Destroying Myth of Indian Indengious Weapons Capability

[Bossman]

India’s Defense Lab Seen as National Industry Failure
Lawmakers’ Report Says DRDO Falls Far Short of Goals

By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI, NEW DELHI


India is at most halfway to its goal of producing 70 percent of the military’s weapons, and lawmakers blame the state-owned Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
Five years after launching an indigenization plan, domestic plants supply only 30 percent to 35 percent of the military’s needs, forcing the military to import far more arms than planned, according to a March 16 report by members of the parliament’s Defence Committee.
“The Committee are not happy to be informed” of this, said the 148-page report, the committee’s fourteenth in a series about the lab. “This gives an impression to the Committee that the country is still largely dependent on imports of defense products and the DRDO, even after 48 years of its formation, has not been able to achieve its targeted mission of self-reliance in defense production.”
Defense News obtained a copy of the report.
And that’s just the latest blast at the state-owned defense lab, whose sluggish pace is blamed for slowing the development of weapons, running up their costs and hurting military readiness.
One Indian Army official blamed DRDO for failing to catalyze indigenous production even of low-tech goods such as rifles, bulletproof jackets and winter-weather clothing.
Now the Indian Defence Ministry wants to revamp the 49-year-old DRDO. A new eight-member committee will recommend changes to the lab by year’s end, Defence Minister A.K. Antony told the Indian Parliament March 22. The group will be led by P. Rama Rao, a former secretary at the Department of Science and Technology.
The other members are Ajit Bhavnani, retired air marshal and former Air Force vice chief; C. S. Cheema, retired Army lieutenant general and former director-general of artillery; A.K. Ghosh, former financial adviser at the Defence Ministry; T.P. Ghoshal of Jadavpur University; Pravesh Jaitly, retired vice admiral and the Nayv’s former chief of materials; Satish Kaura, chairman of the Samtel Group of Industries, based here; and Krishnadas Nair, former chairman of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL).
Defense analyst Nitin Mehta said the committee might cool tempers but is unlikely to alter the bureaucracy or galvanize private-sector arms development. That will come only after the private sector stops teaming up with major overseas defense companies.
DRDO has as many as 439 projects worth $3.7 billion, and its 50 laboratories, mostly in the south of India, have more than 33,000 personnel.
The report noted that 32 years after DRDO began work on the Arjun tank, only 15 of the 124 tanks have been delivered by the Heavy Vehicle Factory in Avadhi.
Among DRDO’s key projects, most of them delayed by 10 to 15 years, are:
• The Integrated Guided Missile Program. Launched in the 1980s, it includes theater missiles, the Nag anti-tank missile and the Quick Reaction Missile.
• A ballistic missile effort that includes the 3,000-kilometer Agni-3 program.
• Advanced Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
• Indian Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System program.
• Indian Navy nuclear submarine.
• Light Combat Aircraft.
• Medium Combat Aircraft.
• Anti-ballistic missile project.
• Communications for the C4I program and air defense.
DRDO officials declined to comment because the Parliament is still in session.
A DRDO scientist said the delays are mostly due to poor coordination between the DRDO and the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force, which often change their requirements.
Over the past five years, India has imported arms and defense gear worth $12.9 billion, compared with $7.8 billion in 1998 through 2001, said defense analyst Mahindra Singh, a retired Indian Army brigadier.
In 2005, India’s defense imports totaled $5.4 billion, topping Saudi Arabia’s $3.4 billion and China’s $2.8 billion, Singh said. In 2006, the country imported $1.5 billion in arms and defense gear from Israel alone. •
E-mail: vraghuvanshi@defensenews.com.

 

[Bossman]

Indian missile a ‘dud’, air force doesn’t want it EnlargeA file picture of the Akash missile system

Serious doubts have been raised by air force officers about the effectiveness of the Akash missile system, according to confidential documents of the Indian Air Force (IAF) seen by HT. The surface-to-air missile system, developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), consistently failed during trials, the papers show.

DRDO’s fault?

Surface-to-air Trishul missile system was scrapped last year. It remained at trial stage for 23 years.

Main battle tank Arjun has been undergoing trials for the past 16 years. The Russian T-90 is still the mainstay of the armoured corps.

Light combat aircraft Tejas is still at trial stage after 23 years. The date of completion for its engine has been revised from 1996 to 2009.

In March, a parliamentary standing committee on defence recommended a complete review of the structure and functioning of the DRDO.

The DRDO says all doubts have been cleared and the missile system is a success. But the IAF is yet to buy and deploy the missile system.

Doubts about the medium-range Akash missile system, developed at a cost of Rs 800 crore after more than two decades of research and trials, emerged at a meeting called by the Western Air Command in Delhi last year. Sixty middle-level and senior IAF officers attended the meeting.

A presentation, based on the report of an IAF expert who had witnessed the trials, contained several startling revelations. “The IAF expert witnessed repeated cases of missile parts falling off during many trials. He recommended that the Akash missile system was not fit to be deployed,” a senior officer, who attended the presentation, told HT.

Pointing out major flaws in this missile system, developed as a part of the country’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, the report presented to the IAF officers says, “The expert noticed it took 25 minutes to load a single missile on the launcher, which rendered this missile system unfit for use in war-like situations. The night loading time would therefore automatically be twice more than daytime.”

Describing the Akash missile trials as a “disaster”, the presentation report says, “Out of 20 test trials seen by the IAF expert, the majority of them ended in a failure.”

"It was not capable of picking up low-level targets over any sea, due to multi-path reflection. The missile warhead was also not capable of engaging present-generation targets, due to repeated failures," the report says.

However, the DRDO has strongly defended the missile system. In a written response to queries by HT, the DRDO said it was "fully satisfied with the current status of trials of Akash. Currently all doubts have been cleared and resolved".

"The missile system is now complete after successful trials and the organisation is confident about its success," the DRDO added.

The IAF report criticised the DRDO and senior officials from the Ministry of Defence, saying, "There was deliberate data suppression and the IAF was pressured to either change or withdraw the report."

The report indicates that desperate moves were made during the trials to prove that the system was a success. "A radar was placed on a 13-metre-high platform for all trials, to increase the efficiency of the missile system artificially, which would not be the case in hostile conditions of war," it says.

Cautioning the IAF on the limitations of the Akash missile system, the report says, "In its present status, Project Akash cannot meet the operational requirements of the IAF, due to major design flaws, and if the IAF wanted to use this particular missile system, then it would have to lower its acceptability standards."

The DRDO, however, said the Akash missile system had an edge over other systems due to its multi-target handling capacity, being a fully automatic system. It said since the system was completely indigenous, it could be quickly upgraded within the country

---------- Post added at 09:41 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:40 AM ----------

Defence Weekly VOLUME 43 | ISSUE 44 | 1 NOVEMBER 2006

Questions arise over DRDO’s effectiveness

RAHUL BEDI Correspondent

New Delhi


The recent clamour in India over the alleged improper import of Israel Aircraft Systems/Rafeal Armament Development Authority Barak-1 point defence missile systems has high lighted issues relating to the efficacy of the country's premier weapons developing agency . The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). It has also excited debate within the military over the questionable dependency of succeeding administrations on the DRDO in belief of its ability to develop a varied range of defence equipment. This has adversely affected India's defence modernisation, senior service officers said. The DRDO is forever promising but rarely ever delivering as it is preoccupied with reinventing the wheel. This forces India to resort to imports in order to modernise and upgrade its military but that gets swathed in controversy, Brigadier Arun Sahgal of the United Service Institution in New Delhi said. The failure of the DRDO's Trishul project, involving development of a new low-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM), resulted in the navy acquiring the Barak-1 system in 2000. The Barak-1 equips most frontline battle ships. The DRDO recommended against the acquisition, which is now the subject of an investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Further, the case has seen a broad range of military purchases stall as officials hold off on decisions on concerns over potential future prosecutions. On 10 October the CBI laid corruption charges against former defence minister George Fernandes and retired Indian Navy commander in-chief Sushil Kumar, as well as other politicians and middlemen in connection with the USD25 million Barak deal. On 18 October Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, who has since been shifted to the foreign affairs portfolio, overruled the DRDO to give the Trishul short-range SAMs project a further year of funding until the end of 2007. A day earlier the development agency declared the Trishul a simple "technology demonstrator" after 25 years of effort and 40 test launches together costing INR3 billion (USD66.2 million). The Trishul programme is only the latest in a series of DRDO projects plagued by cost and time overrun,and heavily import dependent. These include the Akash SAM, Nag antitank missile, Tejas light combat aircraft, Arjun main battle tank, Dhruv advanced light helicopter, Nishant unmanned aerial vehicle and the Lakshya pilot-less target drone. Some, like the Tejas, are no where near completion while others, like the Arjun, are unacceptable to the users. New Delhi established a Self-Reliant
Implementation Council in 1995 and declared that, with the DRDO's assistance, it would boost the level of indigenous equipment in the services from 30 per cent to 70 per cent in a decade. Efforts have so far fallen short,with import dependency proliferating. The DRDO's problem is that it is over ambitious.There is no co-ordination between it and the users, retired Indian Army chief-of-staff Shankar Roy-Chowdhury said recently.
The DRDO has a workforce of 40,000, including some 8,000 scientists and a network of over 50 laboratories. It has a similar number of science and technology units and about 70 academic institutions. Military officials concede reform efforts launched in the mid-1990s have made little difference. These saw the agency restructured through terminating scores of "low-end" projects found to be costly and time
consuming and by involving the private sector.

---------- Post added at 09:41 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:41 AM ----------

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php...6224&C=landwar

India To Test Arjun in Exercise; Army Claims Tank Is Faulty

By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI, NEW DELHI


India will test its 14 Arjun main battle tanks in June desert exercises alongside, and in comparison to, Russian T-90 and T-72 tanks.
But Army officials have already declared that the indigenous tank is not fit for combat.
Conceived in 1974 at an original design and development cost of $3.6 million, the Arjun tank program under the Defence Research and Development Organization now costs $83.33 million. The Arjun tank was to have replaced the aging T-72, but development delays led the service to order T-90s after the Kargil battle in 1999, and the Army still says it has a serious shortage of main battle tanks. The T-90 now serves as India’s main battle tank.
An Army official said next month’s exercises are user and comparative trials in the deserts of Rajasthan.
Army sources said the Arjun continues to be only a training tank and is not yet qualified for combat, as it is very heavy and will need many changes in its logistics tail, including the size of the rail cars that transport them.
But a Defence Ministry official said the Arjun’s defects have been removed, and if it passes next month’s tests, more production orders will be placed with the state-owned Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadhi.
Army officials disagree, saying there are still at least a dozen defects in the tank, including a deficient fire-control system, inaccurate gun and faulty air conditioning that makes it difficult to operate in very hot conditions.
The quality of the Arjun tank also has been a concern for the Parliament’s Standing Committee for Defence, which in its 16th Report in 2006-’07 said that one official had testified, “I am afraid our quality control is very poor. I have heard that five tanks were presented before the media. However, when the media and other people went away, the tanks were put back in the factory because still some quality checks had to be made.
“The biggest problem in India in respect of defense production is quality control. If China can do it, why can we not do it?”
The Defence Ministry official admitted that there is a shortfall of about 3,500 tanks and that the delivery schedule of the Arjun is not satisfactory. The Army is junking more tanks in the next two to three years than it will be inducting, which will lead to further shortfalls. The Army sources said that around 1,000 tanks out of the 3,000 now in service will be junked by 2008.
If the Arjun is not cleared for combat, the Army will need to purchase more tanks besides the T-90 from overseas markets and upgrade more than 1,600 of its T-72 tanks, the Army sources said. •

 

[Bossman]

India shelves Trishul project

By Iftikhar Gilani

link

NEW DELHI: Following repeated failures, India has put the Trishul missile system project on hold. Sources here said that the government-run Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) has been told to stop work on Trishul and the project will be wound up by the end of the year.

The government has asked the DRDO to concentrate now on co-development of the next generation Barak II missile system project that was signed last January as a joint venture with Israel. Barak II is to have a firing range of 60 km. Barak I’s firing range is 9 km. Ironically, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a case against former defence minister George Fernandes and some businessmen only a few days ago for taking bribes in the purchase of Barak missile systems.

Fernandes had ordered five Barak systems while the present government has ordered seven more after they were certified as the best by the Indian Navy.

Trishul has been a pet project of President APJ Abdul Kalam, who used to be the chief of the DRDO. The end of Trishul is seen here as a major blow to the DRDO, which had already been under attack in the Defence Ministry for the failing guidance and propulsion mechanisms of the long-gestation project.

Fernandes went for the Barak purchase in 2000 on the Indian Navy’s insistence but he did not kill the Trishul project. After some 50 trials and estimated expenditure of over Rs 3 billion on Trishul over the past 22 years, the Indian Navy told the government to junk it two years ago.

Trishul was developed as a short range missile with three variants as part of the Integrated Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). It was meant for a range of 12 km fitted with a 15 kg warhead. Designed to be used against low-level (sea skimming) targets at short range, the system aimed to defend naval vessels against missiles and also as a short range surface to air missile on land.

In 2004, the DRDO was told to remove Trishul from the list of active programmes for the user, meaning it need not be developed to meet the requirements of the Indian Navy. It was, however, allowed to continue the project as an exercise in “technology demonstration”. The navy has since told the government that even demonstrations are unnecessary after India struck a deal with the Barak manufacturers for joint development of future systems.

Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash has stated that there should be no doubts about the Barak’s capabilities. “Our experience with the Barak missile has been good. We are happy with it,” he said. “Trishul” means trident in Sanskrit, while “Barak” stands for lightning in Hebrew.

 

[acetophenol]

INDRA series of 2D radars meant for Army and Air Force use. This was the first high power radar developed by the DRDO, with the Indra -I radar for the Indian Army, followed by Indra Pulse Compression (PC) version for the Indian Air Force, also known as the Indra-II, which is a low level radar to search and track low flying cruise missiles, helicopters and aircraft. These are basically 2D radars which provide range, and azimuth information, and are meant to be used as gapfillers. The Indra 2 PC has pulse compression providing improved range resolution. The series are used both by the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army

 

[Bossman]

India's Zombie Jet Fighter
by James Dunnigan
April 23, 2006

StrategyPage Error Page 2

India, like the United States, has weapons development projects that go on and on, to the point where the weapon is obsolete, but has too many political supporters to allow it to be cancelled. India has a number of these boondoggles, most of them missiles or aircraft. These problems arose when, in the 1980s, India decided to develop and build certain weapons themselves. This kept money and jobs in India, and eliminated dependence on foreigners for these weapons. All good in theory, but in practice, there were major problems.

Take, for example, the Indian attempt to build a jet fighter to replace their Russian MiG-21s. To address this need, in 1983 India began their "Light Combat Aircraft" (or "Tejas") project. Building something better than the 1950s era MiG-21 didn't seem too difficult. But 23 years later, the Tejas is still in development. The aircraft has become something of a zombie project. It can be killed, or really brought to life. Even with 500 test flights, there are still serious problems that prevent putting the aircraft into production. The MiG-21s are still in service, and falling apart. The situation is getting critical.

The good news is that the Tejas will be cheap, costing about $25 million each. The bad news is that most of the key elements of the Tejas development have moved at a glacial pace. The final design was not finished until 1990. The most critical part of the aircraft, the engine, was to have been Indian made, but the "Kaveri" engine, designed and built with Russian assistance, has yet to come together. The Tejas has been flight tested mainly with the American F404 engine, which is also used in the U.S. F-18 and F-117A, and the Swedish Gripen. The Indians finally agreed to collaborate with foreign engine makers, to get the Kaveri engine working. This is what the Swedes did, licensing F404 technology from U.S. manufacturer General Electric, to build their own engine. The Indians currently plan to have the Tejas in service by 2010, even if the initial squadrons have to use American made F404 engines.

The Tejas is smaller than the F-16 and nearly the same size as the Swedish Gripen. Unlike the Gripen, Tejas has less capable electronics and has not been in service for ten years already. India had hoped to export the Tejas, but with competition like Gripen, and continuing problems designing components, it's going to be rough going. Since India only needs a few hundred Tejas, lack of export orders means higher per-aircraft cost (as fewer aircraft absorb the development cost). Thus, there will be charges that it would have been cheaper to buy the Gripen, or Mirage 2000, or even the many second-hand F-16s available, than to develop Tejas. On the plus side, the Tejas project also created an Indian capability to develop jet fighters, including the complex engines. China also found that developing this kind of capability is not cheap, and projects like Tejas are how you pay for your new skills.

 

[Bossman]

StrategyPage Error Page 2

Arjun, the Big Tank That Couldn't

May 30, 2006: Another Indian weapons program has turned into a disaster. This time it's the Arjun tank. Development began in the 1980s, and so far, the army only has five of the tanks, for evaluation purposes. The evaluation is not going well. Originally, the Arjun was to have replaced thousands of Russian tanks, but now, after so many delays, the army only wants 128 Arjuns. But even that may be too optimistic. As has so often happened with other weapons projects, the Arjun is having problems with its electronics. In this case, it's the fire control system. But Arjun has also had problems with its engine, and that fact that its size and weight prevents it from being used with current tank transporters. The Defense Ministry cannot bring itself to admit defeat, so all attempts to just cancel Arjun have failed. Instead, the number ordered will be reduced until, well, perhaps none will appear in regular service.

---------- Post added at 09:48 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:47 AM ----------

DRDO muddles through 439 projects:


New Delhi: From missiles, radars and electronic warfare programmes to even juices, mosquito repellents and titanium dental implants, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) does it all. And, by and large, flounders in them all, with technical glitches, time and cost overruns.

Amid growing demand by armed forces and experts that DRDO “concentrate” only on “a few core and critical areas” to bolster the country’s defence preparedness, latest statistics show the organisation has as many as 439 ongoing projects at a total cost of a whopping Rs 16,925 Crore (US $ 3.64 Billion)*. "DRDO, with around 29,000 personnel in 50 laboratories and establishments under its umbrella, certainly needs to get its act together. Not even 10% of its total budget (DRDO got Rs 5,454 Crore (US $ 1.17 Billion)* in 2006-07) is spent on fundamental research," says a senior defence official.

Adds an Army officer, "What is the use of having such a huge defence R&D set-up if it cannot even come up with basics like good bullet-proof jackets, webbing and light-weight ballistic helmets. Even the systems they manage to deliver to us suffer from operational problems."

The long-standing aim to take the country towards self-reliance in military capabilities, of course, remains a mere pipedream. If in 1991-92, 25% of India’s total defence expenditure was spent on imports, the case remains the same even now.

DRDO, of course, has to contend with inadequate funds, with its allocation hovering just around 6% of the total defence budget. Moreover, it’s not able to attract top scientific talent in the absence of good career prospects and other incentives.

But even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently told DRDO he was "concerned by the problems of cost and time-overruns, which have plagued our defence industry for decades now".

Consequently, it’s no wonder that the armed forces prefer the import route because of DRDO’s long track-record of delivering too-little, too-late. Of the 439 projects, for instance, the really big ones number around 20. But the progress in them, more or less, has been shoddy.

The Arjun main-battle tank project, for one, was sanctioned way back in 1974. After spending a huge amount of money, the first five Arjun tanks are still being tested for battle-worthiness, with the Army not too keen to induct them.

Similar is the story with Tejas Light Combat Aircraft, sanctioned in 1983 to replace the country’s ageing MiG fleet. Though its prototypes have completed over 530 flights, IAF is not fully convinced yet whether it will induct them by even 2012. This when government has already sanctioned Rs 5,489.78 Crore (US $ 1.18 Billion)* for Tejas till now.

The country’s integrated guided missile development programme, which kicked off in 1983, has only now shown some progress, with a few Prithvi and Agni missile variants being inducted into the armed forces.

(* US $ 1.00 = IN Rs 46.5532)

ToI

 

[acetophenol]

Rajendra fire control radar for the Akash SAM: The Rajendra is stated to be ready. However, it can be expected that further iterative improvements will nonetheless be made. The Rajendra is a high power, Passive electronically scanned array radar (PESA), with the ability able to guide up to 12 Akash SAMs against aircraft flying at low to medium altitudes. The Rajendra has a detection range of 8o km with 18 km height coverage against small fighter sized targets and is able to track 64 targets, engaging 4 simultaneously, with up to 3 missiles per target. The Rajendra features a fully digital high speed signal processing system with adaptive moving target indicator, coherent signal processing, FFTs, and variable pulse repetition frequency.The entire PESA antenna array can swivel 360 degrees on a rotating platform. This allows the radar antenna to be rapidly repositioned, and even conduct all round surveillance.[35]

 

[Bossman]

DISMAL PERFORMANCE OF DRDO: A case study of the MBT ARJUN:

by S.Chandrasekharan


On April 27, the Public Accounts Committee in its report to both Houses of Parliament, came down heavily on the Defence ministry for the inordinate delay in the production of the Main Battle Tank- Arjun. It said that the delay overshot the time schedule by 16 years resulting in a cost overrun twenty times more. It may still take two years or more for the tank to be made available thus having an adverse impact on the country’s preparedness and worse still, the report says that bulk production of these tanks is "nowhere in sight."

It will be useful to make a case study of Arjun Tank as delays in R&D projects relating to the development of Weapons Systems besides being costly in financial terms have strategic and military/operational implications.

Case Profile of MBT Arjun:

1970 DRDO commences the project for MBT
1980's (mid) Target date for completion of development as envisaged in the original plan.
1992-93 MBT Arjun undergoes field trials, 22 years after the commencement of the project. Trials were declared successful. However the then COAS, Gen. Shakar Roy Choudhary suggests some refinement of weapons parameters.
1997 Proposals for mass production cleared.
2000 Tank still not made available to user and may take two or more years.

Two things are clear from this. First, the DRDO took 22 years to develop the pre-production models for field trials. Second, it took another five years of field trials for the decision makers to clear the project. In the first case the onus for delay is with DRDO while in the second, all the parties involved namely the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Ministry of Defence (MOD), Ministry of Defence Production (MODP) and the Army Headquarters (AHQ) are equally responsible.

Reasons for Delay:

As there is no integrated management of such projects it is useful to study the role of each agency from the sanctioning authority to producer, to the end user to understand why and how the delays occurred.

DRDO:

The DRDO has no excuses for the delay of 22 years and the only plausible reason one could think of is that the end user AHQ kept on revising the Qualitative Requirements (QRs) midstream thus delaying the project. It is admitted that changing of QRs midstream tends to delay the project but the DRDO could have foreseen this and taken remedial steps.

DRDO had enough experience in R & D while developing the Vijayantha and lessons learnt should have made them anticipate problems like changing QRs.

Secondly the QR changes were confined to weapons systems, fire control system, night vision devices etc. These at any rate were not to be indigenously produced and could have been purchased off the shelf from abroad to speed up the development.

One cannot but conclude that

* DRDO was wanting in implementation of time-bound project objectives which come only when a project is run on scientific management lines.

* DRDO’s functioning has got bureaucratised like other agencies viz. the MOD and MODP.

* Lack of accountability which is a major ill in all bureaucracies.

Army Headquarters (AHQ):

Changing QRs midstream does contribute to delay in the project and the Army’s only excuse could be that the inordinate delay in R & D of MBT coupled with changing threat perceptions and technology advancement of armaments forced them to change the QRs

It is unrealistic to expect the R&D units to revise the project on time if frequent changes of QRs are made for whatever reasons.

* It should be possible at the initial stage itself to fix a time frame for the validity of QRs and if mass production does not take place within the stipulated period then revised QRs should apply.

* QR changes if any should be realistic and in conformity with Indian tactical requirements, terrain and weather conditions. The tendency to pick up points for QRs from glossy Defence journals should be avoided.

* QRs should not be changed midstream. If it is required for emergent reasons, then it should be applied only for a second phase of the project with variants if any.

* Military bureaucratisation at Army Head quarters also contributes to delay. Proposals for even small items have to go through many different directorates with each directorate trying to preserve its turf by queries and counter queries and suggestions. Thus, the files go from one to another, back and forth involving waste of precious time. While this could be acceptable at the initial stage, it is inexcusable to allow such sea sawing at the intermediate stages for revision of QRs.

Role of Ordnance Factories Board:

Ordnance Factories provide the vital link between the project managers, here the DRDO and the end users, the Army. It is seen that in most of the cases the Ordnance factories Board make unrealistic and ambitious time schedules and financial plans. The Armed Forces complain that production schedules are never adhered to and overrun in terms of schedule invariably results in cost escalation and thus a vicious cycle is created,. This log jam could be broken only if all the three parties viz. the producer, end user and the link provided by the ordnance board sit together and frankly discuss the capabilities to adhere to a realistic schedule.

This is based on the assumption that there would be no bureaucratic delay on the part of MOD and MODP which in fact is not the case.

MOD and MODP:

Like all other agencies in India the MOD and the MODP are plagued by the following ills.

* Civil Bureaucrats in MOD and MODP have no clue of defence requirements and their criticality. They continue to treat all issues in the languorous bureaucratised style of administration they had learnt while administering districts.

* They are not attuned to the modern industrial management or financial management disciplines and red tape takes a heavy toll in terms of coming to quick and critical decisions.

* Lack of accountability. In defence matters there could be no compromise as national security interests are involved.

The Arjun tank is a case in point. The Public accounts committee reports that the "delay in production of MBT Arjun has created such a precarious situation there is no option but to retain obsolete Vijayantha tanks." The Vijayantha tanks were in the process of being phased out.

* Both MOD and MODP have not monitored the Arjun project in any purposeful manner. There have been serious delays in decision making and financial allocations.

* The MODP has set up Monitoring Committees for various projects and it is not known how far the monitoring committee has discharged its duties efficiently in the case of the Arjun project.

* Much would depend upon the personality of the Defence Production Secretary as the post itself is not considered by administrators as a prized one. Added to this is the staffing of the MODP at the middle level. These are mostly filled by deputationists from diverse disciplines who have practically no exposure to modern management techniques and no idea of the cutting edge technologies generally required for Defence products.

* Though the Secretary of MODP is of the rank of a Secretary, in terms of administration the Defence Secretary assumes the role of a Principal Secretary with powers to override the MODP Secretary who at times may be senior to the Defence Secretary.

Conclusion:

It is not our intention here to make a fault finding paper. But there has to be accountability of various agencies in the matter of acquisition or research and production of weapons and weapons systems which have an impact on our national security. One typical example is the weapon locating radar for the Indian army. The third report of standing committee on Defence 1999-2000- demands for grants (2000-2001), Lok Sabha Secretariat, April 2000 states-

We quote -

"The Committee find on the basis of the facts brought before it that the Ministry of Defence has not shown any sense of seriousness in acquiring this item ( WLR). The enquiry in respect of this item started in 1989 and even after a decade the Indian Army has not been able to acquire it. Our adversary is in possession of the weapon locating radar and it was used by it during the Kargil conflict to destroy our gun positions".

Who is to answer for the "seeming casualness shown by the Defence ministry?" Should not someone be made accountable?

Defence R&D projects to be viable should meet the requirements of end users in time, if not ahead of time to keep pace with advances in Defence technology. The DRDO should be geared up to execute these projects in a dynamic and integrated manner and there should be accountability at all levels. (Please see one other paper of ours- "The Warrior Scientists of India)

There is need to restructure the interrelationship of MOD, MODP, Ordnance Board and the DRDO. There is no doubt that there will be a tendency to buy equipment off the shelf from other countries as this helps officials to make frequent trips abroad. There is scope for corruption and though denied the role of dubious middlemen cannot be avoided. The DRDO route where viable should be opted, but the procedures will have to be streamlined.

 

[acetophenol]

Central Acquisition Radar, a state of the art planar array, S Band radar operating on the stacked beam principle. With a range of 180 km against fighter sized targets, it can track while scan 200 of them. Its systems are integrated on high mobility, locally built TATRA trucks for the Army and Air Force; however it is meant to be used by all three services. The Planar array was codeveloped by DRDO with a European firm with both the DRDO and the firm sharing design rights, whereas the rest of the hardware and signal processing were done locally. Initially developed for the long running Akash SAM system, seven were ordered by the Indian Air Force for their radar modernization program, and two of another variant were ordered by the Indian Navy for their P-28 Corvettes. The CAR has been a significant success for radar development in India, with its state of the art signal processing hardware.[36][37] The ROHINI is the IAF specific variant while the REVATHI is the Indian Navy specific variant. The ROHINI has a more advanced Indian developed antenna in terms of power handling and beamforming technology while the IREVATH adds two axis stabilisation for operation in naval conditions, as well as extra naval modes.

 

[acetophenol]

BEL Battle Field Surveillance Radar

The PJT-531 Battle Field Surveillance Radar- Short Range (BFSR-SR) is a man portable 2D short range Battle Field and Perimeter Surveillance Radar developed by the Indian Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The BFSR has been designed by DRDO's Bangalore-based laboratory, the Electronics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) and is being manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL).[1]
BFSR has found use in the Indian border areas, especially along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir to prevent infiltration. Over 1100 units are in use by the Indian Army. Foreign Countries have also placed orders for the BFSR.[2]
Over 1,400 BFSRs are now being used by the Army against moving surface targets. A BFSR radar that offers foliage penetration is under development.[3]

Operators

India - Indian Army (1176 units).
- Border Security Force (BSF)[17][18]
Indonesia (~100 units)[20]
Sudan (10 units)[21]
Mozambique Bought for trials

 

[Bossman]

DRDO to preserve the ice Penis of Lord Shiva:

Srinagar: The two-month-long incident-free Amarnath yatra concluded today as a record five lakh pilgrims paid obeisance at the cave shrine this year.

This is for the third consecutive year that the annual Amarnath pilgrimage has come to an end without any incident of violence.

More than 5000 pilgrims led by Mahant Deepender Giri of Dashnami Akhara had a ‘darshan’ of the ‘‘ice lingam (phallic symbol) or Penis’’ of Lord Shiva at the holy cave shrine of Amarnath this morning.

Hundreds of ‘sadhus’ arrived here early morning along with the ‘Chhari Mubarak (holy mace of Lord Shiva)’ to offer special prayers on ‘Shravan-Purnima’ today, which is also the Raksha Bandhan day.

Jammu and Kashmir Governor Lt Gen (Retd) S K Sinha, who is also Chairman of the Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board (SASB), participated in the ‘‘Antim Prarthana (last prayers)’’. He was joined by thousands of devotees.

After special ‘pujan’ at the holy cave shrine, the ‘Chhari Mubarak’ left for Dashnami Akhara in Srinagar from where it had started for the Amarnath cave on August 15 via the traditional yatra route of Pahalgam.

This marked the culmination of the two-month-long Amarnath yatra.

More than five lakh pilgrims from all over the country and abroad paid obeisance at the holy cave shrine of Amarnath this year through Baltal and traditional Pahalgam routes since the commencement of the annual pilgrimage on June 21.

About 60 pilgrims, including 11 women, have died of cardiac arrest or from accidents during the yatra.

Thousands of people lined up everyday to have a darshan of the ‘‘ice lingam (phallic symbol) or Penis’’ of Lord Shiva at the holy cave shrine of Amarnath.

However, the ‘‘icy Shiva lingam or Penis’’ completely melted on August 2, much to the disappointment of devotees thronging the holy cave shrine from all over the country.

Rise in temperature due to rush of pilgrims, use of cameras, burning of incense and other human interferences in the cave are responsible for lingam’s premature melting.

The lingam is formed naturally with an ice stalagmite, which waxes and wanes with the moon.

The holy cave of Amarnath, where the lingam is formed is situated in a narrow gorge at the far end of the Lidder valley at an altitude of 3,888 metres and the temperature is always at sub-zero level.

The Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board (SASB) had last year proposed to create a scientific mechanism for the longevity of the ice lingam at the cave shrine.

It had also approached the Defence and Research Development Authority (DRDO) to send a team to preserve the ice lingam and prevent its premature melting.

The duration of the yatra had become a bone of contention between Gen Sinha and Chief Minister.

The controversy, which dragged on for months, was finally settled after the both Gen Sinha and Chief Minister agreed to start the two-month-long yatra from June 21 via Baltal.

The Governor was advocating a two month-long pilgrimage every year for greater satisfaction of yatris and to help give boost to the local economy.

On the other hand, the Chief Minister had stressed the need for limiting the duration of the yatra to one month only due to security concerns. (UNI)

 

[acetophenol]

Super Vision-2000, an airborne 3D naval surveillance radar, meant for helicopters and light transport aircraft. The SV-2000 is a lightweight, yet high performance, slotted array radar operating in the X Band. It can detect sea-surface targets such as a periscope or a vessel, against heavy clutter, and can also be used for navigation, weather mapping and beacon detection. The radar can detect a large vessel at over 100 nautical miles (370 km).It is currently under modification to be fitted to the Advanced Light Helicopter, and the Navy's Do-228's. Variants can be fitted to the Navy's Ka-25's as well.The radar has been inducted by the Indian Navy and a more advanced variant of the Super Vision, known as the XV-2004 is now in production. The XV-2004 is also operational, and features an ISAR, SAR Capability.

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Long Range Tracking Radar: The LRTR a 3D AESA was developed with assistance from Elta of Israel, and is similar to Elta's proven GreenPine long range Active Array radar. The DRDO developed the signal processing and software for tracking high speed ballistic missile targets as well as introduced more ruggedization. The radar uses mostly Indian designed and manufactured components such as its critical high power, L Band Transmit-Receive modules plus the other enabling technologies necessary for active phased array radars.The LRTR can track 200 targets and had a range of above 500 km and can detect Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, and that India now had the capability to manufacture these radars on its own.The LRTR would be amongst the key elements of the Indian ABM system; DRDO would provide the technology to private and public manufacturers to make these high power systems.

---------- Post added at 09:54 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:53 AM ----------

3D Multi Function Control Radar: A substantial project by itself, the MFCR was developed as part of the Indian anti-ballistic missile program in cooperation with THALES of France. The MFCR is an active phased array radar and complements the Long Range Tracking Radar, for intercepting ballistic missiles. The MFCR will also serve as the fire control radar for the AAD second tier missile system of the ABM program. The AAD has a supplementary role against aircraft as well, and is to engage missiles and aircraft up to an altitude of 30 km. The MFCR fills out the final part of the DRDO's radar development spectrum, and allows India to manufacture long range 3D radars that can act as the nodes of an Air Defence Ground Environment system. As with the LRTR, the MFCR was used successfully in BMD interception effort.
2D Low Level Lightweight Radar (LLLR) for the Army, which require many of these units for gapfilling in mountainous terrain. The Indian Air Force will also acquire the same for key airbases. The LLLR is a 2D radar with a range of 40 km against a 2Sq Mtr target, intended as a gapfiller to plug detection gaps versus low level aircraft in an integrated Air Defence Ground network. The LLLR makes use of Indra-2 technology, namely a similar antenna array, but has roughly half the range and is much smaller and a far more portable unit. The LLLR can track while scan 100 targets and provide details about their speed, azimuth and range to the operator. The LLLR makes use of the BFSR-SR experience and many of the subsystem providers are the same. Multiple LLLRs can be networked together. The LLLR is meant to detect low level intruders, and will alert Army Air Defence fire control units to cue their weapon systems.[42] A 3D LLLR was also revealed in 2008, with the designation "Aslesha".
3D Short Range Radar for the Indian Air Force - ASLESHA: The ASLESHA radars have a range of approximately 50 km against small fighter-sized targets and will be able to determine their range, speed, azimuth and height. This radar will enable the Indian Air Force Air Defence units to accurately track low level intruders. The radar is a semi-active phased array with a 1 meter square aperture. The DRDO was in discussions with the Indian Navy to mount these systems on small ships.
Multi-mode radar,a 3D radar is a HAL project of which DRDO's LRDE is a subsystem provider, this project to develop an advanced, lightweight Multimode fire control radar for the LCA Tejas fighter, has faced stiff challenges and been struck by delay. It has now been completed with Elta's (Israel) assistance. The multimode radar is a greater than 100 km range (detection of a small fighter target), 10 target track, two target engage, lightweight system. It has been revealed that an all new combined signal and data processor had been developed, replacing the original separate units. The new unit is much more powerful and makes use of contemporary ADSP processors. The other radar critical hardware has also been developed and validated, however work remains on the software front. The software for the air to air mode has been developed considerably (including search and track while scan in both look up and look down modes) but air to ground modes are being still worked upon. The radar development was shown to be considerably more mature than previously thought. At Aero India 2009, it was revealed that the 3D MMR project has been superseded by the new 3D AESA FCR project led by LRDE. The MMR has been completed with Elta Israel's assistance and now involved Elta EL/M-2032 technology for Air to Ground mapping and targeting. This "hybrid" MMR has been trialled, validated and will be supplied for the initial LCA Tejas fighters of which 2 Squadrons have been ordered.
DRDO has indigenised components and improved subsystems of various other license produced radars manufactured at BEL, India, with the help of BEL scientists and other researchers. These improvements include new radar data processors for license produced Signaal radars as well as local radar assemblies replacing the earlier imported ones. Several of these items have better performance than the original systems that they replaced.

 

[Bossman]

Pakistan's best friend = Indian domestic defence industry

 

[desiman]

why is this Bossman trolling on this thread ? really Pakistanis need to find something else to do than indulging in India bashing as always, we can show them their reality as well.

 

[desiman]

Be proud on Bharat Rat$hit or similar forums, don't waste bandwidth of a Pakistani forum.

you own this place ? Please cut this crap if you dont.