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Could China's J-10 Fighter Kill the Best from Japan's Air Force?

F2 is 100% F-16 .I guess the japs are only brilliant in making electronics or is it the arms embargo?

J-10b cost 27M USD /bird
F-2 cost 171M USD /bird
You can have 5-6 j-10 in price of 1 F-2
Of course j-10 wins
Seriously if its just the F16 version of japan then why its so expensive?
F16 costs 18 million USD.
 
Try not to shift the topic from aircraft to pilot training.
Clearly, if you a piece of kit that gives ou new possibilities in combat, you modify your tactics accordingly. Why do you assume the JASDF wouldn't? It is just silly.

If you're trying to figure out which country is considered to have the best fighter pilots, and rank countries accordingly the answer is simple: the country that gives its pilots the most hours and best training will have the best fighter pilots.
JASDF is surely in the top 10.

It is useless to discuss the plane without discussing tactics. The tactics are defensive, and training for them will give you mediocre pilots. If all of a sudden you provide them IRST in time of war, it wouldn't be beneficial.

Given the small numbers they have, it seems realistic they do train for shoot and scoot tactics. Japan's whole defence philosophy is to rely on Uncle Sam as big brother.

If you can point me to some authentic source that tells otherwise, I will be happy to reconsider.

Oh one more thing. The best fighter pilots are the ones who employ the best tactics in any given situation, and can precisely pull off the maneuvers needed for those tactics. Flying hours is only one small part of it.
 
It is useless to discuss the plane without discussing tactics. The tactics are defensive, and training for them will give you mediocre pilots. If all of a sudden you provide them IRST in time of war, it wouldn't be beneficial.

Given the small numbers they have, it seems realistic they do train for shoot and scoot tactics. Japan's whole defence philosophy is to rely on Uncle Sam as big brother.

If you can point me to some authentic source that tells otherwise, I will be happy to reconsider.

Oh one more thing. The best fighter pilots are the ones who employ the best tactics in any given situation, and can precisely pull off the maneuvers needed for those tactics. Flying hours is only one small part of it.
Again, you are ASSUMING that JASDF would not change its practise and training if/when it should adopt a new capability on F-2.That simply is a poor ASSUMPTION, for which there is NO SUPPORT in FACT. End of debate.
 
Again, you are ASSUMING that JASDF would not change its practise and training if/when it should adopt a new capability on F-2.That simply is a poor ASSUMPTION, for which there is NO SUPPORT in FACT. End of debate.

You are completely misunderstanding me. I am saying, suddenly providing IRST in time of war is going to be ineffective. Are you trying to be dense on purpose?
 
What are your thoughts on the J-10 as it compares to the F-16?
Everybody loves the 'hard metrics' such as climb rate, weapons carried, thrust, etc...

Let us take the extremes of the hard metrics: F-16 vs Sopwith Camel.

If we put the greenest of pilots into the F-16 and the most experienced of combat pilots into the Sopwith, the F-16 would win in a sec. I said the F-16 and not the pilot.

But if we close the hard metrics gap between fighters, something like the F-4 and F-15, then it becomes less aircraft and more pilot that will make the difference between victory and defeat. Look up Operation Bolo.

Therein lies the problem with looking for hard metrics to make a comparison between two fighters, which inevitably lead to outlandish declarations about whose air force is better than whose: the pilot.

The pilot is the unknown and the problem for such comparisons.

The aircraft does not fight on its own. It needs a human decision maker and this factor is always an unknown. Items like roll rate, max thrust, and cruising speed are tangible comparators. Whereas items like morale, training, motivation, and institutional support are intangible comparators. The latter controls the former.

One example from WW II is the famous 'Thach Weave'...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thach_Weave
A correctly executed Thach Weave (assuming the bait was taken and followed) left little chance of escape to even the most maneuverable opponent.
The tactic was invented before its inventor even met that 'most maneuverable opponent'.

The differences between the hard metrics of the American and the Japanese fighters were greater than %10 overall, the threshold of which fighter's capabilities overtake pilot's capabilities and this comparison favors the Japanese Zero. And yet the intangible metrics of personal experience, study, and creativity allowed the technically inferior American fighters to defeat the superior Japanese fighters.

Nakajima was raging when he got back to Rabaul; he had been forced to dive and run for safety.
In aerial combat, even with today's modern fighters, a break, forced or not, means a run for safety. You most likely will not have a second chance to get a favorable position for another shot.

In many analysts' opinions, the overall differences between the J-10 and the F-16 are less than %10. Sure, you can find discrete items in each fighter that will be quantifiably higher/better than its opponent, but there are plenty of real life experiences like Operation Bolo that will challenge conventional wisdom regarding hard metrics. Between the J-10 and the F-16, it will depends on the pilots.

Another issue is mission types. Both the J-10 and F-16 are multi-roles. With air-air, your opponent is the same as you, but with air-ground, your opponent lives in a different environment, wields different weapons against you, moves differently, and generally outnumbers and outguns you. The F-16 has proven itself to be a formidable long range strike and even CAS platform in actual combat. The J-10 has not. If you must import your defense and if your immediate neighbors are not friendly, which platform would be more attractive to buy ?

Am not saying hard metrics are useless. In fact, hard metrics are vital clues as to how they will place limits on pilot's skills. If you know the jet will out accelerate you, that is a %99.999 safe assumption that a high speed (or even Mach) dash will be a part of his combat repertoire. The limit was changed from your previous opponent's inability to escape you to one where he can outrun you. But just as hard metrics are clues on limits, they also forces creativity on not to get into situations where those limits comes into play. You cannot assume your opponents do not know how to avoid those traps.

What I learned from the martial arts are also common in other forms of combat, although in different words: A good fighter hides his weaknesses, but a great fighter uses them.

The best fighter pilots are the ones who employ the best tactics in any given situation, and can precisely pull off the maneuvers needed for those tactics. Flying hours is only one small part of it.
For now, and probably for at least the next 50 yrs, it is accepted that in order to be 'operational', meaning no longer a student pilot, you need to have 80-100 hrs of actual fight time. It means that if your annual flight hours are less, your skills would atrophied to that of a student pilot level. Then in order to be combat deployable, you need 120-150 annual flight hours. For US, our criteria would add 20 hrs more to that range.

Flying is where you are able to put theory of a tactic into practice. In the movie 'Top Gun', the 'hard deck' is 10,000 ft. It means no combat-type maneuvers below that altitude. It is a safety issue. In real life combat, there is no 'hard deck'. What this means is that without actually flying, even with some limits that do not exist in real combat, you will not know what it is like to have your tactic challenged by the environment and/or by your opponent.

The best fighter pilots are %99.999 of the time have the highest flying hours.
 
You are completely misunderstanding me. I am saying, suddenly providing IRST in time of war is going to be ineffective. Are you trying to be dense on purpose?
Who said anything about suddenly providing IRST in time of war? You had better not call me dense again, pall, particularly since you are making up a scenario, without being clear about this. All I said is that an IRST is easily added to F-2. I never said or implied anything about war- or peacetime. I made clear that when you upgrade an aircraft, you adjust yhour tactics to new capabilities and you practise that.

But even in wartime with a sudden addition, do you really believe JASDF pilots wouldn't know and wouldn't have practiced? I mean, the F15J has an IRST. The subsequent F-15DJ and F-15J Kai variants were also produced. In addition to combat, F-15DJ roles include training. The F-15J Kai is a modernized version of the F-15J. So, it's not an unknown quantity to them. F-2 pilots can practice against an IRST equipped aircraft today. I'm sure they are taught by F-15 collegues about the capabilities and implications for combat. They may even fly along. And they may use a simulator which allows them to practice the capability before it is even on their aircraft.

F-15J-ASDF-FLIR-1.jpg


TFoJ8i6.jpg
 
Everybody loves the 'hard metrics' such as climb rate, weapons carried, thrust, etc...

Let us take the extremes of the hard metrics: F-16 vs Sopwith Camel.

If we put the greenest of pilots into the F-16 and the most experienced of combat pilots into the Sopwith, the F-16 would win in a sec. I said the F-16 and not the pilot.

But if we close the hard metrics gap between fighters, something like the F-4 and F-15, then it becomes less aircraft and more pilot that will make the difference between victory and defeat. Look up Operation Bolo.

Therein lies the problem with looking for hard metrics to make a comparison between two fighters, which inevitably lead to outlandish declarations about whose air force is better than whose: the pilot.

The pilot is the unknown and the problem for such comparisons.

The aircraft does not fight on its own. It needs a human decision maker and this factor is always an unknown. Items like roll rate, max thrust, and cruising speed are tangible comparators. Whereas items like morale, training, motivation, and institutional support are intangible comparators. The latter controls the former.

One example from WW II is the famous 'Thach Weave'...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thach_Weave

The tactic was invented before its inventor even met that 'most maneuverable opponent'.

The differences between the hard metrics of the American and the Japanese fighters were greater than %10 overall, the threshold of which fighter's capabilities overtake pilot's capabilities and this comparison favors the Japanese Zero. And yet the intangible metrics of personal experience, study, and creativity allowed the technically inferior American fighters to defeat the superior Japanese fighters.


In aerial combat, even with today's modern fighters, a break, forced or not, means a run for safety. You most likely will not have a second chance to get a favorable position for another shot.

In many analysts' opinions, the overall differences between the J-10 and the F-16 are less than %10. Sure, you can find discrete items in each fighter that will be quantifiably higher/better than its opponent, but there are plenty of real life experiences like Operation Bolo that will challenge conventional wisdom regarding hard metrics. Between the J-10 and the F-16, it will depends on the pilots.

Another issue is mission types. Both the J-10 and F-16 are multi-roles. With air-air, your opponent is the same as you, but with air-ground, your opponent lives in a different environment, wields different weapons against you, moves differently, and generally outnumbers and outguns you. The F-16 has proven itself to be a formidable long range strike and even CAS platform in actual combat. The J-10 has not. If you must import your defense and if your immediate neighbors are not friendly, which platform would be more attractive to buy ?

Am not saying hard metrics are useless. In fact, hard metrics are vital clues as to how they will place limits on pilot's skills. If you know the jet will out accelerate you, that is a %99.999 safe assumption that a high speed (or even Mach) dash will be a part of his combat repertoire. The limit was changed from your previous opponent's inability to escape you to one where he can outrun you. But just as hard metrics are clues on limits, they also forces creativity on not to get into situations where those limits comes into play. You cannot assume your opponents do not know how to avoid those traps.

What I learned from the martial arts are also common in other forms of combat, although in different words: A good fighter hides his weaknesses, but a great fighter uses them.


For now, and probably for at least the next 50 yrs, it is accepted that in order to be 'operational', meaning no longer a student pilot, you need to have 80-100 hrs of actual fight time. It means that if your annual flight hours are less, your skills would atrophied to that of a student pilot level. Then in order to be combat deployable, you need 120-150 annual flight hours. For US, our criteria would add 20 hrs more to that range.

Flying is where you are able to put theory of a tactic into practice. In the movie 'Top Gun', the 'hard deck' is 10,000 ft. It means no combat-type maneuvers below that altitude. It is a safety issue. In real life combat, there is no 'hard deck'. What this means is that without actually flying, even with some limits that do not exist in real combat, you will not know what it is like to have your tactic challenged by the environment and/or by your opponent.

The best fighter pilots are %99.999 of the time have the highest flying hours.

Thanks for the reply. Excellent points to think about.
 
Everybody loves the 'hard metrics' such as climb rate, weapons carried, thrust, etc...

Let us take the extremes of the hard metrics: F-16 vs Sopwith Camel.

If we put the greenest of pilots into the F-16 and the most experienced of combat pilots into the Sopwith, the F-16 would win in a sec. I said the F-16 and not the pilot.

But if we close the hard metrics gap between fighters, something like the F-4 and F-15, then it becomes less aircraft and more pilot that will make the difference between victory and defeat. Look up Operation Bolo.

Therein lies the problem with looking for hard metrics to make a comparison between two fighters, which inevitably lead to outlandish declarations about whose air force is better than whose: the pilot.

The pilot is the unknown and the problem for such comparisons.

The aircraft does not fight on its own. It needs a human decision maker and this factor is always an unknown. Items like roll rate, max thrust, and cruising speed are tangible comparators. Whereas items like morale, training, motivation, and institutional support are intangible comparators. The latter controls the former.

One example from WW II is the famous 'Thach Weave'...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thach_Weave

The tactic was invented before its inventor even met that 'most maneuverable opponent'.

The differences between the hard metrics of the American and the Japanese fighters were greater than %10 overall, the threshold of which fighter's capabilities overtake pilot's capabilities and this comparison favors the Japanese Zero. And yet the intangible metrics of personal experience, study, and creativity allowed the technically inferior American fighters to defeat the superior Japanese fighters.


In aerial combat, even with today's modern fighters, a break, forced or not, means a run for safety. You most likely will not have a second chance to get a favorable position for another shot.

In many analysts' opinions, the overall differences between the J-10 and the F-16 are less than %10. Sure, you can find discrete items in each fighter that will be quantifiably higher/better than its opponent, but there are plenty of real life experiences like Operation Bolo that will challenge conventional wisdom regarding hard metrics. Between the J-10 and the F-16, it will depends on the pilots.

Another issue is mission types. Both the J-10 and F-16 are multi-roles. With air-air, your opponent is the same as you, but with air-ground, your opponent lives in a different environment, wields different weapons against you, moves differently, and generally outnumbers and outguns you. The F-16 has proven itself to be a formidable long range strike and even CAS platform in actual combat. The J-10 has not. If you must import your defense and if your immediate neighbors are not friendly, which platform would be more attractive to buy ?

Am not saying hard metrics are useless. In fact, hard metrics are vital clues as to how they will place limits on pilot's skills. If you know the jet will out accelerate you, that is a %99.999 safe assumption that a high speed (or even Mach) dash will be a part of his combat repertoire. The limit was changed from your previous opponent's inability to escape you to one where he can outrun you. But just as hard metrics are clues on limits, they also forces creativity on not to get into situations where those limits comes into play. You cannot assume your opponents do not know how to avoid those traps.

What I learned from the martial arts are also common in other forms of combat, although in different words: A good fighter hides his weaknesses, but a great fighter uses them.


For now, and probably for at least the next 50 yrs, it is accepted that in order to be 'operational', meaning no longer a student pilot, you need to have 80-100 hrs of actual fight time. It means that if your annual flight hours are less, your skills would atrophied to that of a student pilot level. Then in order to be combat deployable, you need 120-150 annual flight hours. For US, our criteria would add 20 hrs more to that range.

Flying is where you are able to put theory of a tactic into practice. In the movie 'Top Gun', the 'hard deck' is 10,000 ft. It means no combat-type maneuvers below that altitude. It is a safety issue. In real life combat, there is no 'hard deck'. What this means is that without actually flying, even with some limits that do not exist in real combat, you will not know what it is like to have your tactic challenged by the environment and/or by your opponent.

The best fighter pilots are %99.999 of the time have the highest flying hours.

First of all, many thanks for a wonderfully insightful post - as usual. Deserves a positive rating.

Although flying time is essential, my understanding is that actual insight is developed in the post flight debrief where your superiors and your peers critique you, and you likewise. It is that discussion, and time spent reflecting on lessons learnt that allows the pilot to internalize the skills that take him from subliminal to sublime. Without this feedback loop, you could fly all day and night throughout the year and it would not make much difference.
 
Thanks for the reply. Excellent points to think about.
Bottom line is this...

Analyze the hard metrics, such as wing loading, climb rate, operationally usable thrust and not max thrust, roll rate, etc...etc...The list is long and this is where we have dedicated people for the job.

1 - If the differences between fighters are within %12-15 of each other, pilot skills matters the most.

2 - If those differences are within %15-20 of each other, tactics matters the most, and this is where the organization, such as the squadron or even the whole air force itself, heavily influences the development of new tactics and refinement of current ones.

3 - If those differences are greater than %20, then the aircraft begins to pull away from the pilot.

Take item one, for example.

The spooks gave you photos of the enemy's new fighter and one thing you noticed is that the new fighter has the cropped delta wing plan, just like yours. Cropped delta wing is where the tips are removed to reduce drag at high angle-of-attacks ( AoA ).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_wing
...tip is cut off. This helps avoid tip drag at high angles of attack....
Immediately, you remember that in previous battles, your pilots prevailed whenever they took the fight to extreme maneuvers with high AoA where his pilots could not keep up with yours. That was item 2 or even 3. Now it is evident that the enemy's technological factor is rising or even par with yours. You would be compelled to assume the worst -- that his pilots WILL be proficient at high AoA flight regimes.

Can you assume that even though their fighters have similar innovations with yours, their pilots will not be able to exploit those innovations ? Sure, you can make that assumption. History is repleted with military leaders who paid for such mistakes with their careers and even with their lives.

This is why the US assumed the best about the MIG-25 Foxbat when we saw the -25 shares similar physical features with the A-5 Vigilante.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_A-5_Vigilante
Despite being designated by the US Navy as a "heavy", the A-5 was surprisingly agile for such a large aircraft. Without the drag of bombs or missiles, even escorting fighters found that the clean airframe and powerful engines made the Vigilante very fast at high and low altitudes.
This planform raised the bars on many features desired in a multi-role fighter. The F-15 came from the A-5, not the MIG-25 as popularly believed.

It was not until the US got to examine a Foxbat in Japan -- defection of Viktor Belenko -- that the -25 was relegated to item 3 when compared against the F-15 or even against the older F-4. From that time on, no USAF or USN pilot was afraid of the Foxbat.

Making hardware comparisons is fraught with dangers, the least is getting too emotional and the worst is overconfidence. That last item will cost irreplaceable lives.
 
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