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China-Pakistan : The End of the All-Weather Friendship?

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It is much deeper than that.

India is an irrelevant country, that has yet to beat even sub-Saharan Africa in terms of social indicators like poverty or starvation.

The alliance between China and Pakistan is much deeper than just having common enemies. Just like the ancient Silk Road, Pakistan is our link to the resource-rich Islamic world and the geopolitical pivot of Asia.

if india is so irrelevent why reply,why attack india in 1962,why as indian govt representatives not to attend buddhist comference,etc
please answer
 
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if india is so irrelevent why reply,why attack india in 1962,why as indian govt representatives not to attend buddhist comference,etc
please answer

You hosted our separatist group in 1959, and tried to steal our land in 1962, which is why we smashed you to pieces.

Yet you are nothing more than an annoyance. But to be fair, you are quite good at annoying China+Pakistan. The problem is that you can't handle the response, and cry when China+Pakistan do anything in return to you.
 
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Indians as much as they hate to admit it are jealous of Sino-Pak Close Relations :china: :pakistan:

Mate we dont give a damn who your in love with, or who you will hop in bed with tomorrow and who you will backstab tomorrow. Good for China Pakistan :tup:
 
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Pakistan China Russia and Iran should come up with something like NATO.....a joint force...that can prevent uncle sam from waging war in our neighourhood......american are pretty clever....they wont wage a war in cuba or veneuzela.......they know the effects of war in their region will somehow affect them...so what they do is they find proxy war zones and then waste their taxpayers money there so that their senators can earn money..
 
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Then what is? The fabled Russo-Hindi Bhai Bhai one? I trust that India was extremely happy to pay the inflated price for the Gorky.



Don't need Pakistan to keep you in check. We have Aksai Chin as a buffer ;)



Policies can be changed and the U.S. will have to leave one day and their declining economy will not allow them to tank China or Russia's rise much longer. :azn:

Then what is? The fabled Russo-Hindi Bhai Bhai one? I trust that India was extremely happy to pay the inflated price for the Gorky.

of course,no body is freind of anybody.They have interst and u too have common interst.pakistan needs you and you need pakistan for routes and for india:azn:(you cant ignore it,you made them nuclear armed and it has been proved many times)
but now u.s will be there and so we will be thats why it will be neutralise:azn:

Don't need Pakistan to keep you in check. We have Aksai Chin as a buffer

you are over estimating your self again..you need them to divert indian attention towards china

Policies can be changed and the U.S. will have to leave one day and their declining economy will not allow them to tank China or Russia's rise much longer.

they have already mentioned that they are going to keep bases till decade more:azn: and to keep iran,pakistan +china in check..:lol:
be updated with latest news:azn: Mr bambam
 
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China never violated Pakistan's sovereignty and never killed Pakistani soldiers and never placed sanctions on Pakistan.

We all know what arrogant U.S. government did to Pakistan after they used us to tear down the SOviets.




By the way, we know our enemies hate this Pakistan-China friendship.

So keep getting angry, only your health will suffer :lol:





By the way who invited Americans in the sub continent ??????

thats what i say chinese is also using pakistan there is nothing called brother or freindship only the strategic need which has brought Pak and China closer.

and We are not jeolous and why should we be......
Its only a advise that wake up ! stand on your feet, why always looking for a shoulder.

A peace and Prosper Pakistan is more good for India than china.
 
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Not one of the "brother" brigade has been able to explain what was China doing during the worst Pakistani floods when millions were suffering.

Is that how you treat a brother?

The USA saved thousands of Pakistani lives and even India offered substantial help that could have gone much higher if there had been any reciprocation.

Sadly, it was a repeat of the Kashmir earthquake when Pakistan was more interested in replacing the labels of aid goods from India than anything else.
 
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China-Pakistan : The End of the All-Weather Friendship?

Evan A. Feigenbaum
December 4, 2011

China is often called an "all-weather friend" to Pakistan -- a strategic partner, a reliable source of trade and aid, and Islamabad's closest military ally. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has described the friendship between the two countries as "higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey." In September, he told the visiting Chinese Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, "Your friends are our friends," continuing, "your enemies are our enemies, and your security is our security."

But do things look so straightforward when viewed from Beijing? To be sure, Chinese money pours into places Western cash fears to tread. But Beijing is not oblivious to risk. In fact, Chinese money flows disproportionately to investments that carry little to no risk and deliver returns that, however modest, are predictable. Moreover, at least some Chinese companies have proved willing to abandon investments as their perception of risk has risen. In September, for example, Kingho, a large private Chinese miner, is reported to have abandoned a proposed $19 billion investment to build a coal mine and power and chemical plants in Pakistan's Sindh province after reassessing investment and security risks.

Indeed, Beijing's investment calculus is increasingly based on a sophisticated balancing of three types of risk: geopolitical, political, and financial.

Geopolitical risk (not least China's rivalry with India) has long led Beijing to support Islamabad through thick and thin.

Friendly ties between the two help satisfy four Chinese strategic objectives:

They ensure security and stability in China's western provinces and along its continental Asian border; anchor China's poorer western provinces in a web of cross-border economic activity; bottle up India in the subcontinent, forestalling the emergence of a continental-sized rival and precluding more extensive Indian security activities in East Asia; and assure that no other major power, particularly the United States, advances its interests in continental Asia at China's expense through, for instance, military deployments or permanent access arrangements.

Beijing aims to use Islamabad to box out New Delhi in Afghanistan and the broader region.


In recent years, these four objectives have become ever more pressing, reinforcing Beijing's inclination to support Pakistan. Take the issue of securing China's western border. The drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan will, unavoidably, prompt serious questions in Beijing about Kabul's capacity to maintain security. That, in turn, will prompt still larger questions about whether Pakistan and Central Asian governments can suppress extremist groups and ideologies that may emanate from Afghanistan's and Pakistan's tribal areas and bleed across the Chinese frontier.

Beijing also aims to use Islamabad to box out New Delhi in Afghanistan and the broader region. Thus, India's expanding reach into East Asia is no doubt reinforcing China's reflexive tilt toward Pakistan.

Until now, India has been, at most, a third-tier Chinese strategic concern -- distantly behind internal insecurity and challenges in the East Asian littoral. But India's rapid economic growth has given it a growing strategic profile beyond South Asia. India is becoming an Asian power and a global player. It is deepening defense ties with Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam, four countries that are wary of China's rise and also are increasingly close to the United States. And New Delhi has signed free trade agreements with South Korea, Singapore, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as a comprehensive economic partnership with Japan. As India's strategic reach expands, a continuing rivalry with Pakistan that preoccupies its diplomacy and pulls its attention back to its own neighborhood remains a net positive for Beijing.

Through this traditional geopolitical prism, then, Beijing's relationship with Islamabad appears unassailable. But Beijing no longer has the luxury of looking exclusively through this single lens. Increasingly, it also balances the political, and especially financial, risks to its interests.

Chinese nationals in Pakistan have come under unprecedented attack in recent years. And Beijing is ever more sensitive to protecting those citizens -- mostly engineers and other skilled workers -- abroad. Libya proved a watershed in this regard because of the scope and sheer scale of the Chinese presence there. The onset of violence yielded a robust debate in China about the state's responsibilities to its citizens overseas. Sensitive to domestic perceptions and pressures, Beijing undertook its largest ever noncombatant evacuation, removing some 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya by chartered merchant vessels, chartered and military aircraft, and overland buses. The Chinese navy also dispatched a frigate to support the operation, an unprecedented long-range operational deployment.

This means that Islamabad cannot forever presume that Chinese workers and money will stay in Pakistan if those assets come under attack on a larger scale. Beijing has shown little stomach for telling Islamabad to rein in anti-India insurgent groups that operate from Pakistan, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. But those groups that have killed or kidnapped Chinese nationals are another matter.

And China appears to have begun sorting and distinguishing these anti-India proxies from domestically focused groups, such as the Baloch separatists or pro-Taliban elements that could pose a more existential threat to Chinese interests. Balochistan has seen repeated attacks on Chinese nationals, including a 2004 bombing that killed three engineers working at the Gwadar port and a 2006 attack on a bus near Hub. In response to one kidnapping case, conducted by elements associated with the Lal Masjid in Islamabad, Beijing placed ferocious pressure on the Pakistan army to intervene.


But it is investment risks, not geopolitical or political ones, that are more likely to alter China's long-standing calculus in Pakistan. Chinese money generally follows the flag, yet global trends suggest that Beijing is becoming vastly more sensitive to investment constraints and macroeconomic conditions. It is often taken for granted that Chinese companies can bear more risk than their Western counterparts and that Beijing will underwrite the kinds of investments from which most other governments and firms would shy away. But as China's global reach has grown, so, too, has its economic incentive to revisit these practices.

There are, for example, intriguing parallels between China's conundrum in Pakistan and the problem it faces in Europe. In both cases, debt-laden economies have aggressively sought to attract a portion of Beijing's considerable stock of investment capital -- its $3 trillion pool of foreign exchange reserves. But Beijing is weighing such activities against the many problems it must now manage at home. Investment in such environments has grown more difficult to sell domestically. As one pithy post put it on Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter): "Better to save [debt-burdened] Wenzhou than to rescue [debt-burdened] Europe!" And when China does invest abroad, it is under enormous pressure to ensure a positive return.

So it matters more than ever that Pakistan faces an array of economic constraints, including a debt-to-GDP ratio that crossed 60 percent in 2010; painful debt service obligations to its creditors; a large fiscal deficit; double-digit inflation; a depreciating rupee; a trade deficit worsened by high global commodity prices; and above all, the lack of a credible growth strategy.

Chinese financiers will be increasingly skeptical of the returns on investment into such an economy. And here, too, domestic politics come into play. Most of China's population has been left out of the growth miracle of the reform era, and the resultant income and development gap is economically and politically unsustainable. To address the problem, Beijing has been trying to redistribute resources to less wealthy inland provinces that are increasingly important to political stability. Road and infrastructure construction in Pakistan, as well as a bilateral free trade agreement, are tied to Beijing's effort to develop these regions. But these projects will increasingly need to meet higher expectations for returns than did China's traditional low-strings approach to aid.


All this means that China's calculus in Pakistan is becoming more diverse. The central question will be the extent to which political, and especially investment, risks begin to complicate the straightforward geopolitical calculus that has long yielded a remarkable intimacy between Beijing and Islamabad.

To be sure, Beijing is too strategically tied to Pakistan -- and too timid in its diplomacy, in any case -- to off-load an erstwhile ally. But China is unlikely to be such an accommodating patron, either. Thus, it will prove less willing to fund the ambitious infrastructure development schemes Islamabad favors. And what is more, the scope and scale of future Chinese economic activity will not, in itself, produce rapid, sustained, and balanced Pakistani growth.

In the long term, economic interaction with India -- the restoration of traditional regional ties and natural economic affinities in the subcontinent -- will almost certainly be more decisive.
In both Europe and Pakistan, debt-laden economies have aggressively sought to attract a portion of Beijing's considerable stock of investment capital. But Beijing is weighing such activities against the many problems it must now manage at home

The bottom line is that China will not simply "bail out" Pakistan with loans, investment, and new untied aid, as commentators watching the deterioration of relations between the United States and Pakistan seem to expect. Rather, China's involvement in the country will closely reflect Beijing's own priorities and evolving risk assessments.

For its part, the United States, which has failed to induce greater Chinese "pressure" on Islamabad, may be able to take advantage of China's new calculus to pursue complementary approaches focused on economics and finance. Countervailing interests, including China's effort to hedge against a growing U.S.-Indian partnership, will continue to obstruct strategic coordination between the United States and China in Pakistan, especially on anti-India and Kashmir-focused militant groups.

But the more the two countries' economic threat assessments converge, the more Beijing and Washington should be able to turn a shared but abstract interest in Pakistan's "stability" into more complementary policies.


China

I know many will have itch to troll but plz stay to the topic as its a serious discussion.

sure.. what ever floats your boat :pakistan::cheers::china:
 
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of course,no body is freind of anybody.They have interst and u too have common interst.pakistan needs you and you need pakistan for routes and for india:azn:(you cant ignore it,you made them nuclear armed and it has been proved many times)

Like I said, we are friends and we are good neighbours, hence we treat eachother well and with respect. Heck we helped North Korea too. You are worrying too much my friend and it's not good for your health.


you are over estimating your self again..you need them to divert indian attention towards china

You should have looked in the mirror, around you and watch your media. It will become apparent who is chest thumping but is constantly panicking and is in fear of China.

they have already mentioned that they are going to keep bases till decade more:azn: and to keep iran,pakistan +china in check..:lol:
be updated with latest news:azn: Mr bambam

They say, but that doesn't mean they can. A decade is a very long time my friend. Their economy could be drastically different by then and so will their policies ;)
 
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I've come across over multiple threads over the past year & a half where our Indian friends on this forum had tried to convince the Pakistanis & Chinese members that the relationship between our countries isn't genuine, & isn't going to last. It gets exhausting having to read similar articles Indians spring up from time to time in the form of a thread, & then replying the same things that have been repeated constantly for many many months now in the past threads. Bhara-tis, get a life.
 
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I've come across over multiple threads over the past year & a half where our Indian friends on this forum had tried to convince the Pakistanis & Chinese members that the relationship between our countries isn't genuine, & isn't going to last. It gets exhausting having to read similar articles Indians spring up from time to time in the form of a thread, & then replying the same things that have been repeated constantly for many many months now in the past threads. Bhara-tis, get a life.
Yes Sir! U absolutely right . The Indians are so much afraid and paranoid of our brother China that they can't even go to sleep at night.......We realli feel sorry for them now.........:D
 
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Yes Sir! U absolutely right . The Indians are so much afraid and paranoid of our brother China that they can't even go to sleep at night.......We realli feel sorry for them now.........:D

It is pretty funny though, watching them get worked up into a panic. :P
 
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Yes Sir! U absolutely right . The Indians are so much afraid and paranoid of our brother China that they can't even go to sleep at night.......We realli feel sorry for them now.........:D

I've responded to them soo many frickin times on this God dammit topic, it just gets exhausting when an insecure Indian springs up the same type of thread from time to time, it's gets tiring to even respond to it now, when you've done that already so many times.
 
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