Taking fire power as the main parameter - some thoughtful people started thinking of multiplying it - and saturating the battlefield with more of it - and that's how the idea of multiple rocket launchers was translated into the manufactures of MLRs. It is a fad now - perhaps a formidable fashion.
In fact in some circles it was thought - and is still being thought - perhaps rightly so that the single barrelled artillery has reached its optimum development - and there is no further scope for its development as such.
I remember while writing on this subject I wrote in The Nation Lahore of May 1991 '... The single barrelled gun has almost reached the end of its development. The medium gun (155 mm calibre) has got a barrel length of 50 calibres (50 x 155 mm) Any increase in barrel length will pose problems of articulation weight distribution - and even recoil absorption. The barrel construction would require advanced autofrettage technology and other refinements to withstand stresses of extra range ammunition (HEER i.e. High Explosive Extra Range.) ... It would also probably require liquid propellants rather than the existing and commonly used single or double based propellants. Towed artillery (single barrelled) - and especially comparatively heavier weapons, need time both for deployment and coming out of action. This problem has been partially solved by the Bofor auxiliary mover - a sort of gear which can displace the gun (once it fires). It is in fact a 'shoot and scoot' arrangement as the Indian authorities prefer to call it.
'... And then only a limited number of guns can be self-propelled which have to keep pace with armour operations...' Gen Sunderji (late) an Ex-COAS of the Indian Army was a great fan of 'shoot and scoot' idea.
The idea and use of MLRs appears to be gaining more ground - especially so after the Gulf War - 1991 - where these multi-rocket launchers played havoc with Iraqi targets. Some diehards like the Bofors and others had doubted the ballistic performance and accuracy of the rocket launchers - but apparently they did not appreciate the saturation of the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area) which these multiple rockets could cause with the instant shower of steel (time wise). A conventional gun could do this but in a slower manner - and hence the effect would be partially lost.
Yes, strictly from ballistic point of view it is a moot point if the rocket launchers could be just a ballistically sophisticated as well tried workhorse i.e., the single barrelled gun. But sometimes the accuracy has to be traded for fire effect and surprise - and that's exactly what the rocket launchers do. Even the armour is not safe against the shower of steel which emanates from the rocket launchers - and it is almost instantaneous - It puts the fear of God in the opponents heart.
There is evidence from the accounts of 1991 Gulf War - that these weapons have even been used - and very effectively too as CB (Counter Battery) weapons - merely on the strength of their volume of fire power, and not intrinsic accuracy.
Gulf War - 1991 may perhaps be considered as a watershed in the use of artillery by the warring sides. The Allies used their guns in the most offensive manner - and the Iraqis were purely defensive and therefore could not make any impression on the Allies. It should be conceded that the Iraqis had enough artillery - but they did not use it effectively. Some innovative technology was also used by the Allies in the Gulf War to make their artillery more effective and cost efficient. Some of the more important force multipliers were:
*The effective use of RPVs/UAVs (Israeli supplied) for the purpose of target acquisition. These could operate and acquire targets in depth areas - and those located away from the line of sight - and were great help to the field commander as a real time information.
*The Allies made use of highly streamlined and sophisticated survey methods and used satellites for fixations - and other survey operations. This was very quick and accurate - and was the basis of very accurate 'Predicted Fire.' The American call it 'surprise' fire.
*The Allies made a very extensive use of SP (Self-Propelled) and Multiple Rocket Launchers in their artillery plan as opposed to the Iraqis who relied mostly on towed single barrelled guns (which were emplaced.)
I had an opportunity of getting a first hand information about the use of artillery in the Gulf War from the then Chief Instructor of Artillery School-Fort Sill (USA) - now Maj-Gen Robert H. Scales Jr and some of his more pertinents observations will be found in the paragraphs that follow. Incidentally he toured the battlearea immediately after the war - and has also written the official American history of Gulf War - 'Certain Victory - The US Army in the Gulf War'.
This happened sometimes in August/September 1992 - and here are some pertinent extracts from Gen Scales' letter to me.
'... Your letter arrived just as we are closing down our project. But I can give you some general answers to your questions.
Here goes:
Ratio of Towed Versus SP.
This is the key lesson of the war. The American ratio was eight to one SP to towed. Iraqi artillery was one to ten. Before the ground war began, Iraqis detached most truck primers and employed these to haul supplies. As a result the Iraqi artillery could not displace between missions. The Iraqis hoped to compensate for their lack of mobility by bunkering guns and ammunition ... In previous wars, this was an effective technique because towed artillery is a most difficult target to destroy with indirect fire.... However, the appearance of MLRs and bomblet ammunition (smart ammunition too - parenthesis mine) has changed the equation radically. With a single point of explosion, to cause damage fragments must strike an equilibrator, gun sight or propellant storage to kill a towed gun - a very unlikely prospect. A two-third maximum range with **** ammunition (as against smart-parenthesis mine) the probability is about one in two thousands. But with multiple impacts from bomblets ammunition delivered with less than 50 meters error thanks to CM Radars, position locating devices, digital fire control, etc., the probability of incapacitating a gun is about one in ten for each volley fired, about one in three for a single MLR pod ... Remember today the radius of error is now smaller than the radius of effect for indirect fire - that is the real technological revolution in modern ground warfare - not precision munitions as the popular Press attests....'
It appears that the above trends in the development of artillery are quite discernible in India and elsewhere. India as would be known is perennially engaged in a war of low intensity against Pakistan on the CFL (Ceasefire Line) - and in the recent traumatic Kargil Operations. India has a burgeoning artillery arm officered by at least 4,617 officers - and as a result of Kargil operation in which their intelligence and target acquisition was flawed are thinking in terms of acquiring more state of the art equipment - and force multipliers.
It is generally thought in India that their 'Pinaka' developed by DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) is not really suitable as multi-barrel - rocket system. The Indians are toying with the idea of the Russian Smerch system which can saturate targets upto 70 Kilometers - and would have done much better in Kargil where the intruders were occupying heights in Batalik and Point 4875 in Dras Sector.
The Indian Army has also decided to go in for Israeli unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) - Searcher Mark II - which will provide long range electronic surveillance and target acquisition capability for counter bombardment (CB) Operations. The Indians are also tempted by the Israeli ELM-2140 Battle Field Surveillance radar - and of course they have a programme in sight for more SP guns.
It appears that the Indians are fast learning from the lessons of the Gulf War - and thus providing more teeth to their artillery arm. Pakistan - comparatively is moving rather slowly in this direction.
