gambit
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What is the 'beaconing effect' ?
A beacon is a signal of some form that is designed to attract attention. A flag is a visual beacon. A trumpet is an auditory beacon. Both are essentially long range communication devices. Long range as in outside of physical contact.
The keywords here are 'to attract attention', which indicate an effect. Hence, the phrase 'beaconing effect'. Attracting attention can be either intentional or unintentional. A bald man in a group of men with full heads of hair is -- usually -- unintentionally attracting attention to himself. When low tide revealed a small reef, the observers' eyes are usually drawn to the reef. A model wearing colorful clothes is intentionally drawing attention to herself. A opera tenor hitting an extraordinary low note is intentionally attracting attention to his effort.
Electronic counter-countermeasure - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In radar detection, only a small fraction of the total transmitted power returned from a reflection, aka 'target'. By the time the penetrator became a target, any activation of EW countermeasure will be to overwhelm the sensor, thereby denying the seeking radar the precise spatial location of the penetrator. Unfortunately, this attempt to deny the seeking radar of the penetrator's spatial location also create -- unintentionally -- the 'beaconing effect'.
So how can the penetrator uses EW to advantage ? The answer lies in understanding the foundation of radar detection physics and targeting principles.
In radar detection, any body that is outside of 75% of maximum distance is usually problematic for targeting. So assume for simplicity's sake a maximum distance of 100 km, any body that produces a reflection at greater than 75 km will be difficult for the seeking radar to process that reflection as a valid, meaning consistent, target. It will be difficult, not impossible. For the seeking radar, this body may produce a reflection in one millisecond, nothing in the next millisecond, and generally inconsistent over time. Approaching the maximum distance, this body may or may not produce reflections from pulse to pulse in a pulse train, making detection even more problematic. The seeking radar may process this amorphous body as worthy of revisiting in the next sweep, meaning to keep in memory, or to dismiss it completely, meaning to erase from memory. Either way depends on the radar's system design.
In EW, if the penetrator activate his countermeasure at the moment of detection of the seeking radar's transmission, which assume to be that 100 km maximum distance, the penetrator's countermeasure would create that 'beaconing effect'. In essence, the penetrator unwittingly aided the seeking radar to his own general direction of entry, if not precise spatial location. Remember that a countermeasure signal power is always greater than reflected signal power because the desire is to deny the seeking radar any precise spatial location.
The decision to activate countermeasure falls under understanding targeting principles AFTER understanding the foundation of radar detection physics. Since physics already imposed a certain level of uncertainty upon the seeking radar, the penetrator wanting to avoid attention upon himself can exploit that 'greater than 75% of maximum distance' vulnerability. He can safely assume that upon detection of a seeking radar's transmission, he is at the edge of that maximum distance, so there should NOT be any automatic activation of countermeasure to avoid creating that 'beaconing effect'. He would know that his own reflections are themselves small beacons, no matter how weak their power or how inconsistent over time, so any additional power generated by him will be counterproductive to his mission, which is to penetrate an airspace undetected.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) greatly aids the penetrator in mapping out those maximum distances of radar transmissions from multiple radars providing detection coverage for important surface locations. No radar network, meaning multiple radars working together, have perfect coverage. It is 'perfect' only in the sense that a penetrator is ignorant of the maximum distances of all the radars in that network, thereby continually going below that 75% threshold from one radar to the next, thus revealing himself by his reflections, from one radar to the next.
This does not mean the 'beaconing effect' is a negative in EW. The effect can be used as a diversion tactic to cover for a different penetrator who may approach the area from a different direction. The countermeasure transmission power does not have to be at maximum level, but maybe just enough to create a 'target' for a seeking radar. Overwhelming the seeking radar indicate countermeasure is in play and will create one response, but creating a false target will create a different response, one that can be exploited to the penetrator's advantage.
A beacon is a signal of some form that is designed to attract attention. A flag is a visual beacon. A trumpet is an auditory beacon. Both are essentially long range communication devices. Long range as in outside of physical contact.
The keywords here are 'to attract attention', which indicate an effect. Hence, the phrase 'beaconing effect'. Attracting attention can be either intentional or unintentional. A bald man in a group of men with full heads of hair is -- usually -- unintentionally attracting attention to himself. When low tide revealed a small reef, the observers' eyes are usually drawn to the reef. A model wearing colorful clothes is intentionally drawing attention to herself. A opera tenor hitting an extraordinary low note is intentionally attracting attention to his effort.
Electronic counter-countermeasure - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
One area of EW is the avoidance of radar focus, meaning the desire to NOT attracting the attention of a radar seeker.
In radar detection, only a small fraction of the total transmitted power returned from a reflection, aka 'target'. By the time the penetrator became a target, any activation of EW countermeasure will be to overwhelm the sensor, thereby denying the seeking radar the precise spatial location of the penetrator. Unfortunately, this attempt to deny the seeking radar of the penetrator's spatial location also create -- unintentionally -- the 'beaconing effect'.
So how can the penetrator uses EW to advantage ? The answer lies in understanding the foundation of radar detection physics and targeting principles.
In radar detection, any body that is outside of 75% of maximum distance is usually problematic for targeting. So assume for simplicity's sake a maximum distance of 100 km, any body that produces a reflection at greater than 75 km will be difficult for the seeking radar to process that reflection as a valid, meaning consistent, target. It will be difficult, not impossible. For the seeking radar, this body may produce a reflection in one millisecond, nothing in the next millisecond, and generally inconsistent over time. Approaching the maximum distance, this body may or may not produce reflections from pulse to pulse in a pulse train, making detection even more problematic. The seeking radar may process this amorphous body as worthy of revisiting in the next sweep, meaning to keep in memory, or to dismiss it completely, meaning to erase from memory. Either way depends on the radar's system design.
In EW, if the penetrator activate his countermeasure at the moment of detection of the seeking radar's transmission, which assume to be that 100 km maximum distance, the penetrator's countermeasure would create that 'beaconing effect'. In essence, the penetrator unwittingly aided the seeking radar to his own general direction of entry, if not precise spatial location. Remember that a countermeasure signal power is always greater than reflected signal power because the desire is to deny the seeking radar any precise spatial location.
The decision to activate countermeasure falls under understanding targeting principles AFTER understanding the foundation of radar detection physics. Since physics already imposed a certain level of uncertainty upon the seeking radar, the penetrator wanting to avoid attention upon himself can exploit that 'greater than 75% of maximum distance' vulnerability. He can safely assume that upon detection of a seeking radar's transmission, he is at the edge of that maximum distance, so there should NOT be any automatic activation of countermeasure to avoid creating that 'beaconing effect'. He would know that his own reflections are themselves small beacons, no matter how weak their power or how inconsistent over time, so any additional power generated by him will be counterproductive to his mission, which is to penetrate an airspace undetected.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) greatly aids the penetrator in mapping out those maximum distances of radar transmissions from multiple radars providing detection coverage for important surface locations. No radar network, meaning multiple radars working together, have perfect coverage. It is 'perfect' only in the sense that a penetrator is ignorant of the maximum distances of all the radars in that network, thereby continually going below that 75% threshold from one radar to the next, thus revealing himself by his reflections, from one radar to the next.
This does not mean the 'beaconing effect' is a negative in EW. The effect can be used as a diversion tactic to cover for a different penetrator who may approach the area from a different direction. The countermeasure transmission power does not have to be at maximum level, but maybe just enough to create a 'target' for a seeking radar. Overwhelming the seeking radar indicate countermeasure is in play and will create one response, but creating a false target will create a different response, one that can be exploited to the penetrator's advantage.
