China's Blitzkrieg on U.S. Carrier

[gambit]

Unless you are a premiere aerospace engineer with distinguished awards and with a long list of citations of your articles, the link is merely your opinion.

And yours is any less?

As a known China-hater, you enjoy raising nonsense objections. Do you remember our discussion where you made the ridiculous claim that all incoming ballistic warheads come in vertically and not at an angle?

I have said this once before. I will not spend hours repeatedly proving your ignorance of technical matters. I have proven it before and I will not continue to waste my time.

This is not a difficult subject matter. Ballistic missiles are decades-old technology. It is also well-known that computer chips enable smart weapons to guide themselves onto a target. There are many sensors and other methods of acquiring targeting information. With all three elements, a ballistic missile is on its way to its target.

From what I see of this 'technical' explanation, even a toaster would qualify. The readers can see for themselves that they will learn far more about some of the basics of the ICBM from this...

http://www.defence.pk/forums/866788-post28.html

...Than they would learn from your simplistic 'computer chips'.

Your pal bailed the forum...

http://www.defence.pk/forums/1100176-post231.html

...After he used paywall sources with nary a clue of what they mean and I used Chinese engineers to debunk his sorry arguments. I see little differences between the two of you.

The issues of defense and American response are a separate matter. However, to constantly carp about non-existent technical problems shows that you are in a tiny minority of China-haters.

If the technical challenges that I posed to you fanboys here are 'non-existent', then so is the DF-21.

 

[Martian2]

Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

China Testing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM); U.S. Preparing Accordingly–Updated With Latest Analysis & Sources|Andrew S. Erickson

"On 24 August 2010, Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), made the following statement to Japanese media in Tokyo:

“To our knowledge, [China’s ASBM] has undergone repeated tests and it is probably very close to being operational.”

A 16 August 2010 background briefing by a Senior U.S. Department of Defense official indicates that China still needs to successfully integrate its ASBM with C4ISR in order to operationalize it:

“We continue to be concerned about their efforts to development this—this particular system. I would say the primary area… where we see them still facing roadblocks is in integrating the missile system with the C4-ISR. And they still have a ways to go before they manage to get that integrated so that they have an operational and effective system.”

“But nonetheless, this is an area that, for all the obvious reasons, remains, you know, of great concern for us.”

The just-released 2010 U.S. Department of Defense Report on China’s Military offers a general background:

“Augmented by direct acquisition of foreign weapons and technology, [defense industry] reforms have enabled China to develop and produce advanced weapon systems that incorporate mid-1990s technology in many areas, and some systems—particularly ballistic missiles—that rival any in the world today.” (p. 43)

“Production trends and resource allocation appear to favor missile and space systems….” (p. 44).

“China has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. It is developing and testing several new classes.” (p. 1)

“China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and when integrated with appropriate command and control systems, is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean.” (p. 2)

“The PLA is acquiring conventional MRBMs to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from China’s shores out to the first island chain.” (p. 31)

“The PLA Navy is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with Sky Wave and Surface Wave OTH radars. OTH radars could be used in conjunction with imagery satellites to assist in locating targets at great distances from PRC shores to support long range precision strikes, including by anti-ship ballistic missiles.” (p. 2)

“Over the long term, improvements in China’s C4ISR, including space-based and over-the-horizon sensors, could enable Beijing to identify, track, and target military activities deep into the western Pacific Ocean.” (p. 37)

Based on sophisticated organizational analysis, Mark Stokes and Tiffany Ma suggest that the Second Artillery may be constructing ASBM missile brigade facilities in the northern Guangdong Province municipality of Shaoguan (韶&#20851:

“Last week, China’s state-run media quietly announced the construction of facilities for a new Second Artillery missile brigade – the 96166 Unit – in the northern Guangdong municipality of Shaoguan… the province is already home to a Second Artillery short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) brigade (the 96169 unit in Meizhou)….”

“Although the introduction of the 1,700km range solid fuelled, terminally guided DF-21C ballistic missile into Guangdong is possible, the brigade is also a candidate to be the first unit equipped with the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21C, first introduced into the active inventory in 2005, is designed to attack fixed targets on land. If an ASBM is successful in passing the necessary design reviews and a sufficient sensor network is in place, the Shaoguan brigade could become the first in the PLA to field a lethal capability against moving targets at sea out to a range of 1,500-2,000km or more from launch sites.”

“The Second Artillery planned to finalize the design of the DF-21D by the end of 2010 and the establishment of a permanent deployment location often coincides with the design finalization of a new missile. However, an initial operational capability is likely a ways off, as a follow-on testing of a prototype design may be needed prior to certification for full-rate production.”

Shaoguan’s location near Hunan Province, with the inter-provincial Nanling mountains and tunnels through them that complicate satellite surveillance (under construction since at least 2008), offers significant advantages:

“Whether the unit is equipped with the DF-21C or the more advanced DF-21D maritime variant, the establishment of a conventionally-capable medium range ballistic missile brigade in Guangdong would decisively expand the Second Artillery’s striking radius. More specifically, it would enable the Second Artillery to support the Central Military Commission to enforce territorial claims in the South China Sea, or strike targets in a Taiwan-related contingency without having to overfly Japanese territory.”

Other recent indications of Chinese ASBM development progress include the reported completion of a DF-21D rocket motor facility in 2009 and the recent launch of 5 advanced Yaogan satellites, three of which were apparently placed in the same orbit on 5 March–thereby perhaps offering better coverage of critical areas along China’s maritime periphery. Another possible indication is a recent news release attributed to China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) citing Wang Genbin, Deputy Director of its 4th Department, as stating that the DF-21D can hit “slow-moving targets” with a CEP (circular error probable, meaning half of missiles fired will strike within) of dozens of meters. Mark Stokes, a noted expert at the Project 2049 Institute on this and related issues, stated on 4 June 2010 that 'odds are what you’re seeing now in terms of testing is… flight tests of the [DF-21D] motor itself and the airframe… the final step would be most likely going against a target at sea in a realistic environment.'”

 

[Brotherhood]

Brother, by arguing with a typical Chinese hater will get you no where, especially with a self hating(賣國&#36042.

 

[gambit]

Brother, by arguing with a typical Chinese hater will get you no where, especially with a self hating(賣國&#36042.

Just for you, brother, am going to break my rule -- again -- about using paywall sources, like I did here...

http://www.defence.pk/forums/1100176-post231.html

...And please pay attention to the authors' names and time of publication...

Ship Detection with Short Coherent Integration Time in Over-the-Horizon Radar

Xin Guo , Jin-Lin Ni , Guo-Sui Liu

Research Center of Electronic Engineering Technology, Nanjing University of Science & Technology, China

REPORT DATE 14 APR 2005

I. Introduction

The skywave over-the-horizon-radar (OTHR) is unique in radar family that employs the ionosphere to refract the radar high frequency signal (3-30mhz) to illuminate the target from the top down, thus significantly extending the detection range of 1000-4000km and permitting wide-area surveillance. However, scanning such vast coverage area requires relatively short coherent integration time (CIT) to increase the data rate, so as to ensure the work of the tracker.

For aircraft, short CIT is not a problem since their speeds separate them well from the ocean/ground clutter. But for ships, the low Doppler resolution resulting from the short CIT is not sufficient in most case to distinguish them from the close powerful ocean clutter.

In order to improve the signal-to-clutter ratio (SCR), a Fourier transform based clutter cancellation algorithm is proposed by Root [1-2]. By modeling the first-order clutter as sinusoid and subtracting it from the data, the ships can be exposed in short-time Doppler spectrum. This clutter subtraction means that the amplitude, frequency and initial phase of clutter must be estimated. In [1-2], Fourier based techniques is utilized to estimate the clutter, in which the clutter frequency and amplitude are directly obtained by the peak in Doppler spectrum, and initial phase is found by numerical search in the range 0 2 that minimize the energy of estimation error. However, since the Doppler resolution of short-time data is low, the clutter frequency estimation is not accurate if only maximal Fourier transform amplitude is used. This imperfect parameter estimation and clutter subtraction will result in the clutter residue. To remove them, iteration cancellation technique is used until the ships are shown up. However, as algorithm proceeds by iteration, the clutter residue will spread in Doppler spectrum and present a difficulty in ship identification and even masks the ships.

In this paper, an improvement to above Fourier based clutter cancellation is presented. We employ high-accuracy parameter estimation method [3] to obtain the clutter parameters, while the basic clutter subtraction and iteration cancellation is the same as in [1-2]. In this method, not only the amplitude information of dominant peak in Fourier spectrum but also the phase information is considered. With Fourier phase analysis, better clutter frequency and amplitude estimation can be achieved. As the result, after clutter cancellation, the clutter residue may have lower power and lesser spreading in Doppler spectrum, which will benefit the ship identification. Besides, in this method, the initial phase of the clutter can be directly calculated, avoiding the numerical search in the range 0 2 .

<snipped>

VI. CONCLUSION

Realizing ship detection with short CIT will enhance the OTHR data rate and guarantee the timely surveillance of the large areas. But the short CIT and the resulting low Doppler resolution cannot separate the ships from the close powerful ocean clutter. To overcome this problem, the ocean clutter cancellation algorithm is proposed by Root. In this paper, some improvement is presented. By combining the Fourier phase information, better clutter parameter estimation can be achieved. As the result, after clutter cancellation, the power and spreading of clutter residue in Doppler spectrum may reduce, which is helpful for the visibility and identification of ships. In addition, this method can directly get the initial phase, which eliminated the numerical search in the range 0 2 . However, note that this approach employs the phase information, it generally requires the Bragg peaks have high clutter-to-noise ratio. This requirement is usually satisfied in OTHR.

Finally, we would point out that the multimode propagation is a limitation for ship detection. First, it yields more than two Bragg peaks and the extra Bragg peak may be mistakenly regarded as the ship target. Second, the multiple positive (or negative) Bragg lines may be very close in Doppler spectrum and have approximate power, thus the Fourier phase analysis method may not get correct parameter estimation and lead the clutter cancellation unsatisfactory. Though selecting proper radar operating frequency can achieve single mode propagation, this is not always feasible due to the ionospheric condition and the desired surveillance region. Therefore, it requires further research to remove this contamination before ship detection.

The operating freqs used by OTH radars (3-30mhz) are usually the same as that of ordinary AM/FM music radio stations that are affected by day/night ionization of the atmosphere's layers because of the sun...

AM, FM Radio Waves and Sound

The ionosphere is much more effective in reflecting these radio waves at night. (Incidentally, technically, it's refracting, not reflecting, but the effect is somewhat the same.)

That's why at sunset most AM radio stations in the U.S. have to:

* reduce power

* directionalize their signal (send it more in some directions than others), or

* go off the air (sign off until sunrise the next day)

This may explain why your favorite AM radio station goes off the air at sunset, or becomes much harder to hear (because of reduced power).

Chinese engineers are encountering the same refractory problems as we have decades ago with their OTH radars. Except that the US have a considerable technological semiconductor advantage today that allows US superior data processing to separate the real targets from ocean surface clutter. And that the Chinese military could see a decoy and empty oil tanker as an aircraft carrier.

So if putting your exaggerated claims about the DF-21 under the technical microscope qualify as 'Chinese hating', I guess you had better start yelling at senors Xin Guo , Jin-Lin Ni , Guo-Sui Liu

 

[Martian2]

Ship Detection with Short Coherent Integration Time in Over-the-Horizon Radar

Xin Guo , Jin-Lin Ni , Guo-Sui Liu

Research Center of Electronic Engineering Technology, Nanjing University of Science & Technology, China

REPORT DATE 14 APR 2005

The report is FIVE years old. That is prior to successful 2007 ASAT and 2010 mid-course GBI (i.e. ground-based interceptor) tests. For God's sake, the Type 052C "171 Haikou was launched on 30 October 2003 and was commissioned in 2005."

At the stupendous pace of technological development in China, five years is ancient history. Don't you have a source from modern times?

 

[gambit]

The report is FIVE years old. That is prior to successful 2007 ASAT and 2010 mid-course GBI (i.e. ground-based interceptor) tests. For God's sake, the Type 052C "171 Haikou was launched on 30 October 2003 and was commissioned in 2005."

At the stupendous pace of technological development in China, five years is ancient history. Don't you have a source from modern times?

Yup...This is clearly from someone who has not a clue about R/D and manufacturing. Next we will see from the Chinese members here claiming that China will take only one year to deploy anything.

 

[Martian2]

Yup...This is clearly from someone who has not a clue about R/D and manufacturing. Next we will see from the Chinese members here claiming that China will take only one year to deploy anything.

If you believe strongly in the glacial pace of technological change, you might as well cite a source from ten, twenty, or thirty years ago.

Come on, no one cites a Department of Defense study about China's military capabilities from five years ago. Do you know why? It's OUTDATED.

 

[muse]

Doubts over China's 'wonder weapon'
By Jens Kastner and Wang Jyh-Perng

TAIPEI - In the past 12 months, the world's military journals have been awash with analyses of the power balance in the West Pacific possibly tilting in China's favor. Pundits and reporters proclaim in unison that Beijing is about to achieve its goal of making United States military interventions in future conflicts fought out in the Yellow, the East China or South China Seas a very difficult, if not impossible, mission.

Most think-tanks see Washington's democratic allies in the region as being threatened by China's boosted reconnaissance abilities, its submarine fleet and a growing arsenal of cruise and tactical missiles.

Yet, among all of Beijing's options to challenge US naval supremacy, the weapon that sends chills down China's opponents' spines is what is regarded as a Wunderwaffe, or wonder weapon, the Dong Feng 21D, the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile. If the assessments of observers prove correct, China's wonder weapon is to make its way into history books - with it, China would be able to take on the US Navy's aircraft carriers, the pride of the US military.

The outcome of a simulation published by Orbis, an American journal on international relations and US foreign policy, clearly did its job in making military circles uneasy. After a hit by a Dong Feng 21D, it took the nuclear-powered supercarrier USS George Washington a mere 20 minutes to sink.

The DF-21D, as the missile is commonly called, is a modification of a solid-propellant, single-warhead medium-range ballistic missile that China has been working on since the late 1960s. The newest version, also going under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization reporting name CSS-5 Mod-4, is believed to come with the unique feature that it can target a moving aircraft carrier as far away as 3,000 kilometers from a land-based mobile launcher.

Enabled by this new weapon, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) hopes to gain the option to control the West Pacific from land, as opposed to engaging with the US Navy in sea battles that China would be unlikely to win. If the DF-21D is really as sophisticated as has been widely speculated, the US would have to risk its neck when coming to South Korea's, Japan's or Taiwan's aid in the event of Chinese military aggression.

It can safely be assumed that a fair portion of Washington's military strategies would be rendered useless it the US were to lose the ability to securely travel anywhere using aircraft carriers from which jet fighters start their devastatingly precise bombing campaigns - as has been seen in the wars against Serbia and Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Like the DF-21D's earliest predecessor, the German V-2, a long-range World War II ballistic missile that the Nazis called a Wunderwaffe, China's anti-ship ballistic missile remains shrouded in mystery. Military experts from Washington to Taipei have been left guessing its exact capabilities. It is suggested that the missile's high-angle re-entry into the atmosphere, as well as its speed, make it almost impossible to defend against.

What further worries American defense analysts is that the Chinese apparently have the advantage of being able to screw on almost anything that's found in the PLA's warhead arsenals, such as HEAT shells, which are extremely efficient at penetrating steel, as well as cluster bombs, which eject smaller sub-munitions.

The Chinese could even destroy their opponents' electronic control systems - critical to the operation of ground vehicles and aircraft - by producing damaging current and voltage surges with the help of electromagnetic pulse bombs loaded into the DF-21D. Yet another option would be to fit a missile with a thermobaric fuel-air bomb. This warhead produces a blast wave of a very long duration, a feature that is useful in military applications where the attacker aims to increase the number of casualties and cause greater damage to infrastructure.

As a strong indication of how serious the US sees the threat of China's missiles, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently lamented that the DF-21D "has the ability to disrupt [American] freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options".

Among others, Taiwan has reason to be most concerned about China's apparent potential to deter US carriers from entering the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. The island is home to some of the world's most accomplished scholars who dedicate their careers to monitoring and researching China's security policy.

One of these is Professor Arthur Ding, a research fellow at the China Politics Division at Taiwan's National Chengchi University. Apart from this assignment, he also holds the position of a professor at the Political Warfare Cadres Academy in Taipei. Ding spoke to Asia Times Online on the DF-21D.

Asia Times Online: The DF-21D can strike US aircraft carriers and sink them in a very short time. Will this development have an impact on the naval balance in the East China Sea?

Arthur Ding: This is the ultimate goal China aims to achieve. But technically speaking, it's not feasible. That is because when the missile re-enters the atmosphere, its speed would be somewhere around Mach 7 [2,382.03 meters/second]. That is so fast that there would not be sufficient time to re-direct the warhead to hit an US aircraft carrier precisely. A carrier could only be hit indirectly by a special warhead, such as a fuel-air explosive.

AToL: How will the DF-21D affect Taiwan's security situation?

AD: There's no doubt that China's military modernization does increase the risk for US involvement. Nevertheless, aircraft carriers are unlikely to be the only instruments the US will have at hand. As time goes by, many more weapons may be developed. If this is the case, China will be frustrated and disappointed if it's only focusing on scenarios involving aircraft carriers. Thus, the DF-21D mainly serves as a psychological deterrent for the US.

Jens Kastner is a Taipei-based writer. Wang Jyh-Perng is a reserve captain of the Taiwan Navy and associate research fellow at the Association for Managing Defense and Strategies.

 

[maxx]

AD: There's no doubt that China's military modernization does increase the risk for US involvement. Nevertheless, aircraft carriers are unlikely to be the only instruments the US will have at hand. As time goes by, many more weapons may be developed. If this is the case, China will be frustrated and disappointed if it's only focusing on scenarios involving aircraft carriers. Thus, the DF-21D mainly serves as a psychological deterrent for the US.

I agree with this. US submarines, SSGN and SSN are equally as threatening as an aircraft carrier battle group and are often overlooked.

 

[Martian2]

Asia Times Online :: China News, China Business News, Taiwan and Hong Kong News and Business.

Asia Times Online: The DF-21D can strike US aircraft carriers and sink them in a very short time. Will this development have an impact on the naval balance in the East China Sea?

Arthur Ding: This is the ultimate goal China aims to achieve. But technically speaking, it's not feasible. That is because when the missile re-enters the atmosphere, its speed would be somewhere around Mach 7 [2,382.03 meters/second]. That is so fast that there would not be sufficient time to re-direct the warhead to hit an US aircraft carrier precisely. A carrier could only be hit indirectly by a special warhead, such as a fuel-air explosive.

I disagree with professor Arthur Ding's statement. He never explained his claim. A typical computer processor is in the GHz range. That is 1 billion clock cycles per second. To a modern computer chip, the missile is moving in extremely slow motion (e.g. 2,382 meters / 1,000,000,000 = barely moving).

 

[Martian2]

It would be the actuators (thrusters or fins) which limit ability to change course for a fast re-entry ASBM. But fast re-entry is just one approach of many.

I think the burden is on professor Arthur Ding to clearly explain the details behind his claim. I have not read a similar claim by other experts.

The challenge seems pretty straightforward. A sensor provides targeting data for an incoming warhead. A giga-hertz computer processor (that can execute a billion instructions per second) makes continuous minute adjustments to the steering fins of the warhead and guides it to its target. What exactly is the problem?

We already know that modern flight computers make continuous adjustments to keep an unstable airplane in the air. Similarly, a modern computer should easily be able to make continuous adjustments to the "air fins" of a warhead.

Professor Ding gave us a conclusion. He needs to provide details and connect the dots if he wants to make a persuasive case. Currently, I am not persuaded.

Computers in Aviation

"The General Dynamics (now Lockheed-Martin) F-16, which entered service in the late 1970s and has been built in large numbers, was the first operational jet fighter to use an analog flight control system. The pilot steers the rudder pedals and joystick, but these are not directly connected to the control surfaces such as the rudder and ailerons. Instead, they are connected to a "fly-by-wire" flight control system. Three computers on the aircraft constantly adjust the flight controls to maintain the aircraft in flight and reply to the commands from the pilot. The F-16 is inherently unstable by design, meaning that it would fly out of control if the computers failed (which is why there are three of them). The designers made it unstable in order to improve its maneuverability. The computers constantly readjust the flight surfaces to keep the plane flying. Initially, pilots often referred to the F-16 as "the electric jet." But computer control systems have become so common that they are no longer unusual."

 

[Martian2]

"Hitting a Bullet with a Bullet"

"The Missile Defense Agency said initial results show the interceptor's rocket motor system and kill vehicle performed as planned. Boeing said the warhead was tracked, intercepted and destroyed."


Thirty years ago, I would have given professor Ding the benefit of the doubt. However, a lot has happened in thirty years. In the 1980s, it was conventional wisdom that anti-missile defense was pie-in-the-sky Star Wars technology. After all, everyone knew that you couldn't "hit a bullet with a bullet."

However, we have now all seen the pictures of the successful intercepts of a "bullet hitting a bullet." I want professor Ding to explain why a "bullet"/"kill vehicle" can hit another "bullet"/"warhead", but cannot hit a sitting duck that is 4-acres in size and moving at a ridiculously slow 33 knots per hour.

National Missile Defense: A Status Report - Council on Foreign Relations

"Updated: September 17, 2009

Not only can we hit a bullet with a bullet, we can hit a spot on the bullet with a bullet." - Lt. Gen. Henry A. "Trey" Obering III, Former Director, Missile Defense Agency"

 

[Martian2]

I'm not saying the computation is the main problem. I'm saying making sufficiently powerful actuators is a more difficult problem.

The NMD example isn't a very good analogy because the NMD kill vehicle is much lighter, since it is a hit-to-kill kinetic warhead. It has less mass than a hypothetical ASBM, therefore less inertia, therefore less force required to accelerate. So it is much easier to steer the NMD kill vehicle. A ASBM would be much heavier because it will likely have a chemical warhead, so it is harder to accelerate. This means it needs powerful thrusters or control surfaces with high control authority.

Again, this is all assuming the ASBM re-enters at a high speed.

Can you cite a study from a reputable American source (e.g. Department of Defense study, DARPA, Jane's, major American newspaper, think tank (e.g. Brookings Institution, RAND, etc.), Jamestown Foundation, major American defense contractor (e.g. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, etc.), Naval War College, or any other mainstream reputable organization) that discusses the alleged problem identified by professor Ding?

Quite frankly, I have never heard of this "actuator" problem. I will share what I do know. The United States forced the Soviet Union to the negotiating table because of the introduction in 1983 (e.g. almost 30 years ago) of Pershing II MARV technology.

It is a great puzzle to me that a Pershing II MARVed warhead can be steered in 1983 to its target, but an ASBM MARV warhead in 2010 cannot be steered. Once again, I will assert that professor Ding is alone in his idiosyncratic claim.

http://www.harpoondatabases.com/encyclopedia/Entry1694.aspx

(US Army photo)

"MGM-31C Pershing II

(United States)

Notes:
...
Compared to MGM-31A, MGM-31C was externally similar but had two sets of delta fins. The nose section was a single-warhead MARV (maneuverable re-entry vehicle) consisting of the Goodyear radar seeker, the inertial guidance unit, and the warhead on top of a steering vane package.

Pershing II was launched from a M-790 flatbed trailer towed by a M-1001 prime mover. This had a max speed of 40mph and a road range of 450 miles. (To save money, only enough M-1001’s were bought for active units in Europe, stateside training units used existing HEMTT prime movers.) It was guided inertially through most of the flight. After atmospheric re-entry, the RADAG (Radar Digital Area Guidance) system took over. This took four successively-closer radar “snapshots” of the target as the MARV descended, giving the guidance computer a 128 square-pixel portrait to home on. In the event RADAG was jammed or failed, the Pershing II continued on inertial guidance. The warhead could be set for impact or airburst. The first and second rocket stages, essentially identical, were of a new design that used Kevlar and hybrid-alloy materials. Steering was by vanes in the exhaust in the atmosphere and a reactive system above it. The first stage separated at 1/3rd of the apogee altitude.
...
The first test flight was on 18 November 1977. The missile was declared fully operational in 1983 and in April 1984 deployment to West Germany began. By the summer of 1985, Pershing II had completely replaced Pershing I in operational European units. The following units operated MGM-31C in Europe:
..."

MGM-31 Pershing - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Pershing II
...
Service history

In service 1983–1991
Used by USA (United States Army)

Engine Hercules, two-stage, solid propellant

Operational
range 1,770 kilometres (1,100 mi)

Speed Mach 8+

Guidance
system Singer Kearfott Inertial and Goodyear Aerospace active radar

Steering
system vector control system (steerable nozzle), air fins

Accuracy 30 metres (100 ft) circular error probable (restrictions apply)

Launch
platform M1003 erector launcher

Transport M1001 MAN tractor in Germany; M983 HEMTT in the U.S."

 

[Martian2]

As far as I understood your article, the manoeuvering on Pershing was for adjusting the vehicle after re-entry to be able to much more accurately target a structure, or any other relatively stationary target. The problem with an ASBM is that it would not only have to adjust it's projectory after re-entry to more accurately line itself up with the original target, but it would also have to change it according to the continuing movements of the carrier (if this was the target), which would be steaming ahead at full speed (given this is out in the open sea), and possibly try to move irradically (if it knew it risked being struck by an ASBM).

I take it that you couldn't find a study from a mainstream American source on an "actuator" problem?

Let's go through the sequence of events:

1) MARV warhead is homing in on its target.

2) "Active radar terminal-guidance" locks onto target.

3) MARV warhead impacts with "pinpoint accuracy."

Maneuverable reentry vehicle - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"The maneuverable reentry vehicle (abbreviated MARV or MaRV) is a type of nuclear warhead capable of shifting targets in flight. Refer to atmospheric reentry.

There are several types, of which examples include:

* the version designed for the Trident missile, which had to be able to evade Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems.

* the active radar terminal-guidance version with pinpoint accuracy for the MGM-31C Pershing II missile

* B-611

* DF-15

* the high hypersonic land-based anti-ship ballistic missile variant of the DF-21

* DF-31

* DF-41

* JL-2

* the warheads used by the Topol-M missile which are designed to defeat any US ABM systems."

 

[Martian2]

Active radar homing - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Active radar homing is a missile guidance method in which a guided missile contains a radar transceiver and the electronics necessary for it to find and track its target autonomously. NATO brevity code for an active radar homing missile launch is Fox Three.

Advantages

There are two major advantages to active radar homing:

* Because the missile is tracking the target, and the missile is typically going to be much closer to the target than the launching platform during the terminal phase, the tracking can be much more accurate and also have better resistance to ECM. Active radar homing missiles have some of the best kill probabilities, along with missiles employing track-via-missile guidance.

* Because the missile is totally autonomous during the terminal phase, the launch platform does not need to have its radar enabled at all during this phase, and in the case of a mobile launching platform like an aircraft, can actually exit the scene or undertake other actions while the missile homes in on its target. This is often referred to as fire-and-forget capability and is a great advantage that modern air-to-air missiles have over their predecessors.

Disadvantages

There are two major disadvantages to active radar homing:

* Since the missile has to contain an entire radar transceiver and electronics, it was until recently difficult to fit all of this into a missile without unacceptably increasing its size and weight. Even with today's miniaturisation making this possible, it is quite expensive to make these missiles since the sophisticated electronics within the missile are inevitably destroyed upon impact.

* There is very little chance that targets with any sort of decent radar warning receiver would be unaware that an incoming missile is approaching them. This gives them sufficient time to take evasive action and deploy countermeasures. However, given the accuracy of this homing method, unless the target is especially maneuverable or the missile is not, there may not be much they can do to avoid being intercepted.

* These types of missiles with this mounted equipment are only effective in long range confrontations."