ANALYSIS: Kerry-Lugar and the domestic debate Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
The government should work towards accommodating some, if not all, concerns of the military and the opposition and explore the option with the US administration to dilute the undiplomatic formulation of the contentious provisions of the bill
The current debate on the Kerry-Lugar bill shows close linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy concerns and how the dynamics of domestic politics overrides Pakistans security and foreign policy issues.
The government found itself under heavy political attack on the Kerry-Lugar bill, mainly because of its failure to maintain cordial relations with the major opposition party, the PMLN. The PPP did not fully honour its pre-election commitments to the PMLN. Now, the opposition, especially the PMLN, has picked up the Kerry-Lugar bill as an opportunity to get even with the government.
The on-going debate has four major features that have implications for Pakistans foreign policy and domestic politics.
First, never in the past, Pakistan-US relations caused such controversies and emotionalism. Second, the US has never before offered assistance for socio-economic development to any Pakistani civilian government at such scale. In the past, the balance of US assistance was heavily tilted towards the military. Third, the Pakistan Army never publicly rebuked some provisions governing US assistance to Pakistan, although the army top brass have not rejected US military assistance and cooperation. Fourth, unconfirmed reports with the media and shared by the military circles and some opposition leaders suggest that the detailed stipulations about the military, the intelligence agencies, terrorism and nuclear proliferation were inserted in the bill on the initiative of or with the consent of the Pakistan government.
The Pakistan government is bound to defend the bill because it was consulted by the US government at various stages of its formulations. Its leaders take pride in arguing that they managed to dilute some provisions of the bill like the mention of Abdul Qadeer Khan by name.
If the Pakistan government was monitoring the bill so closely, it should have realised that some of its provisions would be sharply criticised in the domestic context because these provisions intrude into the domains of powerful interests in Pakistan.
The provisions of the bill are not binding on the government of Pakistan and its directives apply to the US administration. Military assistance is subject to certification and economic assistance is subject to monitoring and reviews by the US administration. The government of Pakistan is not bound to submit reports on each item relating to certification and monitoring.
The certification provision, like the Pressler Amendment (1985), provides the US administration with an exit option. If Pakistan loses its relevance to the on-going efforts to control terrorism in and around Afghanistan, the US can stop military assistance by refusing to certify, as was done in 1990.
The monitoring and political assessment will be done by the Holbrooke team and its associates, but their approval is not a pre-requisite for grant of economic assistance. Therefore, Pakistan can follow any policy it wants to pursue.
The major opposition objection relates to the inclusion of some issues in the bill that pertain to, in their opinion, Pakistans exclusive internal domain. Further, they argue that such references amount to framing a charge sheet against Pakistan. It needs to be mentioned that the US Congressional hearings have been taking up all these issues since 2002 and other European government, including the UK, have raised these issues from time to time. Should Pakistan delink itself from all these countries?
This said, there are two major problems with the bill which could have been avoided.
First, some of the provisions have been written in undiplomatic and rude language without taking into account the sensitivities of Pakistans domestic politics. The Pakistan experts associated with the State Department and Pakistans Foreign Office should have known that direct reference to the details of civilian primacy, intelligence agencies and militancy, mentioning of specific places with reference to terrorism and three references to nuclear proliferation are bound to provide enough political ammunition to the opposition in Pakistan to mount a strong political assault on the government whose political support has eroded since the 2008 elections.
The funds to be provided to Pakistan under the Kerry-Lugar bill relate to social and economic development and these have nothing to do with military and security fields. However, section 203 of the bill provides details of certification conditions for military assistance. These should have been legislated separately because these do not seem to apply to the assistance under the bill.
Pakistani critics have mixed military assistance conditions with monitoring provisions to show that these are extremely intrusive and bound Pakistan to follow them in letter and spirit. Further, there is an overlap between these two sets of provisions on terrorism, military and non-proliferation, giving an opportunity to the critics that Pakistans policy options have been restricted.
The most troubling development is public denunciation of some provisions of the bill by the army top commanders. The decision of the top commanders to go public on this issue rather than communicate their concerns quietly to the government has strong political implications. It seems that the top commanders thought that the government would not pay attention unless they join with the anti-bill discourse in the parliament and outside. This statement is bound to embolden the opposition because they now know the most powerful institution of the state is not on board with the government.
Traditionally, the military top brass, especially the Army high command, have taken a strong exception to civilian government interference in militarys internal organisational matters, including promotions, postings and related matters. They think if political leaders are allowed to interfere in these matters their professionalism and internal coherence will be adversely affected.
Similarly, they do not want unilateral civilian decision-making on defence expenditure and its disbursement, their salary, perks and privileges, economic and business interests, key security and defence issues, including the nuclear programme, and military-related intelligence agencies. However, they are prepared to discuss these issues with the civilian government and work towards shared decision-making.
The army top command must have thought that the civilian government would use the cover of section 302 (15) of the bill that goes into minute details of civil-military relations and the provisions regarding terrorism and non-proliferation to interfere with the armys internal organisational affairs. The army top brass have resisted such attempts during the earlier phase of civilian rule (1988-1999) and took a strong exception to the present governments attempt to bring the ISI under complete civilian control.
The public statement by the top commanders has serious implications in the currently polarised political environment. This statement shows the alienation of the army top brass from the civilian government, emboldening the PMLN to take a tough line because it would be much happy if the current controversy makes this government dysfunctional and new elections are forced.
Therefore, if the impression of differences between the civil and the military persists, the opposition parties may explore the option of going to the streets, expecting that the army will not support the civilian government.
The current nationalist euphoria should not be employed to deny Pakistans troubled internal realities and live in self-cultivated delusions. Rather, the political leadership should mobilise human and material resources to strengthen the economy and reduce dependence on foreign economic assistance.
Meanwhile, the government should work towards accommodating some, if not all, concerns of the military and the opposition and explore the option with the US administration to dilute the undiplomatic formulation of the contentious provisions of the bill.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst