ChinaToday
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 31, 2011
- Messages
- 4,557
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
As the world marks the 10th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the question on most peoples minds is: how has 9/11 changed the world?
To Americans, the answer is easy: 9/11 has changed everything. But people outside the United States will beg to differ. 9/11 has definitely changed the United States it has become a more inward-looking country, obsessively focused on its security, politically polarised and militarily and fiscally overextended. The world outside the United States, to be sure, has also greatly changed. Some of the changes, such as the rise of major emerging-market countries (India and Brazil being the best examples), the decline of Europe and the continuing stagnation of Japan, have nothing to do with 9/11. Other momentous events the American invasion of Iraq and the decade-long war in Afghanistan were direct results of 9/11.
More ambiguous is the remarkable rise of China in the past decade. How did 9/11 affect Chinas rise?
Before we answer this intriguing question, we must first take a look at the extent of Chinas gains in economic power and military capabilities since 9/11.
In 2001, the Chinese GDP was $1.16 trillion based on the exchange rate at that time; by 2010, it had expanded four times to $6.04 trillion (using current exchange rate). In the same decade, Chinese foreign trade grew six times, from $500 billion to $3 trillion. Its foreign exchange reserves rose from $212 billion in 2001 to $3.2 trillion in July 2011. Rising wealth enabled China to boost its military spending four-fold. The official defence budget increased from $17 billion in 2001 to $78 billion in 2010. (Real military expenditures are much higher.)
Needless to say, such rapid economic advance has dramatically closed the gap between China and the United States. In 2001, the size of the Chinese GDP was roughly one-tenth of the American GDP. In 2010, it was about 45 per cent (based on exchange rate). In 2001, Washingtons coffers were bulging with budgetary surpluses. By 2010, the United States was running deficits equal to 10 per cent of GDP. Not coincidentally, the past decade saw China becoming Americas largest creditor. In 2001, Beijing held about $160 billion in US Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities. By the end of 2010, Chinese holdings ballooned to close to $2 trillion.
Of course, the Chinese themselves would be indignant about the mere suggestion that China has been a beneficiary of 9/11. They would argue that it was their hard work, not Americas tragedy, that has made the Chinese economic miracle. To a large extent, they are undoubtedly right. Beijings single-minded focus on economic growth, the dynamism and entrepreneurship of the Chinese people and the growing capabilities of Chinese firms have been the driving force behind Chinas stunning economic rise in the last decade.
But could China have gained so much economically without an extremely benign external environment since 9/11?
The answer is definitely no.
What 9/11 did was to reset Washingtons strategic priority in a radical direction. Prior to 9/11, the neo-conservative hawks in the Bush administration, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, identified China as Americas most serious national security threat and were pushing for a containment strategy against Beijing. Indeed, the first eight months of the Bush administration saw a rapid deterioration in US-China ties. Then 9/11 intervened, and Americas attention was diverted to fighting terrorism. Washingtons war on terror, however, would have had only a limited and perhaps short-lived impact on changing Chinas strategic environment. In retrospect, it was the ill-fated invasion of Iraq, which completely consumed Americas energy and preoccupied its military (not to mention the $1 trillion in war-related spending), that provided China the benign security environment it needed to focus on economic development.
At the same time, Beijing adroitly adapted to the post-9/11 international environment by following a pragmatic foreign policy that sought to maintain a stable relationship with the United States while pursuing its long-term strategic goals slowly but surely. In the ensuing decade, Beijing carefully avoided stepping on Washingtons toes and watched, with enormous relief, as the Bush administration dug itself into an ever-deeper hole in Iraq. With a freer hand, China also adjusted its Taiwan policy and managed to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Straits dramatically. It has made significant economic inroads in Africa and Latin America. In East Asia, the perception that China represents the power of the future has taken hold among the regions elites.
When historians look back at this period, few of them would disagree that it was Chinas golden decade.
Alas, good times do not last. For China, the rare strategic opportunities created by 9/11 are fast fading. In Washington, a different president is in office and busy rectifying the costly mistakes made by his predecessor. Given Americas difficult fight in Afghanistan and economic woes at home, it will take some time for Washington to fully regain its strategic initiative and dispel the perception, particularly strong among the elite circles in Beijing, that it is in irreversible decline. In East Asia, Chinas recent assertiveness over territorial disputes and pusillanimous stance towards its trouble-making client state North Korea have squandered the goodwill it has worked hard to earn from its neighbours. Chinas stumble allowed the United States to reassert its influence in East Asia effortlessly. By positioning itself as a strategic balancer against an assertive China, the United States is being welcomed with open arms, from Tokyo to Hanoi.
We are not saying that China and America are again on a collision course. Mostly likely they are not for the immediate future at least. But one thing is certain: China will miss the benign external environment created by 9/11 that has contributed so enormously to its economic rise.
Chinas golden decade - Indian Express
To Americans, the answer is easy: 9/11 has changed everything. But people outside the United States will beg to differ. 9/11 has definitely changed the United States it has become a more inward-looking country, obsessively focused on its security, politically polarised and militarily and fiscally overextended. The world outside the United States, to be sure, has also greatly changed. Some of the changes, such as the rise of major emerging-market countries (India and Brazil being the best examples), the decline of Europe and the continuing stagnation of Japan, have nothing to do with 9/11. Other momentous events the American invasion of Iraq and the decade-long war in Afghanistan were direct results of 9/11.
More ambiguous is the remarkable rise of China in the past decade. How did 9/11 affect Chinas rise?
Before we answer this intriguing question, we must first take a look at the extent of Chinas gains in economic power and military capabilities since 9/11.
In 2001, the Chinese GDP was $1.16 trillion based on the exchange rate at that time; by 2010, it had expanded four times to $6.04 trillion (using current exchange rate). In the same decade, Chinese foreign trade grew six times, from $500 billion to $3 trillion. Its foreign exchange reserves rose from $212 billion in 2001 to $3.2 trillion in July 2011. Rising wealth enabled China to boost its military spending four-fold. The official defence budget increased from $17 billion in 2001 to $78 billion in 2010. (Real military expenditures are much higher.)
Needless to say, such rapid economic advance has dramatically closed the gap between China and the United States. In 2001, the size of the Chinese GDP was roughly one-tenth of the American GDP. In 2010, it was about 45 per cent (based on exchange rate). In 2001, Washingtons coffers were bulging with budgetary surpluses. By 2010, the United States was running deficits equal to 10 per cent of GDP. Not coincidentally, the past decade saw China becoming Americas largest creditor. In 2001, Beijing held about $160 billion in US Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities. By the end of 2010, Chinese holdings ballooned to close to $2 trillion.
Of course, the Chinese themselves would be indignant about the mere suggestion that China has been a beneficiary of 9/11. They would argue that it was their hard work, not Americas tragedy, that has made the Chinese economic miracle. To a large extent, they are undoubtedly right. Beijings single-minded focus on economic growth, the dynamism and entrepreneurship of the Chinese people and the growing capabilities of Chinese firms have been the driving force behind Chinas stunning economic rise in the last decade.
But could China have gained so much economically without an extremely benign external environment since 9/11?
The answer is definitely no.
What 9/11 did was to reset Washingtons strategic priority in a radical direction. Prior to 9/11, the neo-conservative hawks in the Bush administration, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, identified China as Americas most serious national security threat and were pushing for a containment strategy against Beijing. Indeed, the first eight months of the Bush administration saw a rapid deterioration in US-China ties. Then 9/11 intervened, and Americas attention was diverted to fighting terrorism. Washingtons war on terror, however, would have had only a limited and perhaps short-lived impact on changing Chinas strategic environment. In retrospect, it was the ill-fated invasion of Iraq, which completely consumed Americas energy and preoccupied its military (not to mention the $1 trillion in war-related spending), that provided China the benign security environment it needed to focus on economic development.
At the same time, Beijing adroitly adapted to the post-9/11 international environment by following a pragmatic foreign policy that sought to maintain a stable relationship with the United States while pursuing its long-term strategic goals slowly but surely. In the ensuing decade, Beijing carefully avoided stepping on Washingtons toes and watched, with enormous relief, as the Bush administration dug itself into an ever-deeper hole in Iraq. With a freer hand, China also adjusted its Taiwan policy and managed to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Straits dramatically. It has made significant economic inroads in Africa and Latin America. In East Asia, the perception that China represents the power of the future has taken hold among the regions elites.
When historians look back at this period, few of them would disagree that it was Chinas golden decade.
Alas, good times do not last. For China, the rare strategic opportunities created by 9/11 are fast fading. In Washington, a different president is in office and busy rectifying the costly mistakes made by his predecessor. Given Americas difficult fight in Afghanistan and economic woes at home, it will take some time for Washington to fully regain its strategic initiative and dispel the perception, particularly strong among the elite circles in Beijing, that it is in irreversible decline. In East Asia, Chinas recent assertiveness over territorial disputes and pusillanimous stance towards its trouble-making client state North Korea have squandered the goodwill it has worked hard to earn from its neighbours. Chinas stumble allowed the United States to reassert its influence in East Asia effortlessly. By positioning itself as a strategic balancer against an assertive China, the United States is being welcomed with open arms, from Tokyo to Hanoi.
We are not saying that China and America are again on a collision course. Mostly likely they are not for the immediate future at least. But one thing is certain: China will miss the benign external environment created by 9/11 that has contributed so enormously to its economic rise.
Chinas golden decade - Indian Express
