Firstly, the Indians cannot buy whatever they want presently. You guys do not have an infinite pot of gold to afford everything. That distinction is only for the Arabs. Maybe in 10-15 years, if you manage to grow at this rate, you might be able to buy whatever you need. Not now. This misguided belief was one of chief reasons why the 126 fighter jet deal had to cancelled.
You say this knowing, of course, that the 126 fighter jet deal was CHEAPER than the final deal.
Secondly, it is a blessing for you that you have civilian control over the armed forces. I imagine the Indian generals would definitely fancy a situation like we have here in Pak. The solution is not to hand over the budget to the army to do whatever it please but to update your bureaucracy. That will not happen soon judging by the usual pace of development in the subcontinent.
Agree totally.
Thirdly, the Arjun Tank has been plagued by delays and design changes. Your army does not want it. Why to keep pumping money in a project that its principal operator has no confidence in? If IA wants to go for T-90 MS, a tank that it is more comfortable with and has been operating it for quite a while, I see no harm or ill will in such a request. Its performance in the Syrian conflict has been pretty decent. Why not go for a tank that has now proven in combat?
For the following reasons: the delays and design changes were entirely due to the Indian Army shifting goalposts in mid-game. After the infamous trials, the Army tried to retreat to a defensible position and made some absurd and obviously flimsy requests, as well as claiming to have detected faults: the weight, for instance, was considered to be a liability on soft ground, until it was pointed out that the Arjun weighed less per square foot of exposure to the ground than the T90. They raised, and hastily retreated, from the question of night-vision, where they committed the criminal blunder of not knowing that the Arjun had effective night vision, the T90 (at that point of time, in the configuration that India had ordered) had none.
The list goes on and on. Those of us who have actually had the doubtful pleasure of climbing into a Russia tank, a T72, or a T90, know what the Russians think of ergonomics; they can't even spell the damn word. In sharp, horrifying contrast, the Arjun can actually be operated by other than 'little people' (Oh, hello, Tyrion, didn't see you sitting there!).
In every possible respect, the T90 came out behind. If the Army is more comfortable in it than in the Arjun, there is some serious psychological disconnect going on.
Incidentally, the performance of various tanks in Syria raises some questions. The Turkish Leopard tanks suffered, quite as well. Do we now conclude that because Russian tanks did well in that very mixed war, they will do well against an organised Army fighting conventional warfare?
would you say the primary purpose is to buy foreign kit or to kill indigenous development? or a hit 2 birds with one stone ?
In my view, these are two options, buying foreign equipment and promoting indigenisation, and the military may take one at one moment, the other the next moment. Their objective is to keep these options open, rather than tamely allow the bureaucracy to decide which it is to be.
The primary fear of all branches of the military is the fear of embargo, and the possibility of technology denial. If it happens due to hostility of one or the other bloc to Indian policy at that moment, nothing to be
the military of pakistan can buy what ever they like
I'm not at all sure about that. Not any longer. They can want to buy whatever they like, but I strongly doubt that they can any longer translate these into action. Their economy needs to be able to support their appetite.
and so does india
the difference is that the indians bend over easily to outside(out of the Indian armed forces) pressure
True. Let us let the unflattering imagery pass; yes, it is true that the Indian armed forces are nowhere near as powerful in their own country as the Pakistani equivalents are in theirs.
The difference, once again, is that the Pakistanis are limited only by their pockets; the Indians are limited only by their civilian managers. The case of the Indian Air Force, whose requirements and procurement decisions are heavily influenced by the politics of the matter, is a case in point.
who might these tormentors be? one of your own, french, Brits, Yanks, Ruskies, zionists, isi or may be isi pigeon?
yeah i know the last one is the most probable but i want you to think and i need to slight humor.
Why do I get this queasy feeling that you have not read my note? It says,"....their tormentors, the bureaucracy...." That body of men and women have been called many things before, but never French, Brits, Yanks, Ruskies, zionists, the ISI....perhaps the day may come when they may be thought of as ISI stool pigeons, but not yet, not just yet.
not really, examples being
the howitzer gun from sk are running along very smoothly. the russains frigates are coming and sailing along swimmingly and israeli kit and software to are doing well
(even the ones on the nirbhay)
the hold up being primarily in the AF domain.[/QUOTE]
I could now make a list of around ten horrible examples for each of the services; in fact, on another forum, I did so. It seems to be pointless, in hindsight; other than providing a Roman holiday for some twisted minds, it achieves nothing. The people facing the most direct consequences know this and other, deeper facts already; those who should know about it and don't, fail largely due to indifference, an indifference that stems from a selfishness and an obsession with their own central stories to the exclusion of anything that might be termed a national interest. These are few in number, but critically placed.
I cannot agree with your optimistic outlook, while at the same time, I must disagree with the other extreme, and must deprecate the kind of shallow and superficial dismissal of these institutions, for the very simple reason that these fall back to a lower but still effective level of functioning, even after denial of the higher-level integration of weapon systems embodying mobility and firepower, of training and of an increase in electronic and digital capability that is most desirable.