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Eye on China, Navy boosts Eastern Command

I think you have the Formosa situation wrong.

Taiwan is governed by a Chinese government, the Republic of China government. The communist mainland claimed the island after the preceding government fled there. For years the the ROC government on Taiwan claimed the mainland as part of its China, but had given up after the older generations passed on.

And this misconception of Indians that Taiwan had a permanent seat in the security council overwhelms me. The allies and China (ROC) founded the UN and UNSC after World War II (when Indians still enjoyed British citizenship). After the pro-American government lost to the communists on the mainland, they fled to Taiwan and continued representing all of China until Mao decided to collaborate with the US in the fight against the Soviet Union. (At which point, the US had given up trying to remove the communist government through Taiwan but instead turned it into a deterrent against Chinese expansion; much like how China is trying to set up naval bases in Sri Lanka)

And it seems that you, and the others initiating discussion of a cession of parts of Jammu and Kashmir, and Arunachal Pradesh, have got the corresponding situation wrong. I say this politely, with no intention of entering into a dogfight on the subject; if you would like my reasoned explanation for my thinking you to have the situation wrong, it can be provided. But not unless you are willing to listen to reasoned facts and interpretations.
 
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with all this fancy naval stuff indians claim they have......someone came on a boat to mumbai from somewhere and raised havoc on 26/11 according to their version....is this some sort of a paradox?:lol:

terrorists hijacked the planes and crashed it and killed 3000,does it mean USAF IS worst airforce?
 
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Is that a fact, Mr. Armchair General?

U.S. Reactions and Countermeasures

The U.S. military has been aware of Chinese ASBM development for years now, and has monitored it closely. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) first discussed Chinese interest in ASBM development publicly in 2004; the Department of Defense in 2005. A 2006 unclassified assessment by ONI stated that “China is equipping theater ballistic missiles [TBMs] with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with radar or IR [infrared] seekers to provide the accuracy necessary to attack a ship at sea.” Anyone with government experience knows that such disclosures likely represented the culmination of lengthy bureaucratic processes.

The U.S. military has undoubtedly used this long lead time to develop a variety of countermeasures. On 8 January 2011, en route to Beijing for a four-day official visit, Defense Secretary Robert Gates responded to a reporters’ questions about Chinese development of ASBMs and related capabilities by stating: “we’ve been watching these developments all along. I’ve been concerned about the development of the anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles ever since I took this job” in 2007. “They clearly have the potential to put some of our capabilities at risk and we have to pay attention to them, we have to respond appropriately with our own programs.” In fact, Secretary Gates elaborated, “some of [DoD’s] higher priority areas for investment are focused on some of these anti-access programs.” He added: “My hope is that through the strategic dialogue that I’m talking about that maybe the need for some of these capabilities is reduced.”

In a media interview last year, Adm. Patrick Walsh, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, likewise suggested a measured but proactive U.S. response: “When we look at these sorts of developments, such as the ASBM, they are technological developments that we respect, but do not necessarily fear. The key element in any sort of deterrent strategy is to make it clear to those who would use a given piece of technology that we have the means to counter it, and to maintain a technological edge.”

A mid-February 2011 statement by the commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet indicates that the U.S. Navy is taking a proactive, measured approach to Chinese ASBM development. “‘It’s not the Achilles heel of our aircraft carriers or our Navy—it is one weapons system, one technology that is out there,’” Vice Adm. Scott van Buskirk declared in a interview on the bridge of the USS George Washington, the only American carrier home-ported in the western Pacific, while it was in its home port of Yokosuka, Japan for maintenance. “‘Any new capability is something that we try to monitor,’” VADM van Buskirk added, stating that the DF-21D’s capabilities remain unproven. “‘If there wasn’t this to point to as a game changer, there would be something else. That term has been bandied about for many things. I think it really depends in how you define the game, whether it really changes it or not. It’s a very specific scenario for a very specific capability—some things can be very impactful.’” Van Buskirk emphasized that the U.S. Navy will continue to “operate in the seas around Japan, Korea, the Philippines and anywhere else it deems necessary.” “‘We won’t change these operations because of this specific technology that might be out there. But we will carefully monitor and adapt to it.’” Van Buskirk suggested how Beijing might allay concerns the region about its military developments: “‘It goes back to transparency. Using the United States as an example, we are very clear about our intent when conducting routine and normal operations in international waters … That is what you might expect from other nations that might operate in this region.’”

This is a broad-based, long-term challenge, and hence the U.S. military has been developing, and will continue to develop, an appropriate set of responses. The long-anticipated development of China’s ASBM reaching the equivalent of IOC is merely the sharpening “tip” of a much larger “spear” of Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that China is developing to hold at risk key U.S. military platforms, particularly aircraft carrier strike groups (CSGs).

But U.S. ships will not offer a fixed target for such “asymmetric” weapons, including Chinese ASBMs. U.S. military planning documents, including the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)—the Pentagon’s guiding strategy document—clearly recognize China’s growing A2/AD challenge; the QDR charges the U.S. military with multiple initiatives to address it. For example, the Air Force and Navy are pursuing AirSea Battle, a new operational concept designed to preserve U.S. power-projection capabilities in an era of increasing aerospace-maritime battlespace fusion, jointness, tightening budgets, and Chinese and Iranian A2/AD capabilities.

In a world where U.S. naval assets will often be safest underwater and in more dispersed networks, President Obama’s defense budget supports building two submarines a year and investing in a new ballistic-missile submarine, as well as a variety of missile defense systems. The U.S. Navy has moved some of its most capable submarines and ballistic missile defense (BMD)-capable Aegis cruisers and destroyers to the Pacific. In what is likely one of the first of many difficult decisions about how to prioritize significant but not unlimited resources, it has proposed to halt procurement of Zumwalt (DDG-1000)-class destroyers and resume procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class Aegis destroyers. How best to develop and implement ASBM countermeasures is being debated vigorously in U.S. Navy circles.

When asked in December 2010 if U.S. power projection capability were deteriorating because of China’s A2/AD capability, Admiral Robert Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, replied: “No, I don’t think so. Certainly, this kind of capability should be a concern to the region, and it poses a challenge to any naval or air operations that would be conducted in that area were it to be employed. Is it affecting my operations today? Not at all. Were it to pose a challenge to the United States, I’m confident that I have the capability to operate in that air space and water space.”

China
 
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