FAIL - Indians put wreckage of their own aircraft stated as PAF F-6....
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wasileo80
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Oh brainless person, whatever your excuses are, but the fact remains is that is the wreckage of Mig-21 and PAF inducted F-7 (Chinese copy of Mig-21) in 1988, even worse for Indians is that there is not even a single PAF F-7 which were shot down ever in any combat since its induction leave aside on Indian soil. So what ever military installation is that, what ever you say it, your armed forces allow it to be painted and show them at your military installation. At least your armed forces should have some shame not to do such a blunder.
Even there is not a question whether its written there or not that this jet is shot down in 65 or in 71.. but the fact is this is Mig-21 or lets say F-7 ( For your ego and mental satisfaction), Now tell me F-7s of PAF never been shot down in any scirmishes or in any stand off with Indian or with any other Air Force since its induction.. then what the hell a wreckage of F-7 ( if suppose we accept its F-7 of PAF only for your satisfaction) is doing outside of Indian Military installation? Do you have any answer for this? The other proofs which are Serial number, painted flag and etc. lets leave aside for some time.
Damm it.
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Flankerhunter
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Here is the solid irrefutable evidence of Su30 kill by PAF:
As per IAF records it has lost 11 Su30's till now in different accidents but as per Indian MOD and Media reports the totak no. of Su30 lost by IAF stands at "12" nt 11 and currently IAF has 260 out of 272 delivered jets as result MOD placed an order of "12" new jets as replacement for lost ones.
So How IAF lost tht 12th one?Fact z it was hit by PAF, 11 jets lost in accidents while nd 1 hit by PAf so a total of 12 losses. Credit goes to this guy @swiftretort1 on Twitter who has done an excellent job in coming up with this evidence
As per IAF records it has lost 11 Su30's till now in different accidents but as per Indian MOD and Media reports the totak no. of Su30 lost by IAF stands at "12" nt 11 and currently IAF has 260 out of 272 delivered jets as result MOD placed an order of "12" new jets as replacement for lost ones.
So How IAF lost tht 12th one?Fact z it was hit by PAF, 11 jets lost in accidents while nd 1 hit by PAf so a total of 12 losses. Credit goes to this guy @swiftretort1 on Twitter who has done an excellent job in coming up with this evidence
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It shows at what extent India will lie about its so called victories. It's trying it's best to give a different narrative on its wars with Pakistan- changing history and making attempts to show how good it was in combat.
There are many analysts now who totally doubt the narratives of the Indian war machinery. It has never been able to defeat a country far smaller in size and with a lesser military capability- hence it's trying to change this by narrating false stories.
On the contrary, the reality is as follows:
Even in 1971, Pakistanis inflicted heavy damage on Indian military.
"This airforce(the PAF), is second to none"
"The air war lasted two weeks and the Pakistanis scored a
three-to-one kill ratio, knocking out 102 Russian-made Indian jets and losing thirty-four airplanes of their own. I'm certain about the figures because I went out several times a day in a chopper and counted the wrecks below." "They were really good, aggressive dogfighters and proficient in gunnery and air combat tactics. I was damned impressed. Those guys just lived and breathed flying. "
(General (Retd.) Chuck Yeager (USAF) , Book: Yeager, the
Autobiography).
In 1965, Pakistanis really whipped India's rear end.
"Pakistan claims to have destroyed something like 1/3rd the Indian Air Force, and foreign observers, who are in a position to know say that Pakistani pilots have claimed even higher kills than this; but the Pakistani Air Force are being scrupulously honest in evaluating these claims. They are crediting Pakistan Air Force only those killings that can be checked from other sources."
Roy Meloni,
American Broadcasting Corporation
September 15, 1965.
1965 War, the Inside Story by R.D. Pradhan:
In Chapter 8 titled "Of Cowardice and Panic", the author describes the cowardice of Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, the Indian general commanding officer in Lahore sector. When the general was fired upon by Pakistani forces, he "ran away". "On learning that, Lt. Gen. Harbakash Singh and the corps commander drove in a Jonga to the battlefront. Army commander found that the enemy (PAF) air attack had created a havoc on G.T. Road. (Indian) Vehicles were burning and several vehicles of 15 Division abandoned on the road, the drivers having run away, leaving some of the engines still running. Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad was hiding in a recently irrigated sugar cane field. As described by Harabakash Singh: "He (Prasad) came out to receive us, with his boots covered with wet mud. He had no head cover, nor was he wearing any badges of his rank. He had stubble on his face, not having shaved." Seeing him in such a stage, Harbakhash Singh asked him: "Whether he was the General Officer commanding a division or a coolie? Why had he removed badges of rank and not shaved? Niranjan Prasad had no answer."
Pradhan's book contains many different entries by Indian Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan. A Sept 9, 1965 entry reads: Had a very hard day on all fronts. Very fierce counter-attacks mounted and we are required to withdraw in Kasur area. COAS was somewhat uncertain of himself. I suggested to him that he should go in forward areas so that he will be in touch of realities. He said he would go next day.
In Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh reveals that not only did Gen Chowdhury play a very small role in the entire campaign, he was so nervous as to be on the verge of losing half of Punjab to Pakistan, including the city of Amritsar. Harbakhsh describes, in clinical detail, how our own offensive in the Lahore sector had come unhinged. The general commanding the division on Ichchogil canal fled in panic, leaving his jeep, its wireless running and the briefcase containing sensitive documents that were then routinely read on Radio Pakistan during the war. Singh wanted to court martial him, Chowdhury let him get away with resignation.
According to Shekhar Gupta, the editor of Indian Express, Harbkhash Singh recounts that a bigger disaster struck a bit to the south where the other division cracked up in assault, just as it encountered a bit of resistance. Several infantry battalions, short on battle inoculation, deserted and Singh gives a hair-raising account – and confirmation of a long-debated rumor – that Chowdhury panicked so badly he ordered him to withdraw to a new defensive line behind the Beas, thereby conceding half of Punjab to Pakistan. Singh describes the conversation with Chowdhury at Ambala where he refused to carry out the order, asking his chief to either put it down in writing or visit the front and take charge of the battle.
The London Daily Mirror reported in 1965:
"There is a smell of death in the burning Pakistan sun. For it was here that India's attacking forces came to a dead stop.
"During the night they threw in every reinforcement they could find. But wave after wave of attacks were repulsed by the Pakistanis"
"India", said the London Daily Times, "is being soundly beaten by a nation which is outnumbered by four and a half to one in population and three to one in size of armed forces."
In Times reporter Louis Karrar wrote:
"Who can defeat a nation which knows how to play hide and seek with death".
USA - Aviation week & space technology - December 1968 issue.
"For the PAF, the 1965 war was as climatic as the Israeli victory over the Arabs in 1967. A further similarity was that Indian air power had an approximately 5:1 numerical superiority at the start of the conflict. Unlike the Middle East conflict, the Pakistani air victory was achieved to a large degree by air-to-air combat rather than on ground. But it was as absolute as that attained by Israel.
UK - Air International - November - 1991
" the average PAF pilot is almost certainly possessed of superior skills when compared with, say, an average American pilot. As to those who are rated above average, they compare favorably to the very best."
Encyclopaedia of Aircraft printed in several countries by Orbis publications - Volume 5
"Pakistan's air force gained a remarkable victory over India in this brief 22 day war exploiting its opponents weaknesses in exemplary style - Deeply shaken by reverse, India began an extensive modernisation and training program, meanwhile covering its defeat with effective propaganda smoke screen.
To prove its air superiority, PAF put its entire fleets on show for inspection after BOTH of the wars in presence of world dignitaries and aviation community. The five times bigger IAF should have been able to annihilate the tiny PAF to prevent such displays.
Yoichi Shimatsu, a Japanese journalist and former editor of Japan Times, wrote as follows about LeT and Kargil:
Blaming the Lahore-based Lashkar is all-too easy since the outfit was once the West Point of the Kashmir insurgency. The Army of the Righteous, as it is known in English, was a paramilitary force par excellence that routinely mauled the Indian Army along the Himalayan ridge that forms the Line of Control of divided Kashmir. In an attack on the strategic town of Kargil in late spring 1999, Lashkar broke through India’s alpine defense line and came close to forcing New Delhi to the negotiating table.
Along the sawtooth LoC, Lashkar is respected by professional soldiers on both side. A Pakistani hero who fought on the Baltistan heights, Corporal Ahmed, told me of his admiration for the stoicism of these jihadis, who wore sandals to battle in the snow. At a checkpoint in Indian-controlled Kargil, an army captain wearing a Sikh turban said frankly that nobody in the Indian Army could fight man-to-man against Lashkar.
Lashkar earned its reputation in clean-fought mountain warfare, pitting lightly armed guerrillas against Indian armor and superior firepower.
In its finest hours, these fighters would never consider the dirty tactics used against civilians in Mumbai, for example, the gangland-style executions using a shot to the back of a kneeling captive’s head. That is more typical of the Mumbai underworld.
There are many analysts now who totally doubt the narratives of the Indian war machinery. It has never been able to defeat a country far smaller in size and with a lesser military capability- hence it's trying to change this by narrating false stories.
On the contrary, the reality is as follows:
Even in 1971, Pakistanis inflicted heavy damage on Indian military.
"This airforce(the PAF), is second to none"
"The air war lasted two weeks and the Pakistanis scored a
three-to-one kill ratio, knocking out 102 Russian-made Indian jets and losing thirty-four airplanes of their own. I'm certain about the figures because I went out several times a day in a chopper and counted the wrecks below." "They were really good, aggressive dogfighters and proficient in gunnery and air combat tactics. I was damned impressed. Those guys just lived and breathed flying. "
(General (Retd.) Chuck Yeager (USAF) , Book: Yeager, the
Autobiography).
In 1965, Pakistanis really whipped India's rear end.
"Pakistan claims to have destroyed something like 1/3rd the Indian Air Force, and foreign observers, who are in a position to know say that Pakistani pilots have claimed even higher kills than this; but the Pakistani Air Force are being scrupulously honest in evaluating these claims. They are crediting Pakistan Air Force only those killings that can be checked from other sources."
Roy Meloni,
American Broadcasting Corporation
September 15, 1965.
1965 War, the Inside Story by R.D. Pradhan:
In Chapter 8 titled "Of Cowardice and Panic", the author describes the cowardice of Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, the Indian general commanding officer in Lahore sector. When the general was fired upon by Pakistani forces, he "ran away". "On learning that, Lt. Gen. Harbakash Singh and the corps commander drove in a Jonga to the battlefront. Army commander found that the enemy (PAF) air attack had created a havoc on G.T. Road. (Indian) Vehicles were burning and several vehicles of 15 Division abandoned on the road, the drivers having run away, leaving some of the engines still running. Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad was hiding in a recently irrigated sugar cane field. As described by Harabakash Singh: "He (Prasad) came out to receive us, with his boots covered with wet mud. He had no head cover, nor was he wearing any badges of his rank. He had stubble on his face, not having shaved." Seeing him in such a stage, Harbakhash Singh asked him: "Whether he was the General Officer commanding a division or a coolie? Why had he removed badges of rank and not shaved? Niranjan Prasad had no answer."
Pradhan's book contains many different entries by Indian Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan. A Sept 9, 1965 entry reads: Had a very hard day on all fronts. Very fierce counter-attacks mounted and we are required to withdraw in Kasur area. COAS was somewhat uncertain of himself. I suggested to him that he should go in forward areas so that he will be in touch of realities. He said he would go next day.
In Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh reveals that not only did Gen Chowdhury play a very small role in the entire campaign, he was so nervous as to be on the verge of losing half of Punjab to Pakistan, including the city of Amritsar. Harbakhsh describes, in clinical detail, how our own offensive in the Lahore sector had come unhinged. The general commanding the division on Ichchogil canal fled in panic, leaving his jeep, its wireless running and the briefcase containing sensitive documents that were then routinely read on Radio Pakistan during the war. Singh wanted to court martial him, Chowdhury let him get away with resignation.
According to Shekhar Gupta, the editor of Indian Express, Harbkhash Singh recounts that a bigger disaster struck a bit to the south where the other division cracked up in assault, just as it encountered a bit of resistance. Several infantry battalions, short on battle inoculation, deserted and Singh gives a hair-raising account – and confirmation of a long-debated rumor – that Chowdhury panicked so badly he ordered him to withdraw to a new defensive line behind the Beas, thereby conceding half of Punjab to Pakistan. Singh describes the conversation with Chowdhury at Ambala where he refused to carry out the order, asking his chief to either put it down in writing or visit the front and take charge of the battle.
The London Daily Mirror reported in 1965:
"There is a smell of death in the burning Pakistan sun. For it was here that India's attacking forces came to a dead stop.
"During the night they threw in every reinforcement they could find. But wave after wave of attacks were repulsed by the Pakistanis"
"India", said the London Daily Times, "is being soundly beaten by a nation which is outnumbered by four and a half to one in population and three to one in size of armed forces."
In Times reporter Louis Karrar wrote:
"Who can defeat a nation which knows how to play hide and seek with death".
USA - Aviation week & space technology - December 1968 issue.
"For the PAF, the 1965 war was as climatic as the Israeli victory over the Arabs in 1967. A further similarity was that Indian air power had an approximately 5:1 numerical superiority at the start of the conflict. Unlike the Middle East conflict, the Pakistani air victory was achieved to a large degree by air-to-air combat rather than on ground. But it was as absolute as that attained by Israel.
UK - Air International - November - 1991
" the average PAF pilot is almost certainly possessed of superior skills when compared with, say, an average American pilot. As to those who are rated above average, they compare favorably to the very best."
Encyclopaedia of Aircraft printed in several countries by Orbis publications - Volume 5
"Pakistan's air force gained a remarkable victory over India in this brief 22 day war exploiting its opponents weaknesses in exemplary style - Deeply shaken by reverse, India began an extensive modernisation and training program, meanwhile covering its defeat with effective propaganda smoke screen.
To prove its air superiority, PAF put its entire fleets on show for inspection after BOTH of the wars in presence of world dignitaries and aviation community. The five times bigger IAF should have been able to annihilate the tiny PAF to prevent such displays.
Yoichi Shimatsu, a Japanese journalist and former editor of Japan Times, wrote as follows about LeT and Kargil:
Blaming the Lahore-based Lashkar is all-too easy since the outfit was once the West Point of the Kashmir insurgency. The Army of the Righteous, as it is known in English, was a paramilitary force par excellence that routinely mauled the Indian Army along the Himalayan ridge that forms the Line of Control of divided Kashmir. In an attack on the strategic town of Kargil in late spring 1999, Lashkar broke through India’s alpine defense line and came close to forcing New Delhi to the negotiating table.
Along the sawtooth LoC, Lashkar is respected by professional soldiers on both side. A Pakistani hero who fought on the Baltistan heights, Corporal Ahmed, told me of his admiration for the stoicism of these jihadis, who wore sandals to battle in the snow. At a checkpoint in Indian-controlled Kargil, an army captain wearing a Sikh turban said frankly that nobody in the Indian Army could fight man-to-man against Lashkar.
Lashkar earned its reputation in clean-fought mountain warfare, pitting lightly armed guerrillas against Indian armor and superior firepower.
In its finest hours, these fighters would never consider the dirty tactics used against civilians in Mumbai, for example, the gangland-style executions using a shot to the back of a kneeling captive’s head. That is more typical of the Mumbai underworld.
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