David Headley says he worked for ISI and LeT for Mumbai Attacks

[Nilgiri]

It's actually quite impressive, all you need is the proper context.


Well compared to India, it's nothing, but Pakistan's GDP is only 270 billion to India's $5 trillion(?). It's all a matter of context.

Besides, I didn't mention remittance in this case, I was talking about FDI, which has little to nothing to do with remittance.


Anywhere from half a billion to a billion a year, that is what I can guess. No one talks about it, as everyone seems to be focused solely on CSF for whatever reason, even though the CSF and reimbursement make up a fraction of US support to Pakistan.


The problem isn't that they've been spread out over a long time (they haven't), the problem is that the US originally invested in the wrong areas (more on military and less on economic front), and spread out their investments over a large number of ill conceived projects; this is changing. The US has realized it's mistakes, and is looking at the Chinese model (a vast majority on economic viable projects, and less on the military front, letting Pakistan handle the military front mainly on it's own terms).

Some reason my multiquote feature is having issues. So point by point:

1. Countries should not rely on remittances too much. They must come in addition to organised structured investment (FDI), especially greenfield. Thats just my view. If you have some resource or report that studies and documents the exact on the ground translation of remittances received by Pakistan, that will be welcome....specifically how much of this remittance turns to hard capital assets. I find that the roughly 2 billion Pakistan gets on FDI per year (till CPEC kicks in) is way too low compared to the 18 billion remittance amount. In a way the remittance shows you the potential where it really should be FDI. For comparison India received (in the latest yearly figures) about 70 billion on remittance and about 60 billion in FDI.

2. When I talk of GFCF (Gross fixed capital formation), i talk about a ratio of GDP spent each year on hard assets. Putting in canals, building houses, net increase in land value, infrastructure, factories, railways etc. For India its about 30%, down from a peak of around 35%. Pakistan has never been past 18%, and in most recent years around 13% (of GDP).

The total size of an economy should have no affect on GFCF. If a sizeable amount of the remittances are converted into hard assets, it would reflect in the GFCF. The problem I see with Pakistan is that its remittances increased from around 2 billion per year during the 80s to around 18 billion today. A growth of around 9 times. That is in line roughly with the amount the Pakistan GDP has grown in the same period (in nominal US dollars)....i.e remittances have always been around 7% of the GDP. But GFCF has actually fell from 19% of GDP in the early 80s to around 13% in 2014.

That means over time, progressively less remittance has been converted to GFCF in % terms (whatever that hypothetically may be if it was a large amount to begin with at all).

It is GFCF (and the closely related GCF) in my experience that provides the launchpad for future sustainable growth. Relying on remittance is not going to cut it unless a high conversion rate is established by some study...and even then it needs to increase several fold to grow the GFCF well past the 13% it is now. CPEC by the way in my estimate will only increase it to around 20% in the coming years (if everything goes to plan), Pakistan should really be targetting well past that.

3. FDI from UAE. How much did it total in the last fiscal year? It cant be projected to be a lot this year since the data so far suggests FDI from non-Chinese countries is actually declining (especially from the US) somewhat:

Pakistan receives $119.3 million in FDI, higher by 7.5% - The Express Tribune

I assume the figures refer to greenfield FDI since total FDI reported by UNCTAD was around 1.7 billion for 2014.

It might also maybe Pakistan has some really weird investment cycle in a given year (so the summer months are really lean and winter is juicier etc.)...so the first 2 months data of the fiscal year cannot be extrapolated to the remaining 10.

Anyways these are not large enough numbers for a 250+ billion dollar GDP from any country. Maybe this year will change with CPEC, but we have to wait and see for that.

4. What figures do you have for proposed US investment in Pakistan in the coming years along the lines of CPEC from China?

Links:

Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) | Data | Table

Personal remittances, received (current US$) | Data | Table

GDP at market prices (current US$) | Data | Table

 

[That Guy]

Some reason my multiquote feature is having issues. So point by point:

1. Countries should not rely on remittances too much. They must come in addition to organised structured investment (FDI), especially greenfield. Thats just my view. If you have some resource or report that studies and documents the exact on the ground translation of remittances received by Pakistan, that will be welcome....specifically how much of this remittance turns to hard capital assets. I find that the roughly 2 billion Pakistan gets on FDI per year (till CPEC kicks in) is way too low compared to the 18 billion remittance amount. In a way the remittance shows you the potential where it really should be FDI. For comparison India received (in the latest yearly figures) about 70 billion on remittance and about 60 billion in FDI.

2. When I talk of GFCF (Gross fixed capital formation), i talk about a ratio of GDP spent each year on hard assets. Putting in canals, building houses, net increase in land value, infrastructure, factories, railways etc. For India its about 30%, down from a peak of around 35%. Pakistan has never been past 18%, and in most recent years around 13% (of GDP).

The total size of an economy should have no affect on GFCF. If a sizeable amount of the remittances are converted into hard assets, it would reflect in the GFCF. The problem I see with Pakistan is that its remittances increased from around 2 billion per year during the 80s to around 18 billion today. A growth of around 9 times. That is in line roughly with the amount the Pakistan GDP has grown in the same period (in nominal US dollars)....i.e remittances have always been around 7% of the GDP. But GFCF has actually fell from 19% of GDP in the early 80s to around 13% in 2014.

That means over time, progressively less remittance has been converted to GFCF in % terms (whatever that hypothetically may be if it was a large amount to begin with at all).

It is GFCF (and the closely related GCF) in my experience that provides the launchpad for future sustainable growth. Relying on remittance is not going to cut it unless a high conversion rate is established by some study...and even then it needs to increase several fold to grow the GFCF well past the 13% it is now. CPEC by the way in my estimate will only increase it to around 20% in the coming years (if everything goes to plan), Pakistan should really be targetting well past that.

3. FDI from UAE. How much did it total in the last fiscal year? It cant be projected to be a lot this year since the data so far suggests FDI from non-Chinese countries is actually declining (especially from the US) somewhat:

Pakistan receives $119.3 million in FDI, higher by 7.5% - The Express Tribune

I assume the figures refer to greenfield FDI since total FDI reported by UNCTAD was around 1.7 billion for 2014.

It might also maybe Pakistan has some really weird investment cycle in a given year (so the summer months are really lean and winter is juicier etc.)...so the first 2 months data of the fiscal year cannot be extrapolated to the remaining 10.

Anyways these are not large enough numbers for a 250+ billion dollar GDP from any country. Maybe this year will change with CPEC, but we have to wait and see for that.

4. What figures do you have for proposed US investment in Pakistan in the coming years along the lines of CPEC from China?

Links:

Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) | Data | Table

Personal remittances, received (current US$) | Data | Table

GDP at market prices (current US$) | Data | Table

You seem so fixated on remittance, when remittance was just a small part of my comment. If I wasn't having trouble with the comment box, I'd rebuttal, but the site seems borked. I can't even edit my own posts.

 

[Nilgiri]

You seem so fixated on remittance, when remittance was just a small part of my comment. If I wasn't having trouble with the comment box, I'd rebuttal, but the site seems borked. I can't even edit my own posts.

Well you asserted earlier that remittances from the US count as investment. Basically I'm asking is there any Pakistani study as to how much remittance received on average gets converted to actual investment by the recipients and then we can further discuss the quality and merits of this form of localised and spread investment.

If anything remittances make Pakistan more dependant on the US, rather than anything the US seriously gains as some form of investment strategy....and that just makes you more potentially vulnerable to a US sanction of some kind targeting this. The US itself gains very little from having a remittance stream to Pakistan in my opinion. It will not be something they factor that much when they sit down to think if they should put sanctions on Pakistan.

My assertion is that US interest in Pakistan has lately been for strategic rather than economic reasons. As the strategic reasons diminish, that opens them up to put punitive sanctions with mostly unilateral effect. Pakistan is not going to become a game changing economy in the next 5, even 10 years (and beyond that its speculation). That means there is a real window here were the US can certainly decide enough is enough and ramp up the pressure on Pakistan to take more firm action on Indian focused state terrorism....especially as more and more 3rd party evidence mounts. OBL and San Bernadino are just two forms that impact the US public conscience more than it was to begin with....US policy itself may lag, but it will be inevitably steered over time to coincide with that of India more and more geopolitically. That is my opinion in a nutshell, of course it can happen quite differently.

 

[That Guy]

Well you asserted earlier that remittances from the US count as investment. Basically I'm asking is there any Pakistani study as to how much remittance received on average gets converted to actual investment by the recipients and then we can further discuss the quality and merits of this form of localised and spread investment.

Uh, no I didn't. If I did, then I miss-wrote it. I meant that the cash flow from the US into Pakistan is greater, when I say investment, I don't necessarily mean business. I mean political and social.

It seems you've successfully changed my point from being one of geopolitical, rather than business. What I've said so far pertains mainly to US support for Pakistan, I don't know how you managed to change that into US investing in Pakistani businesses, which I never brought up. My comments have always been about US supporting Pakistani government efforts.

If anything remittances make Pakistan more dependant on the US, rather than anything the US seriously gains as some form of investment strategy....and that just makes you more potentially vulnerable to a US sanction of some kind targeting this. The US itself gains very little from having a remittance stream to Pakistan in my opinion. It will not be something they factor that much when they sit down to think if they should put sanctions on Pakistan.

Again, you're stuck on remittance. This is something I don't get. You're basing your entire argument on one single example I gave, which wasn't even that big.

You're looking at it through a business point of view, rather than one that is geopolitical. The US doesn't care about the financial side, they care about the political side, which was my original point in the first place. The US is invested (politically, not business) in Pakistan, which is why Obama JUST announced he's seeking $860 billion dollars to give as assistance to Pakistan.

US govt seeks $860m for Pakistan - Newspaper - DAWN.COM

Even if it is a slight decrease, it is still a commitment that the US probably doesn't take lightly.

My assertion is that US interest in Pakistan has lately been for strategic rather than economic reasons. As the strategic reasons diminish, that opens them up to put punitive sanctions with mostly unilateral effect. Pakistan is not going to become a game changing economy in the next 5, even 10 years (and beyond that its speculation). That means there is a real window here were the US can certainly decide enough is enough and ramp up the pressure on Pakistan to take more firm action on Indian focused state terrorism....especially as more and more 3rd party evidence mounts. OBL and San Bernadino are just two forms that impact the US public conscience more than it was to begin with....US policy itself may lag, but it will be inevitably steered over time to coincide with that of India more and more geopolitically. That is my opinion in a nutshell, of course it can happen quite differently.

It's ALWAYS been for strategic reasons, economics has little to do with anything. The strategic reason is not diminishing, it's actually increasing.

You're assuming that the US will give up it's clout in Pakistan, just to appease India. Sanctions are a thing of the past, they likely won't happen. There is no window of anything, and that's the truth.

I would say that US and Indian geopolitics are going to diverge. The USA's ultimate goal is to bring India into its own camp, which will not happen. India has it's own sights on regional hegemony, which is something that the US will no tolerate, as it would affect US' own influence in the region.

We can already see US and Indian interests diverge, from Russia and Syria, to even China. Where the US wants to use India to check China militarily and economically, India's goals are to simply keep China out of South Asia. Economically, India and China are probably each other's biggest partners (politically speaking).

 

[Nilgiri]

Uh, no I didn't. If I did, then I miss-wrote it. I meant that the cash flow from the US into Pakistan is greater, when I say investment, I don't necessarily mean business. I mean political and social.

It seems you've successfully changed my point from being one of geopolitical, rather than business. What I've said so far pertains mainly to US support for Pakistan, I don't know how you managed to change that into US investing in Pakistani businesses, which I never brought up. My comments have always been about US supporting Pakistani government efforts.


Again, you're stuck on remittance. This is something I don't get. You're basing your entire argument on one single example I gave, which wasn't even that big.

You're looking at it through a business point of view, rather than one that is geopolitical. The US doesn't care about the financial side, they care about the political side, which was my original point in the first place. The US is invested (politically, not business) in Pakistan, which is why Obama JUST announced he's seeking $860 billion dollars to give as assistance to Pakistan.

US govt seeks $860m for Pakistan - Newspaper - DAWN.COM

Even if it is a slight decrease, it is still a commitment that the US probably doesn't take lightly.


It's ALWAYS been for strategic reasons, economics has little to do with anything. The strategic reason is not diminishing, it's actually increasing.

You're assuming that the US will give up it's clout in Pakistan, just to appease India. Sanctions are a thing of the past, they likely won't happen. There is no window of anything, and that's the truth.

I would say that US and Indian geopolitics are going to diverge. The USA's ultimate goal is to bring India into its own camp, which will not happen. India has it's own sights on regional hegemony, which is something that the US will no tolerate, as it would affect US' own influence in the region.

We can already see US and Indian interests diverge, from Russia and Syria, to even China. Where the US wants to use India to check China militarily and economically, India's goals are to simply keep China out of South Asia. Economically, India and China are probably each other's biggest partners (politically speaking).

Ok gotcha. Thanks for clarifying, your position is all clear to me now.

Overall it was an interesting exchange and we will have to wait and see how it all turns out.

 

[That Guy]

Ok gotcha. Thanks for clarifying, your position is all clear to me now.

Overall it was an interesting exchange and we will have to wait and see how it all turns out.

You have no idea how long it took me to reply. I had to rewrite that entire thing 4 times, and ended up saying "screw it" and just writing something smaller.

What is going on with PDF?

 

[Nilgiri]

You have no idea how long it took me to reply. I had to rewrite that entire thing 4 times, and ended up saying "screw it" and just writing something smaller.

What is going on with PDF?

Some kind of edit bug.

 

[Solomon2]

It's the same relationship and the same 'responsibility for murderous activities' that the US has -

Had? Like forty years ago?

And no, it can't be, because -

1) the Mumbai attackers were Pakistanis, not native Indians.
2) the people you name, unlike LeT leaders were uniformed military officers. (Or is LeT really is a branch of the Pakistani military?)
3) the correct analogy is the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan's military rulers of the years, not that between Pakistan's military and their trained (now Musharaf-acknowledged) terrorists.

Some ills today are a uniquely Pakistani evil, AM.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Had? Like forty years ago?

And no, it can't be, because -

1) the Mumbai attackers were Pakistanis, not native Indians.
2) the people you name, unlike LeT leaders were uniformed military officers. (Or is LeT really is a branch of the Pakistani military?)
3) the correct analogy is the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan's military rulers of the years, not that between Pakistan's military and their trained (now Musharaf-acknowledged) terrorists.

Some ills today are a uniquely Pakistani evil, AM.

Balochistan is not 40 years ago, and neither are the Al Nusra and Free Farting Syrian Rebel Army.

Whether the proxies used and being used by the US and India were locals or not, the death, destruction and genocide they wreaked and are wreaking was, and is, very real and far surpasses any crimes 'Pakistan's proxies' are alleged to have committed.

The massacre of innocents is a evil regardless of who perpetrates it or how they perpetrate it (local and/or foreign proxies) - there is nothing 'uniquely Pakistani' about it.

 

[Solomon2]

Balochistan is not 40 years ago, and neither are the Al Nusra and Free Farting Syrian Rebel Army. Whether the proxies used and being used by the US and India were locals or not, the death, destruction and genocide they wreaked and are wreaking was, and is -

This is the "U.S. etc. presumed guilty despite lack of evidence or testimony" approach - and it doesn't wash.

The massacre of innocents is a evil regardless of who perpetrates it or how they perpetrate it (local and/or foreign proxies) - there is nothing 'uniquely Pakistani' about it.

It is Pakistan's unabashed support for doing so to achieve geopolitical ends that makes it uniquely evil. After all, the Jews murdered in Nariman House were innocent of any crime or even dispute with Pakistan or Kashmir - but they were still deliberately targeted, in the hope of disrupting Israel-India relations. Where is the Pakistani that is willing to denounce these killings as crimes that their Pakistani perpetrators and supporters should be punished for? Nowhere to be found, yes?

Pakistanis like yourself try to muddle the issues and make out other peoples are just as bad as they are. And maybe some were in the past. But values are what one fights for, AM. Justice requires true facts and making distinctions. You're fighting for tribe here while claiming others do the same as your excuse. And it stinks.

 

[Nilgiri]

After all, the Jews murdered in Nariman House were innocent of any crime or even dispute with Pakistan or Kashmir - but they were still deliberately targeted, in the hope of disrupting Israel-India relations.

Even if India did not exist, Pakistan would be anti-Israel. Israel-India relations are just the icing on an established cake: Pakistan is part of a collection of nations that believe (at a deep level in society too not just govt) that Israel should not exist on the map.

 

[guest11]

Balochistan is not 40 years ago, and neither are the Al Nusra and Free Farting Syrian Rebel Army.

Whether the proxies used and being used by the US and India were locals or not, the death, destruction and genocide they wreaked and are wreaking was, and is, very real and far surpasses any crimes 'Pakistan's proxies' are alleged to have committed.

The massacre of innocents is a evil regardless of who perpetrates it or how they perpetrate it (local and/or foreign proxies) - there is nothing 'uniquely Pakistani' about it.

Now that sir is called poppycock.

You and I had this conversation once before and I told you even then;

1) Kasab was a Pakistani citizen as accepted by then former PM Nawaz Sharif, Tariq Khosa, chief investigator and director of FIA.

2) Mr Khosa accepted on record, in an article written by himself that the attack was planned in Pakistan by Pakistani nationals.

3) Not just Headley but Tahawwur Rana another person of Pakistan origin was also convicted by the US court.

Since you are an US citizen, either you accept the facts as they are presented or accept the fact the gross miscarriage of justice is being carried out by the courts of "your" country and should do something about it. File a PIL or its US equivalent and expose the facade of a fair and independent
judiciary.