That what I've been tried to tell you, even a superpower with so many sticks didn't deter China navy expension such cliam the SCS and ADIZ, what make you think that India can do better? they can come with B-52 any time they want that don't deter us to to back down with our ADIZ claim and american civilans planes already comply with China's ADIZ law, so you tell me if this is consider to hide our tail between the legs? or if we just swinging the tail on american's face.
Your Chahbahar is just a joke, you need to load-unload-load the merchandise before reaching the destination, the downtime and cost will make your product non- competitive compare a direct access via Pakistan. of course India has been denied so Chahbahar port is the desperated solution in order to acess to central Asia.
Indian Ocean is a curse to many nations trade road such Japan, Korea and south east Asian countries but not China because Indian navy and merchand ship are all within our DF-21D range, you will think twice to shut down our sea routes or any ships that anchor in your seaport will get the proportional retaliation, your finger snap is not loud enough to ring the alarm bell. As for Gwadar port, it's China's gate way to Middle East, and potential gaz pipeline link to Kashgar...for now it's not the main trade road compare to Indian ocean but this about to be changed when the transport link between China and Pakistan is well established.
Hell yeah it is.
1 week you all scream and shout all over the place an claim territories of others as your own an the next week 2 bombers show you your place and step all over Chinese rants.
SO yes that does look like China backing off with its tail between its leg.
Bullying civilian planes does zilch, when military planes are even now continuing to fly over the Senkakus; which has been the primary Chinese goal(military flight denial to US and Japan over SC sea), albeit failed miserably.
I'm sorry, but you are either in denial or you know nothing about current events.
After the Nov 24 INA signing the ease of trade access from Europe to the Indian Ocean is guaranteed thus making it a very cost effective transportation corridor. And unlike in the case of Pakistan we are not losing any money, the trade process continues alongside Iranian oil imports. After agreements signed by both India and Iran, India can pay 45% of its imports in Indian rupees which the Iranians can directly use to purchase Indian goods thus ease of access, and your point becomes moot.
And so what if its desperate its effective; unlike your desperate and ineffective string of pearls.
Both Iran and Pakistan have developed strategies to create strong economic and transport ties with Central Asia and beyond. Anchoring these strategies are two new seaports: Gwadar in Pakistan and Chabahar in Iran. Spreading out from these ports are existing or planned transportation infrastructure that leads into their respective country’s economic center and importantly for Central Asia, northwards. Both ports are well towards becoming fully operable and are offering generous incentives for companies and governments to do business in their ports. However, serious political, economic and logistical problems remain. For Central Asia one of these two ports, or indeed both, will likely become important links to world markets.
Tip: look way down into the bottom left-hand corner to see the ports.
The problems with Karachi and Bandar Abbas
Karachi is already overburdened with severe congestion from commercial, fishing and military shipping. And from a strategic vantage point it is quite problematic. The Indian Navy targeted the port in 1971 and any blockade in the future would devastate Pakistan since that country has an overreliance on the port of Karachi. The port of Qasim, built in the 1970s was to relive some of that burden and the port of Gwadar is expected to further reduce the reliance on Karachi.
Bandar Abbas is of enormous strategic significance to Iran as it is located on the Strait of Hormuz leading into the Persian Gulf. But that is also a problem for Iran. The area is already burdened with high traffic and of course, the U.S. Navy. Iran wishes to have another port that is more conducive to trade and further growth.
Gwadar
Gwadar, being much further away from India than Karachi, makes obvious strategic sense. But it is its commercial potential that will provide the most benefits. Gwadar is not some long-term project. Its first phase, with 75% of the costs covered by the Chinese government, is already completed. The existing docks, built by the Chinese Harbor Engineering Company, are now being operated by Port of Singapore. Port of Singapore won the contract over Dubai Ports World, the company that was forced out of America by opportunistic xenophobes in both political parties there. Phase two will be completed by 2010, adding even more capacity. Ziad Haider, a researcher at the South Asia Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center, noted that Pakistan can make the project succeed if it maintains the financial and political support of China for the project and if it makes some concessions to the Baluchis near Gwadar, who have already carried out deadly attacks on Chinese engineers.
The problem with Gwadar, wrote Ammad Hassan in his thesis for the US Naval Postgraduate School, is that while the port has been built, “the supporting infrastructure of railroad link, industrial capacity, and civic structures at Gwadar is almost non-existent.” And of course, all analysts mention Pakistan’s extremely problematic relations with the ethnic Baluch in the area who, in addition to having been in a low-grade insurgency for some time, are not at all supportive of the port. And to understate another issue, southern Afghanistan is not quite ready to be a reliable transport corridor for Pakistan to access Central Asia, despite the Afghan government’s voiced support for the project. Nevertheless, the idea of further integrating Central Asian and Russian resources southward with the Asian and Middle Eastern market has others optimistic about the long-term prospects. The Asian Development Bank is somewhat cautious though, noting that initially the port will be significant only to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
Chabahar
Gwadar’s competition for trade and transport will come from Chabahar, the new Indian-financed port in Iran. A port outside of the Persian Gulf makes sense from a strategic and logistical viewpoint for Iran. The port of Chabahar was part of a plan to develop transportation infrastructure in Iran’s east for many years. Initially put in hold in 1984 it was revived in 2002 with Indian help. And the financing and engineering assistance from India is not limited to the port. India, wishing to bypass Pakistan, is also cooperating on a highway system that leads from the port into Afghanistan as well as a planned railroad to Afghanistan. Iranian officials state that they wish to have Bandar Abbas remain as the port for Russian and European trade and have Chabahar become the port for trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran already has good relations with everybody along the route leading north (including the local “warlords”) into Tajikistan. And significantly, it is in Tajikistan where Iran has already been financing several transport projects including the Anzob tunnel. And luckily for the Iranians, the U.S. constructed a bridge over the Amu Darya that fits in nicely with the Chabahar to Khojent route.
Prospects for economic integration of Central Asia with the South
For energy and mineral resources to be sent south from Central Asia a much more expensive transport infrastructure will be required than what is being built at the moment. Another limitation is the lack of a business friendly environment in most Central Asian states. And consumer goods are already entering Central Asia from Russia and China. What more is there a demand for? Furthermore, many Central Asian leaders are obsessed over local issues and haven’t been overly enthusiastic about regional integration (with Uzbekistan being the worst offender).
What is a long-term prospect is Central Asia being a transport route from the ports to Xinjiang, Russia and Kazakhstan, all of them important markets. The routes to Gwadar and Chabahar cut off thousands of kilometers for certain trade routes.
Strategic considerations
Any transportation or military problems in the Straits of Malacca, the Straits of Hormuz, the Suez or anywhere along Asia’s southern coastline will further boost the importance of Central Asia as a transport and trade corridor. Beyond Pakistan and Iran, both China and India are seeking closer relations with Afghanistan and Central Asia. The planned transport and trade routes will have the obvious effect of building solid ties. Iran’s considerations are boosting trade, having secure borders, and avoiding “encirclement” by American proxies (no matter how much a figment of the Iranian government’s imagination). As for Pakistan, the governments there has hoped for better relations with Central Asia. However, their Afghanistan policy always got in the way. Now they hope to move away from that era.
Conclusion
The countries of Central Asia will likely benefit from both Chabahar and Gwadar. Diversifying its import and export routes is a logical economic and political step. Although one should not exaggerate the economic benefits to be reaped. As for the competition between the two ports, it will not be a “winner take all” outcome but rather one port earning the greater share of trade. And the “winner” in this respect will likely be Chabahar, at least in the short term. Iran is more stable than Pakistan, it has better relations with Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, and unlike the Gwadar route its proposed route goes through relatively stable parts of Afghanistan. As long as Iran avoids outright conflict with the United States or any sort of domestic turmoil it should come out of this competition with an advantage.
BS again I had proved you wrong on that other thread but you seem to parrot the same thing over and over again, I guess you go by Hitler's principle of 'repeat the lie over and over again and it'll be perceived as truth', not here pal.
DF-21's range is not enough from Chinese mainland or from Tibet to reach anywhere near the Indian Ocean.
But lets say China does create a higher ranged DF-21, to pin point that crude low maneuverable pseudo ballistic missile in a vast ocean is practically not feasible at all, but the remains moot since DF-21 range is still not enough.
Heck what will you all do when a submarine group threatens your ships?
Can you shoot that too with DF-21s?
"when the transport link between China and Pakistan is well established", LOL good luck with that?
I don't see it happening anytime sooner, not coz of China's inability but coz of Pakistan's ineptitude.
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People please keep it civil.