EDITORIAL: Welcoming the Predator
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muse
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Significant sections of the political elite and large chunks of public opinion in Pakistan are alienated from the threats posed against Pakistan - how will these awakened and galvanized? Short answer: It may not be possible.
What then must be done? If those most likely to express themselves in streets and most likely to find opportunists in politics, persuasive cannot be reasoned with, what must then be done? Perhaps readers can be encouraged to read below keeping in mind the preamble above:
Reviewing Afghanistan
Najmuddin A Shaikh
Reports in the American press indicate that President Barack Obamas administration is finalising its Afghanistan-Pakistan policy. The new policy is expected to be unveiled on the eve of the UN-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan in The Hague on March 31 or, latest, at the NATO summit meeting scheduled for April 3-4. Chances are that since the Obama administration has been stressing the need to evolve policy in consultation with allies, the Presidential Directive will come after these meetings have been held and some refinements made to reflect what has been debated at these two important consultative fora.
The Afpak policys basic premises appear to be firstly a surge in the military effort. This means more US troops since the NATO allies are reluctant to commit any additional troops. Small accretions are expected from Germany but the caveats on the employment of most of the troops provided by NATO in combat zones in the South and East of the country will continue in place.
Of the few countries the UK, Canada and the Netherlands that are engaged in combat against the Taliban it is known that at least two, Netherlands and Canada, will end the military part of their mission in a couple of years. The 17,000 US troops that are to be deployed in the next couple of months will bring US troop levels in Afghanistan to about 50,000, far short of the 160,000 deployed in Iraq at the height of the surge.
This force will have a formidable list of tasks to perform: provide additional security needed for conducting the Afghan Presidential elections in August, fill the gaps left by the withdrawal of Canadian and Dutch troops and provide security in provinces that border on Kabul and have seen a surge of Taliban activity in recent months, provide the trainers needed for the expanded Afghan army which, some analysts are suggesting, has to be expanded well beyond the currently planned figure of 134,000 to about 250,000.
This last item is not as far as one can tell a recommendation made by any of the reviews but it appears to be part of the wish list of commanders on the ground who believe that this sort of strength would be required if the Afghan National Army is to be the key to the US exit strategy.
Theoretically these additional troops will make it possible to not only clear areas now under Taliban thrall but to hold them and thus create the security conditions in which economic development and political reconciliation can move forward. Even as most analysts involved in the review recognise the differences between largely urbanised Iraq and largely rural Afghanistan they hope the success of the surge in Iraq can be replicated in Afghanistan.
The second premise is that there has to be a new focus on political reconciliation and economic development. Bidens assertion that only 5% of the Taliban are hardcore and 70% are those who are with the Taliban because they provide employment is a clear indication that the new policy will aim to provide employment opportunities in the insurgency affected areas that will rival the financial inducements the Taliban are currently offering.
The key element will be the expansion of the PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams). Despite the objections of the Karzai government, these PRTs will work with local representatives rather than with the Central government both in term of economic development and in giving the people the wherewithal to defend themselves against the Taliban.
The premise is that the success of these efforts would lay the ground work for winning over the 70% reconcilable Taliban and for negotiations with the 20% or so who could be persuaded with the right political inducements to join the peace process. Several hundred new positions have been created in the American embassy in Kabul to be filled by American diplomats along with specialists from other departments to undertake this economic development and probably to establish the quiet contacts needed to advance the reconciliation process.
The third premise is that the Karzai government can be cleansed of corrupt elements and can win the confidence of the Afghan people sufficiently for Kabul to be able to negotiate with the Taliban from a position of strength.
The Americans would be happy to accept that in these negotiations Karzai agrees that there will be a large measure of autonomy for the provinces and that so long as the Taliban undertake not to allow Al Qaeda or other terrorist organisations to operate in the areas that are under their control they could enforce their own system of government in these areas and enjoy a share of power in the central government.
The fourth and possibly the most important premise is what can be done in Pakistan. In addition to Americas concern over the known groups operating in the NWFP and FATA, in the past two weeks, there have been a number of reports in the American press about the freedom with which the so-called Quetta Shura of the Taliban has been planning and executing operations in Afghanistan.
At a recent Congressional hearing questions on this subject elicited the response that the Pakistani authorities were concerned about local repercussions if they took action. Two days ago the New York Times reported that the Obama administration was considering the use of drones to attack the Taliban leadership in the areas around Quetta and in the refugee camps.
This was, however, contradicted in a Washington Post story a day later which said that the American military was reluctant to extend the drone attacks beyond the tribal areas and expected that the Pakistan military must recognise the threat and organise themselves to deal with it.
The activities of the Taliban in the border areas of Balochistan therefore will now figure more prominently in American military and political calculations, the more so now that alongside the attack on the container terminal for NATO cargo in Peshawar there has also been an attack on trucks carrying NATO goods into Afghanistan from Chaman. The jeopardy this causes for the logistic support for NATO forces will not be easy to countenance.
In all likelihood, at the conferences scheduled on Afghanistan, the SCO conference in Moscow on March 27 and the March 31 conference in The Hague, Pakistans representative will be asked to recognise the threat posed to Pakistan by the Taliban leadership in Quetta and its environs. But even more importantly, Pakistan will be asked to use its influence and its coercive powers to induce these leaders to seek reconciliation on the much more acceptable terms the Americans now seem to be offering.
The US could also likely use the leverage of the large scale aid that Pakistan is expecting both from the United States directly and, with US assistance, from the Friends of Pakistan, making it dependent on how successfully Pakistan tackles the Quetta Shura.
There are sound reasons for being sceptical about the success of the new Afghan policy. But the one element which we should recognise and must cooperate on is the fact that the Afghan Taliban, their protestations notwithstanding, have ties with our own extremists and that their presence on our soil represents as much of a danger to us as it does to the NATO forces in Afghanistan.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
What then must be done? If those most likely to express themselves in streets and most likely to find opportunists in politics, persuasive cannot be reasoned with, what must then be done? Perhaps readers can be encouraged to read below keeping in mind the preamble above:
Reviewing Afghanistan
Najmuddin A Shaikh
Reports in the American press indicate that President Barack Obamas administration is finalising its Afghanistan-Pakistan policy. The new policy is expected to be unveiled on the eve of the UN-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan in The Hague on March 31 or, latest, at the NATO summit meeting scheduled for April 3-4. Chances are that since the Obama administration has been stressing the need to evolve policy in consultation with allies, the Presidential Directive will come after these meetings have been held and some refinements made to reflect what has been debated at these two important consultative fora.
The Afpak policys basic premises appear to be firstly a surge in the military effort. This means more US troops since the NATO allies are reluctant to commit any additional troops. Small accretions are expected from Germany but the caveats on the employment of most of the troops provided by NATO in combat zones in the South and East of the country will continue in place.
Of the few countries the UK, Canada and the Netherlands that are engaged in combat against the Taliban it is known that at least two, Netherlands and Canada, will end the military part of their mission in a couple of years. The 17,000 US troops that are to be deployed in the next couple of months will bring US troop levels in Afghanistan to about 50,000, far short of the 160,000 deployed in Iraq at the height of the surge.
This force will have a formidable list of tasks to perform: provide additional security needed for conducting the Afghan Presidential elections in August, fill the gaps left by the withdrawal of Canadian and Dutch troops and provide security in provinces that border on Kabul and have seen a surge of Taliban activity in recent months, provide the trainers needed for the expanded Afghan army which, some analysts are suggesting, has to be expanded well beyond the currently planned figure of 134,000 to about 250,000.
This last item is not as far as one can tell a recommendation made by any of the reviews but it appears to be part of the wish list of commanders on the ground who believe that this sort of strength would be required if the Afghan National Army is to be the key to the US exit strategy.
Theoretically these additional troops will make it possible to not only clear areas now under Taliban thrall but to hold them and thus create the security conditions in which economic development and political reconciliation can move forward. Even as most analysts involved in the review recognise the differences between largely urbanised Iraq and largely rural Afghanistan they hope the success of the surge in Iraq can be replicated in Afghanistan.
The second premise is that there has to be a new focus on political reconciliation and economic development. Bidens assertion that only 5% of the Taliban are hardcore and 70% are those who are with the Taliban because they provide employment is a clear indication that the new policy will aim to provide employment opportunities in the insurgency affected areas that will rival the financial inducements the Taliban are currently offering.
The key element will be the expansion of the PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams). Despite the objections of the Karzai government, these PRTs will work with local representatives rather than with the Central government both in term of economic development and in giving the people the wherewithal to defend themselves against the Taliban.
The premise is that the success of these efforts would lay the ground work for winning over the 70% reconcilable Taliban and for negotiations with the 20% or so who could be persuaded with the right political inducements to join the peace process. Several hundred new positions have been created in the American embassy in Kabul to be filled by American diplomats along with specialists from other departments to undertake this economic development and probably to establish the quiet contacts needed to advance the reconciliation process.
The third premise is that the Karzai government can be cleansed of corrupt elements and can win the confidence of the Afghan people sufficiently for Kabul to be able to negotiate with the Taliban from a position of strength.
The Americans would be happy to accept that in these negotiations Karzai agrees that there will be a large measure of autonomy for the provinces and that so long as the Taliban undertake not to allow Al Qaeda or other terrorist organisations to operate in the areas that are under their control they could enforce their own system of government in these areas and enjoy a share of power in the central government.
The fourth and possibly the most important premise is what can be done in Pakistan. In addition to Americas concern over the known groups operating in the NWFP and FATA, in the past two weeks, there have been a number of reports in the American press about the freedom with which the so-called Quetta Shura of the Taliban has been planning and executing operations in Afghanistan.
At a recent Congressional hearing questions on this subject elicited the response that the Pakistani authorities were concerned about local repercussions if they took action. Two days ago the New York Times reported that the Obama administration was considering the use of drones to attack the Taliban leadership in the areas around Quetta and in the refugee camps.
This was, however, contradicted in a Washington Post story a day later which said that the American military was reluctant to extend the drone attacks beyond the tribal areas and expected that the Pakistan military must recognise the threat and organise themselves to deal with it.
The activities of the Taliban in the border areas of Balochistan therefore will now figure more prominently in American military and political calculations, the more so now that alongside the attack on the container terminal for NATO cargo in Peshawar there has also been an attack on trucks carrying NATO goods into Afghanistan from Chaman. The jeopardy this causes for the logistic support for NATO forces will not be easy to countenance.
In all likelihood, at the conferences scheduled on Afghanistan, the SCO conference in Moscow on March 27 and the March 31 conference in The Hague, Pakistans representative will be asked to recognise the threat posed to Pakistan by the Taliban leadership in Quetta and its environs. But even more importantly, Pakistan will be asked to use its influence and its coercive powers to induce these leaders to seek reconciliation on the much more acceptable terms the Americans now seem to be offering.
The US could also likely use the leverage of the large scale aid that Pakistan is expecting both from the United States directly and, with US assistance, from the Friends of Pakistan, making it dependent on how successfully Pakistan tackles the Quetta Shura.
There are sound reasons for being sceptical about the success of the new Afghan policy. But the one element which we should recognise and must cooperate on is the fact that the Afghan Taliban, their protestations notwithstanding, have ties with our own extremists and that their presence on our soil represents as much of a danger to us as it does to the NATO forces in Afghanistan.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
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Let's be sure not to overstate an already immense task. Mr. Shaikh needs reassurance that the Canadians will be in Afghanistan through 2011. The Dutch, I believe, intend to leave by July, 2010. The window to see these newly-deployed forces enhance security is about 16 months before full Dutch withdrawal.
What can be effected by then? Potentially, a great deal-particularly in Helmand and specifically south of Garmsir. Southern Helmand is the worst. This is the absolute untouched heart of the taliban beast, replete with the absolute core of the world's opium epidemic. Helmand's opium production dwarfs any other region on earth and most of it's south remain undisturbed badlands.
If the additional 13,000 U.S. troops are also deployed, then all the better because this spring, summer, and fall will be HOT for a variety of reasons to include a nat'l presidential election and the battle for negotiating leverage. They may be, most accurately, talking about talking at this point.
There's a lot of posturing yet within this preamble.
What can be effected by then? Potentially, a great deal-particularly in Helmand and specifically south of Garmsir. Southern Helmand is the worst. This is the absolute untouched heart of the taliban beast, replete with the absolute core of the world's opium epidemic. Helmand's opium production dwarfs any other region on earth and most of it's south remain undisturbed badlands.
If the additional 13,000 U.S. troops are also deployed, then all the better because this spring, summer, and fall will be HOT for a variety of reasons to include a nat'l presidential election and the battle for negotiating leverage. They may be, most accurately, talking about talking at this point.
There's a lot of posturing yet within this preamble.
muse
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The honorable secretary's article is directed at Pakistanis - what Europeans decide to do is not so much of a problem, they were and are window dressing and if the heartland of the Talib is Garmser it's not a problem for Pakistanis, but for what are now referred to as Afghans -- The problem for Pakistan is to see Pakistan as the pearl, the gem that is to be prized not any other - and the existence of talib, their enablers, financiers, the existence of international islamist terror on the soil of Pakistan, in the media of Pakistan, in the politics of Pakistan, in the conscience of society - these are the real threats the public must be awakened to.
These threats go unrealized, unattended, in a vain and cowardly belief that if only the Pakistani public's attention can be diverted to imagining the rest of the world as a threat, the public may be saved and the world defeated and imperiled - the world will not and must not accept this.
In Afghanistan much thunder will attend the exit strategy, Karzai ought to be given an out, corruption will not cease, it will increase - the problem remains capacity and a salary structure for govt employees out of sync with economic realities; take a look at what a govt clerk earns and what the price for a 10 and 40 kg sack of wheat is.
Public expectations are very different now from that they were when the karzai regime was brought to power -- in a 10 to 15 years the afghan population will double and then double again, a nightmare for Pakistan and Iran and for those in both Iran and Pakistan who will give some thought to history -- the Afghan mountains restricting communications and markets, the doubling of population, the inablity to attain self sufficiency to feed itself, will mean migrations, effecting cultures and societies of the neigboring countries, of these Pakistan is least endowed or ready to deal with such.
These threats go unrealized, unattended, in a vain and cowardly belief that if only the Pakistani public's attention can be diverted to imagining the rest of the world as a threat, the public may be saved and the world defeated and imperiled - the world will not and must not accept this.
In Afghanistan much thunder will attend the exit strategy, Karzai ought to be given an out, corruption will not cease, it will increase - the problem remains capacity and a salary structure for govt employees out of sync with economic realities; take a look at what a govt clerk earns and what the price for a 10 and 40 kg sack of wheat is.
Public expectations are very different now from that they were when the karzai regime was brought to power -- in a 10 to 15 years the afghan population will double and then double again, a nightmare for Pakistan and Iran and for those in both Iran and Pakistan who will give some thought to history -- the Afghan mountains restricting communications and markets, the doubling of population, the inablity to attain self sufficiency to feed itself, will mean migrations, effecting cultures and societies of the neigboring countries, of these Pakistan is least endowed or ready to deal with such.
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Great point about the doubling of afghan population. It has doubled since the Soviet invasion in 1979/80 and I can easily imagine you being correct again. No amount of war has impeded that march.
Sorry for becoming so tactical in the face of your deeper ponderings.
"These threats go unrealized, unattended, in a vain and cowardly belief that if only the Pakistani public's attention can be diverted to imagining the rest of the world as a threat, the public may be saved and the world defeated and imperiled - the world will not and must not accept this."
A fair portion of your nation's shapers of messages reside right here. I hope they're reading and considering your thoughts. I know the RAW agent who monitors this board will appreciate the above thoughts. I certainly do.
Probably wasn't helpful, was it?
Sorry for becoming so tactical in the face of your deeper ponderings.
"These threats go unrealized, unattended, in a vain and cowardly belief that if only the Pakistani public's attention can be diverted to imagining the rest of the world as a threat, the public may be saved and the world defeated and imperiled - the world will not and must not accept this."
A fair portion of your nation's shapers of messages reside right here. I hope they're reading and considering your thoughts. I know the RAW agent who monitors this board will appreciate the above thoughts. I certainly do.
Probably wasn't helpful, was it?
I am confused. Are you serious or are you being sarcastic ? I don't mean to offend anyone, but are you claiming that hashisins are planning another attack?
I thought the last remains of the Hashishins were the Druze - And I know atleast one person belonging to the sect. They don't consider themselves pure islamic, but are as pro-Hezbollah as they get (these people are from Lebanon). The person I knew atleast was extremely peace-loving and believed in negotiated settlements to problems. Basically the same Lebanese mainstream viewpoint. I have difficulty believing another theory on the takeover of the world by these people.
What's the count now ? The Templars, Medicis, Zionists, Hashishins, Communists, Nazi's - who else should I be afraid of now ?
(I am sure I'll regret this post tomorrow
muse
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I think most everyone realizes this but they become defensive when someone, not a Pakistani points to this -- either way, it's time for sobriety and to clean house.
No I was referring to the influence of that movement and of Ibn Tammiyah's work on modern day cult of assasins.
muse
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Dedicated to all who love and value Pakistan before any other:
A tattered coat upon a stick
Ejaz Haider
While in Islamabad, US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief Leon Panetta told the highest echelons of Pakistani government that Predator attacks inside Pakistani territory will not be stopped.
The report in this newspaper quoted diplomatic and government sources as saying: He [Panetta] refused to end the drone attacks in Pakistan, saying a number of top Al Qaeda leaders had been killed in the assaults.
This, for now, has put paid to assurances given by the top government leadership that because the United States is in the process of reviewing its strategy, it would come around to Islamabads viewpoint on this issue as well.
Far away in Brussels, Richard Holbrooke, President Obamas special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, was quoted as saying at the Brussels Forum that The heart of the problem for the West is in western Pakistan. But there are not going to be US or NATO troops on the ground in Pakistan. There is a red line for the government of Pakistan and one which we must respect.
What should we make of this?
First, a word about the new US administrations review process, a concept completely misunderstood.
A review means the US wants to have a more effective Afghanistan policy i.e., it would continue with what it has done, or is doing, successfully and change course only where it has failed. In other words, the US would build on its strengths and address its weaknesses.
If this obvious definition of a review process is accepted, then it should be clear that the US would not agree to stop drone attacks that have proved successful and taken a heavy toll of top Taliban-Al Qaeda leadership.
At this point one must also refer to what Holbrooke has said in Brussels about the red line. This red line has remained effective so far not only because of a technicality but also for concrete operational reasons.
The technicality refers to the problem of justifying foreign troops on the ground (like the ground infiltration near Angoor Ada on September 3, 2008 by US special forces) as opposed to suspected US strikes from the air.
There are two technical points here, as identified by Ahmer Bilal Soofi, one of our leading experts in International Law. One, airspace violation is less tangible and therefore less serious than ground incursion. Two, even more than that the gravity of the airspace violation has to be seen on the basis of the reaction of the state whose airspace is being violated.
Seen from this perspective, the Government of Pakistan has not done much and consistently except sending in occasional notes verbales and summoning the US ambassador only once and that too when Pakistan army troops got killed in an air raid. That summoning had less to do with the violation and was more about the killing of Pakistani troops.
But more than the legal-technical side of it, respect for the red line about ground incursions springs from operational dangers inherent in sending in troops. Ground infiltrations, even when based on credible intelligence, can go wrong because of a number of factors (a discussion of those factors is outside the scope of this article).
Also, if Predator attacks have been generally successful in taking out targets, it makes no sense, both because of legalities as well as operational constraints, to opt for ground infiltration. Put simply, the red line Holbrooke talked about draws respect for three reasons: it would be virtually impossible for any Pakistani government not to retaliate to such incursions into Pakistani territory; ground infiltration will be cost-heavy for invading troops for many reasons including hostility from Pakistan; drone strikes are relatively easier to live with by Islamabad and they have been effective for the US.
This is why we have one statement by Holbrooke in Brussels and another by Panetta in Islamabad. What works will continue to work; what is risky and untried will remain on hold until what works is working and circumstances do not change drastically for US-led forces to take the risks involved in ground infiltration.
Let it be said that were such change of circumstances to come to pass and if the US thought that the cost of inaction on the ground was heavier than acting on the ground, it would act. The red line would be tested at that point and it would then be left to Islamabad to react to the crossing of that line by a foreign government.
So far, however, that point has not been reached. In fact, not entering into Pakistani territory is a policy NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer also talked about when I met him in Brussels as part of a delegation of Pakistani journalists. Scheffer categorically said that NATO had absolutely no plans to cross into Pakistani tribal areas. This was also voiced by NATO spokesperson James Appathurai.
This said, the question of how Pakistan should react to drone attacks remains. I have often said in this space that I do not believe that these attacks are carried out without the knowledge of the Pakistani government. There is enough evidence to support this assertion. But let us, for the sake of the argument, accept the official version i.e., we know nothing about them, which is why we have made such a fuss.
To this then we need to apply a simple framework through some questions. Is it correct that we are fighting an enemy in the tribal areas, an enemy that poses an existential threat to Pakistan? Is the United States an ally, despite many areas of friction?
If the answer to both questions is yes, then we need to ask another. If someone is killing the enemies of this state, even if for its own interests, should we be too bothered about that, especially if we may not have the capacity to do what is required? As for the issue of sovereignty, it is a bit more complex than the simplistic construct we put on it whether wittingly or otherwise. Consider.
Sovereignty works at two levels: internal and external. In fact, much before a state invokes it vis-à-vis the outside world, it is supposed to have actualised it internally, that supposition being the basis of the very existence of a state and its claim to being such an entity.
In a situation where a states writ is being eroded from the inside, any attempt from the outside to restore that writ, far from an invasion of that states sovereignty, is an action necessary to help it reclaim its internal sovereignty.
It is somewhat intriguing that Pakistanis should consider drone attacks meant to take out the enemies of the Pakistani state as an attack on its sovereignty while that sovereignty, to quote Yeats take on old age, has increasingly come internally to look like A tattered coat upon a stick.
To be fair to the world and ourselves, if our state had not lost its internal sovereignty and thus worried everyone, we would not have seen these attacks on our sovereignty. The thing to do therefore, before we lecture the world on sovereignty, is to reclaim it at home.
Ejaz Haider is Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times and Consulting Editor of The Friday Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
A tattered coat upon a stick
Ejaz Haider
While in Islamabad, US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief Leon Panetta told the highest echelons of Pakistani government that Predator attacks inside Pakistani territory will not be stopped.
The report in this newspaper quoted diplomatic and government sources as saying: He [Panetta] refused to end the drone attacks in Pakistan, saying a number of top Al Qaeda leaders had been killed in the assaults.
This, for now, has put paid to assurances given by the top government leadership that because the United States is in the process of reviewing its strategy, it would come around to Islamabads viewpoint on this issue as well.
Far away in Brussels, Richard Holbrooke, President Obamas special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, was quoted as saying at the Brussels Forum that The heart of the problem for the West is in western Pakistan. But there are not going to be US or NATO troops on the ground in Pakistan. There is a red line for the government of Pakistan and one which we must respect.
What should we make of this?
First, a word about the new US administrations review process, a concept completely misunderstood.
A review means the US wants to have a more effective Afghanistan policy i.e., it would continue with what it has done, or is doing, successfully and change course only where it has failed. In other words, the US would build on its strengths and address its weaknesses.
If this obvious definition of a review process is accepted, then it should be clear that the US would not agree to stop drone attacks that have proved successful and taken a heavy toll of top Taliban-Al Qaeda leadership.
At this point one must also refer to what Holbrooke has said in Brussels about the red line. This red line has remained effective so far not only because of a technicality but also for concrete operational reasons.
The technicality refers to the problem of justifying foreign troops on the ground (like the ground infiltration near Angoor Ada on September 3, 2008 by US special forces) as opposed to suspected US strikes from the air.
There are two technical points here, as identified by Ahmer Bilal Soofi, one of our leading experts in International Law. One, airspace violation is less tangible and therefore less serious than ground incursion. Two, even more than that the gravity of the airspace violation has to be seen on the basis of the reaction of the state whose airspace is being violated.
Seen from this perspective, the Government of Pakistan has not done much and consistently except sending in occasional notes verbales and summoning the US ambassador only once and that too when Pakistan army troops got killed in an air raid. That summoning had less to do with the violation and was more about the killing of Pakistani troops.
But more than the legal-technical side of it, respect for the red line about ground incursions springs from operational dangers inherent in sending in troops. Ground infiltrations, even when based on credible intelligence, can go wrong because of a number of factors (a discussion of those factors is outside the scope of this article).
Also, if Predator attacks have been generally successful in taking out targets, it makes no sense, both because of legalities as well as operational constraints, to opt for ground infiltration. Put simply, the red line Holbrooke talked about draws respect for three reasons: it would be virtually impossible for any Pakistani government not to retaliate to such incursions into Pakistani territory; ground infiltration will be cost-heavy for invading troops for many reasons including hostility from Pakistan; drone strikes are relatively easier to live with by Islamabad and they have been effective for the US.
This is why we have one statement by Holbrooke in Brussels and another by Panetta in Islamabad. What works will continue to work; what is risky and untried will remain on hold until what works is working and circumstances do not change drastically for US-led forces to take the risks involved in ground infiltration.
Let it be said that were such change of circumstances to come to pass and if the US thought that the cost of inaction on the ground was heavier than acting on the ground, it would act. The red line would be tested at that point and it would then be left to Islamabad to react to the crossing of that line by a foreign government.
So far, however, that point has not been reached. In fact, not entering into Pakistani territory is a policy NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer also talked about when I met him in Brussels as part of a delegation of Pakistani journalists. Scheffer categorically said that NATO had absolutely no plans to cross into Pakistani tribal areas. This was also voiced by NATO spokesperson James Appathurai.
This said, the question of how Pakistan should react to drone attacks remains. I have often said in this space that I do not believe that these attacks are carried out without the knowledge of the Pakistani government. There is enough evidence to support this assertion. But let us, for the sake of the argument, accept the official version i.e., we know nothing about them, which is why we have made such a fuss.
To this then we need to apply a simple framework through some questions. Is it correct that we are fighting an enemy in the tribal areas, an enemy that poses an existential threat to Pakistan? Is the United States an ally, despite many areas of friction?
If the answer to both questions is yes, then we need to ask another. If someone is killing the enemies of this state, even if for its own interests, should we be too bothered about that, especially if we may not have the capacity to do what is required? As for the issue of sovereignty, it is a bit more complex than the simplistic construct we put on it whether wittingly or otherwise. Consider.
Sovereignty works at two levels: internal and external. In fact, much before a state invokes it vis-à-vis the outside world, it is supposed to have actualised it internally, that supposition being the basis of the very existence of a state and its claim to being such an entity.
In a situation where a states writ is being eroded from the inside, any attempt from the outside to restore that writ, far from an invasion of that states sovereignty, is an action necessary to help it reclaim its internal sovereignty.
It is somewhat intriguing that Pakistanis should consider drone attacks meant to take out the enemies of the Pakistani state as an attack on its sovereignty while that sovereignty, to quote Yeats take on old age, has increasingly come internally to look like A tattered coat upon a stick.
To be fair to the world and ourselves, if our state had not lost its internal sovereignty and thus worried everyone, we would not have seen these attacks on our sovereignty. The thing to do therefore, before we lecture the world on sovereignty, is to reclaim it at home.
Ejaz Haider is Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times and Consulting Editor of The Friday Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
MastanKhan
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Hi,
Many a times this thought has crossed through my mind----the assasins of hassan ibne sabah and the similiarities amongst the taliban / al qaeda's executions of their adversaries---people who spoke against them---people who acted against them---public excecutions and beheadings creating terror amongst the civil population---suicide bombings----visions of heavens and the love and compassion of 72 beautiful women to the martyr---things are so similiar in case, action and results---rewards so enticing for the hopeless young boys and men.
I have always feared in my mind that the pakistanis will never learn to understand the significance of letting the al qaeda disappear into the high mountains after their escaper from tora bora. The death and destruction was too far away from the heartland and busniess centers of the community---frontier---wana---waziristan---the agencies were far off lands---we would never be effected by problems---at last those chechens and uzbeks and arabs are our brethren---they would understand that we gave gave them a place to live-----that was the pakistani mentality---too late we learnt that these were not our brothers---but rather they were snakes that were fed and bred in the enclaves that we provided for their safety----habitually they turned upon us---.
Musharraf should have taken it upon himself to get rid of the menace---he tried to play the devil's advocate---in the end he barely survived---they will get him one day for not doing the job he was supposed to do. He didnot acknowledge the fact that the loyalties had changed instantaneously after the 9/11 scenario---regardless of whatever the truth was behind 9/11 the americans were coming. A gamble was taken by the weak minded people in the army---people who didnot have the courage to look the beast of al qaeda in the eye and let it be known that you are not wanted any more.
A fickle minded pakistani policy regarding al qaeda has played havoc over the nation of pakistan. This beast should have been destroyed on the slopes of hindu kush mountains as they were coming down the mountains----killed---executed---slaughtered and neutralized on the run by the pak millitary. But as we have learnt over the years we lack the killing instinct----we lack the understanding of nipping the problem in the bud---we should have learnt something from the bombings in sudan in hte late 90's after which bin laden was immediately kicked out of the country.
Now we are the a place where the ruthless of the assasins and killers roam around with impunity---killings have turned into a lucratie business---suicide bombings has become a source of pleasure for the fanatics---promise of sex with hooras in the ever lasting life hereafter has made a ruthless murderer of a young muslim boy.
The " OLD MAN OF THE MOUNTAIN " has been re-born. His name is Usama Bin Laden.
Many a times this thought has crossed through my mind----the assasins of hassan ibne sabah and the similiarities amongst the taliban / al qaeda's executions of their adversaries---people who spoke against them---people who acted against them---public excecutions and beheadings creating terror amongst the civil population---suicide bombings----visions of heavens and the love and compassion of 72 beautiful women to the martyr---things are so similiar in case, action and results---rewards so enticing for the hopeless young boys and men.
I have always feared in my mind that the pakistanis will never learn to understand the significance of letting the al qaeda disappear into the high mountains after their escaper from tora bora. The death and destruction was too far away from the heartland and busniess centers of the community---frontier---wana---waziristan---the agencies were far off lands---we would never be effected by problems---at last those chechens and uzbeks and arabs are our brethren---they would understand that we gave gave them a place to live-----that was the pakistani mentality---too late we learnt that these were not our brothers---but rather they were snakes that were fed and bred in the enclaves that we provided for their safety----habitually they turned upon us---.
Musharraf should have taken it upon himself to get rid of the menace---he tried to play the devil's advocate---in the end he barely survived---they will get him one day for not doing the job he was supposed to do. He didnot acknowledge the fact that the loyalties had changed instantaneously after the 9/11 scenario---regardless of whatever the truth was behind 9/11 the americans were coming. A gamble was taken by the weak minded people in the army---people who didnot have the courage to look the beast of al qaeda in the eye and let it be known that you are not wanted any more.
A fickle minded pakistani policy regarding al qaeda has played havoc over the nation of pakistan. This beast should have been destroyed on the slopes of hindu kush mountains as they were coming down the mountains----killed---executed---slaughtered and neutralized on the run by the pak millitary. But as we have learnt over the years we lack the killing instinct----we lack the understanding of nipping the problem in the bud---we should have learnt something from the bombings in sudan in hte late 90's after which bin laden was immediately kicked out of the country.
Now we are the a place where the ruthless of the assasins and killers roam around with impunity---killings have turned into a lucratie business---suicide bombings has become a source of pleasure for the fanatics---promise of sex with hooras in the ever lasting life hereafter has made a ruthless murderer of a young muslim boy.
The " OLD MAN OF THE MOUNTAIN " has been re-born. His name is Usama Bin Laden.
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