Do Russian Tanks Suck?

[vostok]

I want to ask you something.

You do know you cannot turn an immediately capture citizens into German soldier overnight, right?

Most German soldier are conscripted and trained and formed in Germany, Not in occupied France, not in Occupied Denmark, not in Occupied Norway or any other Occupied territories. In a war and campaign like this, you cannot say "Okay, we are going to invade Russia tomorrow, let's conscript some soldier from the Occupied Country today"

What only counted is what you can support with, that's the first principle in warfare, and back then Germany is an away force attacking, that means they need to support their troop away from home. So their "Available Force", the only one that counted, but not the 220 millions occupied soldier or whatever you say, is significantly smaller than what the Russian can afford to muster.

So, yes, Russian uses Human Tactics to feed he germans attacks, and you are frankly just wrong. And I found your logic "Because they have a bigger country than us at that time they will almost always come with a bigger force" funny.

And I'm not saying that people in all German-occupied territories became soldiers. The Germans took only volunteers and only the best (at the start of war). I said that at the industry of Reich worked far more people than at Soviet's one. Therefore they could choose the best soldiers for their army and spend more time and money to train them. At that time , the USSR was torn between the need to ensure the front with soldiers and the need to ensure the plants with workers.
Because of this, the Germans were better trained at the begining of war and Russia could change this situation only in 1943 .
We must not forget that nearly 300 million Europeans almost without a fight surrendered to Hitler and voluntarily worked for Reich . And those few countries that have declared neutrality led to Hitlers very attractive and lively trade , that much help Germans.

 

[Mighty Caty]

And I'm not saying that people in all German-occupied territories became soldiers. The Germans took only volunteers and only the best (at the start of war). I said that at the industry of Reich worked far more people than at Soviet's one. Therefore they could choose the best soldiers for their army and spend more time and money to train them. At that time , the USSR was torn between the need to ensure the front with soldiers and the need to ensure the plants with workers.
Because of this, the Germans were better trained at the begining of war and Russia could change this situation only in 1943 .
We must not forget that nearly 300 million Europeans almost without a fight surrendered to Hitler and voluntarily worked for Reich . And those few countries that have declared neutrality led to Hitlers very attractive and lively trade , that much help Germans.

The problem is, Germany do not have years to "Select" volunteer as you said, and most under German rules does not fight for Germany anyway. French, Netherland, Norway, Denmark for example have started their resistance almost immediately after their occupation in 1940s.

Germany invaded into Russia in 1940, 1 year after they have invaded Poland and started WW2. That time Germany could not have mustered enough so called "Volunteer" even if they are willing even eager for enlistment. Do bear in mind, Finland were fighting Russia at that time, most Scandinavian would choose to help Finland instead of Germany at a different front against Russia and Spain are under civil war at that time, that was the only reason why Spain did not align themselves with the German to begin with. So, with that little to choose from and with that little time, your "Volunteer" theory did not fly over water.

And you seems to underestimated how Western Europe put up a fight with the Nazi and by saying and i quote

300 million Europeans almost without a fight surrendered to Hitler and voluntarily worked for Reich

You show that you have a serious lack of understanding on how and what is the situation in Western Europe during 1939-1945
I am not going to go over this as it will take at least 4 years to get you to speed about what the west has been doing, all I can say is, we western European did not "Almost surrender without a fight" and we did not voluntarily work for Reich, even Sweden, my mother country did not collaborate that much as you said, I don't know if that's your propaganda in Russia or is that is you trying to make a point out of thin air...

 

[vostok]

There was no normal resistance and sabotage in Europe. Many Weterners shared Hitler's views and a had positive attitude to the " crusade against Bolshevism ." For example, the Czech "Skoda" factory - one of the best military plants of Europe worked for Reich until the last day of war. Worked plants of Holland, Denmark and France, Czech Republic, Austria and other countries. Very highly developed countries. At the time in the USSR industry was just beginning to catch up with Europe.
Germans selected best soldiers to elite troops SS. Selected the best - the most strong and tall . While the Germans and the best volunteers fought 300 million Europeans worked for them . Sewed clothes for them , made tanks and guns, made movies and stage plays at the theaters. We should not overestimate the resistance .
Real resistance was present only on Soviet territories - the partizans .

 

[500]

It was the Soviet Union accounting for 75% loss of the Germans in the war.
Here is a map of Europe in 1942. I say that behind the front line in 1942, Germany had 220 million people. And the Soviet Union - 70 million.

First of all Soviets remained with 125 mln in 1942 not 70 mln. Also many of occupied 70 mln were drafted by Soviets before the German occupation and then were drafted after the occupation. During the occupation they were more a burden than contribution.

As for the Europe we should divide it in several parts:

1) Germany-Austria-Sudets - 80 mln. They are most active German fighting force who fought from the beginning to the end with high quality and motivation. They also made the overwhelming majority of German's military production.
2) German allies: Romania-Hungary-Finland (18+9+3.5) = 35 mln. They sent troops to East front, but except 3.5 mln Finns they had very poor quality and motivation. In 1944 all these guys except Hungary switched sides. Virtually no military production.
3) Italy - 42.5 mln. They sent one army to East front which fought in 1942-1943 with very small contribution. Mostly they fought against Allies. In terms of industries Italy production was directed almost solely against the West front.
4) France and Czechoslovakia (42+15) = 57 mln. Czech were captured without resistance, France resisted occupation but later did not make much problems. They did not send troops to Germans, but had relatively developed industries. However French Industries were used mainly to build subs against allies. Czech tanks were used in East front later they build fighters to repel the allied bombings.
6) Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Bulgaria (8+8+3+4+6) = 29 mln. Nether a burden nor contribution.
5) Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Poland (14+1+32+6.2) = 53 mln. They resisted Germany and were considerable burden.

Conclusion:

In terms of military man power its 63.5 mln high quality and motivation ( 75% Germans + Finns) + 27 mln poor quality and motivation (Romania-Hungary) lets add 5 mln for Italian participation = 95 mln. vs Soviet 195 mln. In 1944 situation became much worse for Germans.

In terms of industries except 80 mln Germany and some Czechoslovakia there was very little contribution to East Front. More over even huge portions of German industries were diverted to West, while Soviets were receiving massive aid. I would estimate it as 60 mln (-25%) vs 230 mln (+15%). German industries were much more developed though per capita.

 

[vostok]

First of all Soviets remained with 125 mln in 1942 not 70 mln. Also many of occupied 70 mln were drafted by Soviets before the German occupation and then were drafted after the occupation. During the occupation they were more a burden than contribution.

As for the Europe we should divide it in several parts:

1) Germany-Austria-Sudets - 80 mln. They are most active German fighting force who fought from the beginning to the end with high quality and motivation. They also made the overwhelming majority of German's military production.
2) German allies: Romania-Hungary-Finland (18+9+3.5) = 35 mln. They sent troops to East front, but except 3.5 mln Finns they had very poor quality and motivation. In 1944 all these guys except Hungary switched sides. Virtually no military production.
3) Italy - 42.5 mln. They sent one army to East front which fought in 1942-1943 with very small contribution. Mostly they fought against Allies. In terms of industries Italy production was directed almost solely against the West front.
4) France and Czechoslovakia (42+15) = 57 mln. Czech were captured without resistance, France resisted occupation but later did not make much problems. They did not send troops to Germans, but had relatively developed industries. However French Industries were used mainly to build subs against allies. Czech tanks were used in East front later they build fighters to repel the allied bombings.
6) Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Bulgaria (8+8+3+4+6) = 29 mln. Nether a burden nor contribution.
5) Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Poland (14+1+32+6.2) = 53 mln. They resisted Germany and were considerable burden.

Conclusion:

In terms of military man power its 63.5 mln high quality and motivation ( 75% Germans + Finns) + 27 mln poor quality and motivation (Romania-Hungary) lets add 5 mln for Italian participation = 95 mln. vs Soviet 195 mln. In 1944 situation became much worse for Germans.

In terms of industries except 80 mln Germany and some Czechoslovakia there was very little contribution to East Front. More over even huge portions of German industries were diverted to West, while Soviets were receiving massive aid. I would estimate it as 60 mln (-25%) vs 230 mln (+15%). German industries were much more developed though per capita.

By June 22, 1941, Germany is actually united under its auspices the entire continent exercising their dominance through various means - from establishing a direct occupation of government (most of France, Belgium, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia) to formally equal partnership countries allies (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland, Denmark, Spain, Slovakia, Croatia, Norway, Bulgaria). In addition, closely associated with Germany were the so-called neutral countries - Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal.
In June 22, 1941 under the banner of the Third Reich to the Soviet Union invaded military and economic power virtually all of continental Europe. By the time Germany controlled or patronized area of 3 million square meters. km, with a population of about 290 million people. Even so-called "neutral" Sweden and Switzerland have made a considerable contribution to the growth of the military might of Nazi Germany.
"Skoda" - the second largest arsenal of Central Europe, which in the period from August 1938 to September 1939 released almost as many products as released all the English factories at the same time. "(Cherchill)
In Poland on Germany worked 264 large, 9 thousand medium and 76 thousand small enterprises.
Denmark covers the needs of the German civilian population in oil by 10 percent in meat - 20, in fresh fish - 90 percent. And, of course, the Danish industry compliance with all German orders.
France (41 million people), headed by a collaborationist government Laval and French entrepreneurs willingly collaborated with the Germans, were their main supplier. By the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union in the French "defense", who worked for the Wehrmacht, was employed 1.6 million people. According to incomplete German data up to January 1944 they put Germany about 4,000 aircraft, about 10 thousand aircraft engines, 52 thousand trucks. All locomotive industry and 95 percent of the machine tool worked only for Germany.
Belgium and the Netherlands supplied the Germans coal, pig iron, iron, manganese, zinc, etc.
Moreover, these countries have helped Germany and that took over the costs of the German occupation forces. France, for example, in the summer of 1940 allocated daily for 20 million German marks, and since the fall of 1942 - 25 million This was sufficient not only to have to provide all the necessary German troops, but also for the preparation and conduct of the war against USSR. Total European countries "presented" in Germany for this purpose more than 80 billion marks (including France - 35 billion).
And what about the neutral countries - Sweden and Switzerland ? They worked on Germany too. Swedes supplied bearings , iron ore, steel , rare earth elements . They actually harbored German defense industry until the end of 1944. Rapid German offensive on Leningrad was due , in particular, in order to " lock up " Red navy and secure supply of Swedish steel and ore. Through Swedish "neutral" ports for Germany were significant shipments from Latin America. Our military intelligence reported , for example, that from January to October 1942 in Germany through the Swedish ports imported more than 6 million tons of various cargoes , mainly strategic raw materials.
By 1941, Hitler was able to put itself at the service of the military industry , armament and mobilization reserves of most European countries . This enabled him to create the most powerful in the history of mankind 's war machine .
Maj. Gen. V. Gurkin , committee member of the USSR Ministry of Defense on losses in World War II in the article "On the casualties on the Soviet- German front in 1941-1945 . " Believes that the deadweight loss of life of Nazi Germany on the Soviet- German front , including Austrian, Luxembourg , Alsace , Lorraine , the Sudeten Germans and voluntary formation of other states amounted to 6,923,700 people. (" New Age », № 3 , 1992).
Consequently , the ratio of casualties on the Soviet- German front is no more than 1:1.3 in favor of Germany . This confirms the loss ratio and analysis of human balance Wehrmacht and the Red Army at the end of the war .

 

[500]

By the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union in the French "defense", who worked for the Wehrmacht, was employed 1.6 million people. According to incomplete German data up to January 1944 they put Germany about 4,000 aircraft, about 10 thousand aircraft engines, 52 thousand trucks

4 K aircraft produced in France? Meanwhile some 50 K German aircraft were destroyed on West Front and 22 K supplied to USSR through Lend Lease.

And it was the largest and most developed country captured by Germany.

 

[vostok]

4 K aircraft produced in France? Meanwhile some 50 K German aircraft were destroyed on West Front and 22 K supplied to USSR through Lend Lease.

And it was the largest and most developed country captured by Germany.

Of course , the Germans tried to focus on the final assembly in the Reich . Occupied countries were used mainly as sources of raw materials and semi-finished products .
Not Germany fought against the Soviet Union . The whole Europe did. Just as in 1812 the whole of Europe invaded under the flags of Napoleon.
Even the Pope declared a crusade against the Soviet Union and issued an encyclical against communism. And after the War Europeans began to tell that they participated in the Resistance millions of people and made a lot of films about heroic underground activity. In fact, they voluntarily participated in the war against the Soviet Union on the side of the Reich. However, they, like Hitler, considered the Soviet Union sitizens as savage barbarians, whom you can kill, burn, explode and generally do anything you want.

 

[flamer84]

Yes. You're right, really - 70 million left in the occupied territory, and not controlled by the USSR. 10 million were evacuated. However, I am confused and German figures. The territory controlled by Reich in 1941 lived 290 million. Plus 65-70 million in occupied Soviet territories. So - 350 millions. And in USSR remained 125 millions.
Soviet military casualties - 10 million. German military losses (including Germans who were citizens of other countries before 1935) - 6,923,700.
If we add Hungarians, Romanians and others - the ratio is 1:1.1

This would work if German allies would have had the same quality.

Romanians at Stalingrad stood against Soviet tanks,Katyusha artillery with WW1 guns,basically no AT weapons.Romanian soldiers charged tanks with hammers and Molotovs for God's sake !

The Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies at Stalingrad.-this should settle what the Romanians had to face at Stalingrad,tell me what army in the world could have prevailed with those means at their disposal ?

In September 1942, the 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies started to take up their positions around Stalingrad. After the fall of the city, they were going form the “Marshal Antonescu” ArmyGroup together with the German 6th Army. In the same time arrived also the first elements of the Romanian Air Corps. These were engaged immediately: on 16 September the 7th Fighter Group, on 25 September the 5th Bomber Group and, on 4 October, the 1st Bomber, 8th Fighter, 6th Fighter-Bomber and 3rd Bomber Group arrived. Its mission was to provide air support for the 3rd Romanian and 6th German Armies.

The 3rd Army, commanded by gen. Petre Dumitrescu, was transferred from the Caucasus and replaced 5 Italian and 2 German divisions, between Blij Perekopa and Bokovskaya. The command point was placed at Cernashevskaya. It had to defend a front 138 km long, between Lugovsky and Sukhoy Donetsk, way beyond its possibilities. A division had to defend a front of an average length of 17-22 km. To make things worse, the Soviets had two bridgeheads over the Don at Serafimovich and Kletskaya. Gen. Dumitrescu requested several times to be allowed to eliminate these bridgeheads, but the German command disapproved.

The 3rd Army was made up from the 4th Corps (1st Cavalry and 13th Infantry Divisions), the 5th Corps (5th and 6th Infantry Divisions), the 2nd Corps (9th and 14th Infantry Divisions) and the 1st Corps (7th and 11th Infantry Divisions), in a single echelon, from west to east. It had in reserve the 7th Cavalry and 15th Infantry Division. The 2nd Long Range Recon (Do-17M) and 112th Liaison Squadrons (Fleet 10G) were assigned to the 3rd Army. In November came the German 48th Corps (22nd German Panzer Division and 1st Romanian Armored Division) and was also put in reserve. It also had the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 8th Motorized Heavy Artillery Regiments and the 41st Independent Motorized heavy Artillery Battalion. There were only 48 heavy AT guns, efficient against the T-34 and KV Soviet tanks, thus resulting a density of one gun at every 2.875 km. On 19 November 1942, when the Soviet offensive commenced, the 3rd Army had 152,492 Romanian troops and 11,211 German troops.

The 4th Army, commanded by gen. Constantin Constantinescu, occupied a line south of the city, between Straya Otrada and Sarpa. It was composed of the 6th Corps (1st, 2nd, 4th, 18th and 20th Infantry Divisions) and the 7th Corps (5th and 8th Cavalry Divisions). At its disposal were the 15th, 16th, 17th Observation (IAR 39) and 114th Liaison Squadrons (Fleet 10G). It also had air support from the Fliegerkorps VIII. The command point was installed at Kotelnikovsky. The front of the 4th Army was 270 km long… on map. In practice it was about 300 km long because of the terrain. Thus the 8th Cavalry Division covered a line of 100 km. The 5th Cavalry, the 1st, 4th and 18th Infantry Divisions covered fronts between 27 and 41 km, the 2nd and 20th Infantry Divisions covered 18 km, respectively 20 km. The strength of the Romanian divisions was also a problem: the 18th Infantry Division had the best situation, having 73% of the necessary manpower. The 5th and 8th Cavalry Divisions had 57% and 64% respectively. The rest were under 50%, with the 1st Infantry Division going as low as 25%. The reserves were the 27th Pioneer Battalion and the 6th Rosiori Regiment for the 6th Corps and the 57th Pioneer Battalion and 57th Recon Group for the 7th. Corps. The 4th Panzer Army had in the area the 29th Motorized Infantry Division, which could also intervene. The number of heavy AT guns was also very low, about one at 5.7 km. The 4th Army 75,580 men at the beginning of the Soviet offensive.

Between these two armies it was the 6th Army, commanded by Friedrich Paulus. The German 6th and 4th Army, the Romanian 3rd and 4th Army, the Italian 8th Army and the Hungarian 2nd Army made up Army Group B.

Opposing the 3rd Army was the South-Western Soviet Front (1st Guard Army, 5th Tank Army and 21st Army), which had 5,888 artillery pieces, 728 tanks and 790 airplanes. In front of the 4th Army was the Stalingrad Front (51st, 62nd, 63rd and 57th Army), that possessed 4,931 artillery pieces and 455 tanks.

On 19 November at 0530 in the sector of the 3rd Army a violent artillery preparation battered the entire front-line. The weather conditions were harsh: blizzard, snowing, -20 degrees Celsius. This made close air support impossible. The Soviets assaulted the positions of the 14th Infantry Division with the 5th Tank Army and the junction between the 13th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division with the 21st Army. In total 338,631 men against 3 weak divisions. The 37 mm and 47 mm AT guns were useless against heavy and medium Soviet tanks. So the Romanian troops had to use grenades, anti-tank mines and Molotov cocktails. In the first hours they managed to delay the advance and destroy some armor (25 tanks in the sector of the 13th Division), but later they had to retreat or be encircled. The Red Army also attacked west of Sarisa Valley (the 5th Infantry Division) and at Raspopinskaya (6th Infantry Division) but was repulsed. At Raspopinskaya the Romanian pioneers managed to destroy the tanks that entered the village with explosive charges. In response to the situation developed south of Kletskaya, the 48th Armored Corps was ordered to move towards the Soviet main thrust. Shortly afterwards, the 22nd Panzer Division was redirected to northwest, towards Bolsoy. Reaching Petshany, the German division engaged Soviet armor. By evening, the 1st Romanian Armored Division reached Sirkovsky, making preparations to attack towards Bolsoy the next day.

In the first day of the offensive, the enemy succeeded in making two breaches in the defence disposition of the 3rd Romanian Army: one in the center, 16-18 km wide and 15 km deep and one on the right wing, between the 3rd Romanian Army and the 6th German Army, 10-12 km wide and 35-40 km deep.

On 20 November, the Soviet armored and motorized forces advanced towards Kalach, with the intention of encircling the 6th German Army fighting at Stalingrad. The 22nd Panzer Division, overwhelmed at Petshany by the large number of Soviet tanks, withdrew north of Bol. Donschynka. The 1st Romanian Armored Division, without any available radio contact (the radio station had been destroyed by the enemy during night), tried to advance to Petshany in order to make the junction with the 22nd Panzer Division, but was forced to stop a few kilometres west of Korotovsky by stiff Soviet resistance and numerous counterattacks. The Soviet tanks, flowing between the German 22nd and the Romanian 1st Armored Divisions, occupied the Varlamovsky and Perelasovsky villages and made the junction with forces come from Gromky, thus encircling the 5th Corps. In the 4th Corps’ sector, 40 Soviet tanks attacked the 15th Infantry Division at 1500 hours and a fierce fight occurred. The Romanian unit suffered heavy losses, but resisted and by evening the Soviet forces withdrew. The 7th Cavalry Division of the 2nd Corps unsuccessfully tried to block the enemy’s advance, the right wing of the division, which had fully received the blow, was retreating south while the left wing was reassigned to the 9th Infantry Division. Also, the 1st Cavalry Division had to retreat towards Stalingrad and was subordinated to the 6th Army.

At the end of the day, the defence disposition of the 3rd Romanian Army had a 70 km wide gap in the centre. In this pocket were encircled the 1st Armored Division, three infantry divisions (5, 6 and 15) and remains of other two infantry divisions (13 and 14). The troops of the infantry divisions made up the “Gen. Lascar” Group (about 40,000 men), commanded by maj. gen. Mihail Lascar, former commander of the 6th Infantry Division. The command point of the 3rd Army began moving to Morozovskaya.

On 21 November, the 22nd Panzer Division tried to advance towards Perelasovsky in order to make the junction with the 1stArmored Division and to relieve the “Gen. Lascar” Group, but failed and was stopped on 22 November between Bol. Donschynka and Perelasovsky. There it waited for the Romanian tanks to join it. The 1st Romanian Armored Division was advancing slowly towards Bol. Donschynka, where it was hoping to find the German division, but the village was under Soviet control. Lacking fuel, ammunition and food, it was saved by the 105th Transport Squadron which flew in the badly needed supplies on an improvised airfield. The Romanian unit then headed south and after grim fighting against a Soviet cavalry division backed by tanks between the Sarisa and Surkan valleys, it crossed the river Chir on 25.

On 22 November, the encircled “Gen. Lascar” Group, which had been ordered to resist at any cost, was attacked and transmitted its last message. They had run out of food and each gun had only 40 rounds left. The 105th Transport Squadron (Ju-52) brought them some supplies. After refusing the Soviet proposal to surrender his troops, maj. gen. Lascar decided to try to break from the encirclement during the night. The 15th Infantry Division was supposed to try to brake through to the southwest to friendly lines, towards Bol. Dosnchynka. In the same time the 6th Infantry Division was supposed to retreat towards Petshany The column that began to form east of Golovsky grew 30 km long, totalling about 15,000 men. During the column build up, the enemy launched an attack from the west and took Golovsky. In the fights for the village, the general was taken prisoner. Commanded by maj. gen. Sion, the column managed to brake through during the night, but in the morning was surprised by Soviet tanks and cut in half. The few troops that reached Bol. Donschynka linked with the 22nd Panzer Division and, subordinating to this unit, were ordered to defend Chernashevskaya. On 24 November, 0500 hours, Soviet tanks stormed their positions. The Romanian units, lacking artillery and anti-tank weapons and without the help of the German tanks that had been withdrawn during the night, suffered heavy losses, including maj. gen. Sion. The detachment’s remains withdrew to the 22nd Panzer Division and together crossed the river Chir. Another column of the “Gen. Lascar” Group that escaped from the encirclement was overrun by tanks in the evening of 23 and was entirely destroyed. A small part of the vanguard managed to reach the Romanian lines on 27 November, in Bokovskaya area. The 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment (6th Infantry Division) had succeeded in getting to the river Chir with all its soldiers and equipment. The CO of this unit was maj. Gheorghe Rasconescu. His battalion had managed to prevent the Soviet 8th Cavalry Division from capturing the vital German airfield at Oblivkavia from 26 November to 3 December. This action earned him a Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class and a Ritterkreuz. Maj. gen. Lascar also received some prestigious awards: a Mihai ViteazulOrder 2nd class and Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz.

On 23 November, the Soviet troops of the South-Western Front and of the Stalingrad Front met at Kalach, completing the encirclement of the German 6th Army, parts of the 4th Army and 6 other Romanian infantry divisions and one cavalry division.

The high command lost contact with many of the units and needed to know the situation of the front. The 7th Fighter Group carried out several recon flights on 20, despite the very difficult weather conditions and low clouds. Slt. av. (r) Dicezare flew one of these missions on 21, but as he approached a Soviet column he was hit in the fuel tank by a bullet and had to return to the Karpovka airfield with gas in his cockpit. Serbanescu then took off on the same mission and on his way back discovered that the Soviet tanks were only a few kilometres to the south of the airfield. Since slt. av. (r) Dicezare's airplane was ready (the hole in the fuel tank had been covered by a wooden cork), he was ordered to go to the Romanian Air Corps command and report the situation. He managed to get to Morozovskaya and get gen. Ermil Gheorghiu on the phone. Two JRS-79Bs were then sent to the surrounded airbase and get as many personnel out of there as possible. In the meantime, lt. av. Alexandru Serbanescu, who had a lot of infantry experience (he came in the air force from the elite mountain troops), organized the defence of the airfield. He used the two AAA batteries (one 37 mm and one 75 mm battery) and the guns on the airplanes, which were raised on barrels, to repulse the initial Soviet assault. The heavy fire unleashed on the attackers probably made them believe that they were facing an entrenched infantry formation, instead of a fighter group. However, things could not remain this way and, early on 23 November, all available airplanes took off under the artillery barrage of Soviet tanks. Five aircraft were damaged or destroyed during the attempt, but eight managed to reach Tachinskaya. They also took one or even two (in the case of adj. av. (r) Tiberiu Vinca) mechanics in their Bf-109Es. Another seven unserviceable aircraft were left behind. Later several Ju-52s returned to evacuate some of the personnel. The rest retreated to the Pitovnik airfield, inside the Stalingrad bulge. Some managed to escape on foot from the encirclement.

Because the Soviets were busy consolidating their positions, the front line stabilized. The 3rd Army, with the units that had escaped (7th, 9th, 11th Infantry, 7th Cavalry and 1st Armored Divisions, in total 83,000 men), was subordinated to Army Group "Hollidt" and occupied a line along the river Chir. The 4th Army was situated in the Kral Bayka, Baldihka and Kralov area.

Returning to 20 November, the 4th Army was attacked by the Soviet 57th and 51st Army. The principal shock was received by the 6th Corps in the sector of the 20th, 2nd, 18th and 1st Infantry Divisions. The 57th Army attacked towards Sovetsky (to the north-west) and the 51st Army towards Kotelnikovsky (to the south). The line was broken at the junction of the 2nd and 20th Infantry Divisions and at the junction of the 1st and 18th Infantry Divisions. The Soviets advanced fast, into the breaches created by the first wave, pushing the 13th Tank Corps of the 57th Soviet Army towards Saty, the 4th Mechanised Corps of the 51st Soviet Army towards Plodovitoye and later, the 4th Cavalry Corps towards Abganerovo. The attempt to stop the Red Army troops by using the reserves, and later, by falling back on successive alignments, was unsuccessful. By evening, the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions were virtually destroyed and the 18th Infantry Division was in the danger of encirclement. Likewise, the link with the 20th Infantry Division was interrupted. Despite the stubborn resistance put up by the 91st Infantry Regiment and the 20th Pioneer Battalion, the Soviets broke through towards Tundutovo and Ivanovka, getting behind the division’s position. Within an hour, most of the Romanian soldiers were either dead or captured. About 30-40 men got away. The tanks reached the positions of the 40th Artillery Regiment and destroyed the 2nd Artillery Battalion. At around 1000 hours, the Soviets attacked in the center and on the left wing of the 20th Division. Out of the 1st Battalion from the 83rd Regiment, only 32 men escaped. Maj. gen. Tataranu, the CO, managed to form a line with his reserves as he pulled back. The next day the division counterattacked, together with some German units. Afterwards the 20th Infantry Division was assigned to the German 4th Corps and shared the fate of the German forces encircled at Stalingrad. Given the situation, the 8th Cavalry Division was dispatched to the endangered area while the 4th Infantry Division was assigned to the 7th Army Corps.

On 21 November, the 57th Soviet Army advanced towards Sovietsky (17 km southeast of Kalach) to meet the forces of the South Western Front and encircled the German forces at Stalingrad, while the 51st Soviet Army advanced towards Kotelnikovo, along the Kotelnikovo-Stalingrad railroad. The 6th Corps tried to resist on the alignment Mal Derbety - Tundutovo - Gonchearovsky - Gnylo-Aksayskaya, while the “Korne” Motorized Detachment (3rd and 4th Cavalry Regiments, the 2nd Artillery Battalion of the 3rd Horse Artillery Regiment and a battery of the 7th Heavy Artillery Regiment), backed by German armored units, triggered a counterattack towards Abganerovo. In the same time, the 29th German Motorized Infantry Division attacked from northwest. Without efficient AT weapons, the action failed. In this difficult situation, command was "thrown" (as the CO of the 4th Panzer Army, gen. Hoth, had to admit) to lt. gen. Constantin Constantinescu, yet the Romanian Command was subordinated to the 4th Panzer Army.

In the next day the situation worsened, the enemy taking hold of Mal. Derbety and Tundutovo on the left flank of the 7th Army Corps. The “Korne” Detachment was attacked by Soviet tanks in the Krasnay-Geroy area, suffering heavy losses. At the 6th Corps, the remains of the 1st, 18th and 2nd Infantry Divisions were retreating unable to oppose any organized resistance. The proposal made by the Romanian Command to fall back to better positions on the Aksay River clashed with the German Command decision of holding firmly "on the spot". On 23 November, as the enemy pressure continued, the deputy chief of Staff of the 4th Army demanded and received from the Romanian General Headquarters the ability to take decisions independently from the 4th Panzer Army Headquarters. Subsequently, the 6th Corps fell back to the Aksay River. It was a belated action as the Soviets were already controlling the communication center of Aksay. The “Korne” Detachment, covering the front between the two Romanian corps could not withstand Soviet attacks and fell back, leaving the left flank of the 7th Army Corps uncovered. At the same time the 5th Cavalry and the 4th Infantry Divisions were attacked from the east. In order to prevent the enemy advance between the railroad and the river Don, a new defence line, with the centre at Kotelnikovo was established. In the afternoon, the Soviet troops of the Stalingrad Front met the SouthWestern Front troops in Sovietsky area, encircling of the German forces at Stalingrad. Receiving information about the arrival of a German detachment, the 4th Romanian Army’s commander decided that the positions must be held. The 6th Corps was on the southern bank of the Aksay River, the 4th Infantry Division from Umansevo to Kotsubayev and the 5th Cavalry Division further to Perednaya Elista. The link between the two corps was provided by the “Korne” Detachment, in the Sutov 2 area.

On 24 November the enemy activity was reduced, but the next day the Soviet troops attacked towards Kotelnikovo between the Don and the railroad, pushing the 4th Infantry Division southwards from the left flank of the 7th Corps. On 26 November, the “Korne” and “Panwitz” Detachments (the latter: one tank platoon, two infantry companies, one assault gun battery and a Romanian heavy artillery battery) managed to push back the Soviet troops which had infiltrated between the two Romanian corps. On the 27, the Soviets approaching Kotelnikovo were also repelled by counterattack of the “Panwitz” Detachment and units of the 6th Panzer Division, which recently arrived in preparation for the counter strike to relieve the Axis forces in Stalingrad. The Soviets managed to brake through the line of the 6th Corps at the 18th Infantry Division, thus forcing it to retreat on an alignment 25-30 km south of the river, which was held until the counter strike was launched. The losses of the 4th Romanian Army in this operation were catastrophic: up to 80% in personnel at the 1st, 2nd and 18th Infantry Divisions, those that have received the main blow. There was also here some fierce fighting, as in the sector of the 3rd Army. TwoRitterkreuzes were awarded: one to col. Radu Korne (also taking into account his previous actions in 1941-42 in Crimea, the Ukraine and the Caucasus) and one to col. Ioan Hristea, the CO of the 2nd Calarasi Regiment, which managed to hold his position for about a month before being forced to pull back.

On 16 December, the Soviet 3rd Guards Army started Operation Little Saturn and attacked Army Group “Hollidt”, to which was subordinated the 3rd Romanian Army, along the River Chir. During the fighting the Romanian 1st Corps (7th, 9th and 11th Infantry Divisions) and the German 62nd Infantry Division suffered heavy casualties. On 18 December, the Soviet 6th Army broke through the defence of the Italian 8th Army (in the left of the Romanian 1st Corps) and the 18th, 24th and 25th Tank Corps penetrated deep behind Axis lines, threatening the rear of the front on the Chir. The 1st Corps retreated during the night of 18/19 December to the positions west of the Chernaya Valley, between Kalinovsky and Verh. Tokin. There its troops were surprised by mechanized forces of the Soviet 6th Army. Fierce fighting occurred at Kamenka and Kashary, with many losses on the Axis side. On 22 December the line of the River Chir was abandoned by the left wing of Army Group Hollidt as they retreated towards Morzovskaya. During the fighting that day, brig. gen. Savu Nedelea, the CO of the 11th Infantry Division, was taken prisoner. On 27 December, the 7th Cavalry Division started to retreat towards Bisry, after 40 days of continuous fighting. The following day, however, gen. Hollidt assigned the 11th Rosiori and 11th CalarasiRegiments and the 61st Recon Group the task to defend the German depots at Chernigof. The Romanian cavalrymen held the town against Soviet attacks until 2 January 1943, when they eventually retreated. They were the last Axis troops to leave the Chir line. 28 Iron Crosses were awarded to the men of the 7th Cavalry Division.

To the south, the remains of the 4th Army and the Romanian Air Corps were engaged in the "Wintergewitter" Operation, which aimed to create a link with the Axis troops in Stalingrad. The main blow was going to be delivered by the German 57th Panzer Corps (6th and 23rd Panzer Division - 230 tanks). On its left flank was the Romanian 6th Corps (2nd and 18th Infantry Divisions). On the right flank was the Romanian 7th Corps (1st and 4th Infantry Divisions) and the Cavalry Group "Gen. Popescu" (5th and 8th Cavalry Divisions). The German tanks advanced up to 50 km from Stalingrad, but were stopped. The front held by the Italian 8th Army was broken on 18 December and 7 Italian divisions and the Italian Alpine Corps were encircled.

On 24 December, the Red Army counterattacked, with 149,000 men and 635 tanks, the German 57th Panzer Corps and the Romanian 4th Army. The Cavalry Group "Gen. Popescu" was nearly destroyed on 26 in the fights at Sharnutovsky with the Soviet 6th Mechanized Corps. The Romanian 6th Corps was pushed back by the Soviet 7th Tank Corps and 4th Cavalry Corps. On 29 December, the 57th Panzer Corps had to abandon Kotelnikovsky. The failure of Operation "Wintergewitter" sealed the fate of Axis troops inside Stalingrad. On 15 January 1943 came another devastating blow: the Hungarian 2nd Army was encircled and eventually destroyed (147,971 casualties).

The Romanian army lost 158,854 men (dead, wounded and missing) between 19 November 1942 and 7 January 1943. This represented 16 of the 18 divisions engaged at Stalingrad and half of the active troops (31 divisions). The Romanian Air Corps lost 73 airplanes (26 in battle and the rest on the ground).

On 2 February 1943, the resistance of Axis troops in Stalingrad ceased. Out of the 91,000 prisoners took by the Soviets, only 3,000 were Romanian. These were the survivors of the 20th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division and “Col.Voicu” Detachment. During the horrible battles in the encircled Stalingrad, the Romanian troops had performed very well under the circumstances. At the beginning of December, the 82nd Infantry Regiment, from the 20th Division, repulsed the attack of two Soviet divisions, earning the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class, 50 Iron Crosses for some of its men and citations from the 4th Corps and 6th Army.

@500 It was not motivation ,it was about equipment first and foremost.Soldiers with Molotovs against T34's tend to get slaughtered.If you would look at Stalingrad and other Eastern front battles,they stood their ground many times only to get slaughtered.


P.S. Sometimes,due to german incompetence their allies became a burden.When you trust the poorly equipped romanian army to hold the flank like in the opening of Stalingrad,you're practically asking for trouble.

 

[Mugwop]

Thats myth. Here the main reasons why Soviets produced more tanks than Germans:

1) Soviets mobilized their economy first.
2) Soviets received massive aid from US, while Germans were bombed.
3) Germans produced thousand submarines, V-1 and V-2 rockets in addition to tanks, Soviets concentrated on tanks.


They were not faster. Their transmission sucked.


There is nothing special about slopped armor. Even the WW1 FT-17 had slopped armor.


But u dont show sides.

The early T-34's transmission did suck because of the gearbox but the 5gear transmission was an improvement on it.Plus russians who fought in t-34 had a song where they mocked germans about their petrol engines and slower speed.

 

[500]

The early T-34's transmission did suck because of the gearbox but the 5gear transmission was an improvement on it.Plus russians who fought in t-34 had a song where they mocked germans about their petrol engines and slower speed.

The problem is that 5 speed gearbox appeared only in 1943, when all German tanks were equipped with long barrel 75-mm and 88-mm guns which could penetrate T-34 with ease. So Russian tankers were singing "our tanks are fast but armor sucks".

 

[Mighty Caty]

There was no normal resistance and sabotage in Europe. Many Weterners shared Hitler's views and a had positive attitude to the " crusade against Bolshevism ." For example, the Czech "Skoda" factory - one of the best military plants of Europe worked for Reich until the last day of war. Worked plants of Holland, Denmark and France, Czech Republic, Austria and other countries. Very highly developed countries. At the time in the USSR industry was just beginning to catch up with Europe.
Germans selected best soldiers to elite troops SS. Selected the best - the most strong and tall . While the Germans and the best volunteers fought 300 million Europeans worked for them . Sewed clothes for them , made tanks and guns, made movies and stage plays at the theaters. We should not overestimate the resistance .
Real resistance was present only on Soviet territories - the partizans .

I stopped reading your post after I finished the bolded part. With one sentence, you completely destroyed what the French underground network, OSS network, Norwegian and Dutch underground resistance works during WW2

You should read more on the period history before posting here, since I don't know if you are ultra brain-washed Russian or just trying to cite Russian glory over anything else. I decided to stop replying all and any of your post.

 

[Elucid]

What you are describing is the exact the work of human tactics....

Here is the post my hubby wrote about Unit Tactics and Human Wave attacks.

Small Unit Tactics (SUT)

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Well, my wife ask me to come out of retirement, just once to explain the different between Small Unit Tactics and Human Wave attacks.

If you have been following the post Do Russian Tanks Suck?
There is a discussion between Small Unit Tactics and Human Wave Tactics going on the Battle of Stalingrad. My wife want me to come out and explained the two.

What is Small Unit Tactics??
In the US Army Infantry Doctrine, small unit tactics is the building block of the US Army Combined Arms tactics. Where a bigger Army unit would split into smaller unit and use them to combine inter-service unit (Such as Infantry + Armor) or (Armor + Assault Chopper) to maximize the battle effectiveness.

To under stand SUT, you must understand the formation of a military unit. (Photo courtesy from the US Army Doctrine Manual)

The left(Your) is a standard Calvary Platoon of 4 Bradley and the Right(Your) is a standard Infantry Platoon minus the command element.

For an infantry platoon, it is split into 4 element, 1st Squad, 2nd Squad, 3rd Squad and Command Post. Where each squad are also split into 2 fire teams. Now, the reason I chose this image out of possibly 20 is because it demonstrate well how you can see an inter-support section is formed, 1 BFV (Bradley Fighting Vehicle) section supporting 3 fire teams.

Now, let's look at the infantry platoon commander point of view. If you are focus with a single fire team, you would have 8 teams in a platoon, it would give you a maximum movement (Technically you would cover more ground to split it 8 ways) but it also mean you stretch out your support. You will get a maximum support when you don't split your team, but then your coverage will be significantly lower, as you move as one cohesion unit.

So the balance is to split into 3 fire teams and using this fire teams you can go up with 2 fire team each with 2 BFV section supporting while 1 squad left in reserve, or you can split your asset three way and roam around with your Cavalry in a 3-2 split (Cavalryman called it free-balling) Basically is a game of cups, you try to cover 3 cups with 2 lid as quickly as possible.

Command structure
So, what happened if you split your platoon in 3? You got 3 different and separate command. Which 3 squad operate independently to each other, while the overall commander can deploy them as will according to the AO (Which will explain later) situation, you also get a dynamic response from the 3 teams if you separate them.

They can either occupied 3 different defensive position to lay out an inter-related and mutually supported defense area, or you can try and you can, of course, consolidate the area and use all 3 teams in one location.

But how does it works?

The above image outline platoon level tactics, a "Stepwise-Refinement" method was used to determined the action you, as a platoon leader, would take during contacts. Basically is a spill or fill situation.

When your platoon initiate contact with the enemy, you, as a platoon leader need to judge the situation, as you are split into 3, unless you have encountered a superior enemy force (like a battalion level) or you fail to deploy your squad according to the terrain, which is another topic in advance unit tactics which I will not cover here. In this case, let's say you match an evenly matched enemy.

You would always have 1 unit (squad) take fire from the incoming contact. the split, will then allow you to judge, you have the ability to access the situation and move your unit accordingly (like the way it does in figure 4.2)

However, if you move as a single cohesion unit, you will then be striped away of that opportunity and would only face two option, either commit all your asset and try to hold out or call for relief attack, or beat back where you came from.

Warfighting function

(Sorry for the cut out as I don't know why the army site do not allow a direct hyperlink of this figure)

Warfighting function is the inherent of small unit tactics, it give a leader information to process a order and executing the order with a defined level of requirement. Using the example of Figure 4.2. we can see that the platoon leader make the decision according to warfighting functions.

Step 1. The platoon react to contacts.
Step 2. The platoon identified and located the enemy (Intelligence)
Step 3. The platoon determine can the squad in contact suppress the enemy?
Decision 1 : If it can, can the squad maneuver? (Movement and Maneuver)
Decision 2 : If it cannot, send another squad to support the first squad (Fire support), then go back to decision 1
Decision 1.1 : If the squad can maneuver, either use 1 squad to lay supporting fire and use 2 squad assault.
or, if you had send two squad to support the first contact (a No in original decision 1) then uses 1 squad to assault while 2 squad lay down base of fire (Command and Control)
Decision 2.1 : If the squad cannot maneuver, then reports and wait for reinforcement (Sustainment)
Step 4 : Platoon succeed in assaulting the position, consolidate for defense (Protection)

Area of Operation

Area of Operation dictate the tactics commander used in all level. However, for a success defensive and offensive operation, Area of operation is also important for the overall picture, as your AO would affect the outcome of others or the others AO outcome will affect yours. (well, think about it, if you lost the offensive or cannot hold the line, the enemy will spill over to other AO). Hence when you organize your tactics, you need to consider your AO as a separate pieces of area, but also one giant area as a whole.

What SUT do to your AO is, in defensive battle, you can pick any advantage spots/ vantages point and defend them accordingly. Which will lay out an interlocking and mutually supported defense, which give a "force multiplying" factors. You can do so with single cohesion tactics too, but the different between SUT and SCT is that when using SUT, you can also dynamically manage your AO, as you don't control just one large sector, instead, 3 of your squad leader command 3 different sector, and they can exploit any enemy error and retreat and regroup as the seems fits. All at an instance.

In offensive battle, this is where SUT and SCT part ways. Using SUT, you can organize your attack organically, we commander like to use the word "Organic" because they give you an edge of knowing more of your battlefield with more info/intel flow in, if you failed in one part of the line, you simply regroup and probe another part while the other 2 parts goes on, where as for SCT, you are probing the line in just one spot, and every decision you made is base around that single cohesive unit. you restart every time you hit slack.

That's the main different between Small Unit Tactics and Single unit Tactics

So, what is the different between small unit tactics and human wave tactics??

The two is a 2 different concept in 2 different level, while small unit tactics is the keystone of combined arms, small unit tactics is also heavily utilized in human wave tactics too. A large unit (i.e. Regiments and Divisions) can break into small unit and work their way to the assembly point for a Human Wave assault, equally they can march loud and noisy as a whole to the assembly area. In 21 century warfare, large unit usually cannot march in a single cohesion unit unless air and ground supremacy have been developed or time and again, air interdiction is a very good way to break up a large unit, hence, if you don't have air superiority and you don't want to march in small unit, your enemy will do it for you.

Human wave tactics involved a large amount of small unit tactics, in Vietnam war, the Vietcong expertly uses small unit tactics to infiltrate larger US?ARVN defense and launch strike time and again, the infamous Ho Chi Ming trail is the epicenter of the VC/NVA small unit tactics junctions. The mastery of Small Unit Tactics also contribute to numerous siege to US Firebases in and around South Vietnam. Tunneling, for example, is an example of mastery of SUT with VC/NVA AO we talked about some paragraph ago.

The level between SUT and Human Wave is different. Human wave attack should be equal and compare to Combine arms tactics. When on one side, you get a zero support frontal charge while the other one uses strategic and tactical depth to engage one's enemy.

Hence, what make of Battle of Stalingrad??

Stalingrad is a sort of Human Wave attack. When you apply the warfighting function to Battle of Stalingrad, you would see most of the mini-battle are only fulfilling the protection and movement requirement. When you talk about the goal of defending Stalingrad, they are absents. Partly because of poor commanding and poor intelligence and partly because of the inability to raise a proper defense.

Indeed SUT exist in Stalingrad, the key and goal of such tactics is lacking. The point for SUT is to organize your attack/defense dynamically, or as we commander used to said "Organic", rather what the Russia doing is to feed the German in piecemeal albeit with Small unit tactics.

Copyright US Military Achieve (Figure), @jhungary (Passage)
Well, this is a one off lesson, I am out of here again, I will not reply to any question. Thanks for your time

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The way Russia fed those troop under central command to keep occupying the defensive dug out is itself a human tactics.

Apologies for the late reply, I was busy.
I totally understand what you are saying. Stalin ruthlessly sacrificed his men throughout the war. For him his armies were only objects to be thrown in the way of the German torrent to slow it down. He had unlimited human resource and he used them as sand bags. But this approach is to be expected by a highly populated and poor nation. This defence model will not be too unsuitable for a country like Pakistan if it is attacked by a more powerful country. Masses of poor people here who dont make too much of their lives. Same were the conditions in the USSR back then.

 

[vostok]

I stopped reading your post after I finished the bolded part. With one sentence, you completely destroyed what the French underground network, OSS network, Norwegian and Dutch underground resistance works during WW2

You should read more on the period history before posting here, since I don't know if you are ultra brain-washed Russian or just trying to cite Russian glory over anything else. I decided to stop replying all and any of your post.

If a country has signed capitulation without a fight or almost without a fight - so it gave up. Silly to compare real resistance - Soviet partisans, living in the forests and swamps and constantly attacking the Nazis and small dirty tricks of European resistance.

 

[flamer84]

edit..wrong thread,lol.

 

[Mighty Caty]

Apologies for the late reply, I was busy.
I totally understand what you are saying. Stalin ruthlessly sacrificed his men throughout the war. For him his armies were only objects to be thrown in the way of the German torrent to slow it down. He had unlimited human resource and he used them as sand bags. But this approach is to be expected by a highly populated and poor nation. This defence model will not be too unsuitable for a country like Pakistan if it is attacked by a more powerful country. Masses of poor people here who dont make too much of their lives. Same were the conditions in the USSR back then.

The one thing most people do not know or did not consider in Battle of Stalingrad is the logistic line in both countries.

The trip to supply the German army in Stalingrad from berlin is almost 3 times the trip to supply of Red Army from Moscow. (1377 miles vs 566 miles) Every german troop lost would take 3 times as long to replenish than every red army soldier lost. And subsequently every bullet, shell, food, clothing travel 3 times as long as the Russian counterpart to reach the frontline.

Most people ignore or discount the logistic effort, Germany tried resupplying and recover their invasion force from forefront, but failed, and that's the reason why Germany fail the whole campaign. Even though German troop are better equipped and most likely better trained than the Red Army counter part. But the time for 1 German replacement travel to frontline to Stalingrad to replenish their unit, Red Army can muster 3 soldier, even if they use 2 as a canon fodder and use 1 in reserve, they would eventually maintain a number superiority by day, and when there are more Soviet Reserve than German soldier, then the tide would change

hence why the Human tactics favor the Russian.