Martian2
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Well, according to the Chinese government's website:
"Among the nuclear-weapon states, China has performed the least number of nuclear tests and possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal. It has never taken part in any nuclear arms race or deployed any nuclear weapons outside its territory. "
This would put China's nuclear arsenal below 200.
You have to be careful. You could be jumping to a false conclusion. You have to interpret the Chinese government's statement from a lawyer's view and recognize the ambiguity in their claim.
http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-35-125.pdf
"Estimating the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal has always relied almost exclusively on U.S. intelligence estimates, while Chinese government information about the size or composition of its nuclear forces has been almost non-existent. In the Chinese view, secrecy increases the potential adversaries uncertainty about Chinese capabilities and therefore increases the deterrent effect, although it may also as in the case of the United States cause that adversary to assume the worst. Perhaps in recognition of this dilemma, the Chinese Foreign Ministry in April 2004 published a fact sheet that included the statement: Among the nuclear-weapon states, China ... possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal.93 Since Britain has declared that it has less than 200 operationally available warheads, and the United States, Russia and France have more, the Chinese statement could be interpreted to mean that Chinas nuclear arsenal is smaller than Britains.94
Not surprisingly, the devil is in the details. When the Chinese statement uses the word arsenal, does that mean the entire stockpile or just the portion of it that is operationally deployed? To add to the confusion, Britain has not disclosed the size of its stockpile but only declared that less than 200 warheads are operationally available. This strongly suggests that there may be additional British warheads in storage." (see pp. 38-39)