What's new

Complete Information on India's Almaz-Antey 40R6 / S-400 Triumf

Here's Russia's S-400 Missile System In Action, And How The U.S. Would Deal With It
xukd4bvdxfadf75gs4ur.jpg


Much hyperbole surrounds Russia’s S-400 advanced surface-to-air missile system, which is now being exported abroad and was recently deployed to Syria. Unsurprisingly, Russia has leveraged this deployment to further build-up the public’s perception of the S-400. Still, the S-400 is highly capable, and beating it, or any advanced air defense system, is far from simple.

Why The S-400, And Advanced Air Defense Systems In General, Are So Potent
The video was filmed at the Kapustin Yar test range in the Astakhan region of Russia, during a test of the S-400 against ballistic missile targets. The test supposedly took place while the S-400 was under heavy electronic jamming conditions. Despite this, Russia claims all four of the missiles hit their targets during their mid-course stage of flight.



It is unclear exactly what components of the S-400 system were present for the test aside from the 92N6E “Gravestone” fire control radar, command and control vehicles, transporter-erector-launchers and the missiles. The S-400 can use multiple types of missiles, and can integrate with various sensor systems including older radars designed for later versions of the S-300 system. This trial appeared to test the system in a mobile expeditionary fashion, not where the S-400 unit is one of many surface-to-air missile systems and sensors that are tied together into a integrated air defense system (IADS).

Advanced IADS are increasingly using some level of sensor fusion to meld many different sensor’s data together into a single common “picture” that is capable of providing engagement-quality tracks of enemy targets.


This makes tactics like stealth and jamming less effective than when taking on a single surface-to-air missile system located in just one geographical place at one time (see this image and this image.)

Making things even more complicated is that most IADS have many different sensor and missile systems’ capabilities (not to mention fighter and surveillance aircraft) overlapping in a layered fashion, and some of these could be road-mobile. These systems can pop-up at different locations at different points in times, making them very unpredictable.

This means that what was a once “most survivable route” through an enemy’s IADS, charted based on previous intelligence and often referred to as a “blue line,” could change without notice. If a previously unknown or road mobile air defense system were to pop up in the aircraft’s path it could make the crew adapt its route in real-time, something that could cause a domino effect that greatly reduces their ability to survive over enemy airspace.

Remember, even the stealthiest aircraft is not invisible to radar; it simply has reduced detection range and this may vary greatly depending on what angle the stealth aircraft is at in relation to the sensor radiating it and what wavelength/band/frequency that radar sensor is operating on. Ground-basedinfrared search and track systems are an entirely different story, but these too can be tied into an IADS.

Once again, this video is said to depict the S-400 being tested in a electronic warfare-heavy environment. Recently, some defense observers and journalists have touted America’s premier electronic attack aircraft, the EA-18G Growler, as an antidote to first class air defense systems, and particularly the S-400. This is only partially accurate.

upload_2016-10-14_14-27-28.gif
upload_2016-10-14_14-27-28.gif


A Complex Solution To A Complex Problem
America’s unique electronic warfare and radar suppression abilities includes the Growler, but also many other platforms and ancillary capabilities as well. This complex ecosystem of weaponry and sensors includes various surveillance aircraft, hacking and cyber warfare abilities, active suppression of enemy air defenses tactics and weaponry, along with low-observable aircraft and long-range “standoff” munitions. The last two are especially potent when combined together and electronic warfare support is added.

Firing long-range low observable (stealthy) weaponry from even a non-stealthy aircraft gives enough stand-off distance to begin taking out an enemy’s known air defenses at a safe distance today, the S-400 included in most cases. When a stealthy launch platform is used instead, you can use more plentiful weapons with less range as that stealth aircraft can get closer to the air defenses being targeted than their non-stealthy brethren can.

For instance, an F-16 may be able to get well within JASSM missile range of an advanced SAM site while an F-35 could get within the outer-edge of Small Diameter Bomb range. When you add jamming support, these ranges decrease by a noticeable margin, depending on what tactics are used and what the capacity available is to employ those tactics. The problem is that against an advanced foe, you’re not going up against a single SAM site or radar, but a full constellation of systems that includes aerial assets, just like the advanced integrated air defense system we discussed before.

That is why “brochure comparisons” of systems is nearly useless for such complex military topics. In real life, the Growler does not take on the S-400 alone, and vice-versa.

An advanced IADS including the S-400 in it will likely feature increased detection ranges against stealthy and non-stealthy aircraft alike. It will also make jamming more problematic, and could mean blinding even a portion of that network is much tougher due to multiple layers of redundant air defenses tied together. This is where cyber warfare and pinpoint strikes based on multiple sources of intelligence can be more effective than jamming or going after the surface-to-air missiles and sensors themselves. For instance, taking out the IADS’ “brains,” locations where the sensor fusion occurs, or striking the system’s communications channels.

upload_2016-10-14_14-28-9.gif
upload_2016-10-14_14-28-9.gif

As IADS sensor and fusion capabilities advances and as surface-to-air missile ranges increase, it may be necessary to use stealthy long-range networked weapons, long-range stealthy aircraft and all the other tactics we mentioned, including standoff jamming, in order to begin to degrade and eventually destroy an advanced air defense system. Additionally, this may be necessary due to other area-denial and anti-access capabilities the enemy possesses.

For instance, if a carrier cannot get within 1,500 miles of an enemy’s shores, its aircraft will be incapable of striking targets. Bases within range of ballisitc missile barrages may also be destroyed.

As the cumulative effects of these “first days of war” standoff strikes take hold, the IADS should begin to buckle, and parts of this deadly air defense killing cocktail can be omitted. For instance, instead of using long-range stealthy aircraft to launch long-range stealthy missiles, stealthy fighters can be used to launch medium-range weaponry as their tankers can operate close enough to enemy airspace in order for them to be effective.

Meanwhile, long-range non-stealthy aircraft can begin launching long-range weapons, which frees up stealthy long-range aircraft to begin pushing over or near the enemy’s shores for direct attacks. Systems like Miniaturee Air Launched Decoys can be used along with strike assets to push deeper into an enemy’s territory, wiping out its air defenses along the way.

As time goes on, a “sanitized” corridor should emerge over enemy airspace, where less complex tactics can be applied and at higher sortie rates. For instance, fighter strikes can be flown with electronic warfare and wild weasel support, without the need for standoff weaponry, or in some cases, without stealthy aircraft at all.

In other words, it takes a complex cocktail of jamming, surveillance and attack assets, both kinetic and non-kinetic, to take on any advanced integrated air defense system, of which the S-400 could be a part. And even then, you degrade and eventually destroy the enemy’s air defense in a very throughout and methodical manner.

So although it is an incredibly capable and critical weapon system, those who say the EA-18G Growler—or any other single weapon system for that matter—is some panacea for modern air defense systems are greatly simplifying a complex solution to a very complex problem.

Contact the author at tyler@jalopnik.com.
Photo credits: Growler, F-15 via DoD, S-400 at Latakia via Russian MoD.
 
.
Introduction

The Almaz S-400 Triumf or SA-21 system is the most recent evolution of the S-300P family of SAM systems, initially trialled in 1999. The label S-400 is essentially marketing, since the system was previously reported under the speculative label of S-300PMU3. At least one report claims that funding for the development of the Triumf was provided in part by the PLA. The principal distinctions between the S-400 and its predecessor lie in further refinements to the radars and software, and the addition of four new missile types in addition to the legacy 48N6E/48N6E2 used in the S-300PMU2 Favorit.

S-400-Battery-Composition-Diagram.gif

A 2008 diagram published by Almaz-Antey showing the composition of an S-400 battery. Notable points include the integration of external low band NNIIRT Protivnik GE and VNIIRT Gamma DE L-band radars, and a range of passive emitter locating systems. All have the angular accuracy to provide midcourse guidance updates for missile shots.

As a result an S-400 battery could be armed with arbitrary mixes of these weapons to optimise its capability for a specific threat environment. The 30N6E2 further evolved into the more capable 92N6E Grave Stone, carried by a new 8 x 8 MZKT-7930 vehicle. The additional range required a significantly uprated transmitter tube to provide the higher power-aperture performance needed, in additional to an improved exciter and automatic frequency hopping capability. The 96L6 is offered as an 'all altitude' battery acquisition radar, also carried by a 8 x 8 MZKT-7930 vehicle. A new 3D phased array acquisition radar is employed, the 91N6E derived from the 64N6E2, and the 40V6M/MD mast is an available option. The 55K6E command post is employed, carried by an 8 x 8 Ural 532361 truck.

Optional acquisition radars cited for the S-400 include the 59N6 Protivnik GE and 67N6 Gamma DE in the L-band, but also the 1L119 Nebo SVU in the VHF band, and the multiband Nebo M. The Nebo SVU/M have a claimed capability against stealth aircraft. In addition to further acquisition radar types, the S-400 has been trialled with the Topaz Kolchuga M, KRTP-91 Tamara / Trash Can, and 85V6 Orion / Vega emitter locating systems, the aim being to engage emitting targets without emitting from the acquisition radars, or if the acquisition radars have been jammed. In June, 2008, the manufacturer disclosed the integration of the 1RL220VE, 1L222 and 86V6 Orion emitter locating systems with the S-400.

TEL options include the baseline 5P85TE2 semitrailer, towed by a 6 x 6 BAZ-64022, the improved 5P90S self-propelled TEL hosted on the BAZ-6909-022 and intended to carry a heavier missile payload than the legacy MAZ-79100 series TELs, and a new heavyweight towed TEL to be designated the 5P90TMU.

Imagery of the 5P90S self-propelled TEL shows a new gantry design, a new elevating folding mast with a directional antenna, and a state-of-the-art NK Orientir precision navigation system, with an increased baseline for the satnav antennas, compared to the installation on the S-300PMU2 vehicles.

Long term planning is to host all S-400 battery components on BAZ Voschina series vehicles, with the 92N6 Grave Stone and 96L6-1 carried on the 10 x 10 BAZ-69096 chassis, and a new BAZ-6403.01 8 x 8 tractor is to be used to tow the 91N6 Big Bird battle management radar, and 40V6M/T series mobile mast systems. The 55K6E battery command post will be hosted on the BAZ-69092-012 6 x 6 chassis, a flatbed variant of which will be used to tow the 63T6A power converter and 5I57A power generator. The 8 x 8 BAZ-69096 chassis is also intended for future use in the 96K6 Pantsir S1 / SA-22 SPAAGM.
1. Unfortunately it lacks the detail of later Almaz-Antey disclosures on the S-300PMU2 Favorit, but does provide a good discussion of the rationale behind the S-400 design design, and its key design features.

Lemanskiy et al state that definition of the S-400 design was performed jointly by the designers and the Russian MoD, with specific capability foci in:

  • Defeating threats at low and very low flight altitudes;
  • Dealing with the overall reduction of target signatures resulting from the pervasive use of stealth technology;
  • Dealing with the increase in target quantities resulting from the widspread use of UAVs;
  • Applying all means to defeat advanced jammers employed by opponents;
  • Surviving in an environment where PGMs are used widely;
  • Accommodating an environment where an increasing number of nations are deploying TBMs and IRBMs.
Lemanskiy et al observed that several key imperatives were followed during the design process:
  • An open system architecture with a high level of modularity, intended to permit follow-on capability growth in the design;
  • Multirole capabilities and the capacity for integration with legacy IADS technologies;
  • Suitability for the air defence of fixed infrastructure targets, as well as manoeuvre forces;
  • Suitability for integration with naval surface combatants;
  • The ability to exploit legacy missile rounds already in operational use;
  • High operational mobility and deployability;
  • High lethality and jam resistance;
There imperatives were applied to the design of configurations for the Russian Armed Forces and for export clients.

Export variants of the S-400 Triumf are intended to destroy opposing stand-off jammer aircraft, AWACS/AEW&C aircraft, reconnaissance and armed reconnaissance aircraft, cruise missile armed strategic bombers, cruise missiles, Tactical, Theatre and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, and any other atmospheric threats, all in an intensive Electronic Counter Measures environment.

Lemanskiy et al describe the system composition as four core components:
  1. The 30K6E battle management system, comprising the 55K6E Command Post and 91N6E Big Bird acquisition radar;
  2. Up to six 98Zh6E Fire Units, each comprising a 92N6E Grave Stone “multimode” engagement radar, up to twelve 5P85SE2 / 5P85TE2 TELs, each TEL armed with up to four 48N6E2/E3 missiles;
  3. A complement of SAM rounds, comprising arbitrary mixes of the 48N6E, 48N6E2 and 48N6E3;
  4. The 30Ts6E logistical support system, comprising missile storage, test and maintenance equipments.
All system components are carried by self-propelled wheeled all-terrain chassis, and have autonomous power supplies, navigation and geo-location systems, communications and life support equipment. Mains power grid converters are installed for fixed site operations.

The design permits all equipment vans to be separated from the vehicle chassis for installation and operation in hardened shelters.
[paste:font size="3"]Miroslav Gyűrösi).

The 55K6E is employed to control all components in the group of batteries, and can collect and present status information from all components. It can also control the operating modes of the 91N6E Big Bird acquisition and battle management radar, including its IFF/SSR functions. A comprehensive C3 /datalink package is installed, and an Elbrus-90 mikro central processor is used to execute the dataprocessing and system management code. Sharing hardware with the S-300PMU2 54K6E 2 CP, the 55K6E uses 18 inch LCD panels for all crew stations.

Five common consoles are installed, with unique software driven presentation for the five person crew of the CP, the latter comprising:

  • 1 x Air Defence Unit Commander
  • 1 x Air Situation Management Officer
  • 2 x Fire Control Officers
  • 1 x Engineering Officer
While Lemanskiy et al did not detail the 55K6E any further, the high level of commonality suggests that more recent Almaz-Antey disclosures on the 54K6E2 CP also apply to the 55K6E2.
[paste:font size="3"]Miroslav Gyűrösi).

The 92N6E departs from the specialised engagement and fire control functionality of earlier radars in the Flap Lid family, exploiting abundant computing power no differently than Western AESAs. It is intended to provide autonomous manual and automatic sector searchs, target acquisition and tracking, in adverse weather, Electronic Counter Measures, chaff and low altitude clutter environments. The radar is equipped with an IFF capability.

The 92N6E Grave Stone will automatically prioritise targets, compute Launch Acceptable Regions for missile launches, launch missiles, capture missiles, and provide midcourse guidance commands to missiles while tracking the target and missile. Missile guidance modes include pure command link, semi-active homing, and Track via Missile (TVM) / Seeker Aided Ground Guidance (SAGG), where missile semi-active seeker outputs are downlinked to the Grave Stone to support the computation of missile uplink steering commands.

The radar can track 100 targets in Track While Scan mode, and perform precision tracking of six targets concurrently for missile engagements. data exchanges between the 92N6E Grave Stone and 30K6E battle management system are fully automatic.

The 92N6E Grave Stone data processing subsystem is designed around the Elbrus-90 mikro SPARC multiprocessor system, like the S-300PMU2 30N6E2 Tomb Stone variant. Computing power is exploited to support a diverse range of modes and waveforms. These including:

  • Sniffing waveforms at varying power levels to establish the presence of interfering emitters at a given angle and frequency;
  • Adaptive beam control reflecting immediate operational conditions;
  • Variable PRFs and scan rates for missile and target tracking;
  • Defeat of high power active noise jammers by the use of “radical measures” in the design.
New Electronic Counter Counter Measures technology was employed in the design of the 92N6E Grave Stone, but was neither described nor named.

Lemanskiy et al described the 48N6E3 missile in some detail, but did not include any disclosures beyond what is already public knowledge.

The authors did state that increased radar power-aperture product performance in both the 92N6E Grave Stone and 91N6E Big Bird increases the capability of the S-400 Triumf to engage low signature or stealth targets, but their cryptic claim of 50 percent of the engagement range remains difficult to interpret.

What is evident is that the fully digital S-400 Triumf displays most if not all of the typical capability gains seen in the latest generation of fully digital systems of Western design.

48N6E3-Cutaway-Almaz-Antey-1S.jpg

48N6E3 SAM Cutaway. Note the TVC vanes in the exhaust nozzle. The seeker is labelled as 'semi-active radar' (Almaz-Antey)
[paste:font size="4"]Tor M1/M2, Tunguska M and Pantsir S/S1 series.

Some sources have credited the 9M96E/9M96E2 missiles to the S-300PMU1 and S-300PMU2 Favorit, which appears to have been the demonstration platform for prototypes of these missiles. Integration of these missiles on either of these systems will not present any challenges, due to backward compatibility in TELs and the use of a datalink supported active radar terminal seeker. To date there have been no disclosures on domestic production or export sales of the 9M96 series. Russia media reports in 2010 indicated that production may soon commence for use on S-400 systems, using a new four chamber launcher/container design with an identical form factor to the standard 48N6 design.

5P85SE-9M96E2-Quad-Launcher-MAKS-MiroslavGyurosi-1S.jpg


S-400 5P85SE demonstrator TEL with quad 9M96E launch tubes. This design may be replaced in production with a four chamber design in the same form factor as the 48N6 launch tube (image © Miroslav Gyűrösi).

9M96-SAM-Test-1.jpg


9M96E series missile test launch (Fakel).


Fakel-9M96E-MAKS-2005-Aminov-1S.jpg


9M96E missile at MAKS 2005 (© 2005, Said Aminov).
[paste:font size="4"]5N62VE Square Pair FMCWguidance and illumination radar. Given that the Russian S-200 inventory and missile warstock has been decommissioned and exported, if this capability is retained, it is for export clientele.

If software and datalink modems are supplied in production S-400 systems to support the S-200 / SA-5, this raises the question of potential hybridisation with other legacy SAM types. With most potential export clientele already operating legacy SAM systems such as the S-75M/SA-2 Guideline, S-125/SA-3 Goa and 3M9/9M9/SA-6 Gainful, this could prove to be an attractive marketing tool. The model claimed for the S-200/SA-5 would likely be applied, using the SNR-75 Fan Song, SNR-125 Low Blow or 1S91 Straight Flush to guide the missiles to an aimpoint produced by the 92N6E Grave Stone tracking the target, and in the latter instance, provide terminal phase illumination. The key issue of reconciling location errors between the various system components can be addressed by satellite navigation, with dual mode GPS/Glonass receivers already widely used in Russian equipment. The use of theNK Orientir precision geolocation and angular alignment system in the S-300PMU2 and S-400 presents a good example.

The 2008 VKO paper by Lemanskiy et al of Almaz-Antey described the capability to control a range of S-300P variant batteries, and other contemporary IADS elements, but did not elaborate on legacy SAM system integration.
[paste:font size="4"]55K6E
Self Propelled Command Post
Ural 532301
1T12M2A
Site Survey Vehicle
GAZ-66/UAZ-3151
92N6E Grave Stone
F1E2 Radar Cabin / F2E2 Control Cabin
MZKT-7930
91N6E Big Bird
Self Propelled Acquisition Radar MZKT-7930 Tractor
96L6E
Self Propelled Acquisition Radar
MZKT-7930
5P90S
Self Propelled Transporter Erector Launcher
BAZ-6909 series
5P85TM/TE2 Semitrailer Transporter Erector Launcher BAZ-64022 Tractor
22T6-2/22T6E2
Transloader / Crane
Ural-532361-1012
5T58-2A Missile Transporter Four 5P32 Launch Tubes
KrAZ-260 Tractor
5I57A
Mobile Diesel Power Generator 200 kW
MAZ-5224V Trailer
63T6A
Mobile Mains Grid Power Converter
MAZ-5224V Trailer
82Kh6/83Kh6A
Mobile Mains Grid Power Converter MAZ-5224V Trailer
A - to date designations of these battery components have not been disclosed, S-300PMU2 items listed instead.



S-400 Battery Component Options
59N6 Protivnik GE
Mobile Acquisition Radar KrAZ-260 Tractor
67N6E Gamma DE
Mobile Acquisition Radar KrAZ-260 Tractor
1RL220VE
Mobile Emitter Locating System
Ural-43203
1L222M Avtobaza
Mobile Emitter Locating System Ural-43203/4310
86V6 Orion/Vega
Mobile Emitter Locating System Ural-43203
40V6M
Semi-Mobile Mast System 24 Metre
MAZ-537 Tractor
40V6MD Semi-Mobile Mast System 40 Metre
MAZ-537 Tractor
KS-4561AA Mobile Crane
KrAZ-257
KT-80/KS-7971A
Mobile Crane MAZ-79100
ATs-5.5A
Fuel Tanker Truck
KAMAZ-4310
MOBD
Mobile Crew Accommodation Vehicle
MAZ-543M
A - to date designations of these battery components have not been disclosed, S-300PMU2 items listed instead.


 
. .
[paste:font size="4"][1], [2] tractor is a distinctive feature of the S-400, making it readily identifiable in comparison with the KrAZ-260 towed 5P85TE variants used with the SA-20 Gargoyle. Later S-300PMU2 systems exported to China use the 5P85TE2 TEL and BAZ-64022 tractor (Almaz-Antey/Vestnik PVO).

5P85TE2-BAZ-6402-TEL-2S.jpg


5P85TE2-TEL-Deployed-1S.jpg


5P85TE2-TEL-BAZ-64022-1S.jpg




[paste:font size="4"]

Late production 91N6E battle management radars are to be towed by the 8 x 8 BAZ-6403.01 tractor (image BZKT).


[paste:font size="4"]Yevgeniy Yerokhin, Missiles.ru.

3rd-Battalion-61996-Emblem.gif


S-400-Battery-Components-Missiles.ru-1S.jpg


Above, below: S-400 battery components.

S-400-Battery-Components-Missiles.ru-2S.jpg


92N6E+96L6E-Missiles.ru-1S.jpg
 
.
how many more threads Indians will open on s400 for god sake stop this drama...
 
. . . . .
5P85TE2-TEL-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-6S.jpg


5P85TM/TE2 elevating the launch gantry. The operator on the right is monitoring the TEL status and control panel.

5P85TE2-TEL-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-3S.jpg


Auxiliary Power Unit control panel exposed.

5P85TE2-TEL-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-4S.jpg


TEL main status and control panel in detail.
 
.

5P85TE2-TEL-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-9S.jpg


Above, below: telescoping datalink antenna, common to late variants of S-300PMU1/2 TELs. The design is clearly built to radiate with a horizontal toroidal mainlobe.

5P85TE2-TEL-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-10S.jpg


5P85TE2-TEL-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-2S.jpg


TEL status and control panels in crew cabin.
92N6E Grave Stone / MZKT-7930
92N6-Grave-Stone-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-1S.jpg


92N6E Grave Stone, stowed.

92N6-Grave-Stone-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-2S.jpg


92N6-Grave-Stone-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-3S.jpg


92N6E Grave Stone with space feed primary antenna deployed, and telescoping datalink mast elevated. Note the auxiliary apertures used for sidelobe cancelling and interferometry along the base of the main transmissive array.

92N6-Grave-Stone-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-4S.jpg


92N6E Grave Stone driver cabin.

92N6-Grave-Stone-Elektrostal-Varlamov-2011-5S.jpg



@SOHEIL @PARIKRAMA @waz @WebMaster @litefire @Abingdonboy @ranjeet



 
. . . .
India is purchasing 5 S400 systems which contains how many S400 missiles?
 
.
Back
Top Bottom