China’s Quietly Sinks New Delhi’s Influence in the Indian Ocean

[haidian]

China’s Quietly Sinks New Delhi’s Influence in the Indian Ocean
By HARSH V. PANT / ASIA SENTINEL| January 12, 2013 |

A quiet Chinese challenge to India’s pre-eminence in South Asia through diplomatic and aid effort has now been extended to small island nations dotting the Indian Ocean.

While China, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian nations fight over specks of islands and reefs in East and South China Sea, mainly because of undersea resources, islands in the Indian Ocean are emerging as a new focus for struggle.

The latest hotly contested arena: Maldives, a chain of 26 islands about 1,000 kilometers due south of India. With just 320,000 nationals, Maldives has assumed a disproportionately large profile primarily because of its geopolitical position astride strategic sea lines of communication and China’s attempt to win influence.

The rivalry was brought to light when Maldives canceled a lucrative contract granted to Indian and Malaysia companies amid speculation that a Chinese company was behind the move, although the reality could be more prosaic.

In November, the Maldivian government unilaterally terminated an agreement with India’s GMR Infrastructure, Ltd., and Malaysia Airports Holdings Berhad to operate and modernize Ibrahim Nasir International Airport in Male, citing irregularities in the award of the US$511 million contract.

The two firms were jointly awarded the 25-year contract in 2010. The largest Indian foreign direct investment in Maldives had huge symbolic importance for India’s profile in the atoll nation.

GMR took the battle all the way to the Singapore Supreme Court, which ruled that Maldives indeed had the power to take control of the airport. GMR intends to seek compensation of more than $800 million from the Maldivian government for terminating the deal, whereas the Maldives is insisting on a forensic audit from an international firm.

Many in India had expected New Delhi to escalate the conflict, by declining to release annual budgetary support of $25 million, forcefully reminding the Maldives about its security dependence on India.

Ignoring such calls, the Indian government has been quick to convey to Maldives that, if there were political reasons for the contract’s cancellation, these “shouldn’t spill over into a very, very important relationship, a very valuable relationship” between the two states. Two days after the project’s cancellation, the Maldives defense minister flew to Beijing.

New Delhi recognizes the strategic importance of Maldives. Any escalation by India would have only fanned anti-India sentiments in the island nation, allowing other powers, especially China, to further entrench themselves at India’s expense.

India refused to take sides when Nasheed, the first democratically elected president of Maldives, was ousted from power in February 2012 and immediately reached out to the new President Mohamed Waheed, assuring him of continuing cooperation. The reason is simple: India simply cannot afford to alienate the Maldive government given China’s growing reach.

The president of Maldives was in China in October when Beijing announced a $500 million package of economic assistance.

India had always viewed Maldives as important for maintaining security in the Indian Ocean region, but attempts by Beijing to expand its footprint in Maldives and the region have raised the stakes for New Delhi. China has also been busy forging special ties with other island nations on India’s periphery including Sri Lanka, Seychelles and Mauritius.

China’s attempt to gain a foothold in the Indian Ocean came into stark relief last year when reports emerged of an offer from Seychelles—another strategically located island nation in the Indian Ocean—to China for a base to provide relief and resupply facilities to the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

Though promptly denied by Beijing, the offer underscored the changing balance of power in the region. India has traditionally been the main defense provider for Seychelles – providing armaments and training to its Peoples’ Defence Forces (SPDF).

China has been proactive in courting Seychelles since former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to the island nation in 2007. Much to India’s consternation, Beijing now participates in training SPDF and provides military hardware. China has expanded military cooperation with Seychelles, providing two Y-2 turboprop aircrafts for surveillance of the economic exclusion zone.

The Chinese defense minister was also in Sri Lanka in October to offer support worth $100 million for various welfare projects in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, areas beset with Tamil insurgency. At a time when domestic political constraints have made it difficult for New Delhi to reach out to Colombo, Beijing has been quick to fill that vacuum.

Even Mauritius, the security of which is virtually guaranteed by Indian naval presence, can’t resist the lure of Beijing funds.

With the rise in the military capabilities of China and India, the two are increasingly rubbing against each other; China expands its presence in the Indian Ocean region and India makes its presence felt in East and Southeast Asia.

In this context, Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid recently suggested that India must accept “the new reality” of China’s presence in areas it considers exclusive, seeming acknowledgement that both the South Asian and Indian Ocean regions are rapidly being shaped by the Chinese presence.

China’s rising profile in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region isn’t news. What’s significant is the diminishing role of India and the rapidity with which New Delhi has ceded strategic space to Beijing in regions traditionally considered India’s periphery.

This quiet assertion of China has allowed various smaller countries to play China off against India. Most states in the region now use the China card to balance against India’s predominance. Forced to exist between two giant neighbors, the smaller states have responded with a careful balancing act. The recent spat between New Delhi and the Maldives merely reflects the evolving ground realities in the Indian Ocean region.

(Harsh V. Pant teaches in King’s College, London)

 

[Kompromat]

'Fight the enemy where they ain't': Sun Tzu, The Art Of War

 

[Protocol man]

Well done CPC!
We need to deepen our relationship with all South Asian nations.

 

[Srinivas]

'Fight the enemy where they ain't': Sun Tzu, The Art Of War

It is chanakya's diplomacy. When you want to make any country your friend, first you smoke out the evil networks in that country and then you establish your relationship, This is what is happening in Indian ocean.

Regarding the defense agreement with Maldivian govt. It opened the doors for India to enter into agreements with Vietnam,Phillipines,Japan, South Korea and Singapore.

 

[haidian]

the competition eventually boils down to the economy strength,money talks in most cases,India's economy is just a fraction of China's,that makes it almost impossible to exercise influence over international issues.

 

[JSCh]

This article is written by a delusional egomaniac Indian.
"Two days after the project’s cancellation, the Maldives defense minister flew to Beijing."
That prove that Beijing is complicit in the matter?
Seychelles offered a base to Beijing, which so far is not accepted. Seychelles has military relationship with lots of country, why pick on China?
And it is really strange that when Indian speak of India Ocean Region, they always avoid mentioning the elephant in the room -- The US Navy.
I do not understand why Indian has this mentality that these small countries' diplomatic or military relationship with India needs to be exclusive.
Don't they have the right to decide what is best for them?
And who say that international relationship have to be mutually exclusive? If you are not with me, you are against me?
Because "the security of which is virtually guaranteed by Indian naval presence"? Whether they like it or not?
And this is the country where their countrymen keep repeating the accusation of bullying against China?

 

[Srinivas]

the competition eventually boils down to the economy strength,money talks in most cases,India's economy is just a fraction of China's,that makes it almost impossible to exercise influence over international issues.

In Indian ocean it is about proximity not money and you will discover this in the near future.

 

[HongWu]

India is surrounded, isolated and Maoists are rising. So it attacked Pakistan in Kashmir.

 

[haidian]

In Indian ocean it is about proximity not money and you will discover this in the near future.

actually the more we are involved in Indian ocean,the more of the opposite of what you claimed we find.

 

[Mian H Amin.]

i think Pakistan have invested enough in army , now we must focus on our navy ... which is far way behind

i think Pakistan have invested enough in army , now we must focus on our navy ... which is far way behind

 

[Protocol man]

i think Pakistan have invested enough in army , now we must focus on our navy ... which is far way behind

i think Pakistan have invested enough in army , now we must focus on our navy ... which is far way behind

India is totally surrounded. They have nowhere to run. China is arming all of India's neighbours.
India brought this upon themselves, trying to bully it's neighbours.
China will form a massive alliance between all India's neighbours.

 

[Reashot Xigwin]

Don't say I didn't warn you

Sri Lanka Defends China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean
December 28, 2012 • From theTrumpet.com
Sri Lanka’s transformation from British colony to Chinese pearl highlights the declining influence of America and Britain in the Indian Ocean.
By Andrew Miiller

As the United States grows increasingly concerned about the role of the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lankan Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa is supporting China’s role in the region.

Addressing a gathering of naval delegations from 28 countries at the annual maritime conference in the southern city of Galle on December 13, Rajapaksa insisted that multimillion-dollar funding from China to Sri Lankan ports was purely a commercial interest.

“China has an industry-intensive economy that requires oil imports amounting to more than 200 million tons every year,” he stated. “Most of these oil imports are sourced from the Middle East, and then transported through the Indian Ocean to China. It is obvious that the safety and stability of the Indian Ocean is critical for China’s energy security, and its increasing interest and increasing naval presence in this region is quite understandable.”

China has already invested $360 million into expanding Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port and loaned millions more for other infrastructure projects.

It only takes a quick glance at a world map to see that the Indian Ocean is a vitally strategic pathway for maritime trade. This massive body of water connects four of the great raw-material-producing regions of the world—East Africa, Australia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East—with the power blocs that are the hungriest for those resources—China, Japan and the European Union.

More than 80 percent of the world’s seaborne hydrocarbon trade transits through Indian Ocean choke points.

Right in the midst of the Indian Ocean’s crisscrossing shipping lanes is the strategic island of Sri Lanka, which has one of the fines,t ports in the world, Trincomalee. Great Britain seized control of Trincomalee from the Netherlands in 1795, fearing that the Dutch alliance with the French would give the French Empire control of Indian Ocean trade routes. For the next 152 years, Britain’s control over Sri Lanka ensured Anglo-Saxon trade access to Australia, India and the Orient.

During World War ii, the port of Trincomalee protected the British Seventh Fleet, and proved to be an invaluable asset after London lost the Singapore Naval Base to the Japanese in 1942.

This strategic gateway was completely lost by Britain after London relinquished control of Trincomalee air and naval bases to a newly independent Sri Lanka in 1957. The Sri Lankan government is now being courted by Chinese leaders, who would like to see the port of Trincomalee as a strategic asset in their “String of Pearls” strategy to control the Indian Ocean. This strategy is an attempt by China to control every major Indian Ocean port between Hong Kong and the Port of Sudan as a means of securing access to Middle Eastern oil.

Sri Lanka’s transformation from British colony to Chinese pearl highlights the declining influence of Britain in the Indian Ocean, putting both British and American trade interests in an extremely precarious position. Reference Ron Fraser’s column “The Great Sea Gate Contest” for more-in-depth analysis. ▪