To continue with the discussion of a Vietnam analogy, I think that the one comparison that PA and GOP do not want is that of the events after the Tet offensive.
When Giap launched his grand attacks, the American army, it is said by respected historians, was at the end of its tether. Tet broke the proverbial camel's back and, sometime later, the Americans gave in and got out.
Fast forward 30 years and it turns out that the Vietminh were equally shattered by their own grand assault. 'All' that the US establishment had to do was to retain the will to hold on and North Vietnam was more or less spent. US would have won that war. Or so goes the current interpretation. revisionist history? I dunno. Regardless, my point is that willpower is going to be decisive; who can hold out the longest?
Another related point; comparisons to Vietnam and US Army failures there are alright, but most people tend to forget the intense soul searching that the US army did post Vietnam. I'm an outsider but it seems to me that, unless the game changes completely, the American establishment is not going to let go, far less the US Army, if only because they remember Vietnam and remember it well. Most people underestimate the American's capability to reinvent themselves.
America often blunders in her dealings with the rest of the world; she comes across as arrogant; she can be naive - but these are failings of all superpowers since the Roman Empire.
In the end, never underestimate American grit. And the amazing, undiluted, in your face, focus of the average American. I have seen this for myself and learnt to appreciate it.
Giap was actually against the 1968 Tet Offensive, he felt that neither the NVA and the Viet Cong were ready to make a direct frontal assault on the US/ARVN forces. Such battles are called 'set piece' battles.
Set piece - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In warfare, a set piece battle may involve large formations moving according to a plan and responding to the opposing force also by plan. An example might be the Schlieffen Plan
Giap was never a success at such battles, even when he was fighting against the French forces in North Viet Nam. The Politburo overruled Giap's objections because they were under the belief that with embedded Viet Cong forces among the South Vietnamese population the people would rally to communist cause and rebel.
Hue Massacre
What triggered the Communist slaughter? Many Hue citizens believe that the execution orders came directly from Ho Chi Minh. More likely, however, the Communists simply lost their nerve. They had been led to expect that many South Vietnamese would rally to their cause during the Tet onslaught. That did not happen, and when the battle for Hue began turning in the allies' favor, the Communists apparently panicked and killed off their prisoners.
Hue was not the only population center, major or minor, that suffered communist atrocities. After the offensive and the NVA repelled, the Viet Cong became the persecuted. Who once were their sympathizers became their enemies as attested by former Viet Congs, such as this man...
Amazon.com: A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath: Truong Nhu Tang: Books
Even the NVA's chief propagandist became disillusioned...
Amazon.com: Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel: Bui Tin: Books
Colonel Bui Tin was the man who accepted South Viet Nam's surrender. Here are Bui Tin's comments about the Tet Offensive...
Chapter 3 War
In fact, the Tet Offensive launched on January 31, 1968, turned out to be a great victory for us, at least psychologically. Playing on the arrogance of the American commander, General Westmoreland, we achieved total surprise with a smart and bold move to launch simultaneous attacks on more than forty cities, towns and military bases; the targets included the US embassy in Saigon. Thanks to the media, which exaggerated the damage caused by this offensive, the American public was bedazzled, and under strong pressure the US administration had to agree to negotiations in Paris with the participation of the NLFSVN (National Liberation Front of South Vietnam) which it thus implicitly recognised. At about the same time it began the process of de-escalation leading to the Vietnamisation of the war.
On the other hand, during the Tet Offensive we suffered heavy sacrifices and made many military mistakes, the consequences of which continue to be debated in Hanoi. For example in Saigon we planned to create a 'big bang' by occupying the US embassy plus the Presidential Palace and taking over Saigon Radio, but none of these objectives succeeded. In fact, of the two groups sent with pre-recorded tapes to put on the radio, one lost its way and the other was attacked and capture en route. Then there was the situation in Hue where the fighting continued for well over a month and resulted in the massacre of thousands of people. Quite how many thousands nobody knows because they were buried in various places. Possibly it was the biggest massacre of the war, bigger than My Lai about which the Americans have been so obsessed. So who was responsible? Was it General Tran Van Quang who was in charge of our forces in this military region at the time? Or were the Americans partly to blame because of their fighting tactics? These are questions I have often asked because I have a personal interest. I spent nine years of my life, from the age of seven, going to school and growing up in Hue from where many of my friends and classmates later disappeared.
Where the Viet Cong were once able to wield battalion level attacks, after Tet 1968 they rarely came together enough above squad level. North Viet Nam's Politburo and the NVA's top leadership, other than Giap, overestimated their military capabilities and underestimated South Viet Nam's hostility towards communism, even though the Southerners have no love for their government.
Further evidence of Giap's incompetence at battles other than guerrilla tactics is the Easter Offensive...
Easter Offensive - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
By this time, the process called 'Vietnamization' of the war was well in progress with the only active major US military branch was the USAF. Although the NVA gained valuable grounds, Giap failed to decisively defeat the ARVN and the war continued until 1975, when the US Congress decided to stop funding the war. In other words, had the US continued to be resolute in material and air support, South Viet Nam would have hold. Keep in mind that throughout the entire civil war, from military objectives to negotiations, the goal for the US/SVN political alliance was always about partition, not unification, so since the US was now largely out of the ground war by 1972 under 'Vietnamization', South Viet Nam was no longer politically restrained to below the 17th parallel and could have invade North Viet Nam. South Viet Nam held for three years with only US air support is proof that the ARVN was becoming more professional and competent at prosecuting the war. This fact is always conveniently omitted in many discussions about the Vietnam War and is supported by an admission from North Viet Nam...
Why the latest good news from Iraq doesn't matter. - By Phillip Carter - Slate Magazine
In 1975, Army Col. Harry Summers went to Hanoi as chief of the U.S. delegation's negotiation team for the four-party military talks that followed the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. While there, he spent some time chatting with his North Vietnamese counterpart, Col. Tu, an old soldier who had fought against the United States and lived to tell his tale. With a tinge of bitterness about the war's outcome, Summers told Tu, "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield." Tu replied, in a phrase that perfectly captured the American misunderstanding of the Vietnam War, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."
War is first a political event and secondly supported by military successes. If there are negotiations regarding any possible outcomes of the conflict, the more military successes there are to one side the greater leverage that side has at the negotiation tables. Unfortunately, the Vietnam War was contrary to conventional military wisdom and that have been the source of US military angst since 1975 up to Desert Storm.
There are critical differences between Vietnam/Afghanistan(Soviet invasion) and Swat today.
1. In both Vietnam and Afghanistan you had 'invaders', with the support of locals, acting against other locals (supported by other foreigners).
The US involvement in Indochina, before 'The Vietnam War' and during, was never that of colonial interests, hence not as an 'invader'. By the time the US was fully militarily engaged, there were two distinct political entities in Viet Nam -- North and South. Each side has its own government, currency, economic system and even foreign relations.
Not only that,
BOTH sides had considered full UN memberships...
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve14p1/media/pdf/d74.pdf
Hanoi and Saigon are withholding their applications for UN membership until they can determine whether the US will veto them. Meanwhile, the US has suggested that membership for the Vietnams be linked to admission of both Koreas, and Seoul is pressing Washington to demand that solution.
Hanoi Changes lts Mind. Until recently, the position of Hanoi, which first applied for UN membership in 1946, had been that national reunification must be completed before entry into the UN. In late May, however, representatives of both North and South Vietnam in Paris appealed to Secretary-General Waldheim to take soundings on the possibility of full UN membership for the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and the PRGSV (Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam). (The DRV and the PRG are already members of the WHO and the WMO.)
The UN does not recognize as full members factions that are in a civil war trying to gain control of a territory through bloody means. The consideration of such an application implied that North Viet Nam, China and the Soviet Union were at one time resigned to the possibility of an even greater political partition in Indochina than that of the two Koreas. So if there is going to be a charge levied that the US was an 'invader' in Viet Nam, it begs the question of who is the victim and what are the motives for the US?
If you wish to continue discussing this subject, knowing the penchant of many pop US critics regarding the Vietnam War to call anyone who disagree with popular perceptions about the war as 'ignorant' or 'naive', I will be fair in warning you (or anyone else) that you will be debating this subject with a Viet. I was born in Saigon, South Viet Nam in 1963. I have memories of the 1968 Tet Offensive. My family fled communism first back 1951, before the famine of the disastrous communist imposed land reform of the mid-1950s, and finally in Apr 1975. I am the product of the Vietnam War. I know what I am talking about and can call upon many resources to support my arguments.