Doklam: How India misjudged China’s intentions and it escalated into a major standoff

[Feng Leng]

Doklam: How India misjudged China’s intentions and it escalated into a major standoff
BHARAT BHUSHAN| Updated on: 15 September 2017, 11:56 IST

The India-China military standoff at Doklam was apparently based on Indian misperception of Chinese intentions.

An alternative narration of events leading to the military standoff suggests that the skirmish might have been blown out of proportion and was completely unnecessary. And even though eventually the standoff was resolved through diplomatic negotiations, India was not a net gainer at the end of it.

The Chinese army personnel are still present at a distance of 250 metres from the site of the confrontation. This is where they were before June 16. The Indian Army meanwhile has vacated the area that the Chinese wanted vacated.

According to sources in the security establishment, the standoff which was projected as a result of Chinese road construction activity in the Doklam area was anything but that. A Chinese motorable road apparently already exists in the area. It has been there since 2003 or 2005, according to different estimates.

The standoff, according to these sources, had its origins not in any road-construction activity in the disputed area between China and Bhutan but in the destruction of two Indian Army bunkers in the area.

There are apparently two dozen bunkers in that area. Known as Self-Help Bunkers (SBH), they are not occupied all the time. The Chinese have for long objected to two bunkers that they claim have been built in an area which is within their perception line of their border with Bhutan.

Although Bhutan claims the area, Indian Army units under the control of 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok in Sikkim, patrol it. This includes the area where the two disputed bunkers are located.

The Chinese periodically use bulldozers to destroy the two bunkers whenever they are unoccupied. The Indian Army units patrolling the area equally periodically reconstruct them. This is not considered unusual activity in a disputed border area. Since this is China’s border with Bhutan but is patrolled by the Indian Army, the issue is never raised to a higher pitch.

In November 2007 also the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) had moved into Bhutan's Doklam Plateau and demolished a hut close to some Indian bunkers. The hut was apparently a rest house used by the Indian Army. The Indian side kept the matter quiet as the bunkers were located in Bhutan but manned by Indian Army personnel. In July that year, the PLA had also written to the 17 Mountain Division Headquarters about two “illegal” Indian bunkers but they were at Batangla near the disputed tri-junction (where the borders of India, Bhutan and China meet) warning of “adverse consequences” if they were not removed. The matter was swept under the carpet as the two armies were to conduct joint exercises a month later in December 2007. In 2008 also the PLA had destroyed two bunkers in precisely the same area in Doklam where this June’s standoff took place.

Whenever new Indian Army unit are deployed in the area, the outgoing units apparently don’t inform the incoming unit that the breaking and reconstruction of these two bunkers in particular takes place routinely.

According to sources, this summer when a new army unit was deployed for patrolling the area they decided to spruce up the bunkers, including the two disputed ones. The PLA soldiers suddenly saw something new happening– the Indian soldiers were painting the two bunkers in question in regulation brownish-saffron army colour. The PLA soldiers could not comprehend the enthusiasm of the newly deployed Indian army unit and thought that something more permanent was being built.

Predictably, when the bunkers were unoccupied, the PLA brought out its bulldozers and demolished the bunkers. When the Indian patrol discovered this, not knowing the previous history of such demolitions and reconstructions, they informed their superior officers about the aggressiveness of the Chinese.

The message that Chinese bulldozers were in action in Doklam, according to sources, went all the way up to the Major General who is the General Officer Commanding of the 17 Mountain Division based at Gangtok. He in turn informed his bosses in Army Headquarters in Delhi.

Sources claim that the Chinese use of bulldozers was linked to possible road construction activities by the army authorities sitting in Gangtok. They presumed that the Chinese were extending the existing road from Doka La (Doka Pass) through the Doklam Plateau towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri near the Jampheri Ridge.

The senior army officers in Delhi also believed the road construction theory and instructed the local army unit to prevent any road construction and stay put. Bhutan was taken on board and a full-scale military standoff began. General Bipin Rawat in fact visited both the 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok and the 27 Mountain Division at Kalimpong to boost the morale of his forces and take stock of the ground situation.

The Chinese, meanwhile, could not fathom why India was over-reacting. The Chinese media went on the offensive; and on the Indian side, security experts exaggerated and overplayed the strategic threat to India from the Chinese road construction activity. A full-scale propaganda war over claims, counter-claims and charges and counter-charges began.

At the end of it, through a “near-simultaneous” withdrawal of forces to pre-June 16 positions, the standoff was resolved. Both sides claimed victory but the Chinese went back only 250 metres while to maintain peace India had to give up patrolling the area where two destroyed bunkers had existed. The Chinese got what they wanted.

Although the military standoff is behind us, perhaps an assessment still needs to be made of the strategic cost-benefit analysis of the confrontation, the nature of information flow, the response and analysis systems within the Indian armed forces and the wisdom of the current crop of Indian Army commanders.

http://www.catchnews.com/internatio...it-escalated-into-a-major-standoff-81477.html


So... it turns out India lost even more than they admitted at first. Cannot patrol on behalf of Bhutan anymore and their traditional bunkers gone forever.

 

[deckingraj]

.....man every day we end up finding a new reason how China won....and the funny thing is, it is the same poster......b/w i have learned one thing from this fiasco....bore the hell out of your enemy by spewing utter nonsense day in day out...victory will be yours....

anyways let me comment on this topic....so the gist of this post is that Chinese were never trying to build a road....they brought bulldozers to destroy IA bunkers...however India thought they are going to build road...and went in...and stand off started.... ......wtf??

 

[JanjaWeed]

Lol.. funnier than those North Korean propaganda documentary on YT! Right out of Kim family library..

 

[Joe Shearer]

Doklam: How India misjudged China’s intentions and it escalated into a major standoff
BHARAT BHUSHAN| Updated on: 15 September 2017, 11:56 IST

The India-China military standoff at Doklam was apparently based on Indian misperception of Chinese intentions.

An alternative narration of events leading to the military standoff suggests that the skirmish might have been blown out of proportion and was completely unnecessary. And even though eventually the standoff was resolved through diplomatic negotiations, India was not a net gainer at the end of it.

The Chinese army personnel are still present at a distance of 250 metres from the site of the confrontation. This is where they were before June 16. The Indian Army meanwhile has vacated the area that the Chinese wanted vacated.

According to sources in the security establishment, the standoff which was projected as a result of Chinese road construction activity in the Doklam area was anything but that. A Chinese motorable road apparently already exists in the area. It has been there since 2003 or 2005, according to different estimates.

The standoff, according to these sources, had its origins not in any road-construction activity in the disputed area between China and Bhutan but in the destruction of two Indian Army bunkers in the area.

There are apparently two dozen bunkers in that area. Known as Self-Help Bunkers (SBH), they are not occupied all the time. The Chinese have for long objected to two bunkers that they claim have been built in an area which is within their perception line of their border with Bhutan.

Although Bhutan claims the area, Indian Army units under the control of 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok in Sikkim, patrol it. This includes the area where the two disputed bunkers are located.

The Chinese periodically use bulldozers to destroy the two bunkers whenever they are unoccupied. The Indian Army units patrolling the area equally periodically reconstruct them. This is not considered unusual activity in a disputed border area. Since this is China’s border with Bhutan but is patrolled by the Indian Army, the issue is never raised to a higher pitch.

In November 2007 also the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) had moved into Bhutan's Doklam Plateau and demolished a hut close to some Indian bunkers. The hut was apparently a rest house used by the Indian Army. The Indian side kept the matter quiet as the bunkers were located in Bhutan but manned by Indian Army personnel. In July that year, the PLA had also written to the 17 Mountain Division Headquarters about two “illegal” Indian bunkers but they were at Batangla near the disputed tri-junction (where the borders of India, Bhutan and China meet) warning of “adverse consequences” if they were not removed. The matter was swept under the carpet as the two armies were to conduct joint exercises a month later in December 2007. In 2008 also the PLA had destroyed two bunkers in precisely the same area in Doklam where this June’s standoff took place.

Whenever new Indian Army unit are deployed in the area, the outgoing units apparently don’t inform the incoming unit that the breaking and reconstruction of these two bunkers in particular takes place routinely.

According to sources, this summer when a new army unit was deployed for patrolling the area they decided to spruce up the bunkers, including the two disputed ones. The PLA soldiers suddenly saw something new happening– the Indian soldiers were painting the two bunkers in question in regulation brownish-saffron army colour. The PLA soldiers could not comprehend the enthusiasm of the newly deployed Indian army unit and thought that something more permanent was being built.

Predictably, when the bunkers were unoccupied, the PLA brought out its bulldozers and demolished the bunkers. When the Indian patrol discovered this, not knowing the previous history of such demolitions and reconstructions, they informed their superior officers about the aggressiveness of the Chinese.

The message that Chinese bulldozers were in action in Doklam, according to sources, went all the way up to the Major General who is the General Officer Commanding of the 17 Mountain Division based at Gangtok. He in turn informed his bosses in Army Headquarters in Delhi.

Sources claim that the Chinese use of bulldozers was linked to possible road construction activities by the army authorities sitting in Gangtok. They presumed that the Chinese were extending the existing road from Doka La (Doka Pass) through the Doklam Plateau towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri near the Jampheri Ridge.

The senior army officers in Delhi also believed the road construction theory and instructed the local army unit to prevent any road construction and stay put. Bhutan was taken on board and a full-scale military standoff began. General Bipin Rawat in fact visited both the 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok and the 27 Mountain Division at Kalimpong to boost the morale of his forces and take stock of the ground situation.

The Chinese, meanwhile, could not fathom why India was over-reacting. The Chinese media went on the offensive; and on the Indian side, security experts exaggerated and overplayed the strategic threat to India from the Chinese road construction activity. A full-scale propaganda war over claims, counter-claims and charges and counter-charges began.

At the end of it, through a “near-simultaneous” withdrawal of forces to pre-June 16 positions, the standoff was resolved. Both sides claimed victory but the Chinese went back only 250 metres while to maintain peace India had to give up patrolling the area where two destroyed bunkers had existed. The Chinese got what they wanted.

Although the military standoff is behind us, perhaps an assessment still needs to be made of the strategic cost-benefit analysis of the confrontation, the nature of information flow, the response and analysis systems within the Indian armed forces and the wisdom of the current crop of Indian Army commanders.

http://www.catchnews.com/internatio...it-escalated-into-a-major-standoff-81477.html


So... it turns out India lost even more than they admitted at first. Cannot patrol on behalf of Bhutan anymore and their traditional bunkers gone forever.

Authenticated by catchnews.com.

Good going.

@deckingraj @JanjaWeed

This is the Chinese MR9.

 

[idune]

Authenticated by catchnews.com.

Good going.

@deckingraj @JanjaWeed

This is the Chinese MR9.

For indian "professional" this should be good education.


Indian posturing, post-Doklam, has a tragi-comic feel
By M.K. Bhadrakumar September 6, 2017 10:41 AM

Why the standoff between India and China, near the Sikkim border, began at all, and how it ended, after 71 long and anxious days, on August 28, will likely never be fully known. The Indian foreign ministry maintains cryptically that “following diplomatic communications, expeditious disengagement of border personnel of India and China at the face-off site at Doklam,” took place last week.

New Delhi falls far short of making any claims about an agreement or understanding with Beijing regarding mutual withdrawal – leave alone about China stopping its road-building activities, which led to the standoff in the first instance.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has been more forthcoming. It put on record that:As a result of diplomatic representations and “effective countermeasures” at the military level, the Indian side “withdrew” all its personnel and equipment.


• As a result of diplomatic representations and “effective countermeasures” at the military level, the Indian side “withdrew” all its personnel and equipment.

• The Chinese personnel “onsite have verified” the fact of Indian withdrawal.

• The Chinese troops “continue with their patrolling and stationing” in the Doklam area.

• China will “adjust and deploy its military resources” in the area to meet the needs of guarding the border.

• China has long been undertaking road-building in the area and will in future “make proper building plans in light of the actual situation,” taking into account weather conditions.

New Delhi hasn’t disagreed with China’s contentions. Instead, a series of unattributed, self-serving media leaks have appeared, portraying Indian officials as strong-willed men who stared the Chinese down. This is rather tragi-comic, given the geopolitical reality that the standoff is sure to be a watershed event in India-China relations and regional politics. The Chinese Defense Ministry warned New Delhi to learn its “lesson” from the standoff.

On balance, it appears that India won’t admit its unilateral withdrawal from Doklam, while the Chinese side is disinterested in triumphalism.

Clearly, with the brief summer season about to end in the region’s tangled mountains, India has managed to stall any road-building activity by China during this calendar year.

But the nagging question remains: What prompted India to unilaterally withdraw? To quote a prominent China expert in New Delhi, “In the face of mounting Chinese psychological pressure on asymmetries, combined with coercive diplomacy and deployment of lethal equipment, the Indian announcement of ‘disengagement’ at Doklam comes as no surprise.”

There had been reports – backed by video and photographic evidence –of China moving trainloads of advanced HQ-16 and HQ-17 missiles and other military equipment to Tibet. China was reinforcing its layered air defense systems to counter Indian air power, hinting at serious preparations for a military offensive.

Equally, two other critical factors would have influenced Indian thinking. One, India’s economic growth slowed to around 5.7% between April and June, the slowest quarterly rate in the three years of the present government. A war with China would cripple the economy. Secondly, no country voiced support for India, let alone criticized China. The North Korean issue preoccupied both Washington and Tokyo.

Chinese and Indian patrols at the Doklam Plateau. Photo: AFP
In retrospect, China showed that on issues of territorial sovereignty, there is no question of a compromise. But something may also have changed fundamentally in its attitude toward India. Harsh things have been said, betraying displeasure and anger, and a breakdown in trust and confidence.

A bumpy road lies ahead. Simply put, India is unable to come to terms with China’s rise, and the latter senses that it must now be on guard. Conceivably, Chinese diplomacy in the South Asian region may shift to adversarial mode. With tacit Chinese support, countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka or the Maldives may be in a better position to withstand India’s overbearing presence.

India’s future relations with Bhutan, the friend on whose behalf it stuck out its neck but which kept a Delphian silence, are almost certain to become more delicate. Prof. Taylor Fravel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who is regarded as an authority on China’s borders, wrote last week that China might well revisit its road-building plans in the disputed territory with Bhutan. To quote Fravel,

“Before the standoff in June, China’s permanent presence in the area had been quite limited. China had maintained a road in the area for several decades, but did not garrison any forces. In contrast, India has maintained and developed a forward post at Doka La adjacent to Doklam… China may well seek to rectify this tactical imbalance of forces. In fact, the Chinese spokesperson suggested a move in this direction… If China does this, it would likely build facilities farther away from India’s position at Doka La, making it more challenging for India to intervene and block China next time… India may be faced with the uncomfortable choice of deciding whether to risk much more to deny China a greater presence farther inside Doklam or to accept it.”

The real lesson, therefore, that India should learn from the Doklam standoff is that it shouldn’t draw wrong conclusions. The BRICS Summit in Xiamen is not to be mistaken as a “kiss-and-make-up” moment.

Deep down, India has a choice to make and China is watching closely. Should the Modi government go further down the road of trespassing into China’s core interests in the South China Sea, raking up Tibet-related issues and identifying with the United States’ containment strategy against China?

Such a journey risks military confrontation with China. How far is India prepared to take that risk? The Modi government’s accent could have been on diplomacy in the crucial three-week period after the Chinese notified New Delhi, in late May, of their intention to commence road-building work at Doklam. But instead of activating its diplomatic levers, India resorted to force, confident in the knowledge that in that particular sector of the border it is strongly placed.

The dismal picture that has emerged over the past week is of the Indian officials responsible for that fateful decision counting trees and trying to convince domestic opinion that India “won” and China “lost”. The great danger is that their core constituency of ultra-nationalists will – to take the sports analogy further – now expect them to raise the bar.

http://www.atimes.com/indian-posturing-post-doklam-tragi-comic-feel/

 

[Joe Shearer]

For indian "professional" this should be good education.


Indian posturing, post-Doklam, has a tragi-comic feel
By M.K. Bhadrakumar September 6, 2017 10:41 AM

Why the standoff between India and China, near the Sikkim border, began at all, and how it ended, after 71 long and anxious days, on August 28, will likely never be fully known. The Indian foreign ministry maintains cryptically that “following diplomatic communications, expeditious disengagement of border personnel of India and China at the face-off site at Doklam,” took place last week.

New Delhi falls far short of making any claims about an agreement or understanding with Beijing regarding mutual withdrawal – leave alone about China stopping its road-building activities, which led to the standoff in the first instance.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has been more forthcoming. It put on record that:As a result of diplomatic representations and “effective countermeasures” at the military level, the Indian side “withdrew” all its personnel and equipment.


• As a result of diplomatic representations and “effective countermeasures” at the military level, the Indian side “withdrew” all its personnel and equipment.

• The Chinese personnel “onsite have verified” the fact of Indian withdrawal.

• The Chinese troops “continue with their patrolling and stationing” in the Doklam area.

• China will “adjust and deploy its military resources” in the area to meet the needs of guarding the border.

• China has long been undertaking road-building in the area and will in future “make proper building plans in light of the actual situation,” taking into account weather conditions.

New Delhi hasn’t disagreed with China’s contentions. Instead, a series of unattributed, self-serving media leaks have appeared, portraying Indian officials as strong-willed men who stared the Chinese down. This is rather tragi-comic, given the geopolitical reality that the standoff is sure to be a watershed event in India-China relations and regional politics. The Chinese Defense Ministry warned New Delhi to learn its “lesson” from the standoff.

On balance, it appears that India won’t admit its unilateral withdrawal from Doklam, while the Chinese side is disinterested in triumphalism.

Clearly, with the brief summer season about to end in the region’s tangled mountains, India has managed to stall any road-building activity by China during this calendar year.

But the nagging question remains: What prompted India to unilaterally withdraw? To quote a prominent China expert in New Delhi, “In the face of mounting Chinese psychological pressure on asymmetries, combined with coercive diplomacy and deployment of lethal equipment, the Indian announcement of ‘disengagement’ at Doklam comes as no surprise.”

There had been reports – backed by video and photographic evidence –of China moving trainloads of advanced HQ-16 and HQ-17 missiles and other military equipment to Tibet. China was reinforcing its layered air defense systems to counter Indian air power, hinting at serious preparations for a military offensive.

Equally, two other critical factors would have influenced Indian thinking. One, India’s economic growth slowed to around 5.7% between April and June, the slowest quarterly rate in the three years of the present government. A war with China would cripple the economy. Secondly, no country voiced support for India, let alone criticized China. The North Korean issue preoccupied both Washington and Tokyo.

Chinese and Indian patrols at the Doklam Plateau. Photo: AFP
In retrospect, China showed that on issues of territorial sovereignty, there is no question of a compromise. But something may also have changed fundamentally in its attitude toward India. Harsh things have been said, betraying displeasure and anger, and a breakdown in trust and confidence.

A bumpy road lies ahead. Simply put, India is unable to come to terms with China’s rise, and the latter senses that it must now be on guard. Conceivably, Chinese diplomacy in the South Asian region may shift to adversarial mode. With tacit Chinese support, countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka or the Maldives may be in a better position to withstand India’s overbearing presence.

India’s future relations with Bhutan, the friend on whose behalf it stuck out its neck but which kept a Delphian silence, are almost certain to become more delicate. Prof. Taylor Fravel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who is regarded as an authority on China’s borders, wrote last week that China might well revisit its road-building plans in the disputed territory with Bhutan. To quote Fravel,

“Before the standoff in June, China’s permanent presence in the area had been quite limited. China had maintained a road in the area for several decades, but did not garrison any forces. In contrast, India has maintained and developed a forward post at Doka La adjacent to Doklam… China may well seek to rectify this tactical imbalance of forces. In fact, the Chinese spokesperson suggested a move in this direction… If China does this, it would likely build facilities farther away from India’s position at Doka La, making it more challenging for India to intervene and block China next time… India may be faced with the uncomfortable choice of deciding whether to risk much more to deny China a greater presence farther inside Doklam or to accept it.”

The real lesson, therefore, that India should learn from the Doklam standoff is that it shouldn’t draw wrong conclusions. The BRICS Summit in Xiamen is not to be mistaken as a “kiss-and-make-up” moment.

Deep down, India has a choice to make and China is watching closely. Should the Modi government go further down the road of trespassing into China’s core interests in the South China Sea, raking up Tibet-related issues and identifying with the United States’ containment strategy against China?

Such a journey risks military confrontation with China. How far is India prepared to take that risk? The Modi government’s accent could have been on diplomacy in the crucial three-week period after the Chinese notified New Delhi, in late May, of their intention to commence road-building work at Doklam. But instead of activating its diplomatic levers, India resorted to force, confident in the knowledge that in that particular sector of the border it is strongly placed.

The dismal picture that has emerged over the past week is of the Indian officials responsible for that fateful decision counting trees and trying to convince domestic opinion that India “won” and China “lost”. The great danger is that their core constituency of ultra-nationalists will – to take the sports analogy further – now expect them to raise the bar.

http://www.atimes.com/indian-posturing-post-doklam-tragi-comic-feel/

How many times must we read this?

The man never made it in his own service. He settled down to writing articles explaining exactly what should have been done, what could have been done, what might have been done - only he didn't explain why, given his opportunities as a senior diplomat, even though a senior diplomat struggling to keep up with his peers, he had nothing of what he now pronounces in rounded accents as the perfect prescription for India. And everyone who wants to take a pot-shot at India, but has neither the wit nor the learning nor the experience of worldly affairs to do so picks up these posts and crows over them.

The moral of the story?

Even a third-rate failed Indian diplomat is like a god to these losers. His merest word is scripture, so his merest word automatically takes the place of the rubbish that they themselves are able to generate. So the Chinese cite him, and now the Bangladeshis do. The envious sage leading the empty-headed congregation.

 

[raj76]

wow he is in so much pain that he sits on internet all day to find some 3rd rate articles prints them and rub them on the spot which is still burning

 

[SingaporeGuy]

Well india got what they wanted in BRICS declaration.

Time for china to ask for more land from india

 

[Hakikat ve Hikmet]

Ahh Pentagon boys Ahh !!! Always teaming up with "fake" folks in the fight against China!!! First, South Koreans, then South Vietnameese and now Indians!!!! Who's next???? Bhutan!!!

 

[Tangent123]

The desperation shown by @Feng Leng @SingaporeGuy and few other China HMV to project China as gainer is a good measure to judge their depression and humiliation. China tried this in 1979 with Vietnam when China lost, executed a retreat with it tail between it's legs and started barking when in security of it's land.
Typical Winner knows that he won and is composed, and the looser tries hard to 'prove' the lost point.
Whenever I see their post , I see a highly depressed and humiliated tribe with MEGATONS & MEGATONS of their humiliations pouring with every post.
I think they too feel this whenever they see the mirror and the Chinese flag , and try with more vigor to scrub off the humiliation by scavenging news acticles worldover.
I'm pleased how India reacts in 1962 , in 1987 and now in 2017. The mature country.

 

[sinait]

The desperation shown by @Feng Leng @SingaporeGuy and few other China HMV to project China as gainer is a good measure to judge their depression and humiliation. China tried this in 1979 with Vietnam when China lost, executed a retreat with it tail between it's legs and started barking when in security of it's land.
Typical Winner knows that he won and is composed, and the looser tries hard to 'prove' the lost point.
Whenever I see their post , I see a highly depressed and humiliated tribe with MEGATONS & MEGATONS of their humiliations pouring with every post.
I think they too feel this whenever they see the mirror and the Chinese flag , and try with more vigor to scrub off the humiliation by scavenging news acticles worldover.
I'm pleased how India reacts in 1962 , in 1987 and now in 2017. The mature country.

China "lost" border war with Vietnam 1979 according to YOU.
Vietnam went on to cede An Nam Gate and part of Ban Gioc Waterfall to China after "WINNING".
So what land India is going to cede to China now that India has "WON".
http://maoist.wikia.com/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_War
http://maoist.wikia.com/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_War
In 1999, after many years of negotiations, China and Vietnam signed a border pact, though the line of demarcation remained secret[6]. There was a very slight adjustment of the land border at this time, resulting in land being ceded to China.
.

 

[Rajeev_Anand]

Doklam has given a very high voltage shock to China.

 

[sinait]

Doklam has given a very high voltage shock to China.

China indeed is shocked that lowly and backward India with shortage of ammunition and currently suffering from many internal strive dared to challenge China.
Its like India is trying to commit suicide.
.

 

[rajiv sharma]

Ahh Pentagon boys Ahh !!! Always teaming up with "fake" folks in the fight against China!!! First, South Koreans, then South Vietnameese and now Indians!!!! Who's next???? Bhutan!!!

hello mr senior member , what do you mean by fake folks . kindly elaborate and enlighten me . thanks in advance .

 

[faithfulguy]

China indeed is shocked that lowly and backward India with shortage of ammunition and currently suffering from many internal strive dared to challenge China.
Its like India is trying to commit suicide.
.

There is not a clear winner or loser when it's a compromise. But when it comes to bragging, India will always win. This stand off gave a lots of room to bragging or interpretations, which India excels at. So this is indeed an India media victory.