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Why do so many get it so wrong in China?
By Andrew Hill
Published: March 7 2011 22:57 | Last updated: March 7 2011 22:57
My first reaction to Best Buy’s closure of its nine branded stores in China was: not again. Another retailer had leapt into the Chinese market – and fallen on its face.
Best Buy’s stores – familiar to North Americans and Europeans – are arranged by category of gadget and are big on service. But most Chinese are used to buying electrical goods more cheaply from makers’ agents, working in stores owned by established Chinese competitors such as Suning and Gome, or from smaller, local shops.
Home Depot, the US DIY group, recently closed stores in mainland China, having misread the local market. On Monday, Mattel shuttered its six-storey flagship Barbie store in Shanghai, in the face of waning enthusiasm for a doll ubiquitous in its established markets.
All plainly failed to meet Peter Drucker’s requirement for “true marketing”, which starts “with the customer, his demographics, his realities, his needs, his values. It does not ask, What do we want to sell? It asks, What does the customer want to buy? It does not say, This is what our product or service does. It says, These are the satisfactions the customer looks for, values and needs”.
Yet when Best Buy announced its Chinese move in 2005, it seemed to have struck the right note. Its “lab stores” would be managed by “local leaders” with “strong customer insights”. This would help “accelerate learning about the diverse consumers in China”. Vapid prose apart, Drucker himself could have drafted that press release.
It didn’t need much local insight to deduce that most Chinese customers wouldn’t buy warranties, need installation or pay more for goods available elsewhere for less. But success in its home market made Best Buy overconfident. Kal Patel, now the group’s Asia president and the man who recommended closure, says: “When you’re very, very successful, you can sometimes do things that feel like they go against rational logic. Very good people look at the numbers and then they say: ‘We could change the industry.’”
In fact, Best Buy was learning an increasing amount about the Chinese domestic market from its parallel ownership of Five Star, a chain of electrical retailers operating on the traditional model, where it acquired control in 2006. It was the US model that fell short. Mr Patel says: “Long term, I question whether you can be that revolutionary with the industrial structure [in China]: five years we’ve been there and the industrial model hasn’t changed.”
In spite of Best Buy’s setback, rivals are still convinced they know better. Within days of the retailer’s news, Media Markt heralded further expansion in China, on a model that sounds oddly similar to the one that let its US competitor down.
What lessons should those who follow in Best Buy’s footsteps learn?
●Use local knowledge and relevant prior experience. Non-Chinese brewers failed to push the local consumer up to premium beers, while SABMiller, drawing on its knowledge of another emerging market – South Africa – read the local conditions better.
●Start small. Mr Patel says that if Best Buy were launching a Chinese strategy now, it would try out “fast, quick, cheap” ideas. The total bill for restructuring in China, the closure of two more branded stores in Turkey and a revamp of the US supply chain came to $225m-$245m. Even if only part of that bill was attributable to the China experiment, that is a costly laboratory.
●Work on several fronts. Best Buy – which now owns all of Five Star – will expand its locally branded stores in China. But it will also incubate ideas via the internet, work with local partners and explore other options, such as stores within stores.
●Be different. The success of Apple stores in China, which provide the only reliable outlet for its products, contrasts with Best Buy’s experience.
●Stay humble. Non-Chinese groups still seem prone to arrogance about the applicability of their business models that would have embarrassed 16th-century Portuguese traders.
By contrast, Chinese groups investing abroad are using a different tone. Wang Zongnan, chairman of Bright Food, told the Financial Times he would keep Yoplait’s existing management if his bid for the French yoghurt maker succeeded, “because Bright has insufficient knowledge of international markets”. This could be rhetoric, or politics, or a mixture of both. But foreign investors that fail to recognise what they do not know will be condemned to an endless and costly round of trial and error. And error. And error.