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Analysis: A look at US airstrikes in Pakistan through September 2009
By Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer
October 1, 2009 12:38 AM
Long War Journal
Despite the sharp increase in both the frequency and total number of casualties resulting from Predator strikes since mid-2008, civilian casualties have remained very low. Naturally, it is difficult to determine the exact number of civilians killed in Predator strikes for many reasons - including intentional exaggeration by Taliban spokesmen, and vague accounts by Pakistani media sources which frequently report that a certain number of "people" were killed in a strike, but rarely offer a follow-up report identifying which victims were civilians and which were militants. However, it is possible to get a rough estimate of civilian casualties by adding up the number of civilians reported killed from the media accounts of each attack. According to this method, a total of 94 civilians were reported killed as a result of all strikes between 2006 and September 29, 2009.
Considering that drone strikes have resulted in 979 total casualties during that same time period, our numbers show that only 9.6% of the casualties reported have been identified as civilians. While our number is undoubtedly a low estimate, this extremely small percentage suggests that the accuracy and precision of these strikes have improved along with the increased pace of these strikes over the past few years.
The US air campaign in Pakistan has focused almost exclusively on the tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan. Of the total of 88 strikes in Pakistan, 78 strikes, or 88.6 percent, have struck targets in North Waziristan (36 strikes) and South Waziristan (42 strikes). This trend has only increased after the US branched out and struck several targets outside those two tribal agencies during the fall of 2008 and winter of 2009. Since the April 1, 2009 strike in Arakzai, all 30 of the subsequent strikes have been in North and South Waziristan.
The vast majority of the US attacks inside Pakistan have focused on areas under the control of five influential leaders. Twenty-three percent of the attacks (20 attacks total) took place in Baitullah Mehsud's tribal areas. This number rose dramatically since the spring of 2008, when only 10 percent of the attacks hit in Baitullah's tribal areas. This drastic increase reflects the US effort to kill Baitullah, who, as leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, remained closely allied with al Qaeda and sought to bring down the Pakistani state. Since Baitullah's death in August of 2009, Waliur Rehman Mehsud has taken control of Baitullah's territories in South Waziristan, and Hakeemullah Mehsud has taken command of the overall Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan.
The territories of South Waziristan Taliban chieftain Mullah Nazir were also hit 20 times (23 percent of the strikes). The Haqqani Network rounded out the top three, with 22 percent of the strikes (19 strikes total) taking place in their territories. North Waziristan leaders Abu Kasha al Iraqi (eight strikes) and Hafiz Gul Bahadar (five strikes) finish out the top five. In all, nearly 81 percent of the strikes targeted the territories of these five tribal leaders.
First and foremost, the primary objective of the air campaign has been to disrupt al Qaeda’s external network and prevent the group from striking at the US and her allies. The campaign has targeted camps known to house foreigners as well as trainers and leaders for the network. Al Qaeda operatives known to have lived in the West and holding foreign passports have been killed in several Predator strikes. One such strike on an al Qaeda camp in South Waziristan on Aug. 30, 2008, killed two Canadian passport holders as they trained in the camp. Also, Abu Sulayman Jazairi, the former chief of al Qaeda’s external operations branch, was killed in a strike on May 14, 2008.
Another major objective has been to disrupt the Taliban operations in Afghanistan. The Taliban in Afghanistan receive significant support from within Pakistan. Taliban groups that are very active against Coalition forces in Afghanistan, such as the Haqqani Network, the Mehsud Taliban, and Mullah Nazir, have flourished in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas. The US has targeted both Taliban leaders and fighters during these strikes. Several large Taliban training camps that are known to train fighters for the Afghan front have been the targets of attack. For instance, a training camp in Kurram operated by an Afghan Taliban commander was hit on Feb. 16, 2009.
Along with targeting al Qaeda's external operations network and the Taliban's Afghan operations in Pakistan, the US has also targeted Pakistani Taliban commanders who threaten the stability of the Pakistani state. The US hunted Baitullah Mehsud for a year before killing him in a strike in early August of 2009. The US has an interest in preventing nuclear Pakistan from becoming a failed state and needs to keep its supply lines through Pakistan and into Afghanistan open. More than 70 percent of the US and NATO supplies travel through Pakistan's northwest.
Analysis: A look at US airstrikes in Pakistan through September 2009 - The Long War Journal
By Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer
October 1, 2009 12:38 AM
Long War Journal
Despite the sharp increase in both the frequency and total number of casualties resulting from Predator strikes since mid-2008, civilian casualties have remained very low. Naturally, it is difficult to determine the exact number of civilians killed in Predator strikes for many reasons - including intentional exaggeration by Taliban spokesmen, and vague accounts by Pakistani media sources which frequently report that a certain number of "people" were killed in a strike, but rarely offer a follow-up report identifying which victims were civilians and which were militants. However, it is possible to get a rough estimate of civilian casualties by adding up the number of civilians reported killed from the media accounts of each attack. According to this method, a total of 94 civilians were reported killed as a result of all strikes between 2006 and September 29, 2009.
Considering that drone strikes have resulted in 979 total casualties during that same time period, our numbers show that only 9.6% of the casualties reported have been identified as civilians. While our number is undoubtedly a low estimate, this extremely small percentage suggests that the accuracy and precision of these strikes have improved along with the increased pace of these strikes over the past few years.
The US air campaign in Pakistan has focused almost exclusively on the tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan. Of the total of 88 strikes in Pakistan, 78 strikes, or 88.6 percent, have struck targets in North Waziristan (36 strikes) and South Waziristan (42 strikes). This trend has only increased after the US branched out and struck several targets outside those two tribal agencies during the fall of 2008 and winter of 2009. Since the April 1, 2009 strike in Arakzai, all 30 of the subsequent strikes have been in North and South Waziristan.
The vast majority of the US attacks inside Pakistan have focused on areas under the control of five influential leaders. Twenty-three percent of the attacks (20 attacks total) took place in Baitullah Mehsud's tribal areas. This number rose dramatically since the spring of 2008, when only 10 percent of the attacks hit in Baitullah's tribal areas. This drastic increase reflects the US effort to kill Baitullah, who, as leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, remained closely allied with al Qaeda and sought to bring down the Pakistani state. Since Baitullah's death in August of 2009, Waliur Rehman Mehsud has taken control of Baitullah's territories in South Waziristan, and Hakeemullah Mehsud has taken command of the overall Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan.
The territories of South Waziristan Taliban chieftain Mullah Nazir were also hit 20 times (23 percent of the strikes). The Haqqani Network rounded out the top three, with 22 percent of the strikes (19 strikes total) taking place in their territories. North Waziristan leaders Abu Kasha al Iraqi (eight strikes) and Hafiz Gul Bahadar (five strikes) finish out the top five. In all, nearly 81 percent of the strikes targeted the territories of these five tribal leaders.
First and foremost, the primary objective of the air campaign has been to disrupt al Qaeda’s external network and prevent the group from striking at the US and her allies. The campaign has targeted camps known to house foreigners as well as trainers and leaders for the network. Al Qaeda operatives known to have lived in the West and holding foreign passports have been killed in several Predator strikes. One such strike on an al Qaeda camp in South Waziristan on Aug. 30, 2008, killed two Canadian passport holders as they trained in the camp. Also, Abu Sulayman Jazairi, the former chief of al Qaeda’s external operations branch, was killed in a strike on May 14, 2008.
Another major objective has been to disrupt the Taliban operations in Afghanistan. The Taliban in Afghanistan receive significant support from within Pakistan. Taliban groups that are very active against Coalition forces in Afghanistan, such as the Haqqani Network, the Mehsud Taliban, and Mullah Nazir, have flourished in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas. The US has targeted both Taliban leaders and fighters during these strikes. Several large Taliban training camps that are known to train fighters for the Afghan front have been the targets of attack. For instance, a training camp in Kurram operated by an Afghan Taliban commander was hit on Feb. 16, 2009.
Along with targeting al Qaeda's external operations network and the Taliban's Afghan operations in Pakistan, the US has also targeted Pakistani Taliban commanders who threaten the stability of the Pakistani state. The US hunted Baitullah Mehsud for a year before killing him in a strike in early August of 2009. The US has an interest in preventing nuclear Pakistan from becoming a failed state and needs to keep its supply lines through Pakistan and into Afghanistan open. More than 70 percent of the US and NATO supplies travel through Pakistan's northwest.
Analysis: A look at US airstrikes in Pakistan through September 2009 - The Long War Journal
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