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Crises that loom beyond the military action

dabong1

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Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Shireen M Mazari

Despite the very effective censorship on the media regarding the military operation in Swat, tales of despair are coming through – especially of those who have lost their families in the artillery and aerial bombardments and of those over two million still trapped in the war zone. Then there are the images of wheat crop lying unharvested and interviews that do manage to find their way into the electronic media of IDPs in schools receiving absolutely no official aid despite having registered themselves. Perhaps the most lamentable fallout has been the reaction of the Sindh government to the IDPs alongside the PPP spokespersons like Fauzia Wahab who brazenly displayed her ignorance by comparing the IDPs to the Afghan refugees. Is she truly not aware that Swat has been a part of Pakistan for many decades and the IDPs are Pakistani citizens with the right to move freely (without registration) throughout Pakistan? Clearly the Sindh government is trying to push through a policy of racial profiling on one pretext or the other.

Such shameful treatment of our own people by the state shows the sharp contrast between the nation and its massive support for the IDPs and the state with its "ifs and buts". At this rate we will be confronting a mass of IDPs growing more frustrated and angry with each passing day – so they will present ideal breeding grounds for the extremists who prey on the dispossessed and marginalised segments of our society. But the rulers never learn and the operation has been expanded to FATA, so more IDPS will continue to flow without any provisions having been made properly for their accommodation by the state. That is one major reason why the military action will have a socially and politically negative fallout in the long run. The question is whenever the military action ends in Swat and the FATA region, what then? Will the Taliban have been finished off? What is the political strategy that the government has formulated to takeover where the military action ends? Somehow there seems to be no visible clarity on any of these counts, which again undermines the viability of the military action especially in a political vacuum.

Meanwhile, with all attention focused on the ongoing military operation, Balochistan seems to have been pushed onto the back burner which will cost us dearly. We do not have the luxury of time in dealing with Balochistan and the sense of deprivation amongst the Baloch people. The solutions for Balochistan are political and are more a matter of political will than money resources – although the latter will be required if locally-centred development is to be pushed. But it is the political will at the Centre that is lacking and sending the negative signals.

Coming back to the issue of religious extremism, one fallout of the military operation is going to be a dangerous coalescing of this brand of extremism with the political and economically marginalised segments of our society – the numbers now growing because of the manner in which the IDPs are being treated by the state and its various entities. Unless there is a qualitative change in the state's approach to this issue of violent extremism, we are not going to rid ourselves of militancy – whatever label it is given. The military action does not resolve the issue of good governance and justice. Nor does it solve the issue of the marginalised population with its youth seeing no life for itself beyond the madressah – which offers them no gainful employment. A few weeks ago, I gave details of the madressahs and their students in just one district of southern Punjab – D G Khan. And I stated that the numbers and details for Rahim Yar Khan and Rajanpur districts were on a similar fashion. That is why, in order to deal with the issue of bringing in these marginalised youth into the mainstream, the private sector would have to be involved through an "adopt a madressah" scheme. Or must we wait till the situation reaches crisis proportions and the state simply throws up its hands and sends in the military – which is no solution in the long term?

My contention is that it is not so much that all the madressahs are "jehadi" – they are not – but that the student population in most of the madressahs in these outlying areas is the poorest of the poor with no hope of a future at all. So they can be exploited as they are being already to come into the militant fold willy nilly. In a television discussion one of the leaders of the Wafaq ul Madaris was simply not prepared to accept that madressah students were ready fodder for extremists, especially in terms of suicide bombers. However, the little data that I have managed to collate from official sources, shows that it is exactly these poor, marginalised youth often from ordinary non-jehadi madressahs who are taken and brainwashed into becoming suicide bombers.

For example, the profile of Mohammed Siddique of the Karachi Nishtar Park bombing of 11 April 2006 shows that he was 21 years old, with no formal education, but having been in a madressah could read and write Urdu, and read the Quran in Arabic without understanding it (Nazra Quran). He lived in Karachi and worked as a helper in a bookstore near Binori Town Mosque while his family cultivated five kanals of lands in Mansehra. While most of his family lived in Mansehra, one of his brothers worked as a labourer in Rawalpindi. Simple-minded, far from home and family, he was vulnerable and poor and thereby an easy prey for brainwashing. The case of Sana Ullah, resident of Akora Khattak, Nowshera, who carried out the suicide attack on Ameer Muqam on 9 November 2007, is similar. His brothers were labourers in Peshawar and Taxila and his formal education was till 4th grade in the government primary school in Kati Maina, Nowshera. Then he left school to become a Hifz-e-Quran at the Madressah Tahfeez-ul-Quran in the same village but in 2004 he moved on to Madressah Dar-ul-Uloom Rehmania in Swabi and then in 2006 he went on to Turangzai Madressah in Charsadda and finally left even his madressah studies and returned home temporarily. He returned to Swabi and was part of the planned suicide attack on Ameer Muqam. Once in Swabi where he met up with "friends", he told his father he had found employment in Bannu.

More information is always collated by the authorities from suicide bombers who are caught before they can carry out their attacks. One such bomber was Sohail Zeb from Khano Kal'e, Tehsil Sarokai, Tank. Born in 1979, he was one of the few bombers who was college-educated (FA) and was associated with Sipah-i-Sahaba and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi along with his Mehsud friends. He went through their organisational structures and was motivated to join the Taliban by Abid a resident of South Waziristan and went through formal training at the Kiza Phange camp in South Waziristan where the Pesh Imam was an Uzbek. From all accounts the camp was formally organised with proper martial arts and weapons trainers. Again, as in the other two instances, the potential bomber was cut off totally from his family and familiar surroundings.

Then there was the only bomber who left a simple video behind – an exception to the Pakistani pattern of young brainwashed suicide bombers. This was Abdul Kareem, 20 years old, involved in the Allama Hasan Turabi case. He was enrolled in Hanfia Madressah, Moosa Colony Karachi but left in the middle. His family had migrated from Bangladesh and was extremely poor – father was a pushcart vendor – and wanted him to become a Hafiz-e-Quran. The guilt built in him and in his video he declared that since he had failed his family on this count, he had decided to blow himself up and kill "infidels" so he could go to heaven.

These are just four case studies but there is a pattern – madressah-educated, poor families and, apart from the last case, away from families and familiar surroundings. All these add to the vulnerability; but what is the state doing? Will the state simply wait for things to reach a crisis point and then send in the army? Can such action actually rid us of the menace of extremism? No. There has to be a more rational approach to winning back our lost people, especially the youth.



The writer is a defence analyst. Email: callstr@hotmail.com
Crises that loom beyond the military action
 
I hope that the issues in the article will be adressed for it is containing very serious allegations and I feel that if media get more and more of this then it will be better. However I have to say it is a very pro PML(N) article.
 
One must realize that Shireen Mazari is Information Secreatry for Imran Khan's PTI. Therefore her comments must be read keeping that perspective in mind. In my opinion real crisis in Pakistan is 'Crisis of leadership'. I came across the following article in Dawn, which I am posting for the benefit of those who have not already come across it. I find it very poignant.

A leadership vacuum By Mushfiq Murshed
Wednesday, 03 Jun, 2009 | 10:40 AM PST |

Taliban kidnap over 500 Cadet College students SPECIAL COVERAGE
Threat of disease looms as monsoon nears THE ongoing counter-insurgency operation in Pakistan is based on a tenuous national consensus that may falter at any time. Ideally, military action should be decisive and swift, otherwise, the longer the operation lasts the more chances of opposition.

At the moment the Taliban forces resisting army advances in Swat are the first layer of militants that have to be dealt with. However, the true challenge to defeating this insurgency will be apparent once this initial force has been dispersed and the amorphous enemy blends with the general public. The outcome or duration of such a war, therefore, cannot be predicted which is quite contrary to the optimistic ISPR reports that emanate on a daily basis.

To counter such an insurgency two elements are of crucial relevance. First, a strong intelligence network is required whereby the existing military action can eventually morph into an operation where hostile targets are pinpointed and eliminated with minimum collateral damage. For this to be effective there has to be collaboration among the various intelligence agencies working in the region. Despite professing similar agendas of eradicating terrorism and militancy, coordination among the agencies is negligible as the duration of the conflict and its lack of results have created an atmosphere of finger-pointing and mistrust between them.

Furthermore, each province has to build up its local law-enforcement forces. Their numbers have to be increased and they have to be equipped and trained to handle any sporadic militant outbursts in their areas. The fallout of the military onslaught is bound to cross provincial boundaries in the form of terrorism and the probability is high that ad hoc militant outfits may sprout in other parts of the country while the army concentrates its efforts and resources in the NWFP and Fata. This is where a strong local law-enforcement force will be vital to contain such activity before it escalates into a Swat-type situation. In areas where military action is already under way, local security forces need to ensure that peace is maintained once the operations subside.

Another by-product of the war that could have devastating repercussions if not addressed in an appropriate manner is the case of internally displaced people or the IDPs. The exact number of refugees is uncertain. The computation of such statistics is complicated as a majority of IDPs have opted to live outside the camps generally with friends and relatives and, therefore, are unregistered. However, according to some estimates the numbers may have crossed the three million mark.

This is staggering to say the least. Pakistan has not witnessed such a mass migration of refugees in such a short period since partition. The escalation of the number of refugees coupled with mismanagement, once again, by the government could eventually manifest itself in an antagonistic and volatile environment which will indirectly advance the cause of militancy amongst the masses.

International cooperation is needed to contain this potential catastrophe. Global and local support needs to be channelled in a positive way and a coordinated support programme along the lines and scale of the 2005 earthquake relief efforts is required. Otherwise, Pakistan is well acquainted with the dynamics and repercussions of refugee camps. After so many years, the country has yet to recover from the proliferation of drugs and weapons that had manifested itself in the Afghan refugee camps after the exodus began in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

It is, therefore, apparent that the core ingredient for winning this war on terror in Pakistan, at least, is unity. There has to be a unified front among the provinces, the powers at the centre, international allies, intelligence agencies, the military, and most importantly, the general public. Such unprecedented unity can only be achieved if we have a strong visionary leadership to inspire, motivate and bind the people together under the umbrella of the overarching objective of bringing peace, stability and eventual prosperity to the nation.

However, unfortunately there is a leadership vacuum in Pakistan. Our so-called leaders do not seem to realise the severity of the crisis facing the country. Prime Minister Gilani took his time to make a visit to the IDP camps which made it appear almost like an afterthought while Nawaz Sharif paid a fleeting visit which seemed to be inspired more by the possibility of gaining political mileage than any philanthropic motive. MQM chief Altaf Hussain has pontificated about the imminent threat of Talibanisation via telephone while he resides in the UK. Asfandyar Wali Khan virtually went into hiding after the attempt on his life and finally emerged during the APC. Imran Khan and Qazi Hussain Ahmad continue to blame America for this crisis, thereby, implicitly exonerating the militants for the crimes they have committed.

The nation’s leaders have to step up and consolidate national consensus in support of the war; otherwise, the recent military action may, in line with previous similar operations, wither away and be supplanted by some absurd peace deal before the desired result is achieved.

The writer is editor-in-chief of Criterion Quarterly.

mushfiq.murshed@gmail.com
DAWN.COM | Pakistan | A leadership vacuum
 
mixed, thinking never can reach the top?
the only party , which took a stand on terrorism or talibanizm was MQM, although they were carried by the fear , of lossing thier birth place ! which has been a vital target for the taliban terrorists?

ANP & son of GREAT WALI KHAN seems to been divided on the issue!
even he dont have any controll over the regional , leadership of ANP, because of his hidding & he talks what ever, he has been told? much more seen as a leader in the shadows, living in comfort with the blessing of CIA!

QAZI had been dismentlled after a long & unsuccsess-full political carrer! he is Mr no more, only role he can play? is what he is playing! advising IMRAN on the same lines, on which he was succsessfull on the money front but on the political front , he was a totall failure!
well IMRAN is buzy doing his brand of revolutionry politics , which he thinks is right meaning opposing every one! & accepting only QAZI sahib & a former ISI chief, who is his real MENTOR?
PML(n) & NAWAZ doing every thing which can earn him political % over PPPP, for this he can accept anything ? i mean MULLAH FM as a governer of NWFP!
I guss, there is no talk of "CJ-chowdry" & his "JUSTICE PARTY"who is about to take on the currnt govt & who see himself as the next president of pakistan , along with NAWAZ SHARIF as a next prime minster & IMRAN as a next "governer of punjab"
PPPP (z) is just too buzy on financial side, because PPPP(Z) belives that ,they can come back victorious again ,if they has the money power!
how about my, crazy thinking plz keep me posted!;):enjoy::pakistan:
 
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Please don't post baseless arguements I don't know what you have against the CJP.
 

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