Two, Mr. Bhutto would not have found it as easy to continue to befriend army generals and exercise the kind of influence at GHQ that he did during the 1971 debacle. Perhaps Pakistan would have been intact.

Three, the army leadership would have received its fair share of blame for its professional incompetence, and preoccupation with civilian and political affairs at the expense of their military duty.

Four, Perhaps Pakistan would have learnt its lessons and Kargil-II (1965 War was, in fact, Operation Kargil-I) would not have happened. Consequently, Sharif government would not have been toppled and Musharraf would have been living a retired existence for the last 5 years.

The chain of causalities run fairly deep and dense in Pakistan’s history. Our inability and unwillingness to learn from our own mistakes merely reinforces these events and brings us closer to a new–and more challenging–disaster every time. The 1965 War should be remembered as a day of courage and sacrifice of Pakistani people–most notably our men and women in uniform–who were wronged by their civilian and military leaders, but more importantly it should be remembered as a missed opportunity to learn and improve our lot. That is the test we continue to fail each year.

http://pakistaniat.com/2007/09/06/1965-war-a-different-legacy/comment-page-6/

A little reminder of the truth.

 

[jaison]

Pakistan and the world doesn't recognize 1965 as a stalemate (or) Pakistan losing the war as many Indian trolls describe it. It was war which Pakistan fought and won bravely with numerous odd and numbers against it.

As far as India has to be strong for peace. It is NEVER going to be tolerated by Pakistan. Pakistan will keep a balance equation for the peace in the region, as it has the experience of being threatened by the nuclear and conventional weapons in the past.

please read the book "The Myth of 1965 Victory" by an ex isi chief and then u can put forward ur views.........sorry my mistake it was banned by musharraf..

GHQ buys up all copies of ex-ISI chief's book
(From our correspondent)

2 October 2006 Print E-mail

LAHORE — Former ISI chief Lieutenant-General (Retd) Mahmood Ahmed has recently got his book on the history of Pak-India war 1965 published — and strangely enough all the 22,000 copies of this book published by Oxford University Press went to Army Book Club, as if it was not meant for the general public.


When Gen. (retd) Mahmood presented the draft to the GHQ, it suggested certain changes in the contents — and even the title.

How much of these were accepted by the author is not known at this stage.

Sources say the General Head Quarters of the Pakistan Army has bought up all the 22,000 copies of the book, titled The Myth of 1965 Victory, paying the lump sum money amounting to millions, given the high price of the book, to the publisher.

When some leading book houses contacted the OUP to get the book, the publishers flatly refused, saying that it was under contract not to provide the book for general distribution.

It is learnt that Gen. Mahmood himself tried to get more copies of the book published for the general public but could not get permission from the powers that be.

The booksellers are not sure why the book is not meant for general public. Most think that the book might contain some sensitive material. President Musharraf has also recently made a mention of the book in one of his interviews to foreign press while describing Mahmood’s post-retirement activities and referring to it as unpublished yet.

Gen. Mahmood is one of the seven generals who carried out the coup against Nawaz Sharif. He was then Corps Commander Rawalpindi. He was later rewarded for his loyalty to Gen. Musharraf and made DG ISI. Recently, General Mahmood’s name echoed far and wide when President Musharraf revealed in his book In the line of Fire‚ which has created tremors internationally, that it was General Mahmood whom Richard Armitage had warned that if Pakistan did not cooperate with the US government it would be bombed back to the Stone Age. Since this revelation, Mahmood became the most sought after figure for the local and international press.
He was later retired abruptly within a couple of months of 9/11, with speculation that he had been too soft on the Taleban Print E-mail

to suit the new circumstances.
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2006/October/subcontinent_October48.xml&section=subcontinent&col=

 

[Contrarian]

Pakistan and the world doesn't recognize 1965 as a stalemate (or) Pakistan losing the war as many Indian trolls describe it. It was war which Pakistan fought and won bravely with numerous odd and numbers against it.

If you had the numerous odds and numbers versus India, then maybe you shouldnt have attacked in the first place!

As far as India has to be strong for peace. It is NEVER going to be tolerated by Pakistan. Pakistan will keep a balance equation for the peace in the region, as it has the experience of being threatened by the nuclear and conventional weapons in the past.

Do carry on!

 

[Awesome]

You Indian guys do understand that this article wreaks with the intent to piss-off Indians against Pakistan right? Even your government's chilling out these days. However sadly such paranoid ******** still need to be addressed.

From all the "thanks" in the posts up there and the silly pat on the backs, it seems you folks are still primitive enough to fall for such sensationalist crap. A scared off, paranoid and "STRONG" Indian... Now that's not good for peace.

 

[jaison]

that was a great malaymishra ,yes indeed pak had lost its treasure(war diaries) in the act of keeping up its prestige only to loose it later in 1971 and 1999.....india also lost in 1962 against china but has learnt to fight a future war instead of claiming more pla sodiers were dead than ia soldiers.....pak people must understand the reality in a more constructive way and use it to catch up with fast growing countries instead of arguing the same old way.............but i would be wrong if i say pak military did not perform well pak forces are still one of the most professional forces.GOP must also respect them for their valour instead of claiming them as independant jihadists(as in kargil).......long live friendlyindia and pak.....

 

[asaad-ul-islam]

yes, yes i've heard that all too often from our indian friends. as a matter of fact, indians were no where close to winning sialkot.

the citizens of sialkot came to the defense of their own city and helped the pakistani troops repulse indian troops. that's why they were awarded the "HILAL-I-ISTAQLAL" for their bravery.

actually the citizens of lahore and sargodha received this recognition as well. now, can anyone tell me whether the indian villages invaded by the pakistani army put up a resistance or not?

 

[jaison]

yes, yes i've heard that all too often from our indian friends. as a matter of fact, indians were no where close to winning sialkot.

the citizens of sialkot came to the defense of their own city and helped the pakistani troops repulse indian troops. that's why they were awarded the "HILAL-I-ISTAQLAL" for their bravery.

actually the citizens of lahore and sargodha received this recognition as well. now, can anyone tell me whether the indian villages invaded by the pakistani army put up a resistance or not?

that is wat am saying pak forces are capable but like it or not reality is bitter.......and for pak invading indian villages,pak ssgs crossed into indian territory in Operation Gibraltar and the kashmiris were instrumental in informing abt the insurgency to local authorities and in capturing and killing of pak commandos while there was leadership chaos in pak military....just show any neutral link to justify ur argument that pak indeed won 1965......india suffered sever casualities in 1962 and 1965 but it learned from mistakes and executed flawlessly in 1971..

 

[EagleEyes]

If you had the numerous odds and numbers versus India, then maybe you shouldnt have attacked in the first place!


Do carry on!

India was the aggressor who launched a full fledged attack against Pakistan only to be driven back with broken back and bones!

 

[Malang]

Gentlemen, lets keep the thread civil and lets not digress the topic by bringing up the past wars, both country's have differing records so lets leave the topic of what happened, who instigated etc.

PS: From a quick reading of the article I don't know how could someone change the topic to wars and military??

A Strong Firm United Indian Govt. would definetly help peace. as would a Strong Pakistani govt..