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China will deploy a national missile defense system in 2020

They are getting mixed up about ABM capability. They think that they and the US are the only ones having ABM systems because they employ terminal interception. Terminal interception is now becoming more obsolete while midcourse interception is a more advanced and much more effective method.

Future ABM systems will definitely use midcourse interception.

Actually, mid course interception has its problems. Check out the result of a the US mid course interception program. The US is now focusing also on the boost phase. I believe this is the future of ballistic missile defense.

I have to agree with you that terminal phase is become economically feasible as its cheaper to deploy MIRV than interceptors. Without MIRV, terminal phase make sense. but it does not make economic sense when MIRV's are deployed.
 
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Actually, mid course interception has its problems. Check out the result of a the US mid course interception program. The US is now focusing also on the boost phase. I believe this is the future of ballistic missile defense.

I have to agree with you that terminal phase is become economically feasible as its cheaper to deploy MIRV than interceptors. Without MIRV, terminal phase make sense. but it does not make economic sense when MIRV's are deployed.
We need to look at this issue from a more philosophical perspective.

Which is easier? To defend against attacks by meeting the enemy at home soil? Or to foil a method of attack at its source?

Perhaps the question should be framed from a financial perspective....

Which is less costly? To defend against attacks by meeting the enemy at home soil? Or to foil a method of attack at its source?

To thwart an attack at its source mean we need to confront said attack on enemy territory, which in turn demand that we have a presence at least near enemy territory, if not ON enemy territory. The latter is not feasible since no nation would allow a hostile military force on its territory. That leave persistence presence near a potential adversary the next best option. But not everyone can afford to deploy and support a persistence expeditionary force away from home territory.

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Terminal defense is the financially viable option for the majority of the world's countries. Basically, the enemy is already 'here' and we have to meet him.

To meet the enemy at the 'mid-course' segment mean we have to deploy forces outside our sovereignty. This mean a larger military force and a greater financial burden.

To meet the enemy at the 'boost' phase mean we have to deploy forces, not merely outside our sovereignty but right outside the enemy's sovereignty. This mean an even larger military force and greater financial burden.

Not every country can afford to deploy, long term or else, military forces away from home territory just to watch a potential adversary.
 
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We need to look at this issue from a more philosophical perspective.

Which is easier? To defend against attacks by meeting the enemy at home soil? Or to foil a method of attack at its source?

Perhaps the question should be framed from a financial perspective....

Which is less costly? To defend against attacks by meeting the enemy at home soil? Or to foil a method of attack at its source?

To thwart an attack at its source mean we need to confront said attack on enemy territory, which in turn demand that we have a presence at least near enemy territory, if not ON enemy territory. The latter is not feasible since no nation would allow a hostile military force on its territory. That leave persistence presence near a potential adversary the next best option. But not everyone can afford to deploy and support a persistence expeditionary force away from home territory.


Terminal defense is the financially viable option for the majority of the world's countries. Basically, the enemy is already 'here' and we have to meet him.

To meet the enemy at the 'mid-course' segment mean we have to deploy forces outside our sovereignty. This mean a larger military force and a greater financial burden.

To meet the enemy at the 'boost' phase mean we have to deploy forces, not merely outside our sovereignty but right outside the enemy's sovereignty. This mean an even larger military force and greater financial burden.

Not every country can afford to deploy, long term or else, military forces away from home territory just to watch a potential adversary.

I believe the cost of placing forward bases are just one factor. Another factor is geopolitical realities. Lets do a theoretical comparison of US and China and their ability to deploy boost phase missile interceptor. Lets move the time line down 20 years to year 2030 and that China equals US in GDP ,which is likely given the currently trend. Lets give China a technology boost so that they have similar ability to intercept missiles at boost phase as the US. But because of the geography and politics, China would have slim to little chance of knocking off a missile from Montana or the Dakotas while the US forces in Asia Pacific has a much greater ability to knock off a missile firing off in China.

The reason is because the US has existing presence in Asia and the Pacific Ocean is pretty much an American Lake. It would be less costly for US to deploy necessary asset to destroy a Chinese missile than the other way around. So the US presence in Asia Pacific will make China much more difficult to counter the US. Even if China start to exceed US in economy and become much wealthier, the odds for PLAAF to patrol the US west coast and shoot down a missile is still slim to none.
 
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I believe the cost of placing forward bases are just one factor. Another factor is geopolitical realities. Lets do a theoretical comparison of US and China and their ability to deploy boost phase missile interceptor. Lets move the time line down 20 years to year 2030 and that China equals US in GDP ,which is likely given the currently trend. Lets give China a technology boost so that they have similar ability to intercept missiles at boost phase as the US. But because of the geography and politics, China would have slim to little chance of knocking off a missile from Montana or the Dakotas while the US forces in Asia Pacific has a much greater ability to knock off a missile firing off in China.

The reason is because the US has existing presence in Asia and the Pacific Ocean is pretty much an American Lake. It would be less costly for US to deploy necessary asset to destroy a Chinese missile than the other way around. So the US presence in Asia Pacific will make China much more difficult to counter the US. Even if China start to exceed US in economy and become much wealthier, the odds for PLAAF to patrol the US west coast and shoot down a missile is still slim to none.
China's allies in the Americas -- if any -- can offset some of China's cost in maintaining a persistence Chinese presence to keep watch on the US. The point is still the same, though, that for the most part, terminal phase defense is the only viable option for most countries. That is the future of missile defense. Even for those who are financially capable of projecting and maintaining expeditionary forces, terminal phase defense will still be an important element for home soil defense.
 
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Actually, mid course interception has its problems. Check out the result of a the US mid course interception program. The US is now focusing also on the boost phase. I believe this is the future of ballistic missile defense.

I have to agree with you that terminal phase is become economically feasible as its cheaper to deploy MIRV than interceptors. Without MIRV, terminal phase make sense. but it does not make economic sense when MIRV's are deployed.

Every type of interception has its disadvantages, but midcourse interception targets the slowest and longest stage of ballistic missile. That puts its success rate much higher than the other types of interception. China is also developing an airborne laser similar to the YAL-1.

If you rely on terminal interception, you would have to take the risk that the enemy might use MaRVs or MIRVs. Once the enemy does, you are pretty much defenseless against them.
 
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Every type of interception has its disadvantages, but midcourse interception targets the slowest and longest stage of ballistic missile. That puts its success rate much higher than the other types of interception. China is also developing an airborne laser similar to the YAL-1.

If you rely on terminal interception, you would have to take the risk that the enemy might use MaRVs or MIRVs. Once the enemy does, you are pretty much defenseless against them.

Boost phase is the best time to intercept ICBM's.:coffee:
 
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