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Dassault Rafale, tender | News & Discussions [Thread 2]

Welcome to Rafale came back India home.

But the paint on the tail maybe wrong
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And the cover on the wings maybe moved (above on the 6th people from Right to left)
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All that the paint peeling on the Rafale DH tail indicates is that the airplane has already seen quite a lot of intensive flying. Which is natural, given that the first batch of IAF Rafale pilots are being trained on these twin seaters before they go solo on the Rafale. Nothing alarming about it at all. In fact, all airplanes periodically get paint chipped due to the incredible friction generated during flights.
 
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Simple fact is this -

Stealth aircraft are stealthiest when their control surfaces (canards, elevons, elevators, whatever) are at 0 degrees positive or negative elevation. The incident radar waves have nothing to be reflected off of in that case.

But, these control surfaces are positioned depending on the airspeed, nowadays controlled automatically by the FCS. At high speeds, they need to be angled down, and at low speeds, they need to be slightly angled up. This is with reference to canards. Opposite positioning is true for elevators.

This angling reduces stealth.

Now, to be fair, this problem is the exact same with a fighter that has elevators instead of canards. But, one huge difference that makes a big dent in the RCS is that such a fighter has it’s wing in front of the tail controls. This means that the wing serves as a sort of shield against radar returns, meaning that stealth is far more similar across a wider range of air speeds.

So any canards equipped fighter will see spikes of RCS as the canards deflect up or down, depending on the air speed. It's just plain physics.

Showing pictures of prototypes that NEVER made it into production doesn't make one whit of a difference to physics. And no, physics won't change for China either.
 
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Here below is a 6th gen fighter concept from Boeing. As you can see it has canards.
If a canard plane can't be stealthy, Boeing would not even propose it.
If a canard plane can't be stealthy, Chengdu would have gone with a standard configuration instead. If they opted for canards it's because they've tested it.
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Indian AF claimed that J-20 could be detected by Su-30 MKI.
It could be true, J-20 is not an all-aspect stealth plane like F-22. Its stealth is mostly frontal side focused for Air to Air combat. If a J-20 is returning to base, its non-stealthy engine nozzles will be pointed towards enemy radar, and that will make it easily detectable. But in a real combat scenario, there won't be any Su-30MKI left alive when J-20 returns to base.

In the case of this design that you're showing, guess what is the single biggest RCS contributor that is MISSING?!

The vertical stabilizers.

The absence of vertical stabs will mean the single biggest RCS contributor is gone, leading to such a small RCS that even having canards will not be such a bad thing.

OTOH, the J-20 (which of course is known to be inspired based off the MiG-1.42 designs that were sold to China) has large vertical stabilizers as well as canards.

But feel free to believe that an Air Chief Marshal who regularly gets briefings from technical staff at the IAF doesn't know what he's talking about.
 
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Absolutely no evidence. We even don't know if those Mirage flew with MICA...

In Lybia, 2011, we entered first in the airspace, BEFORE the US fired hundereds od cruise missile. No problem. The Lybian radars never saw the french birds.

All made up stuff from the PAF accounts. JF-17 Block Is that flew don't even have jamming equipment to jam Mirage-2000Is.
 
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In the case of this design that you're showing, guess what is the single biggest RCS contributor that is MISSING?!

The vertical stabilizers.

The absence of vertical stabs will mean the single biggest RCS contributor is gone, leading to such a small RCS that even having canards will not be such a bad thing.

OTOH, the J-20 (which of course is known to be inspired based off the MiG-1.42 designs that were sold to China) has large vertical stabilizers as well as canards.

But feel free to believe that an Air Chief Marshal who regularly gets briefings from technical staff at the IAF doesn't know what he's talking about.

Man, please re-read what you have written, your logic is flawed.

Anyway, following your logic, let's say the vertical stabilizer contributes 100 to RCS and canard contributes 10 to RCS.
The F-22 would have 100 RCS while J-20 would have 110. Making both aircraft comparable in RCS.
A future F-XX conventional fighter without vertical stabilizer VS future J-XX canard fighter without vertical stabilizer, would be F-XX having 0.00000001 RCS and J-XX having 10 RCS. It's like day and night!
If you cant fix the canard RCS problem, in a future 6th gen fighter the problem would be even more serious.
 
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The Rand corporation report about the Lybian 2011 campaign :

The French Military Engagement
The French engagement, labeled Opération Harmattan, started the air campaign, as Sarkozy announced to France’s partners during the Libya summit on March 19 that he had ordered a first strike on Libyan forces in the suburbs of Benghazi. It continued until the last day of Operation Unified Protector. Recent accounts point to a discreet but quite systematic French national ISR campaign focused on the coast of Libya in the preceding week using air, naval, and space assets to establish a more accurate order of battle of the Libyan forces and to assess their capabilities, in the logic of an intelligence preparation of the battlefield.9 Even though this campaign was executed under serious political constraints—the French feared an incident that would jeopardize the chances of a robust U.N. resolution—it allowed a national assessment of the status of Libyan forces and the planning of the initial French strikes. Even though it was relatively modest in size by U.S. standards, Operation Harmattan was nevertheless the largest engagement for the French Air Force and Navy at least since Kosovo. It actually was not modest for France at all when it came to the maximum operational contract given to the air force. At any given time, the French Air Force must be able to provide up to (and no more than) 70 combat aircraft in a coalition operation. But in addition to Libya, the French Air Force was already deployed in several other countries, including Afghanistan (with six combat aircraft), Chad (three aircraft), and the UAE (six aircraft). At the peak of the operation, with 39 combat aircraft engaged in Libya, the French Air Force almost reached its “operational contract” of 70 combat aircraft deployed in operations. Operation Harmattan primarily involved the air force, but the navy and army also contributed. As detailed below, the French took—together with the British—the largest share of strike missions and allowed the United States to withdraw the bulk of their combat assets fairly quickly and “lead from behind,” according to the famous phrase coined during the campaign. This was a very significant experience for the French forces, as they had not played such a central role in coalition operations in post–Cold War conflicts (Bosnia in 1995 came closest, at least on the ground with the Quick Reaction Force set up with London). During the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999 Kosovo campaign, or in Afghanistan since 2001, France always had taken a back seat to the United States in combat operations. This changed with Libya, as the non-U.S. members of the coalition were expected to produce the core military effect after the first few days.
Before entering into the details of the French engagement, two observations are worth noting. First, the Libyan campaign was not the Battle of Britain; it was a limited and successful air campaign conducted by a relatively small force confronting a rather modest adversary that was in no position to engage superior and more modern air forces. Second, the French, compared with many coalition partners, did have a preLibya experience of managing operations with their own command-and-control assets. Much of that experience came through a series of national engagements in Africa, some of which were quite demanding.

Deployment and Command Structure
France deployed military assets from the first day of operations on March 19 until the end of the NATO operation on October 31. Up to 4,300 servicemen and women were deployed as part of Operation Harmattan (the national operation retained its name after the launch of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector). Even though it was a primarily an air campaign, Operation Harmattan involved all three services. France conducted the first strikes in Libyan territory with air force planes that originally operated from French bases, but then flew mostly from La Suda in Crete and Sigonella in Sicily to reduce transit. The Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (GAN) also was quickly involved in operations over Libya from the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle; the first operational flight by naval Rafale M multirole fighters occurred as early as March 22; and the first strike carried out by Super Étendard strike aircraft took place the following day. Twenty-seven different ships were engaged for more than seven months to ensure continuity of maritime operations and control of sea and air space while conducting artillery strikes against land targets. With more than 1,500 days at sea, they allowed the deployment of a naval combat aircraft force, army attack helicopters, and air force helicopters dedicated to the recovery personnel in hostile territory. Aéronavale carrier aircraft accounted for 1,590 sorties (including 840 offensive sorties) from March 22 until August 12, roughly one-fourth of the French total. On May 18, the Army attack helicopter group (GAM), composed of 24 helicopters (20 Gazelles and 4 Tigres), went into action from the Mistral-class Projection and Command Ships (BPC) (Tonnerre followed by Mistral). At the peak of the crisis, France committed more than 40 aircraft, 30 helicopters, and a dozen warships. Air force and navy planes totaled nearly 5,600 sorties and more than 27,000 flight hours, achieving 25 percent of sorties by the coalition, 35 percent of offensive missions, and 20 percent of strikes. This represents nearly 3,100 offensive sorties, 1,200 reconnaissance sorties, 400 air defense sorties, and 340 air traffic control and 580 air-to-air refueling missions. The Army’s attack helicopter group conducted some 40 raids comprising more than 250 sorties.

The Choice of Bases
Libya was a special case of power projection from a French perspective, as operations could be conducted from airfields in France. Several air bases in continental France did take part in the air campaign: Avord, Dijon, Istres-Le Tubé, Nancy-Ochey, and SaintDizier-Robinson. The base in Corsica, Solenzara, played an important role as France’s most southern military airfield. The first strikes were launched from air bases in northeastern France (carried out by Mirage 2000Ds from Nancy, and Rafales from Saint Dizier). But it proved extremely useful to progressively shift the main bases closer to Libya, first by making extensive use of Solenzara, and then by forward-deploying air assets to Sigonella in Sicily and La Suda on Crete. This saved significant transit time and enabled French combat aircraft to spend more time in actual combat missions. In this particular geographical context, the role of the aircraft carrier in the campaign was less important than it would have been in more distant engagements. Accordingly, after it played a significant role in the first months of the French engagement, the Charles de Gaulle was withdrawn from the operation.

The First Days of the Operation
France was the first coalition partner to strike, on March 19 at 6:00 p.m., a few hours before British and U.S. forces went into action. This decision was taken for a series of reasons. It was, of course, Sarkozy’s highly political decision to demonstrate French resolve and take a leadership role. The fact that the strike was announced during the coalition senior-level meeting on Libya and took place immediately after the meeting maximized the political and media effects. The decision also was prompted by a sense of humanitarian emergency, as Qaddafi’s armored forces were closing on Benghazi. The choice of military targets in the ground forces encircling Benghazi was consistent with that concern. From a military perspective, this first strike did not go by the book according to standard U.S. practice, as SEAD operations or the confirmed destruction of Libyan airpower had not yet taken place. It was, therefore, a rather risky operation carried out successfully, and not merely a symbolic attack. It involved around 20 air force aircraft: eight multirole Rafales, two Mirage 2000-5s (for air superiority), two Mirage 2000Ds (for interdiction), six C-135FR tankers, and one E-3F AWACS, striking targets located some 1,500 kilometers from their bases. Four Libyan armored vehicles were reportedly destroyed during the mission, two by GBU-12 laser-guided bombs dropped by the Mirage 2000Ds and two by AASM guided weapons launched by Rafales. This was a rather small number by military standards, but it stopped the advance of Qaddafi’s leading forces at the outskirts of Benghazi and probably helped prevent a massacre in the city. Had Benghazi fallen, the outcome of the war could have been quite different. As such, this initial strike served a critical political and strategic purpose.
As Christian Anrig has noted, this attack could point at a difference in “ways of war”:
Specifically, the United States musters overwhelming force to produce decisive results at the least cost of lives. In contrast, former European colonial powers have a history of fighting outgunned and outnumbered . . . This attitude is also reflected in the French air force’s initial strikes on 19 March 2011. Some commentators were quick to play down the risks involved, arguing that the French had identified a gap in the fixed-site air defense system, but the threat of mobile surface-to air missiles undoubtedly remained.

In their post-war assessment, the French point at this first strike to downplay their reliance on U.S. assets for SEAD. This assessment is correct for this particular raid, since no losses occurred. Libyan air defenses nonetheless identified the French raid and engaged it with an SA-8 surface-to-air missile system, which fortunately was out of range.12 It is, however, questionable that such a risky tactic would have worked for the whole campaign, as the French were probably not ready to take significant risks of aircraft losses. Therefore, this opening move might denote a divergence of operational habits. The French, like the British, are used to making do with less. Despite France’s early accomplishment, the first days of operations relied heavily on U.S. assets, especially ones that the French were unable to provide, including SEAD aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles that conducted deep strikes against critical infrastructure. (Of the 199 sea-launched cruise missiles fired in the first ten days, 192 were American and seven were British. None of the missiles were French, as the French naval equivalent, SCALP Naval, had yet to enter service.) Some have criticized this coalition show of force as unnecessary overkill, with the potential for negative political impact among Arab states in particular. In the first three days of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the French conducted about 55 sorties (slightly more than one-quarter of the grand total, with U.S. forces conducting the bulk of the operations).

Who’s in Charge?
Because the operation was swiftly launched, the command issue was not fully resolved when operations started. In the first three days, operations were primarily under national command. The JFACC in Ramstein focused on deconfliction among the three national U.S., UK, and French operations— Odyssey Dawn, Ellamy, and Harmattan. With a great deal of HQ work, operations evolved after a couple of days to a more integrated approach, allowing the JFACC to take a more classic command role involving “a hierarchy of objectives, distribution of tasks, daily generation of Air Tasking Orders (ATO) orchestrating the whole operation, [and] introduction of opportunity targeting.”13 During the first days of operations, according to Italian journalist David Cenciotti, the French still advocated a coalition-of-the-willing approach and seemed to “have clearly shown an interest to assume command of all air operations of Operation Odyssey Dawn while Italy threatened to cease supporting coalition planes on its airbases and close its airspace if NATO does not take over the unitary command of the air campaign, in clear contrast with the French position.”14 Jean-Christophe Notin’s detailed account confirms this.15 At the time, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was saying, “This isn’t a NATO mission. This is a mission in which the NATO machinery may be used for command and control.” The decision to move to NATO command was made on March 24, after France was put under intense pressure from allies (Britain, the United States, and Italy) to shift in that direction. The NATO structure was in place by March 31 with the formal launch of Operation Unified Protector and with JFC Naples taking over command. France only reluctantly endorsed this move, insisting that the operation should use NATO command assets without being placed under Alliance political control. France went along, but did not really get on board until it became clear that there were more forces engaged in the operation than NATO. France continued throughout the campaign to put the emphasis on the Contact Group as the prime forum for political consultations in the coalition. It is important to underscore General Bouchard’s role in the difficult but successful transition from Odyssey Dawn to Unified Protector, from Ramstein to Naples.

Operations
As the campaign developed over seven months, it went through several distinct phases. Difficult transitions sometimes occurred, especially concerning C2. The first two to three days was the first phase, which actually was a collection of three independent national operations. The second phase was Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) under U.S. command, with other allies contributing significantly (France and the UK) or more modestly (Denmark, Norway, Canada, Qatar). During that first phase, U.S. airpower provided the bulk of all air missions and strikes. As coalition capabilities grew, the United States’ participation declined. Of the 1,990 coalition sorties during OOD,
AFRICOM reported that U.S. forces flew 1,206 sorties, including almost precisely half of the strike missions (463 out of 952).16 During that first phase, the French order of battle evolved. The BA 116 air base at Solenzara, Corsica, became the main forward operating base with the deployment of six of eight Rafales, eight Mirage 2000Ds, and six Mirage F-1CR reconnaissance fighters. Three Mirage 2000-5s started operating from Suda to conduct air-superiority missions with their counterparts from Qatar. The navy deployed the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle with its battle group of 14 Rafales and modernized Super Étendards and two E-2 Hawkeyes, expanding the potential number of sorties. French forces used many capabilities not previously employed in combat. The navy and the air force for the first time fired SCALP cruise missiles (the French version of the British Storm Shadow), with the first raid carried out jointly by the air force (Mirages and Rafales) and the navy (Rafales), firing a total of seven cruise missiles against Al-Joufra air base 250 kilometers into Libya in order to demonstrate there was no safe haven for pro-Qaddafi forces.17 French fighter-bombers also used an IR imagery version of the AASM-guided munition (Armement Air-Sol Modulaire, or modular air-to-surface armament, an all-weather stand-off PGM propelled by a rocket booster) that had not previously been used in Afghanistan. Libya also was France’s first opportunity to deploy new pods on the Rafale, with the Reco NG reconnaissance pod and the Damocles MP targeting pod seeing their first operational use.
After the NATO takeover, the United States withdrew most of its combat assets after April 4 in keeping with its unprecedented decision to play a more modest role. The pace of operations was markedly reduced after peaking in late March at 180 daily sorties. French and British forces suddenly were at the forefront and had to take over a larger share of combat missions with only a handful of partners; only Italy, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Belgium then were engaged in strike missions, while others remained focused on enforcing the no-fly zone. The U.S. decision to “lead from behind” also showed the Europeans’ weaknesses. U.S. assets remained vital to the conduct of operations, as tankers and advanced ISTAR capabilities (including UAVs) proved indispensable to sustaining and continuing the operations, even at the slower pace that characterized the campaign after its initial days. The slow pace, combined with the fact that fewer deliberate targets appeared as regular Libyan forces became scattered and dismounted, significantly slowed down the number of sorties and strikes. Allies also had to adjust their forces to evolving Libyan tactics. France and the UK decided to deploy attack helicopters offshore to add a capability focused on targeted air support for the rebel forces engaged in ground combat. As far as France was concerned, Sarkozy decided on this deployment of army helicopters, which began on May 18, and started conducting daily raids from the Mistral-class BPC ships on June 3. This force of 24 helicopters combined four modern Tigres and 20 older Gazelles and successfully conducted more than 250 sorties in 37 raids. French helicopters destroyed 614 targets, including 400 vehicles, with coalition helicopters carrying out nearly 90 percent of strikes. The UK was the only other nation to employ attack helicopters; the imbalance with the British engagement can be explained by different tactics. British Apaches were used only to attack predesignated targets and did not engage in opportunity targeting. In complicated and demanding missions, the French helicopters were able to attack targets at close range that would have been too risky or to difficult to attack with fixed-wing combat aircraft, given NATO’s rules of engagement. French Army helicopters took real and significant risks and served an important purpose at a time when the operation seemed a bit stalled. The French prepared and promoted the engagement of attack helicopters early in the conflict as an additional tactic aimed at producing tactical effects on the ground. General Bouchard’s background as a helicopter pilot helped the French make a convincing case to NATO. Their engagement required careful planning, as the army Gazelle and Tigre attack helicopters were operating for the first time from a naval platform.18 Drastic security measures also were taken to limit as much as possible the risks for the crews, with air support and a combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) helicopter attached to each raid. Most of the targets destroyed were light vehicles (pickup trucks) that planes found more difficult to target, given the constraints imposed on altitude. These targets also were less important from a strategic standpoint compared to the heavy vehicles, the depots, and C2 that fixed-wing aircraft targeted. Helicopter operations nevertheless played an important tactical role in Brega and Misrata. For the air combat force, the French operation also evolved over time. Six Mirage 2000Ds were redeployed to Souda, which is 900 kilometers from Misrata versus the more than 1,200 kilometers from Solenzara. This redeployment reduced transit time and the need for refueling, and increased time on station in the theater, thus improving the force’s reactivity. The force could perform between 15 and 20 daily interdiction sorties, most often comprising mixed patrols of Rafales and Mirage 2000s or Rafales and Super Étendards, with three more counterair sorties by Mirage 2000-5s from Souda, supported by ten refueling sorties, air control (performed by AWACS or E-2), and reconnaissance (Mirage F-1CR or Rafale with Reco NG pod). When the mission of the Charles de Gaulle ended in August, air operations continued under the sole responsibility of the air force, whose updated force included six Mirage 2000Ns (the nuclear-capable version of Mirage 2000, which since the 1990s also has performed conventional missions), partially compensating for the withdrawal of French Navy aircraft. The French commitment remained altogether relatively modest in size, as the number of combat aircraft engaged in the Libyan theater never exceeded 39. As far as munitions were concerned, the French chief of staff said in a Senate hearing in October 2011 that 1,000 bombs, 600 missiles, 1,500 rockets, and thousands of various ammunition rounds were fired by early September. France did not face significant ammunition shortages and could manage with its stockpile throughout the seven months of operations. Finally, it is important to note that in many respects, the French experience in Libya was a joint experience. Beyond the role of the army attack helicopters, the naval interdiction mission, and the contribution of carrier-based aircraft, the navy also was directly involved in onshore operations. After May 4, French frigates used their guns to fire at land targets, something the French Navy had not done in decades. The navy altogether fired 3,000 100-mm and 76-mm rounds, which reportedly helped damage the morale of besieged anti-Qaddafi forces. Naval assets also were used as intelligence tools; the Rubis-class French nuclear attack submarine (SNA) is said to have performed a number of reconnaissance missions in Libyan waters

Military Lessons
Two points have been rightfully highlighted. Air-to-air refueling capabilities were too limited to allow the coalition to conduct the operation without a massive U.S. involvement during the entire conflict. This point has been well taken, and France intends to accelerate the replacement of its aging KC-135 fleet. Conducted in conjunction with the national decision to acquire more modern tankers (Airbus MRTT), efforts are under way to work on a European acquisition of a fleet of modern tankers as a response to this particular shortfall. The French also have fully acknowledged shortfalls in the area of ISR. They plan to procure jointly with the UK a new generation of medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) UAVs. The French also joined with the United States in a cooperative initiative to improve NATO’s ISR in the preparation for the NATO Chicago summit in 2012. The initiative will go beyond the acquisition of the Air Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, as it will build a NATO ISR capability in Sigonella that is able to use all ISR assets of NATO nations beyond the AGS itself. Libya also has led to debates about the need for more long-range deep-strike capabilities, as the lack of French participation in the first days’ sea-launched cruise missile campaign underscored. Tactically, the value of precision munitions such as the British Brimstone has been highlighted as well. In spite of severe financial constraints, many of these lessons learned should have an impact on the decisions to come in the next procurement bill covering the years 2014 to 2019. The fact remains that military planning across Europe has for decades been built on the assumption that the United States would perform some functions and would provide some key enablers. Based on this assumption, all European governments, including those that have preserved a small but more or less full-spectrum force (France and the UK) have capability gaps that Libya highlighted. Besides those already mentioned, SEAD and CAS come to mind as far as airpower is involved. There is a legitimate pride in France about the positive outcome of the Libya campaign. Even though NATO’s use of force was quite restrained, NATO forces achieved their political objectives through an air campaign that caused very limited collateral damage. Even with the United States only “leading from behind,” the operation demonstrated that Western military power still was able to deliver and did not have to put boots on the ground (except for a very limited number of special forces) to do so. Having taken a significant part in this effort, France deserves its share of this success, especially as far as the high readiness of its forces was concerned. The key issue for the future is the ability of Europeans to deliver budgets allowing the preservation of significant military capabilities in key European countries. This should not be taken for granted, given the deepening of the economic crisis in Europe and the fiscal constraints associated with it. With respect to command and control, it surprised many French officials that all other allies (excluding the United States, but including the UK) were not really in a position to engage in an operation without NATO’s support for planning and commanding the operation. This dependence on NATO’s military structure surprised the French military, which has preserved a strategic culture of autonomy if and when necessary. For their part, the French were only just coming back into NATO’s integrated military structure after the 2009 Sarkozy decision to do so, and will have to reinvest in NATO to gain a better understanding of NATO’s procedures and culture.

Political-Military Lessons
In spite of its reluctance to act through NATO, France now recognizes that the Alliance performed reasonably well as a military structure and proved altogether useful from a military standpoint. It was noticeably successful in integrating non-NATO allies in operations. From a French perspective, some important political-military issues remain to be addressed for the future of the Alliance. First, the Alliance was, initially, not united and had a hard time finding a common position. A major ally (Germany) abstained on UNSCR 1973 and was not only reluctant to use force but not ready to allow the use of force for a mission combining a sound legal basis, a serious security challenge in the vicinity of Europe, and a good moral and political case. Strong political divisions existed on the Libyan crisis within the Alliance and were never completely ironed out. Second, the military contribution of NATO allies was unequal. Some did not take part in OUP (Germany, Central Europeans, and the Baltic States). Only a handful (eight of 28) took an active part in the strikes (United States, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Denmark), while others took part in OUP but limited their commitments to naval operations or enforcement of the no-fly zone. This tendency of some nations carrying the bulk of the effort while others abstain is damaging to the Alliance over the long term. Moreover, this proves the limits of specialization within the Alliance. How can allies rely on unreliable partners for key capabilities when they could decline to participate in a military engagement? An essential lesson is to be learned, especially at the present time, when the “smart defense” narrative at times insists on such specialization as a way to address European capability shortfalls. Third, the American choice to lead from behind also came as a shock to many Europeans. All previous major NATO operations, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, saw the United States taking the lead and providing the bulk of forces. The Libyan case is a challenge to the European allies (and Canada) as it could open a new era in which U.S. leadership in the management of a crisis should not be taken for granted. If Libya signals the way of the future for U.S. leadership, Europeans would consider it a major change. It does question directly the ability of the Europeans to act on their own or with limited U.S. support to address security challenges and crises. The issue could shift from the challenges of interoperability with U.S. forces to the need to be able to act alone. If confirmed, this would dramatically alter the capability requirements for the Europeans, and also could have very significant political implications for NATO and the EU. Finally, the limited U.S. engagement partially explains the length of the conflict. It led the coalition to pursue a longer and more constrained air campaign than what originally was expected and planned. Many rightfully suggest that a full-fledged U.S. commitment probably could have shortened the duration of the conflict by achieving decisive results earlier. Other constraints, such as carefully avoiding collateral damage or allowing the NTC to better organize its ground forces, nevertheless suggest that the conduct of operations and the final outcome might not have been that different.

Libya and the Future of Warfare: A Model for Future Conflicts?
A year after the campaign was completed in Libya, many seemed to have forgotten the operation and the lessons learned from the conflict. The 2012 Chicago summit could have been an opportunity to take stock of a successful NATO operation, but the emphasis was put on ongoing operations, starting with Afghanistan. It is, nevertheless, worthwhile to explore some of the important positive future lessons learned: • Airpower allowed achieving the political objectives that UNSCR 1973 assigned without losses on the Alliance side and with very limited collateral damage from the operation itself (as the U.N. and Amnesty International acknowledged). However, the human costs and consequences of seven months of civil war should not be underestimated. • The operation proved to be relatively affordable despite budget constraints, certainly compared to Afghanistan but also relative to its effects, and was conducted in a relatively short time frame. It thus met the challenges associated with “war fatigue” in Western democracies, the growing aversion to casualties, boots on the ground, and high financial costs. • A long-term and difficult engagement on the ground in Libyan territory was avoided (and even prohibited under UNSCR 1973). This military constraint restricted options, but ultimately led to choosing a less ambitious and demanding path, which presumably took longer but ultimately was successful. The lack of direct control over Libyan territory also had some significant disadvantages, with the difficult stabilization of post-war Libya and the spread of light weapons to the Sahel having a negative impact on the region’s stability. Several years after the end of NATO operations, the final assessment is now darker. It is, however, not clear that a more classic land operation (had such an operation been allowed) would have been much more successful in addressing these complex side effects of regime change in Libya. • Western military superiority can still make the difference. A limited use of airpower had a decisive effect and not only allowed the operation to address ahumanitarian crisis associated with the logic of “responsibility to protect,” but allowed regime change after 42 years of Qaddafi to take place. • NATO taking the lead of an operation involving regional partners with a U.N. mandate was a politically sound approach. This has led NATO to put a new emphasis on partnerships, as the ability to act with non-NATO partners was politically essential and militarily useful. • Intense cooperation among the air forces of key partners (United States, Britain, and France in particular) proved to be extremely useful during the campaign. Can the Libyan model be applied elsewhere? From a political perspective, the conditions were unique and will be difficult to reproduce, as proven by difficult debates about Syria in the UNSC in 2012 and 2013. From a military standpoint, and given the war fatigue in many Western societies, this approach combining local allies and airpower might have more traction than protracted land wars. It is also important to note that ongoing budget cuts in Europe could have a significant effect on the ability of Europeans to conduct such an operation in the future, as it seems that not only the reduction of capability shortfalls will become more difficult, but that European allies might well scrap some capabilities that proved useful in Libya. Although no conflict is ever replayed in the future, the operations in Libya certainly could serve as a model for a variety of future contingencies. It was, in any case, a major experience for France as it allowed the country to successfully test a generation of new equipment. President Sarkozy’s political choice to move to the forefront of the international debate was backed by the more-than-significant commitment of French forces, with airpower playing the major role.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR676.html
 
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Man, people do their tests before going on with a 100+ billion program. If canards are bad for stealth, Chengdu would have gone with conventional configuration.
Regarding Boeing, their 6th fighter concept promises to be more stealthy than F-22 because they will remove the vertical stabilizers. So, why ruin the superior stealth with canards if they are inherently unstealthy?
Besides, the flying tech-demo Boeing X-36 had canards (photo below) and are pretty stealthy, it is simply difficult to achive planform alignment on canards planes.
bItHTpv.jpg
I'm all but not a specialist in Maxwell equation, but some said me that the main problem with canards (about stealth) is their small size.
On the X36 they seems quite big, and perfectly aligned with the other wings planform. Probably a solution.
 
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Man, please re-read what you have written, your logic is flawed.

Anyway, following your logic, let's say the vertical stabilizer contributes 100 to RCS and canard contributes 10 to RCS.
The F-22 would have 100 RCS while J-20 would have 110. Making both aircraft comparable in RCS.
A future F-XX conventional fighter without vertical stabilizer VS future J-XX canard fighter without vertical stabilizer, would be F-XX having 0.00000001 RCS and J-XX having 10 RCS. It's like day and night!
If you cant fix the canard RCS problem, in a future 6th gen fighter the problem would be even more serious.
The J20 canards (as Rafale, EF and Gripen ones) are not fully aligned with the main wings planform ! the canards contribution to RCS may be higher than expected.
 
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I'm all but not a specialist in Maxwell equation, but some said me that the main problem with canards (about stealth) is their small size.
On the X36 they seems quite big, and perfectly aligned with the other wings planform. Probably a solution.
No

The J20 canards (as Rafale, EF and Gripen ones) are not fully aligned with the main wings planform ! the canards contribution to RCS may be higher than expected.



KerfIPy.jpg

By eyeballing, the frontal side looks aligned.(Orange) The problem is the rear side.(green)
But just like I said, the J-20 stealth is mostly frontal side focused. It can be easily detected from the rear, mostly because of engine nozzle.
 
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No





KerfIPy.jpg

By eyeballing, the frontal side looks aligned.(Orange) The problem is the rear side.(green)
But just like I said, the J-20 stealth is mostly frontal side focused. It can be easily detected from the rear.

The leading edge is align in one dimension. Not in the other !
Capture J20 1.PNG

Capture J20 2.PNG

And the trailing edge....
 
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The leading edge is align in one dimension. Not in the other !
View attachment 659357
View attachment 659358
And the trailing edge....
I cant understand what you mean. Please explain better. Maybe using the top view photo and the production plane not the tech demostrator.

By Planform alignment, I mean this :
rTOOYjt.gif

As you can see, the colored lines in the F-22 are PARALLEL, while those of Typhoon are not parallel/aligned
 
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I cant understand what you mean. Please explain better. Maybe using the top view photo and the production plane not the tech demostrator.

By Planform alignment, I mean this :
rTOOYjt.gif

As you can see, the colored lines in the F-22 are PARALLEL, while those of Typhoon are not parallel/aligned

It's obvious what Bon Plan wrote. You're looking at it in 2 dimensions (from the top view) to claim that ah, look the front edges of the canards and wings are aligned. But the rear edges of the canards and wings are not aligned, which is not good for reducing RCS.

Bon Plan is looking at it in the front view- the canards are nowhere near being in the same plane as the wings. They are canted upwards even when they are not deflecting up or down.

And on a huge fighter like the J-20, those canards are pretty massive surfaces. Ergo, one would expect rather large RCS returns compared to say a F-22 or F-35.
 
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It's obvious what Bon Plan wrote. You're looking at it in 2 dimensions (from the top view) to claim that ah, look the front edges of the canards and wings are aligned. But the rear edges of the canards and wings are not aligned, which is not good for reducing RCS.
Just as I said, the rear stealth of J-20 is not good

Bon Plan is looking at it in the front view- the canards are nowhere near being in the same plane as the wings. They are canted upwards even when they are not deflecting up or down.
It doesn't matter, the picture I posted that compare F-22 and Typhoon share the same situation.
Typhoon has canted canards too.

And on a huge fighter like the J-20, those canards are pretty massive surfaces. Ergo, one would expect rather large RCS returns compared to say a F-22 or F-35.
Oh come on, let's put an end to the narrative canards = bad stealth.
The 2 main reason canards could be potentially bad for stealth are :
1) the gap between the canards and fuselage.
2) the reflection between the canard and main wings.

Lets tackle the first problem :
bNWQS7T.jpg

The picture above is an recent variant of J-10. Do you see the protrusion just in front of the canard? (red arrow)
Well, that protrusion shield the gap between canard and fuselage. Early version of J-10, doesn't have that

The same feature is present on Rafale and later versions of Gripen. (pic below, red arrow)
c8AxKcR.jpg


Now here is how J-20 deals with the problem :
m0S3D4L.jpg

As you can see, the profile of the air intakes are not straight (green), but is shaped to shield the already mentioned gap (orange).

Now, lets tackle the second problem :
J-20's canard posture is controlled via software to minimize RCS just like Typhoon.

When J-20 enters an hostile airspace, it activates the "stealth posture" by limiting the canards movement.
In other words, J-20 will change heading and altitude mostly by just moving the main wing surfaces.
The downside is that this posture prevents J-20 from doing extreme maneuver.

The "stealth posture" will be deactivated in 2 situations :
a) When it enters WVR dogfights
b) When it tries to dodge incoming missiles.

In both cases the stealthyness is no more important.
 
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The picture above is an recent variant of J-10. Do you see the protrusion just in front of the canard? (red arrow)
Well, that protrusion shield the gap between canard and fuselage. Early version of J-10, doesn't have that

The same feature is present on Rafale and later versions of Gripen. (pic below, red arrow)
No. These protrusions are used for a electronic counter measures items.
 
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J-20's canard posture is controlled via software to minimize RCS just like Typhoon.

When J-20 enters an hostile airspace, it activates the "stealth posture" by limiting the canards movement.
In other words, J-20 will change heading and altitude mostly by just moving the main wing surfaces.
The downside is that this posture prevents J-20 from doing extreme maneuver.
I don't think so. The FBW system has full autorities. I'm quite sure.
 
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