Indus Priest King
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Let's discuss the ground realities of what happened here:
Kargil peaks captured by Pakistan in 1999
Pakistan still occupies key Drass point
By Praveen Swami
PAKISTAN soldiers perched at peak 5353, on the strategic Marpo La Ridge had a grandstand view of this year's Vijay Diwas celebrations, marking the official end of the Kargil war. At least some of them must had wry smiles on their faces, for although peak 5353 metres is inside the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC), Pakistani troops held the mountain through the Kargil war and continue to do so today.
Artillery observers on peak 5353 metres can direct accurate artillery fire on to up to 20 km of the National Highway 1A, and cripple Indian defensive positions from Mushkoh to Bhimbet. Indian troops are being forced to compensate for this tactical blunder by engaging in a series of operations in the Batalik sector.
Pakistani occupation of point 5353 means Operation Vijay's core objective in Drass, securing the highway, in effect failed. Officials in New Delhi attempt to argue that point 5353 is in an ambiguous location on the Line of Control, and that there are two peaks of the same height which are being confused, claims debunked by copies of the Army's own maps which are in Business Line's possession.
Senior Army commanders in Drass are just as evasive. Asked if Pakistan was indeed in occupation of the peak, 8 Mountain Division Commander Major General Satnam Singh replied that it was ''too early to say''. Asked again, Gen. Singh said he would ''provide authentic information'' during this correspondent's ''next trip''. The strange story of peak 5353 began with the end of Operation Vijay, and the proclamation of a national triumph at Kargil.
Point 5353, like the features around it, had been occupied by Pakistani troops at the start of the Kargil war. Indian soldiers, however, were nowhere near its summit when hostilities were pronounced to have ended. All that had been achieved was the occupation of two secondary positions on the Marpo La ridge line, Charlie 6 and Charlie 7. Pakistani troops also remained on point 5240, some 1200 metres as the crow flies from point 5353. 56 Brigade Commander Amar Aul, in charge of the operations to secure point 5353, responded by occupying two heights on the Pakistani side of the LoC, 4875 and 4251, just before the ceasefire came into force.
Com. Aul's tactics, evidently under political pressure to bring about as quick an end to hostilities as possible, were designed to secure a subsequent territorial exchange. In mid-August, 1999, his efforts to bring about a deal bore fruit. Extended negotiations between the Brigadier and a Pakistani interlocutor, who called himself Colonel Saqlain, led to both sides committing themselves to leave points 5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875 unoccupied.
Both Indian and Pakistani troops were now pulled back to their pre-Kargil position, leaving an arial distance of about a kilometre between the armies along most of the Marpo La ridge. The deal wasn't ideal, for point 5353 was of enormously more strategic importance to India than either 4251 or 4875 were for Pakistan, but it was better than nothing.
Towards the end of October, things began to go horribly wrong. Commander Aul tasked the 16 Grenadiers to take point 5240 and the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles to occupy 5353, choosing to violate the August agreement rather than risk the prospect that Pakistan might reoccupy these positions again. While the 16 Grenadiers attack proceeded as planned, despite bad weather, the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles, for reasons which are still not clear, never made their way up 5353. When Pakistani troops detected the Indian presence on 52 40, they promptly launched a counter assault on 5353. Seven days later, in early November, the Grenadiers unit on 5240 watched Pakistan take up positions on the more important peak.
Pakistan moved rapidly to consolidate its position on 5353. Concrete bunkers came up on the peak, and a road was constructed to the base of the peak from Benazir Post, Pakistan's most important permanent position in the area. In the meanwhile, Commander Aul considered plans to retake the peak. He didn't have much choice. India's positions on 5240 were under threat, along with positions of the 2 Naga in Mushkoh, the 2 Grenadiers in Drass, and the 8 Sikh in Bhimbet. Offensives were discussed in January an d February this year, and again in May and August, but had to be abandoned each time because of the risks involved.
With 5353 and its adjoining area now linked by road to Pakistan's rear headquarters at Gultari, and defensive positions heavily fortified, any frontal attack would mean a full-blown resumption of hostilities in Drass.
The Army's tactics in Kargil now appear to centre around forcing a territorial swap for 5353. The worst of the fighting has come in the Batalik area, to the east of Kargil, where Indian troops have been ordered to take any unoccupied positions they discover on the Pakistan side of the LoC.
In one such operation on April 8, a company of the 14 Sikh Regiment occupied point 5310, an unheld peak roughly one kilometre air distance on the Pakistan side of the LoC. Subedar Bhatnam Singh and one soldier were killed in an avalanche during the operation.
Pakistan retaliation has been prompt. On the night of July 27, a group of 24 porters and four soldiers carrying material for an offensive from Gol Tekri to Rock Fall, facing the key Chorbat La range, were ambushed by Pakistani troops or irregulars. One porter was killed, and three are still missing, presumed dead. There is little doubt that the Pakistani ambush was laid deep in Indian territory for Kalashnikov empties, with a short range, were recovered from the ambush site. The incident followed the destruction, in May, of a new Pakistani post with a shoulder-held missile.
While the Union Government's propaganda on the Kargil War has allowed it to score propaganda points, the end of the conflict is, clearly, not quite yet in sight.
Quotes
Kargil peaks captured by Pakistan in 1999
- Point 5353
- Point Aftab-I
- Point Saddle Ridge
- Point Bunker Ridge
- Shangruti
- Tiger Hill
- Dhalunag
- Point 5353
- Point Aftab-I
- Point Saddle Ridge
- Point Bunker Ridge
- Shangruti
- Dhalunag
Pakistan still occupies key Drass point
By Praveen Swami
PAKISTAN soldiers perched at peak 5353, on the strategic Marpo La Ridge had a grandstand view of this year's Vijay Diwas celebrations, marking the official end of the Kargil war. At least some of them must had wry smiles on their faces, for although peak 5353 metres is inside the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC), Pakistani troops held the mountain through the Kargil war and continue to do so today.
Artillery observers on peak 5353 metres can direct accurate artillery fire on to up to 20 km of the National Highway 1A, and cripple Indian defensive positions from Mushkoh to Bhimbet. Indian troops are being forced to compensate for this tactical blunder by engaging in a series of operations in the Batalik sector.
Pakistani occupation of point 5353 means Operation Vijay's core objective in Drass, securing the highway, in effect failed. Officials in New Delhi attempt to argue that point 5353 is in an ambiguous location on the Line of Control, and that there are two peaks of the same height which are being confused, claims debunked by copies of the Army's own maps which are in Business Line's possession.
Senior Army commanders in Drass are just as evasive. Asked if Pakistan was indeed in occupation of the peak, 8 Mountain Division Commander Major General Satnam Singh replied that it was ''too early to say''. Asked again, Gen. Singh said he would ''provide authentic information'' during this correspondent's ''next trip''. The strange story of peak 5353 began with the end of Operation Vijay, and the proclamation of a national triumph at Kargil.
Point 5353, like the features around it, had been occupied by Pakistani troops at the start of the Kargil war. Indian soldiers, however, were nowhere near its summit when hostilities were pronounced to have ended. All that had been achieved was the occupation of two secondary positions on the Marpo La ridge line, Charlie 6 and Charlie 7. Pakistani troops also remained on point 5240, some 1200 metres as the crow flies from point 5353. 56 Brigade Commander Amar Aul, in charge of the operations to secure point 5353, responded by occupying two heights on the Pakistani side of the LoC, 4875 and 4251, just before the ceasefire came into force.
Com. Aul's tactics, evidently under political pressure to bring about as quick an end to hostilities as possible, were designed to secure a subsequent territorial exchange. In mid-August, 1999, his efforts to bring about a deal bore fruit. Extended negotiations between the Brigadier and a Pakistani interlocutor, who called himself Colonel Saqlain, led to both sides committing themselves to leave points 5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875 unoccupied.
Both Indian and Pakistani troops were now pulled back to their pre-Kargil position, leaving an arial distance of about a kilometre between the armies along most of the Marpo La ridge. The deal wasn't ideal, for point 5353 was of enormously more strategic importance to India than either 4251 or 4875 were for Pakistan, but it was better than nothing.
Towards the end of October, things began to go horribly wrong. Commander Aul tasked the 16 Grenadiers to take point 5240 and the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles to occupy 5353, choosing to violate the August agreement rather than risk the prospect that Pakistan might reoccupy these positions again. While the 16 Grenadiers attack proceeded as planned, despite bad weather, the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles, for reasons which are still not clear, never made their way up 5353. When Pakistani troops detected the Indian presence on 52 40, they promptly launched a counter assault on 5353. Seven days later, in early November, the Grenadiers unit on 5240 watched Pakistan take up positions on the more important peak.
Pakistan moved rapidly to consolidate its position on 5353. Concrete bunkers came up on the peak, and a road was constructed to the base of the peak from Benazir Post, Pakistan's most important permanent position in the area. In the meanwhile, Commander Aul considered plans to retake the peak. He didn't have much choice. India's positions on 5240 were under threat, along with positions of the 2 Naga in Mushkoh, the 2 Grenadiers in Drass, and the 8 Sikh in Bhimbet. Offensives were discussed in January an d February this year, and again in May and August, but had to be abandoned each time because of the risks involved.
With 5353 and its adjoining area now linked by road to Pakistan's rear headquarters at Gultari, and defensive positions heavily fortified, any frontal attack would mean a full-blown resumption of hostilities in Drass.
The Army's tactics in Kargil now appear to centre around forcing a territorial swap for 5353. The worst of the fighting has come in the Batalik area, to the east of Kargil, where Indian troops have been ordered to take any unoccupied positions they discover on the Pakistan side of the LoC.
In one such operation on April 8, a company of the 14 Sikh Regiment occupied point 5310, an unheld peak roughly one kilometre air distance on the Pakistan side of the LoC. Subedar Bhatnam Singh and one soldier were killed in an avalanche during the operation.
Pakistan retaliation has been prompt. On the night of July 27, a group of 24 porters and four soldiers carrying material for an offensive from Gol Tekri to Rock Fall, facing the key Chorbat La range, were ambushed by Pakistani troops or irregulars. One porter was killed, and three are still missing, presumed dead. There is little doubt that the Pakistani ambush was laid deep in Indian territory for Kalashnikov empties, with a short range, were recovered from the ambush site. The incident followed the destruction, in May, of a new Pakistani post with a shoulder-held missile.
While the Union Government's propaganda on the Kargil War has allowed it to score propaganda points, the end of the conflict is, clearly, not quite yet in sight.
Quotes
- "Pakistan is occupying at least six strategically located Indian peaks in the Kargil sector along the Line of Control" - Rajya Sabha member & senior criminal advocate R K Anand. (30 August 2000)
- "Point 5353 is very strategic. In 1992-93, the then corps commander (of India) decided to make a shift pocket on this point and sent personnel there by helicopter. The officers posted there successfully cut off the entire supply to the Pakistani pockets along the LoC for nearly two months."...he said the Indian Army then claimed that point 5353 is "within our LoC and that we have every right to patrol the area." - Rajya Sabha member & senior criminal advocate R K Anand. (30 August 2000)
- "Indian troops had tried to capture Point 5353 on May 18, 1999 when army operations were beginning in Operation Vijay in Kargil last year. But it failed...the operation was carried out by a team of soldiers led by Major Navneet Mehta."..."It is not possible to carry out an assault from the northwestern, western and south western approaches,"..."attack on 5353 called off due to bad weather" and that "13 OR (other ranks) injured in Maj Navneet's Pl (platoon) due to difficult trn (terrain)". - Rajya Sabha member & senior criminal advocate R K Anand. (30 August 2000)
- "If the army's argument that Point 5353 was never India's is to be accepted, then why did they launch the attack?" - Rajya Sabha member & senior criminal advocate R K Anand. (30 August 2000)
- "It looks like our army commanders are wrongly briefing the defence minister," he said when Fernandes' statement was pointed out. "The defence minister mislead Parliament on the basis of the briefing by army officers," Anand said, while demanding action against senior army commanders. - Rajya Sabha member & senior criminal advocate R K Anand. (30 August 2000)
- 'Commander ordered capture of Point 5353 in Kargil war', By Praveen Swami. NEW DELHI, 29 June 2000 - THE HINDU
- 'Pakistan still occupies key Drass point', by Praveen Swami. DRASS, 10 August 2000 - THE HINDU
- 'Fact and fiction on Point 5353; The defence establishment's response to the controversy over Point 5353 plumbs new depths' by Praveen Swami. 30 September 2000 - FRONTLINE
- ‘6 Kargil heights in Pak control’. NEW DELHI, 30 August 2000 - Tribune India
- 'Pakistan occupying six Indian peaks, claims MP' by Josy Joseph. NEW DELHI, 30 August 2000 - REDIFF
- 'Not convinced we won Kargil: Lt Gen Kishan Pal to NDTV' by Nitin Gokhale. NEW DELHI 31 May 2010 00:36 IST - NDTV
- http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/904482.stm
- http://www.ipcs.org/event-report/3r...india-revises-time-frame-of-war/1/254326.html
- https://www.telegraphindia.com/1020828/asp/frontpage/story_1144073.asp
