F-22Raptor
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If such thing as a consensus surrounding President Trump exists today, it is that 2018 promises significant action against China's protectionist economy. Some favor it, some are opposed, but most seem to concede it is likely. Last week's announcement of 30% tariffs on solar panels and 20% on washing machines, coming ultimately from Robert Lighthizer–Trump's Trade Representative and a notable China hawk–has been greeted not with shock, but expectation, and as a harbinger of much more to come.
Not to be outdone, China has been talking up its own potential for disrupting U.S. trade, but has yet to act. Again the consensus, if there is one, probably leans towards China having much more to lose than the U.S. from a straight trade fight. But it is against this backdrop that China's actions in its border zones and contested maritime domains should be examined.
The past as guide to the present
It used to be unfashionable to discuss Mao in the context of modern China, but such has been his rehabilitation by the current leadership, it seems churlish not to recall a few of his strategic insights. On the question of Taiwan, Mao was thought at one time to have been ambivalent to their independence (from Japan), but came to see the nationalist occupied island as a tool with which to navigate the superpower rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. China could, during periods of rapprochement or detente between the USSR and the U.S., ensure that cross straits tensions flared, obliging the U.S. to restate their support for Taiwan in some way, necessitating a few communiques from the USSR, leading to an inevitable diplomatic chilling.
For many years it was thought, and still is by many, that North Korea fulfilled a similar role today, as a temperature control on U.S.-China policy. If things get frosty, China would ensure that North Korea would become problematic. Solutions would then be sought, and China just happened to be able to help, restoring friendliness between the two big powers and reminding the U.S. that keeping China happy has ancillary benefits. Over the last year, for example, how often has Trump–not necessarily altogether sincerely–lauded Chinese help on the Korean peninsula. Yet Trump is either indifferent to this "help" or is merely playing China at their own game.
By the same token, China has been probing hubristically towards India, with border incidents springing up in both Doklam and Arunachal Pradesh. In the South China Sea, Chinese language has grown harsher. A recent U.S. "innocent passage" near Scarborough Shoal or Panatag (ironically also called "Democracy Island") provoked a response that suggested China might reluctantly have to start militarizing the SCS as a precaution, despite having been militarizing them since 2016.
In yet another show of power, China has been appearing in Japanese air and maritime space more frequently than usual, not to mention conducting increasingly assertive unilateral action in relation to Taiwanese airspace. Across the strategic board, therefore, China is on manoeuvres. And whereas in the past, these sorts of flare ups used to be localized and uncommon, now China appears engaged in all theatres at once. They are even talking up their interest in the Arctic, which will likely confuse, or possibly even infuriate, their sometime friends in the Kremlin.
It's the economics, stupid.
The real question is why? Why has China suddenly scaled up its provocations, pressed harder on the raw nerves of each of its regional rivalries? One simple answer is that they are now more powerful, no longer content to "hide their strength, bide their time," according to Deng Xiaoping's well known dictum. A more concerning answer is that their long standing habit of raising the temperature in their traditional hotspots, fully expecting the U.S. to worry about the chaos that might ensue and ease off on the economic pressure, no longer works. Trump, in other words, whether by intention or accident, is calling their bluff.
Of course, some will argue that China is not to blame for worsening relations with India, diplomatic spats with Japan and Taiwan, and broken promises in the South China Sea, but they all share one important factor, which is Chinese assertiveness. Equally, North Korea is routinely portrayed as a problem China can do little about, yet when it comes to it, sanctions agreed with the U.S. (either to shut off coal imports or reduce oil exports) always seem to be reneged upon, as the Kim regime struggles from one provocation to the next.
Now, as the sanctions begin to bite, first on steel and aluminium, then on washing machines and solar panels, and soon with respect to intellectual property violations, China will find itself no longer able to dangle progress on wider strategic matters as a way of forestalling a potential trade war, and will instead have to make good on their threats. It is in this light that China's escalating strategic challenge should be seen, not as a coherent vision of China's future, but an attempt to raise the stakes in a game of strategic poker rapidly coming to an end.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougla...w-how-rattled-they-are-by-trump/#758117f3a397
Not to be outdone, China has been talking up its own potential for disrupting U.S. trade, but has yet to act. Again the consensus, if there is one, probably leans towards China having much more to lose than the U.S. from a straight trade fight. But it is against this backdrop that China's actions in its border zones and contested maritime domains should be examined.
The past as guide to the present
It used to be unfashionable to discuss Mao in the context of modern China, but such has been his rehabilitation by the current leadership, it seems churlish not to recall a few of his strategic insights. On the question of Taiwan, Mao was thought at one time to have been ambivalent to their independence (from Japan), but came to see the nationalist occupied island as a tool with which to navigate the superpower rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. China could, during periods of rapprochement or detente between the USSR and the U.S., ensure that cross straits tensions flared, obliging the U.S. to restate their support for Taiwan in some way, necessitating a few communiques from the USSR, leading to an inevitable diplomatic chilling.
For many years it was thought, and still is by many, that North Korea fulfilled a similar role today, as a temperature control on U.S.-China policy. If things get frosty, China would ensure that North Korea would become problematic. Solutions would then be sought, and China just happened to be able to help, restoring friendliness between the two big powers and reminding the U.S. that keeping China happy has ancillary benefits. Over the last year, for example, how often has Trump–not necessarily altogether sincerely–lauded Chinese help on the Korean peninsula. Yet Trump is either indifferent to this "help" or is merely playing China at their own game.
By the same token, China has been probing hubristically towards India, with border incidents springing up in both Doklam and Arunachal Pradesh. In the South China Sea, Chinese language has grown harsher. A recent U.S. "innocent passage" near Scarborough Shoal or Panatag (ironically also called "Democracy Island") provoked a response that suggested China might reluctantly have to start militarizing the SCS as a precaution, despite having been militarizing them since 2016.
In yet another show of power, China has been appearing in Japanese air and maritime space more frequently than usual, not to mention conducting increasingly assertive unilateral action in relation to Taiwanese airspace. Across the strategic board, therefore, China is on manoeuvres. And whereas in the past, these sorts of flare ups used to be localized and uncommon, now China appears engaged in all theatres at once. They are even talking up their interest in the Arctic, which will likely confuse, or possibly even infuriate, their sometime friends in the Kremlin.
It's the economics, stupid.
The real question is why? Why has China suddenly scaled up its provocations, pressed harder on the raw nerves of each of its regional rivalries? One simple answer is that they are now more powerful, no longer content to "hide their strength, bide their time," according to Deng Xiaoping's well known dictum. A more concerning answer is that their long standing habit of raising the temperature in their traditional hotspots, fully expecting the U.S. to worry about the chaos that might ensue and ease off on the economic pressure, no longer works. Trump, in other words, whether by intention or accident, is calling their bluff.
Of course, some will argue that China is not to blame for worsening relations with India, diplomatic spats with Japan and Taiwan, and broken promises in the South China Sea, but they all share one important factor, which is Chinese assertiveness. Equally, North Korea is routinely portrayed as a problem China can do little about, yet when it comes to it, sanctions agreed with the U.S. (either to shut off coal imports or reduce oil exports) always seem to be reneged upon, as the Kim regime struggles from one provocation to the next.
Now, as the sanctions begin to bite, first on steel and aluminium, then on washing machines and solar panels, and soon with respect to intellectual property violations, China will find itself no longer able to dangle progress on wider strategic matters as a way of forestalling a potential trade war, and will instead have to make good on their threats. It is in this light that China's escalating strategic challenge should be seen, not as a coherent vision of China's future, but an attempt to raise the stakes in a game of strategic poker rapidly coming to an end.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougla...w-how-rattled-they-are-by-trump/#758117f3a397
, it's because China is giving him some face and rewarding him like how Chinese Emperors used to reward our friendly tribute states since ancient times. If he is executing the same Obama policies he too will experience the same kind of humiliation Obama had to go through, it's that plain simple.
