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China's drive for digital supremacy is likely to fail, and Huawei is going nowhere

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China lags far behind in advanced semiconductors, despite strenuous efforts to close the gap
China has a fatal shortcoming in its quest for hi-tech supremacy. The US and its close allies control the critical raw material.

AMBROSE EVANS-PRITCHARD3 June 2020 • 8:48pm

For all its successes, China lags far behind in advanced semiconductors, despite strenuous efforts to close the gap. It must import them.

The Chinese Communist Party cannot hope to achieve global dominance of G5 mobile networks without secure access to these chips and their supporting ecosystem.

Nor can it take a lead in telecommunications and artificial intelligence (AI). Xi Jinping’s master plan to control the ‘internet of things’ and the digital economy of the 2030s runs into an insuperable obstacle.

Washington has enormous blockading power and in mid-May it began to exercise that power with seriously hostile intent, forcing the world’s biggest chip maker - Taiwan’s TSMC - to stop taking fresh orders from Chinese mobile leader Huawei.

We can mark the start of the real Sino-American Cold War from that moment. It played to the narrative - both cultivated by Xi, but also made self-fulfilling by his actions - that the US aims to thwart the rise of China, and therefore that restraint is pointless.

The end of Hong Kong as we know it followed in quick succession. Are there parallels with Franklin Roosevelt’s oil embargo against Japan, which set in motion Tojo’s all-or-nothing escalation in 1941? Not yet, but the gloves are off.

We can have a quaint debate in Britain and across Europe over whether Huawei should be at the centre our G5 networks, and therefore whether the People’s Liberation Army should have leverage through Xi’s doctrine of civil-military fusion.

It is out of our hands. Washington is not going to let Huawei gain such a lockhold in the foreseeable future. Which is why the Government is now bowing to US pressure.

It is not hard to manufacture the low-end logic and memory chips for laptops. It is much harder to make specialised chips for telecommunications or AI, or FGPA circuits that can be programmed. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have the capability, but they are working hand in glove with the US.

Silicon Valley retains paramount power where it matters. It farms out some production to foundries or ‘fabs’ such as TSMC in Taiwan but it does not relinquish ultimate control.

The US and Japan between them also control 85pc of the market for electronic design automation (EDA) needed to create circuits . “Not to sound hyperbolic. All of China’s “self-made” chips are designed, verified, validated, etc, using foreign—mainly US—EDA tools,” said TechNode.

“Semiconductors are not easy to make. The manufacturing process has become progressively more complex as the chips become microscopically small, at the cutting edge of physics and materials science,” said James Lewis, technology director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“China is not a peer. People don’t realize just how much they have been relying on stolen technology. But stealing is not enough. You need the magic ‘know-how’ and that takes years of experience.”

The Chinese caught up fast after 2015 when the Obama administration cut off two Intel chips used by the military but creating a semiconductor industry is harder. “They are on their third ‘Manhattan Project’ trying, but they are not there yet. They are ten years behind on high-end chips,” said Mr Lewis.

Yet time is of the essence. The next five to ten years will decide whether the US alliance system or China controls the digital infrastructure.
Huawei was able to get around the initial US curbs on technology by purchasing chips from TSMC. The US Commerce Department has now shut this down. All chip manufacturers using US equipment, IP, or design software will need a licence before shipping to Huawei.

TSMC promptly announced that it would halt sales to Huawei even though they make up 18pc of revenue. It will instead double down on its US ties with a $12bn plant in Arizona. Such is the long economic and strategic arm of the United States.

We should not be distracted by Donald Trump’s idée fixe on trade tariffs, cars, and soybeans. The actual fight is going at a more sophisticated level, managed by the professionals of the Washington establishment. Trump is best understood as a bellwether. As Henry Kissinger so tellingly put it, he is “one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and force it to give up its old pretences”.

A paper by professors Harold James, Markus Brunnermeier, Rush Doshi from Princeton argues that the Sino-American technology war “holds an uncanny resemblance” to Anglo-German rivalry in the lead up to the First World War. It was a clash between a rising, mercantilist, Wilhelmine autocracy and an anxious Britain, the slipping hegemon striving to preserve control over the nodal points of world trade.

Guglielmo Marconi, backed by the Royal Navy, established a British lockhold on radio telegraphy before the First World War CREDIT: ThoughtCo
What mattered then was radio telegraphy. The Royal Navy teamed up with Marconi to create a radio network with a monopoly over transmissions, buttressed by Britain’s 60pc share of the world’s undersea cable network. The British set the global standard and Marconi leveraged the advantage with a policy of “non-intercommunication” with other operators that refused to toe the line. All were forced to comply.

Kaiser Wilhelm fought back by ordering the electrical companies AEG and Siemens & Halske and AEG to form the rival Telefunken in 1903. Germany pursued its own ‘Belt and Road’, pushing its technology in Latin America and emerging markets, along with the Berlin-Baghdad railway to break out of the maritime blockade - the model explicitly cited by the original author of the Belt and Road in 2012.

Germany did gain a share of radio telegraphy but Britain was still able to monitor German transmissions and force German traffic onto British-controlled networks after 1914, which was how the Zimmerman telegram was intercepted - accelerating US entry into the First World War. In the end Germany failed to achieve its goal through confrontation. It has done spectacularly well instead as a cooperative power.

There are two sides to the Thucydides Trap. Status quo powers can make conflict inevitable by failing to accommodate a thrusting new rival. But rising powers can equally provoke a containment alliance against them if they throw their weight around and misjudge their own strength. Wilhelmine Germany is a salutary lesson.

In my view, Beijing misread the events of 2008 when the US financial system blew up - or seemed to do so - and it looked as America was in steep decline. China in fact suffered the greater structural damage. It drank too deep from the bottle of Leninist-capitalism: credit bubbles and manic over-investment by state-owned behemoths.

Twelve years later, China still has one foot in the middle income trap. The low-hanging fruit of catch-up growth has been picked. Productivity has stalled. The debt ratio is 330pc of GDP. The underlying rate of economic growth has dropped to 4pc and will be 2pc by the early 2020s. The workforce is contracting and demographic atrophy is setting in.

It is not so much that America has done well - although it has regained energy ascendancy to match its hi-tech dominance - but rather that all those charts extrapolating eternal Chinese growth look very silly today. The sorpasso in total GDP may not happen after all.

Xi is now taking a page out of the late Song dynasty in the 12th Century when the leaden neo-Confucian ideology of Zhu Xi smothered a flourishing society that had embraced markets, free thinking, and a high degree of rational science, and was arguably on the cusp of industrial take-off.

The Song dynasty was China's age of invention and free thought. It was shut down by rigid neo-Confucian control. Xi Jinping is repeating the error today
Historian Joel Mokyr said the core of the imperial service exam system became “the mindless memorisation of Zhu Xi’s commentaries on which every ambitious Chinese lad had to waste his childhood” but it also served as an instrument of repressive conformity. China went into 800 years of stagnation.

Xi Jinping’s surveillance regime is doing much the same today. Youth must cut their intellects on his guiding oeuvre, “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era”. It is hard to see how China will achieve the final leap forward to technological supremacy in this political atmosphere.

Xi can muster allies of sorts along his Belt and Road but these are second tier countries. What matters more is that he has antagonized the rich world. The EU has declared his regime to be a “systemic rival” and is erecting barriers against predatory takeovers. His wolf warrior diplomacy is ruffling feathers everywhere.

One can only conclude that hubris has gone to his head. If you are going to take on the developed world, you must at least get your chips in a row first.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/busines...l-supremacy-likely-fail-huawei-going-nowhere/
Can it stop China?
The lacking in China semiconductor industry is not due to know-how but more of a case of market demand.
The supply crisis created by Trump is a blessing in disguise and now more Chinese manufacturers will go Chinese in their purchase like YTMC 3D X-tacking NAND or CMX in order to ensure a continuity in their supplies. Isn't that good news? Bases on Gordon Moore's law, soon they will at PAR with the best. So what if US threatened Nederlands over ASML, China will just have to accelerate their R&D and development of it's own proprietary lithography machines. You think it is not possible.
After all ASML was originally a branch of Philip. IMO no big deal. It only take more time but the end consequences and result may not be what US semiconductor companies wanted. They rather work with China.
That is how US politicians shoot themselves in the foot and ruin the cake for them.
Does China and USA ever need to hostile or fight a war? Any war, trade war, technology war, that is how loser thinks.
 
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Indian labor is 6x cheaper, there are 3x more Indian H1Bs in the US than Chinese and there are Indian CEOs of Google, Microsoft and Pepsi.

Why can't India even replicate 25% of China's success?

because india is secular democracy , there are many factors laws of land aquisition ,envioronmental protection, democracy and civil liberties , which stop rapid development of india. on the other hand, china is autocratic communist nation where human rights , labour laws , envioronmental laws don't come in way of rapid development . chinese can't protest against decision of govt where as protesters will lose life under iron curtain .
 
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because india is secular democracy , there are many factors of laws democracy and civil liberties , which stop rapid development of india. on the other hand, china is autocratic communist nation where human rights , labour laws , envioronmental laws don't come in way of rapid development . chinese can't protest against decision of govt where as protesters will lose life under iron curtain .

But you quoted low labor costs and getting high tech knowledge from America as the key to China's success.

Well, India has lower labor costs and gets more high tech knowledge from America. So why hasn't India been more successful?

You now say that environmental laws are the factor. Well India has worse environment than China too, now what?

What is your next excuse?

Why are there just so many excuses? How many excuses do you need?
 
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But you quoted low labor costs and getting high tech knowledge from America as the key to China's success.

Well, India has lower labor costs and gets more high tech knowledge from America. So why hasn't India been more successful?

You now say that environmental laws are the factor. Well India has worse environment than China too, now what?

What is your next excuse?

Why are there just so many excuses? How many excuses do you need?

china is autocratic communist nation , they use prisoners as labour in projects , no body dares to stop communist from using free labour .no human rights .
 
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china is autocratic communist nation , they use prisoners as labour in projects , no body dares to stop communist from using free labour .no human rights .

which major project that China has and India doesn't have uses prison labor?

Huawei? High speed rail? Which one?

Why are there so many excuses from you?
 
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The article does have some factual information but it downplays Chinese capabilities in semiconductor fabrication.

China is already at the 14nm level versus TSMC's 7nm+ - that is a gap of only 5 years and not 10 as the article suggests.

China's SMIC is fabricating the medium-performance Kirin 710A and so at the worst, in 1 years time, Huawei will need to step down to medium-performance smartphones.

SMIC already is set to go onto a new 14nm+ process and this should be ready to fabricate even more powerful and more energy efficient chips in a year's time.
 
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But you quoted low labor costs and getting high tech knowledge from America as the key to China's success.

Well, India has lower labor costs and gets more high tech knowledge from America. So why hasn't India been more successful?

You now say that environmental laws are the factor. Well India has worse environment than China too, now what?

What is your next excuse?

Why are there just so many excuses? How many excuses do you need?
If I am an investors from a 4 season nation from the West, I will be deterred by first the hot weather, apart from many others that includes pollution and filths... Now added to them is the uncontrollable COVID pandemic. So how many cases is unreported due to lack of testing.
Today it's a record of 9000 and Modi is desperately wanting to reopen India.
 
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China lags far behind in advanced semiconductors, despite strenuous efforts to close the gap
China has a fatal shortcoming in its quest for hi-tech supremacy. The US and its close allies control the critical raw material.

AMBROSE EVANS-PRITCHARD3 June 2020 • 8:48pm

For all its successes, China lags far behind in advanced semiconductors, despite strenuous efforts to close the gap. It must import them.

The Chinese Communist Party cannot hope to achieve global dominance of G5 mobile networks without secure access to these chips and their supporting ecosystem.

Nor can it take a lead in telecommunications and artificial intelligence (AI). Xi Jinping’s master plan to control the ‘internet of things’ and the digital economy of the 2030s runs into an insuperable obstacle.

Washington has enormous blockading power and in mid-May it began to exercise that power with seriously hostile intent, forcing the world’s biggest chip maker - Taiwan’s TSMC - to stop taking fresh orders from Chinese mobile leader Huawei.

We can mark the start of the real Sino-American Cold War from that moment. It played to the narrative - both cultivated by Xi, but also made self-fulfilling by his actions - that the US aims to thwart the rise of China, and therefore that restraint is pointless.

The end of Hong Kong as we know it followed in quick succession. Are there parallels with Franklin Roosevelt’s oil embargo against Japan, which set in motion Tojo’s all-or-nothing escalation in 1941? Not yet, but the gloves are off.

We can have a quaint debate in Britain and across Europe over whether Huawei should be at the centre our G5 networks, and therefore whether the People’s Liberation Army should have leverage through Xi’s doctrine of civil-military fusion.

It is out of our hands. Washington is not going to let Huawei gain such a lockhold in the foreseeable future. Which is why the Government is now bowing to US pressure.

It is not hard to manufacture the low-end logic and memory chips for laptops. It is much harder to make specialised chips for telecommunications or AI, or FGPA circuits that can be programmed. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have the capability, but they are working hand in glove with the US.

Silicon Valley retains paramount power where it matters. It farms out some production to foundries or ‘fabs’ such as TSMC in Taiwan but it does not relinquish ultimate control.

The US and Japan between them also control 85pc of the market for electronic design automation (EDA) needed to create circuits . “Not to sound hyperbolic. All of China’s “self-made” chips are designed, verified, validated, etc, using foreign—mainly US—EDA tools,” said TechNode.

“Semiconductors are not easy to make. The manufacturing process has become progressively more complex as the chips become microscopically small, at the cutting edge of physics and materials science,” said James Lewis, technology director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“China is not a peer. People don’t realize just how much they have been relying on stolen technology. But stealing is not enough. You need the magic ‘know-how’ and that takes years of experience.”

The Chinese caught up fast after 2015 when the Obama administration cut off two Intel chips used by the military but creating a semiconductor industry is harder. “They are on their third ‘Manhattan Project’ trying, but they are not there yet. They are ten years behind on high-end chips,” said Mr Lewis.

Yet time is of the essence. The next five to ten years will decide whether the US alliance system or China controls the digital infrastructure.
Huawei was able to get around the initial US curbs on technology by purchasing chips from TSMC. The US Commerce Department has now shut this down. All chip manufacturers using US equipment, IP, or design software will need a licence before shipping to Huawei.

TSMC promptly announced that it would halt sales to Huawei even though they make up 18pc of revenue. It will instead double down on its US ties with a $12bn plant in Arizona. Such is the long economic and strategic arm of the United States.

We should not be distracted by Donald Trump’s idée fixe on trade tariffs, cars, and soybeans. The actual fight is going at a more sophisticated level, managed by the professionals of the Washington establishment. Trump is best understood as a bellwether. As Henry Kissinger so tellingly put it, he is “one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and force it to give up its old pretences”.

A paper by professors Harold James, Markus Brunnermeier, Rush Doshi from Princeton argues that the Sino-American technology war “holds an uncanny resemblance” to Anglo-German rivalry in the lead up to the First World War. It was a clash between a rising, mercantilist, Wilhelmine autocracy and an anxious Britain, the slipping hegemon striving to preserve control over the nodal points of world trade.

Guglielmo Marconi, backed by the Royal Navy, established a British lockhold on radio telegraphy before the First World War CREDIT: ThoughtCo
What mattered then was radio telegraphy. The Royal Navy teamed up with Marconi to create a radio network with a monopoly over transmissions, buttressed by Britain’s 60pc share of the world’s undersea cable network. The British set the global standard and Marconi leveraged the advantage with a policy of “non-intercommunication” with other operators that refused to toe the line. All were forced to comply.

Kaiser Wilhelm fought back by ordering the electrical companies AEG and Siemens & Halske and AEG to form the rival Telefunken in 1903. Germany pursued its own ‘Belt and Road’, pushing its technology in Latin America and emerging markets, along with the Berlin-Baghdad railway to break out of the maritime blockade - the model explicitly cited by the original author of the Belt and Road in 2012.

Germany did gain a share of radio telegraphy but Britain was still able to monitor German transmissions and force German traffic onto British-controlled networks after 1914, which was how the Zimmerman telegram was intercepted - accelerating US entry into the First World War. In the end Germany failed to achieve its goal through confrontation. It has done spectacularly well instead as a cooperative power.

There are two sides to the Thucydides Trap. Status quo powers can make conflict inevitable by failing to accommodate a thrusting new rival. But rising powers can equally provoke a containment alliance against them if they throw their weight around and misjudge their own strength. Wilhelmine Germany is a salutary lesson.

In my view, Beijing misread the events of 2008 when the US financial system blew up - or seemed to do so - and it looked as America was in steep decline. China in fact suffered the greater structural damage. It drank too deep from the bottle of Leninist-capitalism: credit bubbles and manic over-investment by state-owned behemoths.

Twelve years later, China still has one foot in the middle income trap. The low-hanging fruit of catch-up growth has been picked. Productivity has stalled. The debt ratio is 330pc of GDP. The underlying rate of economic growth has dropped to 4pc and will be 2pc by the early 2020s. The workforce is contracting and demographic atrophy is setting in.

It is not so much that America has done well - although it has regained energy ascendancy to match its hi-tech dominance - but rather that all those charts extrapolating eternal Chinese growth look very silly today. The sorpasso in total GDP may not happen after all.

Xi is now taking a page out of the late Song dynasty in the 12th Century when the leaden neo-Confucian ideology of Zhu Xi smothered a flourishing society that had embraced markets, free thinking, and a high degree of rational science, and was arguably on the cusp of industrial take-off.

The Song dynasty was China's age of invention and free thought. It was shut down by rigid neo-Confucian control. Xi Jinping is repeating the error today
Historian Joel Mokyr said the core of the imperial service exam system became “the mindless memorisation of Zhu Xi’s commentaries on which every ambitious Chinese lad had to waste his childhood” but it also served as an instrument of repressive conformity. China went into 800 years of stagnation.

Xi Jinping’s surveillance regime is doing much the same today. Youth must cut their intellects on his guiding oeuvre, “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era”. It is hard to see how China will achieve the final leap forward to technological supremacy in this political atmosphere.

Xi can muster allies of sorts along his Belt and Road but these are second tier countries. What matters more is that he has antagonized the rich world. The EU has declared his regime to be a “systemic rival” and is erecting barriers against predatory takeovers. His wolf warrior diplomacy is ruffling feathers everywhere.

One can only conclude that hubris has gone to his head. If you are going to take on the developed world, you must at least get your chips in a row first.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/busines...l-supremacy-likely-fail-huawei-going-nowhere/


There are many faulty of the author analysis: the author only see short term period, and fail to see China potential market. The author also fail to see China's strong capability to innovate.

China huge market will sustain Huawei and other tech companies to innovate ahead their competitors from west, until China can close the gap in chip fab technology.
 
.
China lags far behind in advanced semiconductors, despite strenuous efforts to close the gap
China has a fatal shortcoming in its quest for hi-tech supremacy. The US and its close allies control the critical raw material.

AMBROSE EVANS-PRITCHARD3 June 2020 • 8:48pm

For all its successes, China lags far behind in advanced semiconductors, despite strenuous efforts to close the gap. It must import them.

The Chinese Communist Party cannot hope to achieve global dominance of G5 mobile networks without secure access to these chips and their supporting ecosystem.

Nor can it take a lead in telecommunications and artificial intelligence (AI). Xi Jinping’s master plan to control the ‘internet of things’ and the digital economy of the 2030s runs into an insuperable obstacle.

Washington has enormous blockading power and in mid-May it began to exercise that power with seriously hostile intent, forcing the world’s biggest chip maker - Taiwan’s TSMC - to stop taking fresh orders from Chinese mobile leader Huawei.

We can mark the start of the real Sino-American Cold War from that moment. It played to the narrative - both cultivated by Xi, but also made self-fulfilling by his actions - that the US aims to thwart the rise of China, and therefore that restraint is pointless.

The end of Hong Kong as we know it followed in quick succession. Are there parallels with Franklin Roosevelt’s oil embargo against Japan, which set in motion Tojo’s all-or-nothing escalation in 1941? Not yet, but the gloves are off.

We can have a quaint debate in Britain and across Europe over whether Huawei should be at the centre our G5 networks, and therefore whether the People’s Liberation Army should have leverage through Xi’s doctrine of civil-military fusion.

It is out of our hands. Washington is not going to let Huawei gain such a lockhold in the foreseeable future. Which is why the Government is now bowing to US pressure.

It is not hard to manufacture the low-end logic and memory chips for laptops. It is much harder to make specialised chips for telecommunications or AI, or FGPA circuits that can be programmed. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have the capability, but they are working hand in glove with the US.

Silicon Valley retains paramount power where it matters. It farms out some production to foundries or ‘fabs’ such as TSMC in Taiwan but it does not relinquish ultimate control.

The US and Japan between them also control 85pc of the market for electronic design automation (EDA) needed to create circuits . “Not to sound hyperbolic. All of China’s “self-made” chips are designed, verified, validated, etc, using foreign—mainly US—EDA tools,” said TechNode.

“Semiconductors are not easy to make. The manufacturing process has become progressively more complex as the chips become microscopically small, at the cutting edge of physics and materials science,” said James Lewis, technology director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“China is not a peer. People don’t realize just how much they have been relying on stolen technology. But stealing is not enough. You need the magic ‘know-how’ and that takes years of experience.”

The Chinese caught up fast after 2015 when the Obama administration cut off two Intel chips used by the military but creating a semiconductor industry is harder. “They are on their third ‘Manhattan Project’ trying, but they are not there yet. They are ten years behind on high-end chips,” said Mr Lewis.

Yet time is of the essence. The next five to ten years will decide whether the US alliance system or China controls the digital infrastructure.
Huawei was able to get around the initial US curbs on technology by purchasing chips from TSMC. The US Commerce Department has now shut this down. All chip manufacturers using US equipment, IP, or design software will need a licence before shipping to Huawei.

TSMC promptly announced that it would halt sales to Huawei even though they make up 18pc of revenue. It will instead double down on its US ties with a $12bn plant in Arizona. Such is the long economic and strategic arm of the United States.

We should not be distracted by Donald Trump’s idée fixe on trade tariffs, cars, and soybeans. The actual fight is going at a more sophisticated level, managed by the professionals of the Washington establishment. Trump is best understood as a bellwether. As Henry Kissinger so tellingly put it, he is “one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and force it to give up its old pretences”.

A paper by professors Harold James, Markus Brunnermeier, Rush Doshi from Princeton argues that the Sino-American technology war “holds an uncanny resemblance” to Anglo-German rivalry in the lead up to the First World War. It was a clash between a rising, mercantilist, Wilhelmine autocracy and an anxious Britain, the slipping hegemon striving to preserve control over the nodal points of world trade.

Guglielmo Marconi, backed by the Royal Navy, established a British lockhold on radio telegraphy before the First World War CREDIT: ThoughtCo
What mattered then was radio telegraphy. The Royal Navy teamed up with Marconi to create a radio network with a monopoly over transmissions, buttressed by Britain’s 60pc share of the world’s undersea cable network. The British set the global standard and Marconi leveraged the advantage with a policy of “non-intercommunication” with other operators that refused to toe the line. All were forced to comply.

Kaiser Wilhelm fought back by ordering the electrical companies AEG and Siemens & Halske and AEG to form the rival Telefunken in 1903. Germany pursued its own ‘Belt and Road’, pushing its technology in Latin America and emerging markets, along with the Berlin-Baghdad railway to break out of the maritime blockade - the model explicitly cited by the original author of the Belt and Road in 2012.

Germany did gain a share of radio telegraphy but Britain was still able to monitor German transmissions and force German traffic onto British-controlled networks after 1914, which was how the Zimmerman telegram was intercepted - accelerating US entry into the First World War. In the end Germany failed to achieve its goal through confrontation. It has done spectacularly well instead as a cooperative power.

There are two sides to the Thucydides Trap. Status quo powers can make conflict inevitable by failing to accommodate a thrusting new rival. But rising powers can equally provoke a containment alliance against them if they throw their weight around and misjudge their own strength. Wilhelmine Germany is a salutary lesson.

In my view, Beijing misread the events of 2008 when the US financial system blew up - or seemed to do so - and it looked as America was in steep decline. China in fact suffered the greater structural damage. It drank too deep from the bottle of Leninist-capitalism: credit bubbles and manic over-investment by state-owned behemoths.

Twelve years later, China still has one foot in the middle income trap. The low-hanging fruit of catch-up growth has been picked. Productivity has stalled. The debt ratio is 330pc of GDP. The underlying rate of economic growth has dropped to 4pc and will be 2pc by the early 2020s. The workforce is contracting and demographic atrophy is setting in.

It is not so much that America has done well - although it has regained energy ascendancy to match its hi-tech dominance - but rather that all those charts extrapolating eternal Chinese growth look very silly today. The sorpasso in total GDP may not happen after all.

Xi is now taking a page out of the late Song dynasty in the 12th Century when the leaden neo-Confucian ideology of Zhu Xi smothered a flourishing society that had embraced markets, free thinking, and a high degree of rational science, and was arguably on the cusp of industrial take-off.

The Song dynasty was China's age of invention and free thought. It was shut down by rigid neo-Confucian control. Xi Jinping is repeating the error today
Historian Joel Mokyr said the core of the imperial service exam system became “the mindless memorisation of Zhu Xi’s commentaries on which every ambitious Chinese lad had to waste his childhood” but it also served as an instrument of repressive conformity. China went into 800 years of stagnation.

Xi Jinping’s surveillance regime is doing much the same today. Youth must cut their intellects on his guiding oeuvre, “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era”. It is hard to see how China will achieve the final leap forward to technological supremacy in this political atmosphere.

Xi can muster allies of sorts along his Belt and Road but these are second tier countries. What matters more is that he has antagonized the rich world. The EU has declared his regime to be a “systemic rival” and is erecting barriers against predatory takeovers. His wolf warrior diplomacy is ruffling feathers everywhere.

One can only conclude that hubris has gone to his head. If you are going to take on the developed world, you must at least get your chips in a row first.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/busines...l-supremacy-likely-fail-huawei-going-nowhere/
The only fear is fear itself. The moment I see this article I know we are on the right track. Lololol
 
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because india is secular democracy , there are many factors laws of land aquisition ,envioronmental protection, democracy and civil liberties , which stop rapid development of india. on the other hand, china is autocratic communist nation where human rights , labour laws , envioronmental laws don't come in way of rapid development . chinese can't protest against decision of govt where as protesters will lose life under iron curtain .
Dude stop making lame excuses. China and india was in same in 1990 now china is 15 trillion dollar economy and India still not 3 trillion yet. You guys just downgraded to almost close to get junk credit on investment.


Its like bangladeshi ppl arguing with Malaysia who is better lol.

When indians argue with china its the same. Completely different league.
 
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china is autocratic communist nation , they use prisoners as labour in projects , no body dares to stop communist from using free labour .no human rights .

Are you nuts?? America is notoriously known to use prisoners as laborers too. US prisons are privately owned. Major corruption going on. Corrupt judges given kickbacks for sentencing thousands of juveniles to extended stays in jail for literally nothing to minor crimes just to fill up jails. Same sht for adult prisons. The majority being black.

The riots and protest arent just for George Floyd, its against the corrupt system that mainly targets blacks and minorities. Major corruption going on.


Kids for cash scandal
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kids_for_cash_scandal


Dude stop making lame excuses. China and india was in same in 1990 now china is 15 trillion dollar economy and India still not 3 trillion yet. You guys just downgraded to almost close to get junk credit on investment.


Its like bangladeshi ppl arguing with Malaysia who is better lol.

When indians argue with china its the same. Completely different league.

Well said brother
 
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The author also fail to see China's strong capability to innovate (a.k.a theft).
there I corrected it for you

Citing a Daily Telegraph article, getting desperate here it seems.

Then again its an indication of the OPs level of education.
yeah super chinese level of education only approve global times. thanks for the reminder
 
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