Am blaming you for the posts you made without knowing the contexts.
No, he was wrong. And so are you.
I went off the Internet for one week. I asked earlier for you or Mr. Critical to supply some foreign pilots who charged that the Red Flag exercises are 'rigged'. I would think that after one week, there should be no problems. And yet, I find none from the both of you. What you guys said were essentially baseless speculations and insulting to the thousands of pilots -- US and foreign -- who went thru the program. I see a couple of inexperience and ignorant Internet kids believing themselves to be more knowledgeable and smarter than trained professionals.
You want to see ignorance ? Go look in the mirror.
From your argument regarding unknown and uncatalogued signals, we can be assured that in your ignorance, there can be only one response to any unknown and uncatalogued signals: countermeasure or 'jam'.
YOU ARE WRONG. The both of you.
You cited a Congressional testimony. I will do you one better.
https://www.darpa.mil/program/adaptive-radar-countermeasures
In other words, we already know of future threats.
In other words, the Rafale is not the only one who can real time analyze unknown signals and generate countermeasures. But that is not the point I am making following.
Since we have concluded that your response to an unknown signal is to jam it. The real professionals in the field completely disagrees with the both of you.
Note the highlighted.
There are three types of signals: friendly, hostile, and unknown ( neutral ).
This automatically results in three different responses.
We can ignore the friendly.
We can jam the hostile.
But an unknown signal must not automatically be classified as hostile as the unknown signal could be an amalgamation of different signals especially in an EM rich environment. An automatic response to an unknown signal could be counterproductive as it would reveal -- to a listening adversary -- one's own technical capabilities in meeting unknown signals. An automatic response should be the response of last resort.
If you have any experience in working with radios, you would have known of the crossed signals or interference or contamination issue. Radar signals are no different. When freqs and amplitudes are similar enough, two or more signals can be of either constructive or destructive interference. But since you made that absurd declaration, we can assured that you have no experience in working with radios or any EM related fields.
Which leads up to my next point...
Well...Whoop dee doo...
Wait for it...
This argument is
MONUMENTALLY stupid.
You are essentially saying the F-35 is 'backwards' for relying upon what is called a 'threat library', which I earlier called a 'code library'.
To start off...How can you tell if a signal is 'friendly' or 'hostile' or 'unknown' ?
You cannot unless you have said threat library or catalogued signals.
A SIGINT threat library is necessary to enhance classification and offers
FLEXIBILITY in formulating appropriate responses. An unknown signal could have characteristics similar to friendly signals and comparison against a threat library would give the operator a better alternative than to simply 'jam' said unknown signal. An automatic destructive countermeasure response in this situation would be the EW equivalent of fratricide.
Scenario:
F-35 with a populated threat library encounters five radar signals. Based upon comparisons with the threat library, there are:
- Two friendlies
- One hostile
- And two unknowns.
Responses are:
- Ignore the friendlies.
- Jam the hostile.
- Analyze the unknown.
Based upon the analyses of the two unknown signals, the F-35 determined that one unknown signal did not came from the threat region, its signal characteristics such as amplitude and freq were erratic and non-directional, so the conclusion for this signal is low risk. For the other unknown signal, while it did not conformed to any known signatures, there are distinct characteristics that are similar to known threats, so the conclusion for this signal is high threat and even appropriate for countermeasures.
Rafale with a blank threat library encounters five radar signals. Responses are either ignore all or jam all.
Dumbass Rafale.
But wait a minute...
https://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/defense/rafale/a-wide-range-of-smart-and-discrete-sensors/
The Rafale does have a threat library, just like the 'backwards' F-35 does...
Look at the Rafale's sales brochure again: '
...can be easily defined, integrated and updated on short notice by users in their own country, and in full autonomy.
What that mean is that if you buy the Rafale, if
YOU do not populate that threat library, the jet is essentially useless. So what if the Rafale can replicate -- in real time -- any signal it encounters ? This is the feature that you persistently made as superior to the F-35.
Remember, there are three types of signals: friendly, hostile, and unknown ( neutral ).
Without a threat library,
ALL signals would be classified by the Rafale as 'unknown'. What the fvck good is that ? But now it turned out the Rafale is just as dependent on a threat library as the F-35 -- that you ridiculed.
Kid, I informed this forum on military aviation in general, and in radar and 'stealth' in particulars, in ways that you and Mr. Critical can
NEVER match. And this debate further cement that.
But am not done with this issue regarding the Rafale...
A long time ago, I pointed out the Rafale's SPECTRA weakness -- frequency agility by the threat radar.
Normally, I do not use paywalled sources like IEEE because I understand that not everyone can afford or access such services. But in very rare occasions with stubborn people like you, I will make exceptions.
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6377067/
Inside that paper is this significant paragraph...
Coherent transmission and integration allow the radar to perform coherent Doppler processing. The common temporal waveform for this kind of operation is batches of constant frequency and PRI. These batches can last from a few pulses to a few hundred of pulses. This means that for scanning radars, the parameters change from one main lobe hit to the next. For the EW system, classification of such a signal becomes a complicated task.
Note the highlighted, particularly the word 'batches'.
The foundation of radar detection and electronics warfare is statistics. One of the core items of statistics is
SAMPLING.
Given the ability of a hostile radar regarding frequency agility, there is no way for the SPECTRA system to adequately sample every 'batch' to create a coherent response. Even weather radars can have variable pulse trains as a method to filter out specific weather phenomena, but here we are talking about the radars of the F-22 and F-35.
http://www.edwards.af.mil/Portals/50/documents/772/AFD-141126-076.pdf?ver=2016-06-23-110404-277
That is just one example of a pulse train and that is
PUBLIC INFORMATION. Millions of pulses per second.
Now if we bring in a threat radar that is capable of varying its freq, amplitude, pulse trains, and pulse characteristics, under what physical laws is SPECTRA operating under to adequately sample
EACH pulse train in order to create an adequate countermeasure -- jamming -- signal ?
Are you willing to put the Rafale under the same testing environment as you advocate for the F-35 with the F-35 as its adversary ?
Let me guess -- according to you, SPECTRA does not need to sample at all.