COIN - What exactly went wrong then?

[TruthSeeker]

accept my fault could not be able to explain you the taste of apple.

Oh, that's easy! An apple tastes just exactly like a pear but crunchier and different. It also tastes just like a pineapple, except it is not as tart and is less stringy in the teeth. Finally, an apple tastes just like a potato, except it is sweeter. How's that?

 

[waraich66]

Oh, that's easy! An apple tastes just exactly like a pear but crunchier and different. It also tastes just like a pineapple, except it is not as tart and is less stringy in the teeth. Finally, an apple tastes just like a potato, except it is sweeter. How's that?

Enjoy your false imaginations, better eat apple to enjoy the real taste.

 

[shravan]

Oh, that's easy! An apple tastes just exactly like a pear but crunchier and different. It also tastes just like a pineapple, except it is not as tart and is less stringy in the teeth. Finally, an apple tastes just like a potato, except it is sweeter. How's that?

OT

Are you GAY ? Just want to know the Truth...

 

[Fracker]

A major problem with this "philosophy" is that you put the "Islamic world" at risk based on the activities of the most extreme followers of Islam. Witness Afghanistan. Because the GoA followed your philosophy, embracing al Qaeda as fellow Muslims, they brought down on their heads 8 years of war and exile, with no end in sight. If, instead, the GoA had expelled al Qaeda or facilitated the timely arrest of al Qaeda, the US would not have attacked the GoA. So, in applying your philosophy, you must apply it only to fellow Muslims whose actions are just. That is where your philosophy is going horribly wrong for the Islamic world.

Weak in history or what?

USA Demand OBL from Taliban, Taliban asked for Evidences, and fair trail in any islamic country (which means they also willing to do anything against him), but USA didn't give proofs to Taliban, but start preparation to wage war against Taliban, then Taliban requested OBL to leave the country, and USA increase the list to 34 persons, and before taliban could answer, they attacked from pakistani nwfp.

so whats so ever taliban do, USA just wanted to attack afghanistan.. and they did it, and when their goal was complete they stopped. Yet 54% of afghanistan is under taliban. just after 34 miles from kabul, talibans are present..

 

[TruthSeeker]

Are you GAY ? Just want to know the Truth...

No, I am not gay. Why do you ask? I am married (to a female) and have three children and three grandchildren.

Are you GAY? I just want to know the Truth ....

 

[muse]

Shangla becomes new Taliban base



Saturday, August 01, 2009
By Rahimullah Yusufzai

PESHAWAR: Taliban militants fleeing Swat and Buner are increasingly seeking refuge in the Shangla district and making their presence felt by attacking government installations and pro-military politicians and elders.

“I am hearing reports that there are now 1,500 militants in parts of Shangla’s Puran Tehsil bordering Buner. They pose a threat to all of us,” said Fazlullah, the young Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) from Shangla and a relation of former federal minister and PML-Q NWFP President Amir Muqam.

On Wednesday night, Fazlullah’s cousin Haji Khalil Khan, the PML-Q President for Shangla who had been mobilising the people against the Taliban, was killed when a large group of militants attacked his house in Chogha Makhozai village. “The NWFP Chief Minister, Ameer Haider Hoti, who visited Shangla on Thursday to offer his condolences on Haji Khalil’s death also asked me about the militants’ strength in the area. I told him that I haven’t seen the Taliban myself but am aware of their growing presence in parts of Puran Tehsil,” recalled Fazlullah.

Fazlullah’s father Pir Mohammad Khan was killed in a suicide bombing at Amir Muqam’s house in Peshawar’s Hayatabad locality in early 2008. Shangla’s headquarters, Alpurai, was overrun by the Taliban militants, who had mostly come from Swat in 2007. The entire civil and police administration had fled the town. A military operation had to be launched to evict the militants from Shangla at the time, but as has been the case elsewhere, the Taliban gradually returned to parts of the district, particularly to Puran area which is adjacent to Buner. Due to the recent military action in Buner, militants from there have moved to Shangla.

Many militants from Swat, particularly its Charbagh and Khwazakhela Tehsils, have also sought refuge in Shangla.

After gaining strength in Shangla, the militants were reported to have set up roadside checkpoints at certain places, including Shaheed Sar, Hindwano Kandao and Sar Qalla on the Puran-Buner Road. They were patrolling the area and had already blown up a telephone exchange in Puran and fired at a security forces convoy in Martung.

Fazlullah said reports of militants’ attack on his house and that of Amir Muqam weren’t true. “Firing took place near Amir Muqam’s house in the village but it wasn’t attacked,” he clarified the reports appearing in the press.

According to Fazlullah, his family was a target of the militants due to its support for the military operation in Shangla and the rest of Malakand Division. “We are peaceful people. We are against militancy and terrorism. But if a known political family like us isn’t safe, then how could the common people feel confident while living in Shangla,” he argued.

He said security forces should take action against the militants in Shangla but care must be taken to avoid civilian casualties and the use of artillery guns to shell long distance targets be avoided. “We don’t want our poor people to suffer,” he stressed.

On Thursday, the two Taliban militants who were killed in the attack on Haji Khalil’s house were identified. Haji Khalil and his men had fought the militants and killed two of them.

Both were local and hailed from Dheray village in Puran Tehsil. One was Khurshid Ali and the other was identified as Adil. The police arrested Khurshid’s father, named Subedar, along with his brother. Adil’s family members weren’t arrested as they had already disowned and disinherited him for refusing to quit the Taliban.

Taliban arrival in Shangla in growing numbers is a pattern that would be repeated elsewhere in the NWFP in future. They would retreat from areas that are under military attack and move to places where the civil administration and police are weak and the Army has little or no presence. The militants’ strategy is to wage a guerrilla war, create fear among the people and destabilise the area.

 

[muse]

Baitullah is now food for worms, what can Pakistanis, Afghans and Americans now expect:




Beyond Baitullah
Shaukat Qadir


On August 5, an American drone targeted the house of Maulana Ikramuddin, Baitullah Mehsud’s father-in-law, killing Baitullah, his second wife and three others. It took two days after the attack for his death to be announced. If he was a CIA agent, as many among the Mehsuds believe, he had finally outlived his utility.

Let us first examine how Baitullah was different from the other Taliban. I have, in the past, attempted to explain that the tribes bordering Afghanistan — Mehsuds, Wazirs, and Mohmands — revolted against their traditional tribal leadership and the Pakistan government after the US invaded Afghanistan, since both the tribal leadership and the Pakistan government did not want these tribes to get involved in the Afghan struggle against US occupation. Thus this revolt at two levels threw up a new leadership in these tribes. Baitullah was a product of this revolt.

In 2007, Baitullah formed the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and attempted to unite all Taliban groups under his leadership. However, neither the Wazirs nor the Mohmands nor even Fazlullah in Swat accepted him as their leader. He did, however, at that stage, enjoy considerable support within his tribe.

This was the period when Pervez Musharraf was still domestically selling the line that ‘we have been forced into fighting America’s war’; while taking the occasional step against terrorism to pacify the gullible Bush administration. This was also the period when the Lal Masjid episode, the judicial crisis, and the declaration of emergency had diminished Musharraf’s authority, spreading uncertainty in the rank and file of the army, causing large number of forces to surrender to a handful of Taliban; thus strengthening Baitullah et al.

This year also witnessed Al Qaeda’s announcement that Pakistan had replaced the US as its enemy number one. Meanwhile, the Wazirs, under Maulvi Nazir, were fighting pitched battles to oust foreigners from their area; mostly Tajiks and Uzbeks, with a smattering of others. At this stage, Baitullah decided to take up Al Qaeda’s call and, instead of fighting against the US occupation of Afghanistan, took on the Pakistani state.

He began by welcoming all foreigners to his area. He also received assistance from Al Qaeda to set up training schools, run by his aides Hakeemullah and Qari Hussain, for potential suicide bombers. Al Qaeda also provided ‘advisers’ who helped plan attacks in meticulous detail.

While the influx of foreigners and his decision to target Pakistan steadily diminished the support from his own tribe, Baitullah seemed to be rolling in dollars, was reputedly in possession of the best communication and communications monitoring equipment available, as well as the most sophisticated weaponry. In addition, while he took foreigners under his wing, they undertook his protection. What is more, he replenished his stock of suicide bombers with volunteers from Southern Punjab. At the last estimate, there were over two thousand of these; trained or under training.

A less publicised fact is that on the day of his death, a delegation from the Mehsud tribe came to Islamabad to meet with government officials, seeking internally displaced persons status for thousands of families from the Mehsud tribe, people who opposed Baitullah’s attacks on Pakistan and who wanted to escape before military operations began in their area, just as residents of Swat did. I gather that these included a number of erstwhile supporters of Baitullah who were willing to provide information in return for amnesty.

Official reports say that during a dispute that erupted at a meeting to decide Baitullah’s succession, one of his aides, Hakeemullah, was killed. This was but natural, and is probably true. On August 16, a group of Wazirs was attacked and seventeen of them killed; ironically, they were returning from a raid on pro-US forces in Afghanistan. Turkistan Bittani, one of Baitullah’s rivals still surviving, has accused Baitullah’s group and reported Maulvi Nazir, leader of the Wazir TTP. While the Wazirs are not certain who attacked them, most of them are convinced that they were ambushed by Uzbeks and Tajiks, who had been under Baitullah’s protection and were returning to Afghanistan after his death. They believe this was their parting revenge for the Uzbeks killed by the Wazirs since 2007.

Although it is rumoured that Maulvi Nazir is among the dead, I tend to believe the (other) rumour that he is seriously injured and might not survive.

In any case, Baitullah is no more. His tribe no longer finds foreigners acceptable, nor are they willing to accept the supremacy of any of his aides; Hakeemullah, Waliullah, or Qari Hussain. None of them can bring in Baitullah’s wealth, weapons, or support from Al Qaeda.

So, what implications does this have for our future?

Like I stated in an earlier article, if there are only five thousand trained and committed suicide bombers left and they carry out only one attack daily, it will take almost fifteen years for them to end. Consequently, suicide attacks are something we are destined to live with, for quite some time to come.

However, the support that Al Qaeda provided to Baitullah’s TTP is likely to dry up. Which implies that when and if high value targets are subjected to attacks, they are likely to be less damaging and may even be less frequently successful. It also implies that the mechanism that was churning out these killing machines is likely to slow down in the immediate future and dry up soon thereafter.

It also means that while the freedom struggle against US occupation is unlikely to diminish in intensity, military operations in Waziristan may not even be necessary. If it is still necessary, it is likely to be a far easier operation than it would have been were Baitullah alive and supported by his foreign troops.

Has the tide turned? The anti-Taliban feeling in mainland Pakistan seems to have become more unanimous than the anti-American feeling. Rebel tribesmen are feeling the heat and, it is very possible that soon, bodies of ex-Taliban might start turning up in Waziristan like they are doing in Swat.

I am no supporter of vigilantes, but it seems that they might well replace the Taliban, unless the government acts, and acts very soon, to fill the administrative vacuum of law enforcement. Otherwise, we may next have to battle the vigilantes if we defeat the Taliban.

This article is a modified version of one originally written for the daily ‘National’. The writer is a former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Insititute (IPRI)

 

[Elmo]

In any case, Baitullah is no more. His tribe no longer finds foreigners acceptable, nor are they willing to accept the supremacy of any of his aides; Hakeemullah, Waliullah, or Qari Hussain. None of them can bring in Baitullah’s wealth, weapons, or support from Al Qaeda.

So, what implications does this have for our future?


However, the support that Al Qaeda provided to Baitullah’s TTP is likely to dry up. Which implies that when and if high value targets are subjected to attacks, they are likely to be less damaging and may even be less frequently successful. It also implies that the mechanism that was churning out these killing machines is likely to slow down in the immediate future and dry up soon thereafter.

It also means that while the freedom struggle against US occupation is unlikely to diminish in intensity, military operations in Waziristan may not even be necessary. If it is still necessary, it is likely to be a far easier operation than it would have been were Baitullah alive and supported by his foreign troops.

Has the tide turned? The anti-Taliban feeling in mainland Pakistan seems to have become more unanimous than the anti-American feeling. Rebel tribesmen are feeling the heat and, it is very possible that soon, bodies of ex-Taliban might start turning up in Waziristan like they are doing in Swat.

I am no supporter of vigilantes, but it seems that they might well replace the Taliban, unless the government acts, and acts very soon, to fill the administrative vacuum of law enforcement. Otherwise, we may next have to battle the vigilantes if we defeat the Taliban[/SIZE][/FONT][/I].

Firstly, what is the retired brigadier trying to say because he cuts his own arguments. The operation will be easy/unnecessary now since Mehsud is no longer there and then states that vigilantes may crop up if the vacuum is not filled in by government if an operation is not undertaken.

Another aspect Shaukat Qadir easily ignores is that TTP is not consolidated ... each arm in each agency is an independent militant group which had come under the umbrella of the TTP. Most the militancy was spilled over from neighbouring agencies/Afghanistan but laid firm hold on the grounds due to local tribesmen's support.

You have to keep conducting operations, there is no way around it and you can't say it is an easy task. The "operations" have to be a sustained effort where you do not underestimate your opponent.

 

[muse]

Elmo

Mr. Tariq Fatemi, former diplomat, commentator and a apparatchik in the PMLN, (read Saudi Arabia) recently argued that it is not necessary to launch operations in Waziristan - that the Drone targeting of the TTP leadership will caused the loose structure to break and the minions will scatter.

There is an alternate of course, which is arguing that Pakistan must not waste time and this opening must be exploited fully.

Other interests have sought more weapons from the US, they are arguing that armed forces casualties must be reduced, that the public and the army will not tolerate the scale of the casualties - it's compelling.

I don't know where the argument will end, but I think the Brigadier is echoing Mr. Fatemi.

 

[muse]

Defying clarity
Ejaz Haider



Sometimes, pure logic and neat structures don’t work. Tagore famously said that “A mind all logic is like a knife all blade. It makes the hand bleed that uses it.” He was right.

Such is the nature also of irregular war; and while the mind must apply itself to it logically, there’s nary a possibility of linearity in this business.

Bajaur Agency has seen much destruction and displacement. Of the seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions that constitute the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), it lies in the extreme north and at 1,290 sq km is the smallest agency in terms of area. However, its location is terrible because it abuts the Kunar province of Afghanistan in the northwest and west, the still-troublesome Mohmand Agency in the south, Malakand in the southeast and Dir in the northeast.

The area is inhabited by the two large sub-clans of the Yousafzai tribe, the Utmankhel and the Tarakani. These two sub-clans and their offshoots live in four valleys — Pashat, Mamund, Charmang and Nawagai. Kunar is linked with it through four passes — Letai, Kaga, Fazal and Nawa — that run north to south in this order. These passes and countless other crossing points and trails make the Agency prone to infiltration. The fact that Kunar remains restive doesn’t help.

When the government decided to launch an operation in Bajaur on September 4, 2008, the situation in the area had become almost impossible. The fighting had started on August 6 when the Taliban attacked a convoy of Frontier Corps and army troops near Loesam. While their positions were pounded by artillery, Cobra gunships and aircraft, on the ground there were unacceptable gains by the Taliban. They killed 16 troops in the convoy ambush, captured some 24 and besieged 80 Bajaur Scouts in the Loesam area.

This was not unexpected. The situation, over the years, was developing towards this end. The Taliban had acquired virtual control of the area and ran a parallel administration. A large number of Afghan fighters had been steadily entering Bajaur from Kunar and linking up with the Pakistani Taliban led by Faqir Muhammad. Faqir, a Mamund Tarakani from the Mamund tehsil, initially led the Tehreek Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi after the arrest of Sufi Muhammad. In December 2007, he merged his fighters with the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and became the TTP’s now-killed leader Baitullah Mehsud’s second-in-command.

Faqir was also suspected of harbouring Ayman Al Zawahiri and saw at least two Predator strikes at safe houses run by him in Damadola, his hometown. At least one killed many civilians, including children. He was being assisted by Taliban commanders Ali Rehman, Jan Wali alias Sheena and Maulvi Said Muhammad, also known as Maulvi Umar.

Much is made of the peace agreements with some analysts blaming the government for their failure. The fact is that even when the militants wanted the government to cease fire, as happened in late October after the government launched Operation Sherdil (Lionheart) on September 4, 2008 and cleared the area up to Loesam, they made demands (enforcement of sharia law, for instance) which would give them a big share in the administrative/governance pie.

Moreover, most of these peace overtures came when the government used force and pressed its advantage. Take, for instance, the sequence of events in Bajaur after the induction in Torghundi of 26 Brigade.

The brigade was tasked with securing the area up to Khar, which it did in four days and linked up with elements from Bajaur Scouts. The security forces then advanced in a day up to Rashakai. Medium artillery, tanks and gunships were used along with the ground offensive. Beyond this point the advance faced stiff resistance at Tangkhata, Nisarabad and Rashakai. It took the forces almost a month-and-half before they could secure the area up to Loesam, which they did by October 23.

The forces then pushed further towards Zorbandar and cleared the area by November 30 and established link-up with 1 Wing of Bajaur Scouts by December 2.

At another axis, northwest from Khar bazaar towards Inayat Qilla, 5 Wing of Khyber Rifles secured the area up to Inayat Qilla’s FC fort by February 6 this year. By the next day, 3 Wing of Swat Scouts had reached the Bypass. Later that month, 4 Wing Bajaur Scouts had captured Bai China in a surprise attack.

A year after the various battles fought in and around the area, including in Inayat Qilla and from Khar bazaar to Loesam, the signs of destruction are clear. The area looks hauntingly quiet; whatever buildings remain standing are either partially destroyed or have telltale bullet and rocket-strike marks on every wall.

But it was the sustained push, absent until then, which signalled to the entrenched Taliban that the government meant business. While they inflicted losses, at times heavy, on the security forces, their own losses were becoming prohibitive.

They also faced a dilemma. By entrenching themselves in the area, despite impressive defensive positions, they had rendered themselves vulnerable to indirect artillery and direct tank fire from the ground and strikes from aerial platforms.

One thing was clear to me, being on the ground. If the security forces did not have the advantage of aerial platforms and if they had to attack Taliban positions from the ground without suppression fire or close air support which destroyed the Taliban defensive positions or softened them, the number of casualties would have been unacceptably high.

One brigade and elements from Bajaur, Dir and Swat Scouts and Khyber Rifles would not have been enough. And while it is a safe bet that ultimately the security forces would have cleared the area, the fighting, small arms to small arms, would have been bloodier and the cost for the attacker much higher.

The Taliban were well-armed, well-trained and highly motivated. Apart from small arms and light weapons, they were using RRs (recoilless rifles — which can be used in anti-tank, anti-vehicle and anti-personnel roles), SBRLs (single barrel rocket launchers), mortars, RPG-7s etc. It was formidable weaponry to counter armour and infantry assaults on defensive positions both in built-up areas on flat ground (converted into networked defensive positions) and on the low ridges towards the northwest of the axis of advance from Khar to Loesam.

By October 30, therefore, Faqir Muhammad offered to lay down arms and informed the government through a jirga that the Taliban would dismantle their infrastructure and help restore the writ of the state. If the government had fallen for that without clearing up the main defensive positions, the breather would have given the Taliban time to reorganise, regroup and replenish their diminished supplies.

Jaw-jaw is important in this kind of war but the timing has to be right and quite often, as in this case, jaw-jaw and war-war go together. To think that one can dialogue from a position of weakness is to invite trouble.

So, has Bajaur been secured?

It depends on how one defines success in irregular war. There is no Clausewitzean victory in such situations. Bajaur is much more secure than it was a year, even a few months ago. But can we have a coffee shop in Khar bazaar and take spouses and kids for a walk? No.

There is danger lurking out there constantly, and despite patrolling. Having lost control of the territory the Taliban have, paradoxically, gained the traditional advantage of guerrilla fighters: the twin elements of surprise and mobility. The government has denied them the advantage of turning Bajaur into an independent fief run by the TTP. But those who melted away are now at large. They can hunker down, wait patiently and strike when the opportunity presents itself. And aside from conducting ambushes and occasional raids on outposts, there is always the suicide bomber.

While the government has regained control of the roads and communication centres, movement remains dangerous and lowering the guard can invite trouble. Patrolling takes its toll on the nerves of security personnel who have to remain alert every moment because any laxity means paying the cost in blood.

The stabilisation and rehab processes are going on in Lower Dir and Malakand. That should help Bajaur, just as keeping Bajaur under control is important for stabilisation in Lower Dir and Malakand. But Mohmand Agency in the south remains restive, as do parts of Khyber, further south of Mohmand. While it is shorter to go to Bajaur from Peshawar via Mohmand, that route is not taken unless one is heavily escorted and can travel when the sun is still out. Instead, one has to go right up to Batkhela and then turn west and go northwest to Timargara before proceeding on to Bajaur — a much longer route.

Defining victory is important because expectations must be kept low. This is true not just of Bajaur but of other Agencies too and, in general, of the very nature of this conflict where zones of war and peace continue to overlap.

What a luxury it was to fight well-defined inter-state wars. Writing his The Conduct of War, Maj.-Gen JFC Fuller fulminated against the death of aristocracies and the rise of democracies and national armies a la Napoleon’s. Wonder what he would say about the war among the people which defies clarity on all counts.

Ejaz Haider is op-ed editor of Daily Times, consulting editor of The Friday Times and host of Samaa TV’s programme “Siyasiyat”. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

 

[muse]

EDITORIAL: State credibility and terrorism

The army has netted Muslim Khan, the dreaded spokesman of the Swat Taliban, and got him to give important information about the whereabouts of Fazlullah, the warlord he was serving. The capture of Muslim Khan along with four senior commanders came about as a result of intelligence, which in itself is a most significant development in a region that has been ruled by the Taliban terrorists for nearly three years.

The meaning of this development is quite clear. Intelligence works when the local people feel that the state is willing and confident to undertake action and fulfil its obligations. If this trust is missing, only a fool will stick his neck out and volunteer information about the terrorists. One should remember that the punishment of beheading meted out to “spies” was the most savage of all the acts of the Taliban, which they took care to publicise through CDs.

State credibility has been developed by the Pakistan Army gradually over the past few months. It took time because the state was in retreat in Swat in the face of terror, at first forcing the local population to stop talking about the Taliban, and then actually to appear on the media and speak in support of the “sharia” of the warlord who was killing their sons. This had the effect of winning public opinion in the rest of Pakistan over to Fazlullah and his father-in-law, Sufi Muhammad, the head of the earliest Taliban-style organisation, the Tehreek-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi (TNSM).

It is difficult to evaluate the damage that was done in the two years that the state allowed Fazlullah to remain virtually unchallenged. The surrender of the common man in Malakand to the diktat of Fazlullah had its effect on other tribal regions of the country after 2007. As the state shrank in front of terror, the rest of Pakistan began to favour the “Islamic” order of the Taliban and started to insist on “talks”.

The reference to “talks” in time became crucial to understanding the trouble in Pakistan. It signalled the growing defeatism of civil society in the wake of the retreat of the state. The world opposed “talks” while the majority opinion in domestic surveys, including the parliament, called for a “negotiated peace” with the Taliban. Today, thankfully, as the Taliban are on the run, the order of the day of the Pakistan Army is “no talks”. One version is that Muslim Khan came in for “talks” whereas the army had announced that it was no longer willing to parley.

However, the power of the Taliban today is owed to “talks” and agreements that the Taliban never intended to honour and in fact consolidated their position through them. Now the tide has turned after the army action, and terrorists like Muslim Khan are being caught on the basis of intelligence. This means that the affected population has started believing in the ability of the state to defend them against terror. In fact, this process has also quickened after the captured Taliban have revealed more planned terrorist operations and allowed their suicide-bombers to be arrested before they could inflict damage.

The army will have to persevere in its policy of challenging the Taliban if the credibility of the state is to be sustained. The Khyber tribal agency, which is the most crucial territory situated at the historic pass joining Pakistan and Afghanistan, has been neglected in the past on the basis of an erroneous assumption that the warlords there were not dangerous enough. Therefore public trust there is weak today and the state has no credibility. This is proved by the fact that 500 “khassadars” absented themselves from duty on Friday after the warlord threatened them on his FM radio.

Pakistan’s biggest problem in not related to NATO-occupied Afghanistan or India; it is strictly internal and related to the weakening credibility of the state to deliver on security. Our politicians are focused on the “populism” founded on the national sense of honour vis-à-vis the state’s declining external sovereignty. But the truth is graver than that: Pakistan needs to regain the ground it has lost to elements that it once encouraged to violate the sovereignty of other states. It is embarked on the right path today and should not be distracted from it. That is also the only way to regain the lost national honour internationally

 

[muse]

reminds me of a conversation out of Hindu Narratives - ready to war and in between that storm, a calm, a conversation and always duty

The soldier and the lover...
Ejaz Haider


An evening at Shaista Sirajuddin’s is always a stimulating affair and never fails to remind me of the time when I would sit through her class, usually the only one I attended, trying to soak in every word and image.

On this evening, a few days ago, Shaista mentioned Keith Douglas, an English soldier and poet who studied at Oxford and then reported for recruitment and graduated from Sandhurst to fight in WWII as an officer in the Second Derbyshire Yeomanry, a Reconnaissance Armoured regiment. Captain Douglas was killed during the Normandy landing on June 9, 1944 by a mortar shell splinter so fine, as Ted Hughes wrote, that no wound showed on the body. He was 24.

War claims the young and the best, as Herodotus noted millennia ago. That hasn’t changed.

I had not heard of Douglas before but have since read some of his poetry and read up on him. There is horror in those lines, the dreadfulness that always attends violence, more so at a large scale. But the paradox is the understanding that comes with it, the value of life in the midst of death, the appreciation of relationships, sacrifice, camaraderie, even empathy for the enemy.

There is deadly, matter-of-fact prose in the rattling of machine guns and the employment of other weaponry; but it’s the human behaviour in the midst of the sound and fury that signifies both much and nothing that awes and that combination is always poetic.

What does one say when “returning over the nightmare ground” after “the combatants [have] gone” one sees

the soldier sprawling in the sun.

The frowning barrel of his gun
overshadowing. As we came on
that day, he hit my tank with one
like the entry of a demon.
Look. Here in the gunpit spoil
the dishonoured picture of his girl
who has put: Steffi. Vergissmeinnicht.
in a copybook gothic script.

There’s the sense of victory for one’s side but there is also human emotion which goes beyond the sides we take because we are either born into them or, as sometimes happens, we think we are fighting a “just” war being on a particular side.

But she would weep to see today
how on his skin the swart flies move;
the dust upon the paper eye
and the burst stomach like a cave.

For here the lover and killer are mingled
who had one body and one heart.
And death who had the soldier singled
has done the lover mortal hurt.

These are the moments when war’s larger picture, the one that interests the historian and the strategist, shrinks to become one man, the dead soldier who has his woman’s picture in his pocket and who now lies with a burst stomach, decaying, having crossed the line from where none has ever returned, regardless of the pain and love of those who are waiting for the one who death has singled out and claimed at that moment.

But, for the living, or still living, there is also the grim acceptance of the broader picture, of stakes involved, of the job that must be done, no matter how many fall in the course of doing it. And there is also the recognition that tomorrow death may visit the one who has seen his comrades fall today.

War, then, is the constant interaction of deadly prose and awe-inspiring poetry, each informing the other. I cannot think of any other human activity that embraces in itself, and subsumes, so many paradoxes and ironies: such selfishness and such selflessness, such ruthlessness and such compassion, such cold calculation and such passion.

I was talking to Maj.-Gen Tariq Khan, IG-FC. He has, and is, commanding some of the most difficult counter-insurgency operations in the tribal areas. A cavalry officer, he belongs to South Waziristan himself. I asked him about the Scouts that make up the Frontier Corps and its 14 battalions. Are they trained for this kind of war?

General Khan said that he had always endeavoured to keep the Scouts as Scouts. This is how he put it: “Being from the Army I know the value of drills and procedures. While most people feel these are a necessary nuisance to allow for efficiency, I do not agree. These SOPs etc are important because while the average soldier is doing a mission, he does not [necessarily] understand the intent. But the Scouts are too individualistic and must never have their wings clipped by SOPs. They follow an intent and not merely the mission. The Soldier appreciates a situation; a Scout anticipates it.”

I found the fine distinction very incisive. This kind of insight comes when the commander knows his men and when his men know him. That bond does not come easy. War is fascinating and dreadful, more dreadful than fascinating because when the fighting is on and the blood is spilled, the average soldier does not think in terms of poetry or the philosophy of it. That luxury is meant for those of us who can find the right words and write despatches. A Douglas, or to raise the bar, an Orwell, is an exception.

Where the taking and giving of lives is involved, the officer has to lead from the front. General Khan believes, as an adaptive leader, that “the initiative and independence of the Scout” must not be disturbed. If it is, “you shall have a radically negative shift in the efficiency of the institution”.

He went on: “Just a year ago they lost forts, lines of communications and border control; look at it now! These are probably the best troops in the world. If you have their confidence they will follow you to hell. But getting their confidence is not so easy.”

True. General Khan and his officers have had to be with their men in almost every difficult situation. They must compete with them when they shoot rifles, live with them when there is a problem, face the danger where it is most dangerous. General Khan himself was with the troops during the worst days in Bajaur and remained there for two weeks until the siege was broken.

And then there is, in the middle of it all, the simplicity and the hilarity. General Khan told me: “Driving back on the route you took to Khar and back now in the worst days of last year, my driver on reaching the Motorway at Mardan decided to get sophisticated and told the gunman next to him, ‘Put on my seat belt’. The gunman reached across and yanked the belt from where it was secured and promptly tried tying it up with the handbrake. When I asked him what the hell he was doing, he looked at me and said, ‘Didn’t you say we must have our seat belts on? Why are you worried how we do it as long as we do it?’”

Indeed!

Ejaz Haider is op-ed editor of Daily Times, consulting editor of The Friday Times and host of Samaa TV's programme “Siyasiyat”. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

 

[Elmo]

The first half of the piece


I was talking to Maj.-Gen Tariq Khan, IG-FC. He has, and is, commanding some of the most difficult counter-insurgency operations in the tribal areas. A cavalry officer, he belongs to South Waziristan himself.


Last one heard, the issue with Tariq Khan is that he is from D.I Khan, which borders S. Waziristan, and is a non-Pukhtoon. Correct if one is wrong here.

 

[muse]

Howz that an issue? What does where a officer is from have anything to do with anything?

 

[Elmo]

Howz that an issue? What does where a officer is from have anything to do with anything?

Issue... wrong wording, my bad Muse.

There has been critique of the way Tariq Khan handled the insurgency in the early days of his tenure. It was based on the following: he is not a "local" in the tribal areas per se belonging to DI Khan and not familiar with the customs of the tribal agencies, he did not mingle with his men as earlier FC major-generals had done, most of the Scout officers under him had come from other regiments from Punjab and so were not familiar with the language of the region and heavily relied on their tehsildars

As we all know, FC was created by the British for the Durand Line in 1893 and Scout units were raised, who were basically Pashtun tribesmen such as Afridis, Mohmands, the Yusufzais and were grouped together as platoon.

While the FC are trained in the military doctrine, drilled and paraded the same way, however, their duties and weapons have always been slightly inferior to the military as they are not to be used as a front-line force. They are more a policing force meant for a tribe — they can hold ground, repulse an attack, put a small little raid or ambush but not be used in a regular war.


These conventions were broken when many Scout officers were employed who didn't know the tribal culture, didn't know the language and didn't know the people and relied heavily for commanding on the subhedars. The British would choose scout officers who knew the language, who knew the terrain and who knew the tribe and they acted as a cohesive force.

Now to pitch a Scout against the enemy in his own area is full of retribution. So there has been a mistake of using them as a frontline force and that is where we have gone wrong.

But now it's too late to go mend this, whatever damage had to be done has been done. We are using the FC in Dir, Swat, Darra Adamkhel, Mohmand, Bajaur and North and South Waziristan etc etc --- and they are all committed without any respite. Besides a few wings at Warsak and Fort Chimlara and the Chitral Scouts --- these men are going from one battleground to another. Hence I say, the first half of the article was well-laid out.