Creation of Bangladesh

[akzaman]

The Significance of the Six-Point Movement and its Impact on Bangladesh’s Struggle for Freedom and Self-determination

M. Waheeduzzaman Manik

Introduction:The historic Six-Point movement in 1966 was the turning point in Bangladesh’s quest for greater autonomy and self-determination from Pakistan’s colonial domination. The six-point demand has been widely credited as the ‘charter of freedom’ in the history of Bangladesh’s struggle for freedom and independence.

The six-point plan had envisaged, among other things, a full-blown federal form of Government based on the 1940 Lahore Resolution, a parliamentary system of government directly elected by the people on the basis of adult franchise, two separate currencies or two reserve banks for the two wings of Pakistan, and a para-military force for East Pakistan. The spectacular success of the six-point movement in 1966 had prompted the ruling coterie of Pakistan to discredit the organizers of this movement.

Although Ayub Khan’s diabolical regime had used various brutal punitive measures against the proponents, organizers and supporters of the six-point formula, this historic movement had seriously impacted and conditioned the subsequent political development in Pakistan.

The main purpose of this paper is to assess the significance of the six-point movement and its impact on Bangladesh’s struggle for freedom and self-determination. Once the main contents of the six-point plan are summarized, the nature, magnitude, and impact of the six-point movement will be appraised. Aimed at substantiating and validating my own observations about the magnitude and impact of the six-point movement, some scholarly observations will be cited. Finally, some concluding remarks will be made.

The Six-Point Plan: the Main Elements

Sheikh Mujibur Rhaman, the then General Secretary of the East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL), had personally submitted the six-point program to the subject-matter committee of the All-Party Meeting of the opposition political parties of the then Pakistan in Lahore on February 5, 1966. Based on his “6-Point Formula: Our Right to Live” [March 23, 1966], the chief demands and themes of the historic six-point plan are being summarized as follows:

Point 1: “The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of [1940] Lahore Resolution, and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise.”

Point 2: The Federal Government of Pakistan “shall deal with only two subjects, viz.: defense and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall vest in the federating states.”

Point 3: “Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings [of Pakistan] should be introduced;” or if this is not feasible, there should be one currency for the whole country, but effective constitutional provisions should be introduced to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a separate Banking Reserve should be established and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan.

Point 4: The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the “federating units and the Federal Centre will have no such power.” However, the Federation will be entitled to have a share in the state taxes to meet its expenditures. “The Consolidated Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes.”

Point 5: There should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings with clear assurance that “earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West Pakistan Government.” And the “foreign exchange requirements of the Federal Government [of Pakistan] should be met by the two wings equally or in a ratio to be fixed. The indigenous products should move free of duty between the two wings.” The Constitution should “empower the units [provinces] to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with foreign countries.”

Point 6: East Pakistan should have a separate “militia” or “para-military” force.

Immediate Reactions of the Pakistani Political Leaders to the Six-Point Plan

Instead of endorsing Sheikh Mujib’s legitimate six-point-based demand for “maximum” provincial autonomy, the mainstream leaders of the so-called opposition parties for establishing democracy in Pakistan were not even willing to include his proposal in the official agenda of the conference for initiating discussion on the merits or demerits of the of the proposed six-point demands. In fact, no West Pakistani political leaders (not even Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan, the President of the then All-Pakistan Awami League) were willing to lend any support to Sheikh Mujib’s clarion call for maximum provincial autonomy based on the proposed six-point program.

It is also really appalling to recapitulate even after forty long years that the non-Awami League delegates from the then East Pakistan did not endorse the six-point demand. Like their West-Pakistani counterparts, Bengali speaking renegades had also smelled an element of “secession” or “disintegration” of Pakistan in the six-point program. In fact, Sheikh Mujib’s six-point demand could not be pried out of the “subject-matter committee” of that so-called All-party conference. Rather, the proposed six-point anchored proposal for maximum provincial autonomy had received frontal attacks from the mainstream ruling elite of Pakistan. The veteran West Pakistani political stalwarts, in conjunction with their cohorts from the then East Pakistan, had started a slanderous propaganda campaign against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman --- - the chief architect and proponent of the six-point charter even though most of those instant criticisms of the proposed six-point program were characterized by blatant falsehoods, conjectures, distortions, and innuendoes. Yet Sheikh Mujibur Rahman refused to be blackmailed or intimidated by those critics.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Immediate Response to the Critics

In a press conference at Lahore on February 10, 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had pointed out the uselessness and irrelevance of the All-Party Conference. He had clearly articulated that the question of demanding genuine “provincial autonomy” based on the proposed six-point program should not be misconstrued or dismissed as “provincialism.” He underscored that the proposed six-point demand was not designed to harm the common people of West Pakistan.

He had pointed out that the 17-day war between Pakistan and India (1965) made it crystal clear to the “East Pakistanis” that the defense of East Pakistan couldn’t be contingent upon the mercy or courtesy of West Pakistan. He reminded the audience that instead of relying on West Pakistan for its own defense-- a distant land located one thousand miles away, East Pakistan should be made self-sufficient for the purpose of defending itself from external aggression. He also made it abundantly clear that his six-point plan for “maximum” provincial autonomy reflected the long-standing demands of the people of East Pakistan.

On his return from Lahore to Dhaka on February 11, 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had provided further clarification on his six-point demands in a press conference. He explained why he had disassociated himself from the All-Party conference in Lahore. He had clearly stated that the delegates from East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL) had rejected not only the proposals passed by the All-Party Conference but also severed all ties with the disgruntled leaders of this so-called conference of the opposition parties. He said that it was not at all possible for him or his party to “betray the genuine interests” of the aggrieved and deprived people of East Pakistan. He emphasized that the immediate adoption and implementation of his six-point demand “will be conducive to foster durable relationship between two provinces of Pakistan.”

In a press conference on February 14, 1966, he reiterated that the “the question of autonomy appears to be more important for East Pakistan after the 17-day war between Pakistan and India. The time is ripe for making East Pakistan self-sufficient in all respects.”

Reaction of Ayub Khan’s Dictatorial Regime to the Six-Point Plan

Immediately after the provincial autonomy plan based on the six-point formula was unveiled by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the Lahore conference of opposition political parties in early February, 1966, the military autocracy of the self-declared Field Marshal Ayub Khan was quick to denounce it as a separatist or secessionist move. Aimed at browbeating the dedicated champions of greater provincial autonomy, Ayub Khan, the autocratic President of the then Islamic Republic of Pakistan, had started discrediting both the message and the messenger of the six-point program.

Appearing in the final session of the Pakistan (Convention) Muslim League in Dhaka on March 21,1966 (of course being fully attired in the army General’s khaki uniform with full display of all of his regalia and medallions), the self-declared President of the then Pakistan had condemned the six-point based plan for maximum provincial autonomy in the harshest possible terms. Characterizing the six-point formula for provincial autonomy as a demand for “greater sovereign Bengal,” Ayub Khan had claimed that such a plan would put the “Bengali Muslims” under the permanent domination of the “caste Hindus” of neighboring West Bengal.

Comparing the “prevailing situation” in Pakistan [as of March, 1966] with the volatile situation that had existed in the USA before the outbreak of a prolonged Civil War in early 1860s, the self-serving President of Pakistan also arrogated himself by saying that the nation might have to face a “civil war” if such were forced upon “him” by the “secessionists.” He had even threatened the “autonomists” and “secessionists” with “dire consequences” if they failed to shun the idea of six-point based movement for provincial autonomy. He had also the audacity to underscore that the “language of weapons” would be ruthlessly employed for exterminating the “secessionist elements from Pakistan.”

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the flamboyant Foreign Minister of Pakistan, had openly challenged Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to a public debate on the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed six-point plan at Paltan Maidan in Dhaka. To the chagrin of the Ayub regime, Tajuddin Ahmed, number 2 person in the then Awami League, took up the challenge on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Unfortunately, it was Z.A. Bhutto who did not show up for debate! Abdul Monem Khan, the then infamous Governor of East Pakistan, had publicly stated that “as long as I remain Governor of this province (East Pakistan), I would see to it that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman remains in jail.”

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Launches the Six-Point Movement

In response to such false accusations and vile threats, a fearless Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was quick to respond. In a mammoth public gathering at Paltan Maidan, he thundered: “No amount of naked threats can deviate the deprived Bangalees from their demand for provincial autonomy based on their six-point demands.” The greatest champion of Bangalees’ rights for self-determination, along with top leaders of the Awami League, kept on addressing numerous public meetings in the nooks and corners of the then East Pakistan. Without wasting a moment, the entire Awami League and the East Pakistan Students’ League (EPSL), its student front, were geared toward mobilizing and motivating the general masses in favor of demanding self-government and autonomy based on the six-point program.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had presented not only the bold proposal for “maximum provincial autonomy” but he also launched a viable mass movement (which he himself led till he was put in jail on May 9, 1966) for popularizing and mobilizing support for the six-point program. After proposing his historic six-point program, he had actually invested all of his energies and resources in disseminating the fundamental message of “maximum autonomy” for East Pakistan. He started articulating both the rationale and justification for proposing “maximum provincial autonomy” based on his six-point plan. However, before launching a full-fledged mass movement for realizing his six-point demands, Sheikh Mujib had initiated some strategic intra-party measures. The Council Session of the East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL) met on March 18, 19, 20, 1966, and that council session had also restructured the working Committee of the party. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Tajuddin Ahmed were unanimously elected the President and General Secretary respectively of the newly revamped Awami League. The proposed six-point program was also unanimously endorsed by that historic council session for realizing maximum provincial autonomy for the then East Pakistan.

To the dismay of Pakistan’s ruling coterie, the six-point program had generated a great deal of enthusiasm among the people of the then East Pakistan. As noted by Dr. Talukder Maniruzzaman: “To say that this [six-point] programme evoked tremendous enthusiasm among the people of East Bengal would be an understatement. Encouraged by overwhelming popular support, Sheikh Mujib convened a meeting of the EPAL Council [March 18-20, 1966] at which his [Six-Point] programme was unanimously approved and he was elected President of the [Awami League] party. With a phalanx of organizers from the Student’s League, Sheikh Mujib then launched a vigorous campaign. For about three months (from mid-February to mid-May), the urban centers of East Bengal seemed to be in the grip of a ‘mass revolution,’ prompting the Central Government to arrest Sheikh Mujib and his chief lieutenants (Tajuddin Ahmed, Khandokar Mustaq Ahmed, Mansoor Ali, Zahur Ahmed Chowdhury, and others) under the [infamous] Defense of Pakistan Rules and put down a complete general strike in Dacca (June 7, 1966) by killing 13 participating strikers” [Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, UPL, 1988. P. 25].

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s demand for “maximum autonomy” based on his six-point formula seems to have shaken the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The six-point plan had exposed the fact that the real intention of Pakistan’s ruling elite was to “strengthen” the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated Central Government. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman repeatedly said in several public meetings that that the people of Pakistan had always desired a “strong Pakistan,” not a “strong Central Government.” The entire ruling establishment of Pakistan was alarmed, and obviously, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the chief proponent of the six-point program, had become the main target of negative publicity. He had to endure various virulent forms of harassment, intimidation, and fraudulent cases.

Instead of fairly addressing the legitimate grievances and demands of the neglected eastern province of Pakistan, the power elite took a deliberate decision to suppress the quest for maximum provincial autonomy through the use of colonial types of repressive methods and procedures. The ruling coterie of Pakistan was not at all interested in dealing or negotiating with the Awami League on the issue of provincial autonomy even though Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had publicly stated that he was willing to negotiate his six-point plan with anyone in good faith provided a meaningful autonomy was ensured for East Pakistan. Yet the oligarchy of Pakistan started using repressive tactics to suppress the six-point movement. As noted by Dr. Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuyain, “the Ayub regime’s policy towards the six-point demand of the AL was one of total suppression. It showed once again that the [Ayub] regime failed to respond to the political demand” [Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuyain, Emergence of Bangladesh & Role of Awami League, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1982, p. 104].

Indeed, the six-point movement had generated spontaneous mass enthusiasm throughout East Pakistan. The entire nation was galvanized throughout February-March-April-May-June, 1966. In retaliation, the Government had intensified its policy of repression and persecution against Sheikh Mujib and his followers. For example, while Sheikh Mujib was touring various districts in April 1966 to enlist mass support in favor of his six-point program, he was arrested in almost all important places on flimsy and fraudulent charges. Dr. Anisuzzaman, a distinguished literary figure of Bangladesh, has summarized the nature of the repressive measures which Sheikh Mujib had to confront and endure for launching the historic six-point plan at a critical juncture of our history: “During that period [from the middle of February through May 9, 1966], there was hardly any place where Sheikh Mujib was not arrested [on false charges] for addressing public meetings. Today in Jessore, tomorrow in Khulna, day after tomorrow in Rajshahi. And on the following days in Sylhet, Mymensingh, and Chittagong. Once he was released on bail in one place, he rushed to another place. He had no time to waste. The only time wasted was in the process of posting bail for his release. Arrested once again. Being released once again, and then immediately move to another place (to address the public meetings).” (Freehand translation is mine). [Anisuzzaman, “Bangabandhu in the Context of History,” in Mreetoonjoyee Mujib (Immortal Mujib), Dhaka; Bangabandhu Parishad, 1995, pp.11-12].

Throughout the month of May 1966, the Central Government of Pakistan, of course in full collaboration with Abdul Monem Khan, Ayub Khan’s handpicked Governor of East Pakistan had enthusiastically cracked down on all senior most leaders of the Awami League. The arrestees under the Defence of Pakistan Rules included, among others, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul Islam, Khondokar Moshtaque Ahmed, M. Mansoor Ali, and AHM Kamruzzaman. However, the governmental crackdown on the top leaders of the Awami League couldn’t dampen the spirit of the organizers and supporters of the six-point movement.

It was on June 7, 1966 when a full-blown hartal was observed in support of the six-point program throughout the urban centers of the then East Pakistan. In defiance of various oppressive and repressive measures of the autocratic Government of Pakistan, people from walks of life had lent their spontaneous support to this hartal. Obviously, it was a mass response to governmental repressive measures and state sponsored violence since the middle of February 1966 when the historic six-point movement was launched. . Several dozen men were shot dead during hartal on June 7, 1966. Hundreds of participants of the movement were injured. Thousands of Awami League leaders. (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the most volatile and articulate champion of “maximum autonomy” for the then East Pakistan was already put in jail on May 9, 1966) and student workers were put behind bars without any trial. Hulias (warrants of arrest) were issued on hundreds of Awami League workers and student leaders. The Daily Ittefaq, the most popular Bangla newspaper of the then eastern province of Pakistan, was shut down, its press was confiscated, and its editor, Tofazzal Hossain (Manik Mia), was put in jail. Yet the repressive police forces could not halt the march of the six-point anchored provincial autonomy movement. It was significant that the secondary leaders of the Awami League had organized a very successful general strike on June 7, 1966 all over the province. The mass participation in the general strike on June 7 in support of the six-point plan for provincial autonomy was a clear indication of a perceptible shift in the Bengali mood.

Impact and Implications of the Six-Point Movement

The imprisonment of Sheikh Mujib and other top Awami Leaguers in 1966 could not diminish the mass support for the six-point demand. In fact, Pakistan’s ruling elite’s policy of suppression of all forms of political freedoms and dissents had miserably failed to halt the march of the six-point movement. Rather, the use of police violence against the organizers and participants of the six-point movement had prompted and motivated the general population of the then East Pakistan to render their full support for the demand of maximum provincial autonomy. Dr. Talukder Maniruzzaman, one of the distinguished political scientists of Bangladesh, has noted the immediate impact of the governmental repressive measures during the six-point movement on Sheikh Mujib’s popularity in the following words: “As one might have expected, Sheikh Mujib’s arrest in 1966 only served to enhance his popularity, to the point where he became the veritable symbol of Bengali nationalism” [Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, UPL, 1988, p. 23].

In his seminal assessment of the role of the Awami League in the political development of Pakistan, Dr. M. Rashiduzzaman succinctly summarized the significance and impact of the six-point movement: “The impact of the six-point demand of the Awami League was felt far and wide. The central government [of Pakistan] dubbed it as a demand for the separation of the Eastern Wing from the rest of the country, and launched a propaganda campaign, which called for a strong central government and decried the autonomists. On June 7, 1966, there was a province-wide hartal (strike) in East Pakistan sponsored by the Awami League to press the demands embodied in the six-point program. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, along with several lieutenants, were again put into the prison. [Sheikh Mujib was put in jail in early May, 1966]. The government also blamed ‘foreign interests’ in the agitation led by the six-pointers.. ----- After about a year, several East Pakistani civil servants and military officers were arrested on the charge that they had conspired to separate the East Wing by violent means in collusion with India. Eventually, the so-called ‘Agartala Conspiracy case’ was initiated against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 31 others for alleged high treason.” (M. Rashiduzzaman,“The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan,” Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 7, JULY, 1970; pp. 574-587]. In the same article, Dr. Rashiduzzaman also observed about the impact of the six-point movement on the 11-point charter of the 1969 student-mass movement: “For all practical purposes, the eleven-point student program was an expanded version of the Awami League’s six- point demand for autonomy.”

It is evident from the preceding quotations that the six-point movement had a far reaching effects on the subsequent political development in the then Pakistan. It is widely acknowledged that the six point movement was a catalyst to the fomenting of a sustainable movement against President Ayub Khan and his regime in early 1969. In fact, the origins of both the Agartala Conspiracy Case and the anti-Ayub student-mass movement in 1969 can be traced back to the six-point movement. Aimed at destroying Bangalees’ quest for full-blown autonomy and self-determination once and for all, a vile conspiracy was hatched out against Mujibur Rahman, the most articulate champion of greater provincial autonomy. At the behest of Ayub Khan, the Punjabi-Muhajir dominated Central Government of Pakistan had implicated Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the fraudulent Agartala Conspiracy Case. The real agenda of Pakistan’s ruling elite was to hang him as a “traitor.” In other words, the Government of Pakistan wanted to eliminate Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the ardent defender of the legitimate rights of his people, for maintaining a status quo in the form of colonial rule in East Pakistan. However, an anti-Ayub student-mass movement in late 1968 and early 1969 led to the withdrawal of the so-called Agartala Conspiracy case and the unconditional release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from imprisonment.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was at best regarded as the top leader of the Awami League when he had launched the six-point movement in early 1966. He was not yet regarded as the “undisputed leader” of all Bengali speaking people of the then East Pakistan. Nor was he called ‘Bangabandhu’ in 1966. He was not the only political leader of the then East Pakistan who had championed the cause of full provincial autonomy. In fact, there were other top political leaders even within his party with impressive credentials and tested commitment to the pursuit of full autonomy for East Pakistan. There were also more senior political leaders in other political parties, including Maulana Bhasani, who were quite vocal for greater provincial autonomy for East Pakistan. Being disgusted with the colonial brand of exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistani ruling coterie, Maulana Bhasani had uttered “goodbye” to West Pakistan more than once --- at least a decade earlier than the historic six-point movement. In fact, Maulana Bhasani was never willing to compromise on the issue of full provincial autonomy for the then East Pakistan.

Yet Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s fearlessness and relentlessness gave birth to the six-point movement for realizing full provincial autonomy in the early months of 1966. There is no doubt that his relentlessness in starting and sustaining a pragmatic Bengali nationalistic movement that was deliberately geared toward achieving maximum autonomy had clearly distinguished him from other contemporary champions of provincial autonomy. His “fearlessness” also made him the most volatile champion of “full provincial autonomy.” Only a courageous leader of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s stature could come up with the six-point plan for accruing full autonomy for East Pakistan at a time when Ayub Khan’s brute regime was at its pinnacle after consolidating its grip over the entire power structure of the country.

The six-point movement had direct bearing on the following momentous events: the making of the infamous Agartala conspiracy case against Shekh Mujib, the volatile student-mass movement of 1969, the withdrawal of the concocted Agartala conspiracy case and the unconditional release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from imprisonment on February 22, 1969, the removal of the infamous provincial Governor Monaem Khan, the sudden collapse of Ayub Khan’s dictatorship and the rise of Yahya Khan’s diabolical regime, the General Elections in 1970 on the basis of adult franchise, the landslide victory of the Awami League in the general elections and the spectacular rise of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the sole spokesperson of the Bengali speaking people of the then Pakistan, the nine-month long liberation war in 1971, and finally the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation-state on December 16, 1971. Doubtless, these tumultuous events were milestones in the history of Bangladesh’s struggle for freedom and independence. Notwithstanding three decades of rampant distortions of Bangladesh’s political history, it is fair to suggest that the six-point movement was the precursor of these momentous events, and the name of the common thread that had firmly connected these milestones was Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Concluding Remarks

There is no doubt that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would have remained a top Awami League leader even in the absence of a bold provincial autonomy plan in the form of the six-point program. Yet had there been no six-point movement in 1966, there is every doubt if the Agartala Conspiracy Case would have been hatched out against him at that particular time. Had there been no Agartala Conspiracy Case, the student-mass movement of 1969 would not have exclusively focused on his unconditional release from imprisonment. Thus the six-point movement, the Agartala conspiracy case, and the 1969 student-mass movement had provided the much-needed context and momentum for the his emergence as Bangabandhu (Friend of Bengal) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. From that juncture of our history, he did not have to look backward. The whopping majority of Bengali speaking people of the then East Pakistan had vested their full trust in their Bangabandhu in the general elections of 1970. Therefore, his spectacular success in the historic general elections of 1970 and his emergence as the legitimate sole spokesperson and undisputed leader of his people owe a great deal to his success in the historic six-point movement in 1966.

The six-point plan had also reflected the legitimate grievances and genuine demands of the people of the then East Pakistan. There is little wonder why the historic six-point movement had garnered so much spontaneous mass support throughout the province. The timing, first for presenting, and then starting a sustainable Bengali nationalist movement for realizing the professed goals of six-point demand was crucially important. The economic and political demands, as stipulated and enumerated under the six-point program, were the frontal assault on the foundation of Pakistan’s colonial exploitation and authoritarian modes of governance.

Dr. M. Waheeduzzaman (Manik) writes from Clarksville, Tennessee, USA where he is a Professor and the Chair of the Department of Public Management at Austin Peay State University. His e-mail address is mwzaman@aol.com or zamanw@apsu.edu

http://bangladesh-web.com/view.php?hidDate...000000000111223

 

[salman nedian]

Provincial autonomy was no doubt the right demand but separate currancy wasn't!

I have said it before that separate coutries of Europe has adopted single currancy ,how can you enforce 2 currancies in one country?

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

sadly nothing was given to the Bengalis.

It was a canard to say that East Pakistan was sapping the economy of Pakistan!

The typical Punjabi big talk!

conrary to the popular canard about Bengalis, including what Batman said about 'Bengalis anywhere'.

Here is some interesting fact about Bengal on the Indian side:

West Bengal’s growth rate from 1993-94 recorded 7.2 per cent which was second only to Karnatak’s 8.11 corresponding figure to India 6.3 per cent and Punjab stood for 3.8 per cent only.During the same period ,the average per capita income grew to5.5 per cent in West Bengal against 4.3 per cent at national level.This is all credible as West Bengal’s population growth since 1981 is high as 2.34 per cent,primarily because of the influx from Bangladesh.
The result thus achieved by the state due to the reason in agricultural productivity front line player because of land reform contributes 14.6 per cent of the country’s total production.The state has the third highest average yield in India---2424 kg per hectre against the national average of 1739 kg.In this context considering Punjab and Haryana have 89.72 per cent and 65 per cent respectively,of its irrigated land against West Bengal’s 28.1 per cent.It reveals that in the year 2001-02,Punjab produced 24.89 million tones from 38.47 lakh hectres of irrigated land against West Bengal’s 16.50 million tones from 19.11 lakh hectres of irrigated land.This works out to an astounding 34 per cent more yield per acre despite the preponderance of marginalize sized holdings as a result of land reform.The data obtained from the state directorates of Statistics may raise the question of reliability;yet it emerges some trends.The period from 1985-86 to 1990-91,West Bengal recorded a growth of 24.52 per cent ie the sixth lowest in India.Rajasthan at 63.35 per cent was maximum,with Andhra Pradesh at 45.97 per cent and Maharashtra was 45.47 per cent.But the situation gradually changed after economic reform started in the year1991.West Bengal recorded 33.12 per cent growth from the year 1995-96 to 1999-2000.During the same period Rajasthan came down at 23.97 per cent.
Sceptics argue that the high growth rate of West Bengal is not as creditable as it appears because of the low base dismal growth in the preceeding years.
Those who do not earn enough to purchase a minimum calorie of food intake of 2400 calories in rural and 2100 calories in urban should be considered below poverty line as recommended by National Sample Survey Organization.Using this scale ,West Bengal in the year 1999-2000 had below poverty line 27.02 per cent of its population; higher than the national figure of 26.10 per cent.The UNDP has introduced two( GDP and poverty levels) comprehensive indices to reflect the “quality of life” and “deprivations”for Human Development Index and Human Poverty Index respectively.West Bengal has attracted the highest capital;next only to Guzrat,but ahead of Maharashtra ,UP and Andhra Pradesh.But reveals badly 2.52 per cent jobs against 3.75 in Andhra,3.92 in UP,4.05 in Guzrat and 5.60 in Maharashtra respectively.But only white collar jobs unable to solve the problem of food security;more blue collar workers through self-employment and diversification of agriculture---fruits,vegetables,milk,egg ,meat and fishes etc.will enhance employment opportunities as well as food security.
Enlighten politics is necessary to improve the delivery systems of the government.Transparancy and accountability in the functioning of the states will be followed by social audit.The logistics of lending support to a population in the unorganized sectors require massive participation by political will and can not be left totally to the bureaucratic power within the government. However, the approaches used to strengthen good governance in developing countries like India remain strikingly similar to those used to promote economic reform.

http://topics.developmentgateway.org/foodsecurity/rc/filedownload.do~itemId=1068145

Look down on Bengalis 'anywhere' and you will suffer!

 

[akzaman]

How did rape become a weapon of war?

By Laura Smith-Spark BBC News

The UN has accused the Janjaweed militia in Sudan of using mass rape
Women's bodies have become part of the terrain of conflict, according to a new report by Amnesty International. Rape and sexual abuse are not just a by-product of war but are used as a deliberate military strategy, it says.

The opportunistic rape and pillage of previous centuries has been replaced in modern conflict by rape used as an orchestrated combat tool. And while Amnesty cites ongoing conflicts in Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, Chechnya, Nepal and Afghanistan, the use of rape as a weapon of war goes back much further.

Spoils of war?
From the systematic rape of women in Bosnia, to an estimated 200,000 women raped during the battle for Bangladeshi independence in 1971, to Japanese rapes during the 1937 occupation of Nanking - the past century offers too many examples. So what motivates armed forces, whether state-backed troops or irregular militia, to attack civilian women and children?

Gita Sahgal, of Amnesty International, told the BBC News website it was a mistake to think such assaults were primarily about the age-old "spoils of war", or sexual gratification. Rape is often used in ethnic conflicts as a way for attackers to perpetuate their social control and redraw ethnic boundaries, she said. "Women are seen as the reproducers and carers of the community," she said.

"Therefore if one group wants to control another they often do it by impregnating women of the other community because they see it as a way of destroying the opposing community."
A report by Medecins Sans Frontieres says it first came across rape as a weapon in the 1990s. "In Bosnia systematic rape was used as part of the strategy of ethnic cleansing," it said.
"Women were raped so they could give birth to a Serbian baby."

The same tactic was used in a "very strategic attack" by state-backed Pakistani troops during the fight for Bangladesh's independence in 1971, Ms Sahgal said. "They were saying 'we will make you breed Punjabi children'," she said, with the aim of weakening the integrity of the opposing ethnic group.

Amnesty this year accused the pro-government Janjaweed militias in Sudan's Darfur region of using mass rape in order to punish, humiliate and control non-Arab groups. Such attacks cause women and children to flee their homes, lead to fragmentation of communities and bring the risk of infection with HIV/Aids.

Sexual violence is also used to destabilise communities and sow terror, Amnesty says in its Lives Blown Apart report. In Colombia, rival groups rape, mutilate and kill women and girls in order to impose "punitive codes of conduct on entire towns and villages", so strengthening their control.

Act with impunity
The strategic use of rape in war is not a new phenomenon but only recently has it begun to be documented, chiefly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia and Sudan, said Ms Sahgal.

And even after conflicts are resolved, few countries seem willing to tackle what is often seen as a crime against individual women rather than a strategy of war. In many nations the collapse of the rule of law leaves them unable to deal with allegations of rape, while in others women feel too exposed to stigma to accuse their attackers.

International courts have tackled some cases in Bosnia, where Muslim women were forced into sexual slavery in the town of Foca in the 1990s, and in Rwanda, but the vast majority of perpetrators act with impunity.

Representatives of the 200,000 "comfort women" forcibly drafted into military sexual slavery by Japan from 1928 until the end of World War II are still fighting for restitution. Far from colluding, women from Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and East Timor were "severely coerced" into prostitution, says Ms Sahgal.

And whether a woman is raped at gunpoint or trafficked into sexual slavery by an occupying force, the sexual abuse will shape not just her own but her community's future for years to come. "Survivors face emotional torment, psychological damage, physical injuries, disease, social ostracism and many other consequences that can devastate their lives," says Amnesty.

"Women's lives and their bodies have been the unacknowledged casualties of war for too long."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/4078677.stm

 

[MastanKhan]

Hi,

My pakistani brethren have a very difficult time understanding and accepting the reality that is 'Bangladesh'.

My personal belief and experience states that if Jinnah would have been alive, he would have accepted it as a natural reality.

Look at Bangladesh in this sense-------if there was no support from the east wing, there was no seperate nation for the muslims. So, two majority muslim areas joined hands together, created a united goal and the outcome was the nation of pakistan. It is totally unreal---two nations under one flag and a thousand miles apart created at the same time.

Brotherhood takes a lots of sacrifice, energy and an eternal commitment, a lots of give and take and still at the end of the day, there may come up differences. Now, when these differences become bloodied and there is no compromise, THEN SEPERATION is the best solution. It is just like a marriage, where one partner thinks that they are being abused, used and taken for granted---regardless of what the truth is. There can be no justification given, no excuses made and if one of the partner becomes belligerent and does not accept the responsibility, there is going to be some blooding.

A good example is a movie, ' WAR OF THE ROSES ', starring Michael Douglas.

The question asked should have been, ' What would Jinnah do once Bangladesh got created' ? And to that I write, that Jinnah would say, ' Let us start allover again with our relationship. We had achieved our primary goal in the past, now let us take this new relationship to the next level of friendship. You, the master of your own house----let us find the common grounds that have helped us in the past to overcome our differences and move ahead '.

 

[Marathaman]

Hi,

My pakistani brethren have a very difficult time understanding and accepting the reality that is 'Bangladesh'.

My personal belief and experience states that if Jinnah would have been alive, he would have accepted it as a natural reality.

Look at Bangladesh in this sense-------if there was no support from the east wing, there was no seperate nation for the muslims. So, two majority muslim areas joined hands together, created a united goal and the outcome was the nation of pakistan. It is totally unreal---two nations under one flag and a thousand miles apart created at the same time.

Brotherhood takes a lots of sacrifice, energy and an eternal commitment, a lots of give and take and still at the end of the day, there may come up differences. Now, when these differences become bloodied and there is no compromise, THEN SEPERATION is the best solution. It is just like a marriage, where one partner thinks that they are being abused, used and taken for granted---regardless of what the truth is. There can be no justification given, no excuses made and if one of the partner becomes belligerent and does not accept the responsibility, there is going to be some blooding.

A good example is a movie, ' WAR OF THE ROSES ', starring Michael Douglas.

The question asked should have been, ' What would Jinnah do once Bangladesh got created' ? And to that I write, that Jinnah would say, ' Let us start allover again with our relationship. We had achieved our primary goal in the past, now let us take this new relationship to the next level of friendship. You, the master of your own house----let us find the common grounds that have helped us in the past to overcome our differences and move ahead '.

First abuse....leads to divorce...then friendly reconciliation...and finally a new platonic relationship.

I'm guessing that Bangladesh is the ex-wife here?

(Chill guys..its just a joke).

 

[Ababeel]

Creation of Bangladesh is another sad story of muslim history of south Asia. A careful study shows the Nationalistic poison which has been entered in body of Ummah is showing its deadly reactions from time to time in different forms. Take a senario if Islamic were the rulers at that time this tragedy would have been reverted.
Bright examples are there of Jamaat actions against all odds and dangers. They tried to prevent the then pakistan from disintegrationcaused due to Pnjabiyat and Bangaliyat.

 

[Marathaman]

Creation of Bangladesh is another sad story of muslim history of south Asia. A careful study shows the Nationalistic poison which has been entered in body of Ummah is showing its deadly reactions from time to time in different forms. Take a senario if Islamic were the rulers at that time this tragedy would have been reverted.
Bright examples are there of Jamaat actions against all odds and dangers. They tried to prevent the then pakistan from disintegrationcaused due to Pnjabiyat and Bangaliyat.

Nationalistic Poison. Interesting term.

Btw....this whole "Ummah" thing....what are its origins?

Is it a recent concept, or has it been mentioned in the quran or hadiths.

 

[akzaman]

Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views

Introduction

The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 was a unique phenomenon- it was the first nation-state to emerge after waging a successful liberation war against a postcolonial state. The nine-month-long liberation war in Bangladesh drew world attention because of the genocide committed by Pakistan which resulted in the killings of approximately three million people and raping of nearly a quarter million girls and women. Ten million Bengalis reportedly took refuge in India to avoid the massacre of the Pakistan army and thirty million people were displaced within the country (Loshak, 1971; Mascarenhas, 1971; Payne, 1973; Ayoob and Subrahmanyan, 1972; O'Donnell,1984).

Written two decades after the genocide, this essay addresses the following: the historical forces that led to the genocide; the nature of the genocide-why, how, and who committed the genocide; the world response; the long-range impact of the genocide on the victims; the way the genocide is remembered today; and some lessons that can be drawn from the 1971 Bangladesh genocide.

Background to the Genocide

Though the liberation war in Bangladesh lasted only nine months, the nationalist movement that preceded the war spanned the previous two decades. Indeed, the seeds of the Bangladesh nationalist movement were planted very soon after the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

When India was partitioned on the basis of religion and the new state of Pakistan was established comprising the Muslim majority areas of India, Bengali Muslims voluntarily became a part of Pakistan. But very soon it became apparent to the Bengali Muslims that, despite their numerical majority, they were being hurt in a variety of ways: (1) their linguistic cultural identity was being threatened by the ruling elite (which was predominantly non-Bengali) in the new state; (2) they were being economically exploited; and (3) they were excluded from exercising state power (Jahan, 1972).

The nationalist movement first emerged as a struggle to defend and reserve the ethnic linguistic Bengali identity of the Bengali Muslims. Though the Bengalis comprised 54 percent of Pakistan's population, in 1948 the ruling elite declared their intention to make Urdu, which was the language of only 7 percent of the population, the sole state language. Bengali students immediately protested the decision and launched a movement which continued for the next eight years until the Pakistan constitution, adopted in 1956, recognized both Bengali and Urdu as state languages (Ahmad, 1967).

The Bengalis had to defend not only the right to practice their own language, but also other creative expressions of their culture-literature, music, dance, arts. The Pakistani ruling elite looked upon Bengali language and culture as too "Hindu leaning" and made repeated attempts to "cleanse" it from Hindu influence (Umar, 1966, 1967, 1969). First, in the 1950s, attempts were made to force Bengalis to substitute Bengali words with Arabic and Urdu words. Then, in the 1960s, state-controlled media such as television and radio banned songs written by Rabindra Nath Tagore, a Bengali Hindu, who won the Nobel prize in 1913 and whose poetry and songs were equally beloved by Bengali Hindus and Muslims.

The attacks on their language and culture alienated the Bengalis from the state-sponsored Islamic ideology of Pakistan and intensified their linguistic and ethnic identity that emphasized a more secular ideology and attitude.

The Bangladesh nationalist movement was also fueled by a sense of economic exploitation. Though jute, the major export earning commodity, was produced in Bengal, most of the economic investments took place in Pakistan. A systematic transfer of resources took place from East to West Pakistan creating a growing economic disparity and a feeling among the Bengalis that they were being treated as a colony by Pakistan (Rahman, 1968; Jahan, 1972).

In the 1950s and 1960s, a group of Bengali economists carefully documented the process of economic disparity and martialled arguments in favor of establishing a "two-economy" system. The movement toward autonomy initiated in the 1950s culminated in the famous six points program of 1966, which not only rejected the central government's right of taxation but demanded that the power to tax and establish trade and commercial relations, including the establishment of separate accounts of foreign exchange earning, be placed in the hands of the provinces.

However, it was lack of political participation and exclusion from state power that gradually drove the Bengalis from participation, to demanding autonomy, and finally to demanding self-determination (Jahan, 1972). Constituting a majority of the population, the Bengalis expected to dominate or at least share the political power in the federal government of Pakistan. But soon after the creation of Pakistan, a small civil and military bureaucratic elite held a monopoly on government power. As a result, the Bengalis had virtually no representation in that power elite (Sayeed, 1967 , 1968; Jahan, 1972).

From the beginning, the Bengalis demanded democracy with free and regular elections, a parliamentary form of government, and freedom of political parties and the media. But the ruling elite in Pakistan thwarted every attempt at instituting democracy in the country (Callard, 1957; Sayeed, 1967). In 1954, a democratically elected government in East Bengal was dismissed within ninety days of taking power. A constitution was adopted in 1956 after nine years of protracted negotiations only to be abrogated within two years by a military coup. Just before the first nationally scheduled election, the military took direct control of the government in 1958. This was out of fear that the Bengalis might dominate in a democratically elected government.

The decade of the 1960s saw the military rule of General Ayub Khan. It was eventually toppled in 1969 as a result of popular mass movements in both wings (East and West) of Pakistan. However, after the fall of Ayub, the civil-military bureaucratic elite again regrouped and put General Yahya Khan, who was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, in charge of the government. The Yahya regime acceded to a number of key demands of the Bengali nationalist movement including the holding of a free democratic national election on the basis of one man one vote. The first free democratic national elections, held in Pakistan in 1970 two decades after the birth of the country, resulted in a sweeping victory of the Bengali nationalist party, the Awami League. The election results gave the Awami League not only total control over their own province, but also a majority nationally and a right to form the federal government.

Again, though, the ruling elite in Pakistan took recourse to unconstitutional measures........... March 1, 1971, General Yahya postponed indefinitely the scheduled March 3rd session of parliament. This, in turn, threw the country into a constitutional crisis. The Awami League responded by launching an unprecedented non-violent, non-cooperation movement which resulted in the entire administration of then East Pakistan coming to a virtual standstill. Even the Bengali civil and military officials complied with the non-cooperation movement. Indeed, the movement demonstrated that the Bengali nationalists had total allegiance and support of the Bengali population.

The Yahya regime initiated political negotiations with the Bengali nationalists but at the same time flew thousands of armed forces in from West to East Pakistan, thus consolidating preparations for a military action. On March 25, 1971, General Yahya abruptly broke off the negotiations and unleashed a massive armed strike against the population of Dhaka, the capital city. In two days of uninterrupted military operations, hundreds of ordinary citizens were killed, houses and property were destroyed, and the leader of the Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was arrested. The army also launched armed attacks in Chittagong, Comilla, Khulna, and other garrison cities. Simon Dring, a reporter with the Daily Telegraph London, and Michel Laurent, an Associated Press photographer, escaped the Pakistani dragnet, and roamed Dhaka and the countryside. On March 28 they reported that the loss of life had reached 15,000 in the countryside. On the Dhaka University campus, seventeen professors and some 200 students were killed in cold blood (Loshak, 1971, pp. 88-126).

The news of the Dhaka massacre immediately spread to the rest of the country. Instead of cowing the unarmed Bengalis into submission, which was probably the intention of the Pakistani army in initiating the brutal killings, it only inflamed nationalist sentiments. Within twenty-four hours of the armed crackdown in Dhaka, on March 26, 1971, the independence of Bangladesh was declared from the city of Chittagong. It was announced over the radio, which was controlled by the Bengali nationalists, on the behalf of the Awami League and its leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The upshot of this is that a new nation was born out of what was a premeditated genocide (Jahan, 1972; Ayoob and Subhrahmanyan, 1972).

Bangladesh Genocide 1971

The genocide in Bangladesh, which started with the Pakistani military operation against unarmed citizens on the night of March 25, continued unabated for nearly nine months until the Bengali nationalists, with the help of the Indian army, succeeded in liberating the country from Pakistani occupation forces on December 16, 1971.

The atrocities committed by the Pakistan army were widely reported by the international press during 1971 (Loshak, 1971; Mascarenhas, 1971; Schanberg, 1971; Jenkins, et al., August 2, 1971; Coggin et al" August 2, 1971).

From the eyewitness accounts documented during and immediately after the genocide in 1971 and 1972 and later published over the last twenty years, it is possible to analyze the major features of the Bangladesh genocide-why and how it was committed, who was involved in the crimes, and who the victims were.

Why Was the Genocide Committed?

The genocide in Bangladesh caught the outside observers as well as the Bengali nationalists by surprise. After all, the Bengali nationalists were not involved in any armed struggle prior to March 25, 1971. They were essentially waging a peaceful constitutional movement for democracy and autonomy. Their only crime, as Senator Edward Kennedy observed, appeared to have been to win an election (Malik, 1972). So why did the Pakistani ruling elite initiate a brutal military action?

Perhaps, the main reason behind the atrocities was to terrorize the population into submission. The military commander in charge of the Dhaka operations reportedly claimed that he would kill four million people in forty- eight hours and thus have a "final solution" of the Bengal problem. (Jahan, 1972). The Pakistani military regime calculated that since the Bengalis had no previous experience in armed struggle, they would be frightened and crushed in the face of overwhelming fire power, mass killings, and destruction.

But the atrocities created a completely opposite effect on the Bengalis.

Instead of being cowed, they rose in revolt and chose the path of armed struggle to resist armed aggression. When news of the Dhaka massacre reached other cities and towns, human waves overran the police stations and distributed arms to people. But the initial armed resistance was short-lived as the Bengalis lacked substantial arms and were vastly outnumbered in terms of trained soldiers. The Pakistani army was able to recapture a majority of the towns. Not surprisingly, the process was brutal and innocent civilians were killed indiscriminately by the military.

Though the initial armed resistance failed, the Bengali nationalists were not prepared to give up the liberation struggle. Instead of direct confrontation, the liberation fighters chose the course of guerrilla warfare. Nearly 100,000 young men were given armed training within Bangladesh and India and they succeeded in virtually destroying the communication and supply lines of the Pakistani army. To retaliate against the guerrillas, the Pakistani army embarked on a strategy of destroying entire areas and populations where guerrilla actions were reported. Massive killing, looting, burning, and raping took place during these "search and destroy" operations (Coggin, Shepherd, Greenway, 1971, pp. 24-29; Jenkins, Clifton, and Steele, 1971, pp. 26-30; Malik 1972).

The reasons behind the genocide, however, were not simply to terrorize the people and punish them for resistance. There were also elements of racism in this act of genocide. The Pakistani army, consisting of mainly Punjabis and Pathans, had always looked upon the Bengalis as racially inferior-a non-martial, physically weak race, not interested or able to serve in the army (Marshall, 1959). General Ayub Khan's (1967) remarks about the Bengalis in his memoirs reflected the typical attitude of the Pakistan's civil military power elite:

East Bengalis...probably belong to the very original Indian races,...

They have been and still are under considerable Hindu cultural and linguistic influence. ...They have all the inhibitions of downtrodden races. ...Their popular complexes, exclusiveness, suspicion and. .. defensive aggressiveness. ..emerge from this historical background. (p.187)

The image of the Bengalis as a non-martial race, created by the British colonialists, was readily accepted by the Pakistani ruling elite. A policy of genocide against fellow Muslims was deliberately undertaken by the Pakistanis on the assumption of racial superiority and a desire to cleanse the Bengali Muslims of Hindu cultural linguistic influence.

How Was the Genocide Committed?

On March 25, 1971, when the Pakistani government initiated military action in Bangladesh, a number of sites and groups of people were selected as targets of attack. In Dhaka, for example, the university campus, the headquarters of the police and the Bengali para militia, slums and squatter settlements, and Hindu majority localities, all were selected as special targets. The Pakistani ruling elite believed that the leadership of the Bengali nationalist movement came from the intellectuals and students, that the Hindus and the urban lumpen proletariat were the main supporters, and that the Bengali police and army officials could be potential leaders in any armed struggle. In the first two days of army operations, hundreds of unarmed people were killed on the university campus, and in the slums and the old city where Hindus lived. (Eyewitness accounts of killings in the Dhaka university campus are included in the oral testimony that accompanies this essay.)

When the news of the Dhaka massacre spread and the independence of Bangladesh was declared on March 26, spontaneous resistance was organized in all the cities and towns of the country. The Awami League politicians, Bengali civilian administration, police, army, students, and intellectuals constituted the leadership of the resistance. This first phase of the liberation war was, however, amateurish and uncoordinated and only lasted approximately six weeks. By the middle of May, the Pakistani army was successful in bringing the cities and towns under their control though the villages remained largely "liberated" areas.

In occupying one city after another, the Pakistani army used the superiority of its fire and air power to its advantage. These operations also involved massive killings of civilians and wanton lootings and destruction of property. The leadership of the resistance (e.g., Awami League leaders, army and civilian officials, and intellectuals) generally left the scene prior to the Pakistani army's arrival. They took refuge either in India or in the villages.

But, in any case, the Pakistani army engaged in indiscriminate killings and burnings in order to terrorize the population. Again, Awami Leaguers, students and intellectuals, civilian and army officers, and Hindus were selected as targets of attack (Malik, 1972). The army's campaign against the cities and towns not only led to massive civilian casualties, it also resulted in a large-scale dislocation of people. In fact, nearly ten million people-Hindus as well as Muslims-migrated to India, and approximately thirty million people from the cities took refuge in the villages. Government offices, educational institutions, and factories were virtually closed.

The second phase of the liberation war-from mid-May to September-was a period of long-term planning for both the Bengali nationalists and the Pakistani government. The Bengali nationalists set up a government-in-exile and undertook external publicity campaigns in support of their cause. They also recruited nearly one hundred thousand young men as freedom fighters who underwent military training and started guerrilla operations inside Bangladesh.

The Pakistan army essentially dug in their own strong-holds during this period with periodic operations to rural areas to punish the villagers for harboring freedom fighters. The army also engaged in large-scale looting, and raping of girls and women.

In fact, systematic and organized rape was the special weapon of war used by the Pakistan army during the second phase of the liberation struggle. While during the first phase, young able-bodied males were the victims of indiscriminate killings, during the second phase, girls and women became the special targets of Pakistani aggression. During army operations, girls and women were raped in front of close family members in order to terrorize and inflict racial slander. Girls and women were also abducted and repeatedly raped and gang-raped in special camps run by the army near army barracks. Many of the rape victims either were killed or committed suicide. Altogether, it is estimated that approximately 200,000 girls and women were raped during the 1971 genocide (Brownmiller, 1981). (An eyewitness account of the mass rape camps organized by the Pakistani army is included in the oral history account that accompanies this essay.)

All through the liberation war, able-bodied young men were suspected of being actual or potential freedom fighters. Thousands were arrested, tortured, and killed. Eventually cities and towns became bereft of young males who either took refuge in India or joined the liberation war.

During the second phase, another group of Bengali men in the rural areas--those who were coerced or bribed to collaborate with the Pakistanis- fell victim to the attacks of Bengali freedom fighters.

The third phase of the liberation struggle-from October till mid-December-saw intensified guerrilla action and finally a brief conventional war between Pakistan and the combined Indian and Bangladeshi forces which ended with the surrender of the Pakistani army on December 16, 1971 (Palit, 1972; Ayoob and Subrahmanyan, 1972) .As guerrilla action increased, the Pakistani army also intensified its "search and destroy" operations. Several villages were destroyed each day during this phase.

In the last week of the war, when their defeat was virtually certain, the Pakistani government engaged in its most brutal and premeditated genocidal campaign. During this time, villages were burnt and their inhabitants were indiscriminately killed. In order to deprive the new nation of its most talented leadership, the Pakistanis had decided to kill the most respected and influential intellectuals and professionals in each city and town. Between December 12 and 14, a selected number of intellectuals and professionals were picked up from their houses and murdered. Many of their names were later found in the diary of Major General Rao Forman Ali, advisor to the Martial Law Administrator and Governor of occupied Bangladesh (Malik, 1972).

The victims of the 1971 genocide were, thus, first and foremost Bengalis.

Though Hindus were especially targeted, the majority of the victims were Bengali Muslims-ordinary villagers and slum dwellers-who were caught unprepared during the Pakistani army's sweeping spree of wanton killing, rape, and destruction. As previously mentioned, the Pakistani ruling elite identified certain groups as their special enemies-students and intellectuals, Awami Leaguers and their supporters, and Bengali members of the armed forces, and the police. But many members of these targeted groups went into hiding or in exile in India after the initial attack. As a result, the overwhelming majority of the victims were defenseless ordinary poor people who stayed behind in their own houses and did not suspect that they would be killed, raped, taken to prison, and tortured simply for the crime of being born a Bengali.

The sheltered and protected life of women, provided by the Bengali Muslim cultural norm, was virtually shattered in 1971. Thousands of women were suddenly left defenseless and to fend for themselves as widows and rape victims. The rape victims were particularly vulnerable. Though they were the casualties of the war, many of them were discarded by their own families as a way to avoid shame and dishonor (Brownmiller, 1981; Jahan, 1973).

Who Committed the Genocide?

The Pakistani government-the Yahya regime-was primarily responsible for the genocide. Not only did it prevent the Awami league and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from forming the federal government, but it opted for a military solution to a constitutional crisis. In doing so, it decided to unleash a brutal military operation in order to terrorize the Bengalis. Yahya's decision to put General Tikka Khan-who had earned the nickname of Butcher of Baluchistan for his earlier brutal suppression of Baluchi nationals in the 1960s-in charge of the military operation in Bangladesh, was an overt signal of the regime's intention to launch a genocide.

When Bangladesh was liberated, the Pakistani army surrendered; and shortly thereafter, the Bangladesh government declared its intention to hold war crime trials against the Pakistan army. Specific charges, however, were only brought against 193 officers (out of the 93,000 soldiers within its ranks). Bangladesh, however, later gave up the idea of war crime trials in exchange for a negotiated settlement of outstanding issues with Pakistan. This specifically involved the return of the Bengalis held hostage in Pakistan, repatriation of the Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan, division of assets and liabilities, and recognition of Bangladesh (O'Donnell, 1984).

But the Pakistani military leaders were not the only culprits. The political parties, e.g., the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), also played an important role in instigating the army to take military action in Bangladesh. The PPP and its leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto supported the army action all through 1971 (Bhutto, 1971; Jahan, 1973).

There were also Bengalis who collaborated with the Pakistani regime. During the second phase of the liberation struggle, the Pakistani government deliberately recruited Bengali collaborators. Many of the Islamic political groups (Muslim League and the Jamaat-e-Islami) opposed to the Awami League also collaborated with the army. Peace committees were formed in different cities and localities and under their auspices rajakars (armed volunteers) were raised and given arms to counter the freedom fighters. Two armed vigilante groups (Al Badr and Al-Shams) were trained, and took the lead in the arrest and killing of the intellectuals during December 12-14, 1971. Some Bengali intellectuals were also recruited to conduct propaganda in favor of the Pakistanis.

The non-Bengali residents of Bangladesh-the Biharis-were the other group of collaborators. Many of them acted as informants and also participated in riots in Dhaka and Chittagong. Biharis, however, were also victims of Bengali mob violence.

The World's Response to the Genocide

World response to the genocide can be analyzed at dual levels-official and non-official. At the official level, world response was determined by geopolitical interests and major power alignments. Officially India was sympathetic and supportive of the Bangladesh cause from the beginning. The U.S.S.R., India's major superpower ally, supported the Indian-backed cause. As a result of the U.S.S.R.'s support, all the Eastern bloc countries naturally were also supportive of Bangladesh (Jackson, 1975).

Pakistan's allies were predictably opposed to Bangladesh. Pakistan launched a propaganda campaign to deny the existence of genocide (White Paper, 1971; Bhutto, 1971). Islamic countries were generally supportive of Pakistan. So was China. The official policy of the United States was to "tilt in favor of Pakistan" because Pakistan was used as an intermediary to open the door to China (Jackson, 1975).

At the non-official level, however, there was a great outpouring of sympathy for the Bangladesh cause worldwide because of the genocide. The Western media-particularly the U.S., British, French, and Australian- kept Bangladesh on the global agenda all through 1971. Well-known Western artists and intellectuals also came out in support of Bangladesh. George Harrison and Ravi Shankar held a Bangladesh concert. Andre Malraux, the noted French author, volunteered to go and fight with the Bengali freedom fighters. In the United States, citizen groups and individuals lobbied successfully with Congress to stop military aid to Pakistan. Despite the Nixon administration's official support of the Pakistani government, influential senators and congressmen {such as Frank Church and Edward Kennedy)spoke out strongly against the genocide. Members of parliament in the United Kingdom, Europe, and other Western countries were also highly critical of the Bangladesh genocide.

Both officially and unofficially, India played a critical role in mobilizing support for Bangladesh. The genocide and the resultant influx of ten million refugees in West Bengal and neighboring states created spontaneous unofficial sympathy. The press, political parties, and voluntary organizations in India pressed Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, to immediately intervene in Bangladesh when the Pakistani army cracked down in March 1971. The Indian government initially declined to intervene but gave moral and financial support to the Bangladesh government-in-exile as well as the freedom fighters. It also sponsored a systematic international campaign in favor of Bangladesh. And finally in December 1971, when the ground was well prepared, Bangladesh was liberated as a result of direct Indian army intervention (Jackson, 1975).

The world's sympathy for the Bangladesh people in the aftermath of the 1971 genocide was also demonstrated by the tremendous relief and rehabilitation efforts mounted by the United Nations and private voluntary organizations in Bangladesh. Even before the liberation of Bangladesh, large-scale relief efforts were undertaken by the world community to feed the refugees in the India-based camps. And during the first two years of the birth of the new nation ''as many as 72 foreign relief groups, including U.N. agencies, contributed to what observers considered the largest single and most successful emergency relief endeavor of our times" {0' Donnell, 1984, p. 112). Nearly $1.3 billion of humanitarian aid was given to Bangladesh in the first two years of its existence.

Though the international community responded generously in giving humanitarian aid, there was very little support for the war crime trials that Bangladesh proposed to hold. The Indian army very quickly removed the Pakistani soldiers from Bangladesh soil to India in order to prevent any reprisals or mob violence against them. India and other friendly countries were also supportive of a negotiated package as a way to settle all outstanding issues between Pakistan and Bangladesh, including the war crimes. Though public opinion favoring war crime trials against the Pakistani army has high in Bangladesh, the Sheikh Mujib regime finally decided to forego the trials. This created a deep scar in the national psyche; indeed, the lack of a trial created a sense of betrayal and mistrust.

Long-Range Impact of the Genocide on the Victims

A major impact of the genocide was the introduction of violence in Bangladesh society, politics, and culture. Prior to 1971, Bengalis were a relatively peaceful and homogeneous community with a low level of violent crimes. They were highly faction ridden and politicized but differences and disputes were generally settled through negotiations, litigation, and peaceful mass movements. After the Pakistani armed attack, Bengalis took up arms and for the first time engaged in armed struggle. This brought a qualitative change in people's attitude to conflict resolution. Non-violent means of protest and conflict resolution were largely discarded in favor of armed violence.

The genocide, looting, burning, and rapes also brutalized the Bangladeshi society. After witnessing so much violence, the people seemed to have developed a higher degree of tolerance toward wanton violence.

The role of Bengali collaborators in perpetuating the genocide created deep division and mistrust in the otherwise homogeneous Bengali social fabric. After the birth of Bangladesh the whole country appeared to be divided between the freedom fighters and collaborators. But not all collaborators were clearly identified. For example, the members of the two vigilante groups (Al Badr and Al-Shams) were never traced and punished. As a result, the feeling that the collaborators were still at large and capable of striking again created deep fear and a certain paralysis of action particularly among the intellectuals.

In addition to these three generalized impacts-violence, brutalization, and mistrust-the genocide has had several long-term impacts on the different victim groups. The Hindu community has not felt safe again in Bangladesh, and after 1971 many of them decided not to return to Bangladesh. Furthermore, there has been a steady migration of young Hindus to India even after Bangladesh was liberated.

Students and youth, who became familiar with the use of arms, did not give them up after 1971. They started using sophisticated weapons in settling political scores. Continuous armed conflicts between rival student groups have made the college and university campuses one of the most dangerous places in the country. That has resulted in destroying the academic atmosphere and the standard of educational institutions.

The genocide and the issue of collaborators also created a deep division within the armed forces. From 1975 to 1981, the various factions of the armed forces staged numerous bloody coups and countercoups which resulted in the killing of virtually all the military leaders who participated in the liberation war.

The status of women was also altered as a result of the genocide. The sudden loss of male protection forced thousands of women to seek wage employment. For the first time, women entered occupations, e.g., public works program, rural extension work, civil administration, police, etc., which were not open to them before. Violence against women has also become more widespread and common.

Do People Care Today?

The genocide and the liberation war has been kept alive primarily through creative arts-theater, music, literature, and painting. Over the last five years, nearly two decades after the genocide was committed, many vivid eyewitness accounts of the genocide and personal diaries of 1971 have been published in Bangladesh. It is interesting to note that from 1971 to 1973, it was mostly foreigners who published eyewitness accounts of the Bangladesh genocide {Mascarenhas, 1971; Malik, 1972; Payne, 1973). Bengalis themselves did not sit down to write or collect these accounts. But a decade and a half after the events, a flood of writing on the genocide has begun to emerge, most of it coming from Bangladesh written by ordinary citizens who relate their personal experiences of the genocide. These recollections are powerful and evocative.

While the genocide and the liberation war have not been forgotten by the people of Bangladesh, the collaborators have been gradually "rehabilitated" through state patronage. Since the 1975 army coup and the overthrow of the Awami League regime, many of the collaborators who had been opposed to the Awami League joined the political parties floated by the two military leaders, Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981) and Ershad (1982-1990). The two military leaders tilted the country toward Islamic ideology, allowed religious-based parties to function, and appointed a few well-known collaborators to their cabinet. The gradual ascendance of the Islamic forces in the country became even more evident when, after the 1991 election, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) succeeded in forming the government with the support of the fundamentalist party, Jamaat-e-Islami.

The control of state power by the collaborators of the 1971 genocide finally enraged the victims of genocide to take direct political action. They launched a mass movement to eliminate the "Killers and Collaborators of 1971." A citizens' committee was convened in 1991. It was headed by Jahanara Imam, a well-known author whose son was killed by the Pakistani army in 1971. It demanded a trial of Golam Azam, the head of the Jamaat-e-Islami party for complicity in the 1971 killings. The non-partisan civic organization galvanized the support of the intellectuals and youth. The major opposition party, the Awami League, also threw in its support. The citizen's committee organized major non-violent protests, nationwide strikes were organized, and a public trial was held where children, wives, and other relatives of victims of genocide gave testimony against the Jamaat-e- Islami party and its leader Golam Azam. The genocide and the collaborators' issue, which had gradually been sidestepped since 1975, were brought back to the center stage of the political arena in 1992.

Lessons from This Genocide

What lessons can be drawn from the 1971 Bangladesh genocide? First, once a state adopts a systematic policy of genocide against any nationality group, the nationality group, threatened with genocide, will feel stronger in the legitimacy of their claim to form their own separate state.

Second, once a policy of genocide is initiated, it is difficult to settle conflict through peaceful negotiations. The Bengalis gave up the path of constitutional struggle and political negotiations and chose the course of armed struggle after the Pakistani intention of killing several million people to arrive at a "final" solution became evident to the Bengalis.

Third, the genocide creates a deep trauma in the national psyche. It creates fear, suspicion, and mistrust. The Bengalis are suspicious of all foreign powers including India, which helped to liberate the country. Resentment against the Indian army emerged in the weeks following the liberation of the country and the Indian army was withdrawn within ninety days. There is not only constant fear of foreign aggression, there is also distrust about foreign agents and collaborators. The deep animosity between the freedom fighters and collaborators makes national consensus building efforts almost impossible. Creating a civil society in Bangladesh continues to be difficult since the issue of genocide divides the nation so deeply.

Eyewitness Accounts

Genocide in Bangladesh

The following eyewitness accounts of the 1971 genocide depict different incidents. The first two eyewitness accounts describe the mass murders committed on March 25 night on Dhaka University campus. The first account is by a survivor of the killings in one of the student dormitories (Jagannath Hall) where Hindu students lived. The second account is by a university professor who witnessed and videotaped the massacres on Dhaka University campus. The third and fourth eyewitness testimonies describe the mass rape of women by the Pakistanis. The fifth testimony describes the killings in the village of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the nationalist movement. The last account describes the atrocities of the non-Bengali Biharis who collaborated with the Pakistan army. The testimonies are taken from two sources; one is a Bengali book entitled 1971: Terrible Experiences (Dhaka: Jatiya Shahitya Prakasheni, 1989), which was edited by Rashid Haider and is a collection of eyewitness accounts. Sohela Nazneen translated the accounts from Bengali to English. The other source, The Year of the Vulture (New Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1972), is an Indian journalist's (Arnita Malik) account of the genocide. In the Malik book Dhaka is spelled as Dacca, which was the spelling used in 1972.

Massacre at Jagannath Hall

This testimony is from Kali Ranjansheel's, "Jagannath Hall e-Chilam" ["I was at Jagannath Hall"], in Rashid Haider (ed.), 1971: Vayabaha Ovigayata [1971: Terrible Experiences] Dhaka: Jatiya Shahitya Prakasheni, 1989, p. 5. It was translated by Sohela Nazneen. Reprinted with permission.

I was a student at the Dhaka University. I used to live in room number 235 (South Block) in Jagannath Hall. On the night of 25th of March I woke up from sleep by the terrifying sound of gunfire. Sometimes the sound of gunfire would be suppressed by the sound of bomb explosions and shell-fire. I was so terrified that I could not even think of what I should do! After a while I thought about going to Shusil, assistant general secretary of the student's union. I crawled up the stairs very slowly to the third floor. I found out that some students had already taken refuge in Shusil's room, but he was not there. The students told me to go to the roof of the building where many other students had taken shelter but I decided (rather selfishly) to stay by myself I crawled to the rest rooms at the northern end of the third floor and took refuge in there. I could see the East, the South and the West from the window. I could see that the soldiers were searching for students with flashlights from room to room, were taking them near the Shahid Minar (Martyr's memorial) and then shooting them. Only the sound of gunfire and pleas of mercy filled the air. Sometimes the Pakistanis used mortars and were shelling the building. The tin sheds in front of assembly and some of the rooms in North Block were set on fire. ...

After some time about forty to fifty Pakistani soldiers came to the South Block and broke down the door of the dining room. The lights were turned on and they were firing at the students who took shelter in that room. ...When the soldiers came out they had Priyanath (the caretaker of the student dormitory) at gunpoint, and forced him to show the way through all the floors of the dormitory. During this time I was not able to see them as I left the restroom by climbing up the open window and took shelter on the sunshed of the third floor. But I could hear the cracking sounds of bullets, the students pleading for mercy and the sound of the soldiers rummaging and throwing things about in search of valuables. The soldiers did not see me on the sunshed.

...After they left I again took refuge in the washroom. I peeked through the window and saw that the other students' dormitory, Salimullah Hall, was on fire. The Northern and the Eastern parts of the city was on fire too as the North and East horizon had turned red. The whole night the Pakistani soldiers continued their massacre and destruction. ...Finally I heard the call for the morning prayer. ...

...The curfew was announced at dawn and I thought that this merciless killing would stop. But it continued. The soldiers started killing those who had escaped their notice during the night before.

...It was morning and I heard the voices of some students. I came out of the washroom, and saw that the students were carrying a body downstairs while soldiers with machine guns were accompanying them. It was the dead body of Priyanath. I was ordered to help the students and I complied. We carried bodies from the dormitory rooms and piled them up in the field outside.

There were a few of us there-students, gardeners, two sons of the gates-keeper and the rest were janitors. The janitors requested the Pakistanis to let them go since they were not Bengalis. After a while the army separated the janitors from us.

...All the time the soldiers were cursing and swearing at us. The soldiers said "We will see how you get free Bangladesh! Why don't you shout Joy Bangla (Victory to Bengal)!" The soldiers also kicked us around. After we had finished carrying the bodies, we were divided into groups. They then took my group to one of the university quarters and searched almost every room on the fourth floor and looted the valuables. Downstairs we saw dead bodies piled up, obviously victims from the night before. They also brought down the flag of Bangladesh.

...After we came back, we were again ordered to carry the dead bodies to the Shahid Minar. The soldiers had already piled up the bodies of their victims and we added others bodies to the piles. If we felt tired and slowed down, the soldiers threatened to kill us-

...As my companion and I were carrying the body of Sunil (our dormitory guard), we heard screams in female voices. We found that the women from the nearby slums were screaming as the soldiers were shooting at the janitors (the husbands of the women). I realized that our turn would come too as the Pakistanis started lining up those students who were before us, and were firing at them. My companion and I barely carried the dead body of Sunil toward a pile where I saw the dead body of Dr. Dev [Professor of Philosophy]. I cannot explain why I did what I did next. Maybe from pure fatigue or maybe from a desperate hope to survive!

I lay down beside the dead body of Dr. Dev while still holding onto the corpse of Sunil. I kept waiting for the soldiers to shoot me. I even thought that I had died. After a long time I heard women and children crying. I opened my eyes and saw that the army had left and the dead bodies were still lying about and women were crying. Some of the people were still alive but wounded. All I wanted to do was to get away from the field and survive.

I crawled towards the slums. First I went to the house of the electrician. I asked for water but when I asked for shelter, his wife started crying aloud and I then left and took refuge in a restroom. ...Suddenly I heard the voice of Idu who used to sell old books. He said,

"Don't be afraid. I heard you are alive, I shall escort you to safety." I went to old Dhaka city. Then I crossed the river. The boatman did not take any money. From there, I first went to Shimulia, then, Nawabganj and finally I reached my village in Barishal in the middle of April.

Horror Documentary

This testimony is from Amita Malik's The Year of the Vulture (New Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1972, pp. 79-83).

At the professors' funeral, Professor Rafiq-ul-Islam of the Bengali De-partment whispered to me, "At the television station you will find that there is a film record of the massacre of professors and students at Jagannath Hall. Ask them to show it to you."

This sounded so incredible that I did not really believe it. However, I wasted no time in asking Mr. Jamil Chowdhury, the station manager of TV, whether he did, indeed, have such a film with him. "Oh yes," he said, "but we have not shown it yet because it might have dreadful repercussions." He was, of course, referring to the fact that the

Pakistani army was still very much in Dacca in prisoner-of-war camps in the Cantonment, and it would have been dangerous to show them gunning down professors and students at Dacca University. The people of Dacca had shown tremendous restraint so far, but this would have been going a bit too far. However, I had it confirmed that N.B.C. VISNEWS and other international networks had already obtained and projected the film.

"But who shot the film?" I asked in wonder. "A professor at the University of Engineering, who had a video tape-recorder and whose flat overlooks the grounds of Jagannath Hall," said Mr. Chowdhury. It was therefore by kind courtesy of Dacca TV that I sat in their small projection room on January 5 and saw for the first time what must be a unique actuality film, something for the permanent archives of world history.

The film, lasting about 20 minutes, first shows small distant figures emerging from the hall carrying the corpses of what must be the students and professors massacred in Jagannath Hall. These are clearly civilian figures in lighter clothes and, at their back, seen strutting arrogantly even at that distance, are darker clad figures, the hoodlums of the Pakistan army. The bodies are laid down in neat, orderly rows by those forced to carry them at gun-point. Then the same procession troops back to the Hall. All this time, with no other sound, one hears innocent bird-song and a lazy cow is seen grazing on the university lawns. The same civilians come out again and the pile of bodies grows.

But after the third grisly trip, the action changes. After the corpses are laid on the ground, the people carrying them are lined up. One of them probably has a pathetic inkling of what is going to happen. He falls on his knees and clings to the legs of the nearest soldier, obviously pleading for mercy. But there is no mercy. One sees guns being pointed, one hears the crackle of gunfire and the lined up figures fall one by one, like the proverbial house of cards or, if you prefer, puppets in a children's film. At this stage, the bird-song suddenly stops. The lazy cow, with calf, careers wildly across the lawn and is joined by a whale herd of cows fleeing in panic.

But the last man is still clinging pathetically to the jack-boot of the soldier at the end of the row. The solider then lifts his shoulder at an angle, so that the gun points almost perpendicularly downwards to the man at his feet, and shoots him. The pleading hands unlink from the soldier's legs and another corpse joins the slumped bodies in a row, some piled on top of the very corpses they had to carry out at gunpoint, their own colleagues and friends. The soldiers prod each body with their rifles or bayonets to make sure that they are dead. A few who are still wriggling in their death agony are shot twice until they also stop wriggling.

At this stage, there is a gap, because Professor Nurul Ullah's film probably ran out and he had to load a new one. But by the time he starts filming again, nothing much has changed except that there is a fresh pile of bodies on the left. No doubt some other students and professors had been forced at gun-point to carry them out and then were executed in turn. In so far as one can count the bodies, or guess roughly at their number in what is really a continuous long-shot amateur film, there are about 50 bodies by this time. And enough, one should think.

Professor Nurul Ullah's world scoop indicated that he was a remarkable individual who through his presence of mind, the instinctive reaction of a man of science, had succeeded in shooting a film with invaluable documentary evidence regardless of the risk to his life.

I immediately arranged to trace him down and he very kindly asked me to come round to his flat. Professor Nurul Ullah is a Professor of Electricity at the University of Engineering in Dacca. I found him to be a quiet, scholarly, soft-spoken, and surprisingly young man with a charming wife. He is normally engrossed in his teaching and students. But he happened to be the proud possessor of a video tape-recorder which he bought in Japan on his way back from a year at an American university. He is perhaps the only man alive who saw the massacre on the lawns of Dacca University on the first day of the Pakistani army crack-down. He took his film at great risk to his personal life. It was fascinating to sit down in Professor Nurul Ullah's sitting room and see the film twice with him, the second time after he had shown me the bedroom window at the back of his flat which overlooked both the street along which the soldiers drove to the university and the university campus. When he realized what was happening, he slipped his microphone outside [through] the window to record the sounds of firing. The film was shot from a long distance and under impossible conditions. Professor Nurul Ullah's description of how he shot the film was as dramatic and stirring as the film itself:

"On March 25, 1971, the day of the Pakistani crack-down, although I knew nothing about it at the time, my wife and I had just had breakfast and I was looking out of my back windows in the professors' block of flats in which I and my colleagues from the Engineering University live with our families. Our back windows overlook a street across which are the grounds of Jagannath Hall, one of the most famous halls of Dacca University. I saw an unusual sight, soldiers driving past my flat and going along the street which overlooks it, towards the entrance to the University. As curfew was on, they made announcements on loudspeakers from a jeep that people coming out on the streets would be shot. After a few minutes, I saw some people carrying out what were obviously dead bodies from Jagannath Hall. I immediately took out my loaded video tape recorder and decided to shoot a film through the glass of the window. It was not an ideal way to do it, but I was not sure what it was all about, and what with the curfew and all the tension, we were all being very cautious. As I started shooting the film, the people carrying out the dead bodies laid them down on the grass under the supervision of Pakistani soldiers who are distinguishable in the film, because of their dark clothes, the weapons they are carrying and the way they are strutting about contrasted with the civilians in lighter clothes who are equally obviously drooping with fright. “As soon as firing started, I carefully opened the bedroom window wide enough for me to slip my small microphone just outside the window so that I could record the sound as well. But it was not very satisfactorily done, as it was very risky. My wife now tells me that she warned me at the time: ~re you mad, do you want to get shot too? One flash from your camera and they will kill us too.' But I don't remember her telling me, I must have been very absorbed in my shooting, and she says I took no notice of what she said.

"It so happened that a few days earlier, from the same window I had shot some footage of student demonstrators on their way to the university. I little thought it would end this way.

"Anyway, this macabre procession of students carrying out bodies and laying them down on the ground was repeated until we realized with horror that the same students were themselves being lined up to be shot. After recording this dreadful sight on my video tape-recorder, I shut it off thinking it was all over only to realize that a fresh batch of university people were again carrying out bodies from inside. By the time I got my video tape-recorder going again, I had missed this new grisly procession but you will notice in the film that the pile of bodies is higher.

"I now want to show my film all over the world, because although their faces are not identifiable from that distance in what is my amateur film, one can certainly see the difference between the soldiers and their victims, one can see the shooting and hear it, one can see on film what my wife and I actually saw with our own eyes. And that is documentary evidence of the brutality of the Pak army and their massacre of the intellectuals."

Our Mothers and Sisters

The following testimony is from M. Akhtaurzzaman Mondol's "Amader-Ma Bon" ("Our Mother and Sisters") which appears in Rashid Haider (Ed.) 1971: Terrible Experiences, p. 197. It was translated by Sohela Nazneen. Reprinted with permission.

We started our fight to liberate Vurungamari from the Pakistani occupation forces on November 11. 1971. We started attacking from West, North and East simultaneously. The Indian air forces bombed the Pakistani stronghold on November 11 morning. On November 13 we came near the outskirts of Vurungamari, and the Indian air force intensified their air attack. On November 14 morning the guns from the Pakistani side fell silent and we entered Vurungamari with shouts of "Joy Bangla" (victory to Bangladesh). The whole town was quiet. We captured fifty to sixty Pakistani soldiers. They had no ammunition left. We found the captain of the Pakistan forces, captain Ataullah Khan, dead in the bunker. He still had his arms around a woman-both died in the bomb attack in the bunker. The woman had marks of torture all over her body. We put her in a grave.

But I still did not anticipate the terrible scene I was going to witness and we were heading toward east of Vurungamari to take up our positions. I was informed by wireless to go to the Circle Officer's office. After we reached the office, we caught glimpses of several young women through the windows of the second floor. The doors were locked. so we had to break them down. After breaking down the door of the room, where the women were kept, we were dumbfounded. We found four naked young women, who had been physically tortured, raped, and battered by the Pakistani soldiers. We immediately came out of the room and threw in four lungis [dresses] and four bedsheets for them to cover themselves. We tried to talk to them, but all of them were still in shock. One of them was six to seven months pregnant. One was a college student from Mymensingh. They were taken to India for medical treatment in a car owned by the Indian army. We found many dead bodies and skeletons in the bushes along the road. Many of the skeletons had long hair and had on torn saris and bangles on their hands. We found sixteen other women locked up in a room at Vurungamari High School. These women were brought in for the Pakistani soldiers from nearby villages. We found evidence in the rooms of the Circle Officers office which showed that these women were tied to the windowbars and were repeatedly raped by the Pakistani soldiers. The whole floor was covered with blood, torn pieces of clothing, and strands of long hair. ...

The Officer's Wife

This testimony is from Amita Malik's The Year of the Vulture, pp. 141-42.

Another pathetic case is that of a woman of about 25. Her husband was a government officer in a subdivision and she has three children. They first took away the husband, although she cried and pleaded with them. Then they returned him half-dead, after brutal torture. Then another lot of soldiers came in at 8 or 9 A.M. and raped her in front of her husband and children. They tied up the husband and hit the children when they cried.

Then another lot of soldiers came at 2.30 P.M. and took her away. They kept her in a bunker and used to rape her every night until she became senseless. When she returned after three months, she was pregnant. The villagers were very sympathetic about her but the husband refused to take her back. When the villagers kept on pressing him to take her back, he hanged himself. She is now in an advanced stage of pregnancy and we are doing all that we can do to help her. But she is inconsolable. She keeps on asking, "But why, why did they do it? It would have been better if we had both died."

The Maulvi's Story

This testimony appears in Arnica Malik's The Year of the Vulture, pp. 102-104.

On April 19, 1971, about 35 soldiers came to our village in a launch at about 8 A.M. A couple of days earlier, I had asked the Sheikh's father and mother to leave the village, but they refused. They said. "This is our home and we shall not go away." Soon after I heard the sound of the launch, a soldier came running and said, "Here Maulvi, stop, in which house are the father and mother of the Sheikh?" So first I brought out his father. We placed a chair for him but they made him sit on the ground. Then Sheikh Sahib's amma [mother] was brought out. She took hold of my hand and I made her sit on the chair. The soldiers then held a sten-gun against the back of the Sheikh's abba [father] and a rifle against mine. "We will kill you in 10 minutes," said a soldier looking at his watch.

Then they picked up a diary from the Sheikh's house and some medicine bottles and asked me for the keys of the house. I gave them the bunch of keys but they were so rough in trying to open the locks that the keys would not turn. So they kicked open the trunks. There was nothing much inside except five teaspoons, which they took. They saw a framed photograph and asked me whose it was. When I said it was Sheikh Sahib's, they took it down. I tried to get up at this stage but they hit me with their rifle ***** and I fell down against the chair. Finally, they picked up a very old suitcase and a small wooden box and made a servant carry them to the launch.

Then they dragged me up to where the Sheikh's father was sitting and repeated, "We shall shoot you in 10 minutes." Pointing to the Sheikh's father, I asked: "What's the point of shooting him? He's an old man and a government pensioner." The soldiers replied, "Is lire, keonki wohne shaitan paida kira hai" ["Because he has produced a devil."]. "Why shoot me, the imam of the mosque?" I asked. “Aap kiska imam hai? Aap vote dehtehain" ["What sort of an imam are you? You vote."], they replied. I said: "The party was not banned, we were allowed to vote for it. We are not leaders, we are janasadharan [the masses]. Why don't you ask the leaders?" The captain intervened to say that eight minutes were over and we would be shot in another two minutes. Just then a major came running from the launch and said we were to be let alone and not shot.

I immediately went towards the masjid (mosque) and saw about 50 villagers inside. Three boys had already been dragged out and shot. The soldiers asked me about a boy who, I said, was a krishak (cultivator). They looked at the mud on his legs and hands and let him go. Khan Sahib, the Sheikh's uncle, had a boy servant called Ershad. They asked me about him. I said he was a servant. But a Razakar maulvi, who had come with them from another village, said he was the Sheikh's relative, which was a lie. The boy Ershad was taken to the lineup. He asked for water but it was refused.

Another young boy had come from Dacca, where he was employed in a mill, to enquire about his father. He produced his identity card but they shot him all the same. They shot Ershad right in front of his mother. Ershad moved a little after falling down so they shot him again. Finally, the boy who had carried the boxes to the launch was shot. With the three shot earlier, a total of six innocent boys were shot by the Pakistani army without any provocation. They were all good-looking and therefore suspected to be relatives of the Sheikh.

After this, the Sheikh's father and mother were brought out of the house. Amma was almost fainting. And the house was set on fire and burnt down in front of our eyes until all that remained was the frame of the doorway which you can still see. Altonissa, the lady with the blood- stained clothes of her son, is the mother of Torab Yad Ali who was shot. They did not allow her to remove her son's body for burial, because they wanted the bodies to be exposed to public view to terrorize the villagers. They also shot Mithu, the 10-year old son of this widowed lady. She had brought him up with the greatest difficulty-they never had anything to eat except saag-bhaat (spinach and rice). They shot little Mithu because he had helped the Mukti Bahini. You can now ask the ladies about their narrow escape.

Shaheeda Sheikh, Sheikh Mujib's niece, then added that fortunately all the women were taken away to safety across the river to a neighbouring village three days before the Pakistani soldiers came. For months they had lived in constant terror of Razakars pouncing on them from bushes by the village pond. Beli Begum, Mujib's niece, a strikingly lovely woman, told me how she had fled from the village when seven months pregnant and walked 25 miles to safety. Pari, a girl cousin, escaped with a temperature of 104 degrees. Otherwise they would all have been killed.

Massacre at Faiz Lake

This testimony is from Abdul Gofran's "Faiz Lake-Gonohataya" ("Massacreat Faiz Lake"), which first appeared in Rashid Haider (ed.), 1971: 1errible Experiences. It was translated by Sohela Nazneen.

I own a shop near Akbar Shah mosque in Pahartali. On November lOth, 1971, at 6. A.M. about forty to fifty Biharis came to my shop and forced me to accompany them. I had to comply as any form of resistance would have been useless against such a large number of people. They took me to Faiz Lake. As we passed through the gates of Faiz Lake I saw that hundreds of non-Bengalis had assembled near the Pump house and wireless colony. The Bengalis who had been brought in were tied up. They were huddled by the side of the lake which was at the north side of the Pump-house. Many of the Biharis were carrying knives, swords and other sharp instruments. The Biharis were first kicking and beating up the Bengalis brutally and then were shoving their victims towards towards those carrying weapons. These other group of armed Biharis were then jabbing their victims in the stomach and then severing their heads with the swords. I witnessed several groups of Bengalis being killed in such a manner. ...When the Biharis came for me one of them took away my sweater. I hen punched him and jumped into the lake. ...I swam to the other side and hid among the bushes. .. The Biharis came to look for me but I was fortunate and barely escaped their notice. From my hiding place I witnessed the mass murder that was taking place. Many Bengalis were killed in the manner which had been described earlier.

The massacre went on till about two o'clock in the afternoon. After they had disposed off the last Bengal victim, the Biharis brought in a group of ten to twelve Bengali men. It was evident from their gestures that they were asking the Bengalis to dig a grave for the bodies lying about. I also understood from their gestures that the Biharis were promising the group that if they completed the task they would be allowed to go free. The group complied to their wish. After the group had finished burying the bodies, they were also killed, and the Biharis went away rejoicing. There were still many dead bodies thrown around the place.

In the afternoon many Biharis and [the] Pakistani army went along that road. But the Pakistani soldiers showed no sign of remorse. They seemed rather happy and did nothing to bury the dead.

When night fell I came back to my shop but left Chittagong the next day.

Genocide in Bangladesh
by Rounaq Jahan in Samuel Totten, et al. New York: Garland Publishing, 1997

 

[MastanKhan]

AKzaman,

At this stage, your paste and post article is pretty useless. You have found a nation, build upon it.

The germans found out in the 2nd world war that even if they had a thousand machine guns firing continuously for days, would not kill as many people as they anticipated. That is why they created the gas chambers.

It is technically not possible to kill a million people even with a thousand machine guns firing for 48 hours continuously.

So what it comes down to from the article is that the pakistani millitary must have a maginficiant eternal hard-on for those 70000 plus troops who were raping these quarter of a million of bengali women continously at random and then killing some 3 million bengalis at the same time. In a mass killing scenario, it would take about on the average, roughly 20 rounds of machine gun fire to kill an individual, because there is so much wastage of fire power as people are not standing in one line, one behind the other to die. So, to kill 3 million people, there would be approximately 60 million rounds needed to do the job plus over a thousands of machine guns and then it could be close to six months of continuous 24 hour firing that they may still not achive even 1/3 rd of that goal---well the problem with these lies is that, unlike others, as many times they are told, they still are not believable.

Seems like there is a multiplier effect of 2000 thousand to 2500 hundred in that article. Which mean that the exageration level of rape and killings is that of 2000 times to 2500 times.

The bengalis a non-marcial race----that is indeed a stupid statement---whomsoever came up with that was only trying to cover up the truth to justify the exageration. The bengalis were first grade warriors at all times----so don't give me that sob story.

 

[Ababeel]

Nationalistic Poison. Interesting term.

Btw....this whole "Ummah" thing....what are its origins?

Is it a recent concept, or has it been mentioned in the quran or hadiths.

If you don't know Quranic concept regarding Ummah, please don't meddle in what I ma saying.
A muslim has to follow the concepts provided by Quran and Sunnah. There is no such thing as "recent concept" in Islam.

 

[Marathaman]

If you don't know Quranic concept regarding Ummah, please don't meddle in what I ma saying.
A muslim has to follow the concepts provided by Quran and Sunnah. There is no such thing as "recent concept" in Islam.

Er...then why am i asking questions.

Right...so I don't know about Islam...and when I ask you to tell me....I shouldn't poke my nose.

How silly of me.

I should have realized that the Bangladeshis here are too damn arrogant.

 

[Adux]

I should have realized that the Bangladeshis here are too damn arrogant.

They are ok, we just have three here in Pakdef...who is rather weak in their brain cells....just them be

 

[salman nedian]

Kbagdadi,
We should answer Marathaman's question to clear his concept may be we get one converted.



Marathaman,
Muslim Ummah is the core concept of Islam its not any new concept. Quran and Hadith(Sayings of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W)) clearly says that muslims are brothers and there is no discrimination among them regarding color,cast,nationality etc.

Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) in his last "Hajj" (Pilgrimage) sermon clearly mentioned that no arab is superior than any non-arab and vice versa.there is another Hadith by Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W):

"Muslims are like a body that if one part of the body gets hurt the hole body feels the pain"

Hope i answered ur question.

 

[Marathaman]

Kbagdadi,
We should answer Marathaman's question to clear his concept may be we get one converted.



Marathaman,
Muslim Ummah is the core concept of Islam its not any new concept. Quran and Hadith(Sayings of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W)) clearly says that muslims are brothers and there is no discrimination among them regarding color,cast,nationality etc.

Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) in his last "Hajj" (Pilgrimage) sermon clearly mentioned that no arab is superior than any non-arab and vice versa.there is another Hadith by Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W):

"Muslims are like a body that if one part of the body gets hurt the hole body feels the pain"

Hope i answered ur question.

Thats alright....I googled it.

Thanks anyways