Frogman
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Egyptian Defence Review
Critical analysis of Egyptian Defence and Security
Egyptian Air Force: Repeating Past Mistakes
Posted on July 2, 2017 by egygreenfly
Since the Peace Accords with Israel the Egyptian Air Force has gone through several changes. What was predominantly a Soviet equipped Air Force suddenly had to realign its procurement policies away from the Soviet Union and towards the West.
However it also had to keep several Soviet types such as the MiG – 21 in service as a stop-gap measure until it could induct newer, better, and most importantly supported fast jets after it cut relations with its former sponsor in favour of the United States. In order to help rebuild its Armed Forces $1.3 Billion of US government budget was allocated to Egypt for the past 40 odd years.
What was planned though did not happen what did is somewhat perplexing to the outside observer and angering to anyone who has heard of something called logistics. Without getting bogged down in the how or why of history or procurement processes for the sake of brevity and to avoid an increase in blood pressure, Egypt at the turn of the century was operating six different fast jets from four different sources not including light attack aircraft and advanced trainers (the latter two being another headache).
The backbone of the EAF past the year 2000 was around 200 Lockheed F – 16 Falcons of various Blocks. In addition to that rather large fleet they also operated dozens of Mikoyan MiG – 21, Chengdu F – 7, McDonell Douglas F – 4 Phantom II, Dassault Mirage V, and Dassault Mirage 2000 fighter jets. In total the EAF was operating over 400 fighter jets before 2012. So what’s wrong with that?
It’s hard to pick somewhere to begin given that the differences have consequences from the top down. We’ll start with training of technicians and pilots or anyone generally hands on with the air craft. Instead of training infrastructure for one or two similar types the Air Force had to support half a dozen, each with different standards, procedures, and techniques meaning that it would require a fair bit of retraining for conversion from one type to another which creates a force that is not very flexible to say the least. Career prospects would be limited to the type someone serves on as the Air Force itself will have very little incentive to retrain personnel.
The Egyptian Air Force has a very odd fixation with differentiating sources of armament. Although understandable through a political lens it makes less sense when they stop prioritising some of their most ‘secure’ platforms in favour of something completely different and usually less capable. To illustrate my point lets take the example of the Mirage in Egyptian service. They invested heavily in repair and overhaul facilities for no more than six squadrons of fighters that were due to be retired in fifteen years or less and even went as far as upgrading two squadrons of Mirage V in 2003 (a fighter at the fringe of the AF and currently held in tactical reserve with the proposition of them being sold to Lebanon) while neglecting the forces backbone that is set to remain in service until 2040 at least.
Read the entire article at: https://egyptdefreview.wordpress.com/2017/07/02/egyptian-air-force-repeating-past-mistakes/
follow Egyptian Defence Review on Twitter: https://twitter.com/EgyGreenfly
Critical analysis of Egyptian Defence and Security
Egyptian Air Force: Repeating Past Mistakes
Posted on July 2, 2017 by egygreenfly
Since the Peace Accords with Israel the Egyptian Air Force has gone through several changes. What was predominantly a Soviet equipped Air Force suddenly had to realign its procurement policies away from the Soviet Union and towards the West.
However it also had to keep several Soviet types such as the MiG – 21 in service as a stop-gap measure until it could induct newer, better, and most importantly supported fast jets after it cut relations with its former sponsor in favour of the United States. In order to help rebuild its Armed Forces $1.3 Billion of US government budget was allocated to Egypt for the past 40 odd years.
What was planned though did not happen what did is somewhat perplexing to the outside observer and angering to anyone who has heard of something called logistics. Without getting bogged down in the how or why of history or procurement processes for the sake of brevity and to avoid an increase in blood pressure, Egypt at the turn of the century was operating six different fast jets from four different sources not including light attack aircraft and advanced trainers (the latter two being another headache).
The backbone of the EAF past the year 2000 was around 200 Lockheed F – 16 Falcons of various Blocks. In addition to that rather large fleet they also operated dozens of Mikoyan MiG – 21, Chengdu F – 7, McDonell Douglas F – 4 Phantom II, Dassault Mirage V, and Dassault Mirage 2000 fighter jets. In total the EAF was operating over 400 fighter jets before 2012. So what’s wrong with that?
It’s hard to pick somewhere to begin given that the differences have consequences from the top down. We’ll start with training of technicians and pilots or anyone generally hands on with the air craft. Instead of training infrastructure for one or two similar types the Air Force had to support half a dozen, each with different standards, procedures, and techniques meaning that it would require a fair bit of retraining for conversion from one type to another which creates a force that is not very flexible to say the least. Career prospects would be limited to the type someone serves on as the Air Force itself will have very little incentive to retrain personnel.
The Egyptian Air Force has a very odd fixation with differentiating sources of armament. Although understandable through a political lens it makes less sense when they stop prioritising some of their most ‘secure’ platforms in favour of something completely different and usually less capable. To illustrate my point lets take the example of the Mirage in Egyptian service. They invested heavily in repair and overhaul facilities for no more than six squadrons of fighters that were due to be retired in fifteen years or less and even went as far as upgrading two squadrons of Mirage V in 2003 (a fighter at the fringe of the AF and currently held in tactical reserve with the proposition of them being sold to Lebanon) while neglecting the forces backbone that is set to remain in service until 2040 at least.
Read the entire article at: https://egyptdefreview.wordpress.com/2017/07/02/egyptian-air-force-repeating-past-mistakes/
follow Egyptian Defence Review on Twitter: https://twitter.com/EgyGreenfly
