That would have been nice, but what I mean is what work was done on the ground to see if the population was willing to actively participate. Not days in advance but weeks if not months or even years in advance.
One major issue is that without Pakistani support, the armed struggle part of Kashmir movement doesnt head anywhere. This should NOT be the case. Can you see the same in Palestine. Unless hamas or hizbullah crack things up, nothing moves and even then they commit blunders. So the first part of any resistance is dedication and effort of the local population to stand up to the occupiers by any means necessary on their own, without external support, and if the external support comes then welcome it, instead of running like confused goats here and there. The 90's insurgency in J&K had mujahideen from different countries who wanted to fight for Kashmir after the Afghan war. These were settled in FATA and the next stop was Lal masjid, before continuing on to LOC. I dont have stats of ratio of kashmiri origin muahideen vs other ethnic/nationals, but Kashmir struggle shouldnt have died down after 2000's, while Kargil being a golden opportunity for internal struggle.
Coming to Ops Gibraltar, while many say that Ayub saw China thrash India in 62 while Pakistan made Indian Army run from Rann from Kutch, a different motive was also there. The timing, the lack of support from external powers (e.g. USA) and the fear that India will strike again in some other sector like it tried in Rann of Kutch. So the operation was a mixture of factors. Secondly, for any military plan or any plan in general, there will be nay sayers, there will be ones who oppose it and call it a failure from the start and when the Ops does fail, they will stand as heroes and yell out, "Told you so". This happens everywhere in the world. What if Kargil succeeded ? such people would never come forward and say hey I said so from the start that it will be failure.
The Army in 1960's was under strength in all formations. I remember reading and hearing that in 65 war, only one S&T unit was full strength with its trucks and pickups, probably 55 or more, all the other units had 25-30 trucks to support an entire division. Same with tanks, artillery and AD. Ammunition was very short and getting ammo to battlefield was another issue due to lack of transport. In Ops Gibraltar, the situation was the same, few men, few volunteers, few weapons, few radio sets, some ammo, no reserve, no worthwhile exfil plan. But if you look at any Ops undertaken by Pakistan Army against a bigger Indian Army, the chances of success were always slim, even then at many places due to luck or presence of mind or some other factor, the ops would either stall the Indian Army or make them flee, but this wasn't always the case. Its only now after 2000's that most formations of Pakistan Army stand at full strength of men and material, the days of ad-hoc formations are gone, which basically means extra but practically, it is under strength, under equipped formation hastily formed to show boost in numbers with independent operational capability.
Ops Gibraltar was the same. No time for specific training for personnel. IA was always bigger and holding the line of defense was next to impossible. Many knew it before they went in, however sometimes under orders and sometimes volunteering, the ops went ahead. Kashmiris did what wasnt expected from them. The initial plan was to make contact with them and get them aligned with the plans. That never went well. The confused Kashmiris didn't know any better. They weren't expecting Pakistan to actually and practically get things moving for them after the 48 ceasefire, it had been 17 years. Any guerilla ops is time sensitive. Ayub knew that taking India head on was not on the cards. In defending Pakistan from Indian Army, he had some hope and that showed in 65 war, but offensive directly on the border or LOC would have been a disaster. Actually, this mentality kept going on till Kargil war and its only after Indian cold start doctrine that certain formations within Pakistan Army have been formed which are expected to take the war to India in Indian territory. On the other side, Indian Army kept sunder ji doctrine of massive elephant walk but deviated from it in past few decades. For Ayub, the big elephant that india was, attacking at from sides and in small numbers seemed the to key to some sort of success. Out numbered 1:3, or even 1:7 at some places, there wasn't much choice.
At this point in time, its interesting that India wants to create a LOC on Durand line. The reason is that just like LOC, the Durand line is not a fixed border and this thought has come from India operating consistently in Afghanistan during US invasion. After all, Durand line isn't a finalized demarcated line from Afghanistan's perspective. To make it an international border doesn't give it the value of LOC where a constant action can take place to keep Pakistan bogged down completely from both sides. Pakistan wants to make it an International border which is why fencing took place.
