China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: CRS Report

[ironman]

This is from the latest Congressional Research Service report (The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century).Posting the part where Pakistan is mentioned, you can download entire report from here. Link

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issue​

Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
July 27, 2009

Nuclear Technology Sales to Pakistan

Overview

In 1996, U.S. policymakers faced the issue of whether to impose sanctions on the PRC for
technology transfers to Pakistan’s nuclear program, and Beijing issued another nuclear
nonproliferation pledge. Since then, the United States has maintained concerns—but at a lower
level—about continued PRC nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, particularly involving the
construction of nuclear power plants at Chashma. The PRC government is believed to know
about some, if not all, of the ongoing nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Nonetheless, in 2004, the
Bush Administration supported China’s application to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
despite Congressional concerns about China’s failure to apply the NSG’s “full-scope safeguards”
to its nuclear projects in Pakistan. (Full-scope safeguards apply IAEA inspections to all other
declared nuclear facilities in addition to the facility importing supplies in order to prevent
diversions to any weapon programs.)

Ring Magnets and Another Pledge

In 1996, some in Congress called for sanctions after reports disclosed that China sold
unsafeguarded ring magnets to Pakistan, apparently in violation of the NPT and in contradiction
of U.S. laws, including the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629) and Export-Import Bank Act
(P.L. 79-173), as amended by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (Title VIII of P.L.
103-236). On February 5, 1996, the Washington Times disclosed intelligence reports that the
China National Nuclear Corporation, a state-owned corporation, transferred to the A.Q. Khan
Research Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, 5,000 ring magnets that can be used in gas centrifuges
to enrich uranium. Reportedly, intelligence experts believed that the magnets provided to Pakistan
were to be used in special suspension bearings at the top of rotating cylinders in the centrifuges.
The New York Times, on May 12, 1996, reported that the shipment was made after June 1994 and
was worth $70,000. The PRC company involved was China Nuclear Energy Industry
Corporation, a subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation. The State Department’s
report on nonproliferation efforts in South Asia (issued on January 21, 1997) confirmed that
“between late 1994 and mid-1995, a Chinese entity transferred a large number of ring magnets to
Pakistan for use in its uranium enrichment program.”

The Clinton Administration’s decision-making was complicated by considerations of U.S.
corporations doing business in China. Officials reportedly considered imposing then waiving
sanctions or focusing sanctions only on the China National Nuclear Corporation, rather than
large-scale sanctions affecting the entire PRC government and U.S. companies, such as
Westinghouse Electric Corporation (which had deals pending with China National Nuclear
Corporation) and Boeing Aircraft Company. At the end of February 1996, Secretary of State
Warren Christopher instructed the Export-Import Bank to suspend financing for commercial deals
in China for one month, reported the New York Times (February 29, 1996). Christopher reportedly
required time to try to obtain more information to make a determination of whether sanctions
would be required. Meanwhile, DCI John Deutch reportedly said at a White House meeting that
PRC officials at some level likely approved the sale of magnets. Defense Secretary William Perry
supported this view, but officials of the Commerce and Treasury Departments and the U.S. Trade
Representative argued there was lack of solid proof, according to the Washington Post (April 1,
1996).

On May 10, 1996, the State Department announced that China and Pakistan would not be
sanctioned, citing a new agreement with China. Clinton Administration officials said that China
promised to provide future assistance only to safeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirmed its
commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, and agreed to consultations on export control and
proliferation issues. The Administration also said that PRC leaders insisted they were not aware
of the magnet transfer and that there was no evidence that the PRC government had willfully
aided or abetted Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program through the magnet transfer. Thus, the State
Department announced that sanctions were not warranted, and Export-Import Bank
considerations of loans for U.S. exporters to China were returned to normal. On May 11, 1996,
China’s foreign ministry issued a statement that “China will not provide assistance to
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.” In any case, since 1984, China has declared a policy of nuclear
nonproliferation and a requirement for recipients of its transfers to accept IAEA safeguards, and
China acceded to the NPT in 1992.

That year, Congress responded to the Administration’s determination not to impose sanctions by
adding language on “persons” in the Export-Import Bank Act, as amended by Section 1303 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY1997 (P.L. 104-201), enacted on September 23, 1996.

Other Nuclear Cooperation

On October 9, 1996, the Washington Times reported that a CIA report dated September 14, 1996,
said that China sold a “special industrial furnace” and “high-tech diagnostic equipment” to
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan. In September 1996, PRC technicians in Pakistan
reportedly prepared to install the dual-use equipment. The deal was allegedly made by the China
Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, the same firm which sold the ring magnets. Those who
suspected that the transfer was intended for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program said that high
temperature furnaces are used to mold uranium or plutonium. The CIA report was said to state
that “senior-level government approval probably was needed” and that PRC officials planned to
submit false documentation on the final destination of the equipment. According to the press, the
CIA report said that the equipment was set to arrive in early September 1996. The Washington
Post, on October 10, 1996, further reported that the equipment was intended for a nuclear reactor
to be completed by 1998 at Khushab in Pakistan. On October 9, 1996, the State Department said
that it had not concluded that China violated its promise of May 11, 1996. However, the State
Department did not publicly address whether the suspected transfers occurred before May 11,
1996, violated the NPT, or contradicted U.S. laws (including the Arms Export Control Act,
Export-Import Bank Act, and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act).
Concerns have persisted about PRC assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. As reported by
Pakistani and PRC news sources in 1992, China began to build a nuclear power plant at Chashma
and was suspected in 1994 of helping Pakistan to build an unsafeguarded, plutonium-producing
reactor at Khushab, according to Nucleonics Week (June 19, 1997 and February 26, 1998).
Operational since 2001, the Chashma reactor has IAEA safeguards but not full scope safeguards
(Nucleonics Week, April 26, 2001; and IAEA, Annual Report 2001).

Referring specifically to Pakistan’s efforts to acquire equipment, materials, and technology for its
nuclear weapons program, the DCI’s June 1997 “Section 721 report” for the last half of 1996
(after China’s May 1996 pledge) stated that China was the “principal supplier.” Then, on May 11
and 13, 1998, India conducted nuclear tests, citing China’s nuclear ties to Pakistan, and Pakistan
followed with nuclear tests on May 28 and 30, 1998. China, as Pakistan’s principal military and
nuclear supplier, failed to avert the tests and did not cut off nuclear aid, but condemned the tests
at the U.N. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s annual report on arms control for 1998
stated that “there continued to be some contacts between Chinese entities and Pakistan’s
unsafeguarded and nuclear weapons program.”

In 2000, news reports said that some former U.S. nonproliferation and intelligence officials
suspected that China provided equipment for Pakistan’s secret heavy water production plant at
Khushab, where an unsafeguarded reactor reportedly started up in April 1998 and has generated
weapons-grade plutonium. Clinton Administration officials at the White House and State
Department reportedly denied China’s involvement but said that they did not know the origins of
the plant.2 The DCI reported in November 2003 that, in the first half of 2003, continued contacts
between PRC entities and “entities associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program” cannot
be ruled out, despite the PRC’s 1996 promise not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, testified to the
Senate Intelligence Committee on February 24, 2004, that PRC entities “remain involved with
nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and Iran,” while “in some cases,” the entities are
involved without the government’s knowledge, thus implying that there are cases in which the
PRC government has knowledge of the relationships.

On May 5, 2004, China signed a contract to build a second nuclear power reactor (Chashma-2) in
Pakistan. This contract raised questions because of continuing PRC nuclear cooperation with
Pakistan and its signing right before a decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on China’s
membership, with U.S. support. With a pre-existing contract, Chashma-2 would be exempted
from the NSG’s requirement for full-scope safeguards (not just IAEA safeguards on the reactor).3
(See Nonproliferation Regimes (MTCR, NSG, etc.) below for policy discussion.) After China’s
last step of covering the Chashma-2 reactor under a pre-existing contract, the United States and
other countries have to monitor China’s subsequent agreement in October 2008 to build two more
nuclear reactors in Pakistan for compliance with the NSG’s rules, unless there is an exemption
(like that for India).

A. Q. Khan’s Nuclear Network

China’s past and persisting connections to Pakistan’s nuclear program raised questions about
whether China was involved in or had knowledge about the long-time efforts, publicly confirmed
in early 2004, of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program, in
selling uranium enrichment technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. DCI George Tenet
confirmed A.Q. Khan’s network of nuclear trade in open testimony to the Senate Intelligence
Committee on February 24, 2004.

China’s association was a concern, particularly because China was an early recipient of the
uranium enrichment technology Khan acquired in Europe.5 Also, there were questions about
whether China shared intelligence with the United States about Khan’s nuclear technology
transfers. With the troubling disclosures, China could have been more willing to cooperate on
nonproliferation or could have been reluctant to confirm its involvement. A senior Pakistani
diplomat was quoted as saying that, while in Beijing in 2002, PRC officials said they knew “A.Q.
Khan was in China and bribing people, and they wanted him out.”6 Particularly troubling was the
reported intelligence finding in early 2004 that Khan sold Libya a nuclear bomb design that he
received from China in the early 1980s (in return for giving China his centrifuge technology), a
design that China had already tested in 1966 and had developed as a compact nuclear bomb for
delivery on a missile.7 That finding raised the additional question of whether Khan also sold that
bomb design to others, including Iran and North Korea. According to two former U.S. nuclear
bomb designers, the PRC proliferated nuclear bomb technology to Pakistan, including a test
conducted in 1990 for Pakistan of its first nuclear bomb.8 DCI Porter Goss testified in February
2005 that the Bush Administration continued to explore opportunities to learn about Khan’s
nuclear trade, adding that “getting to the end of that trail is extremely important for us. It is a
serious proliferation question.”9 In his memoir of 2007, George Tenet wrote that Khan’s broad
international network included China, North Korea, and vaguely “the Muslim world.”10 Finally,
on January 12, 2009, the State Department imposed sanctions on 13 people and three companies
for involvement in A.Q. Khan’s network that proliferated nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and
North Korea. But the Department did not name China among a number of countries that provided
close cooperation to investigate and shut down that proliferation network.

Missile Technology Sales to Pakistan

Overview

From the early 1990s to 2000, the George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations faced the issue
of whether to impose sanctions on PRC “entities” for transferring M-11 short-range ballistic
missiles or related technology to Pakistan. The Clinton Administration took eight years to
determine in 2000 that PRC entities had transferred complete M-11 missiles as well as technology
to Pakistan, but waived sanctions in return for another missile nonproliferation pledge from
Beijing. However, despite that promise of November 2000, the United States has continued
concerns about PRC technology transfers that have helped Pakistan to build domestic missile
programs, including development of medium-range ballistic missiles. In September 2001, the
George W. Bush Administration imposed sanctions for PRC proliferation of missile technology to
Pakistan, denying satellite exports to China.

M-11 Missiles and Another Pledge

Transfers of the PRC’s M-11 short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) or related equipment exceed
MTCR guidelines, because the M-11 has the inherent capability to deliver a 500 kg (1,100 lb)
warhead to 300 km (186 mi). Issues about U.S. sanctions have included the questions of whether
PRC transfers to Pakistan involved M-11 missile-related technology (Category II of the MTCR)
or complete missiles (Category I). Sanctions for missile-related transfers are mandated under
Section 73(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Section 11B(b)(1) of the Export
Administration Act (EAA) (as amended by the FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act).

In June 1991, the Bush Administration first imposed sanctions on entities in China for
transferring M-11 technology to Pakistan. Sanctions affected exports of supercomputers,
satellites, and missile technology. The Administration later waived the sanctions on March 23,
1992. On August 24, 1993, the Clinton Administration determined that China had again
transferred M-11 equipment (not whole missiles) to Pakistan and imposed new sanctions
(affecting exports of some satellites). On October 4, 1994, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen signed a joint statement, saying that Washington would waive
the August 1993 sanctions and Beijing would not export “ground-to-ground missiles” “inherently
capable” of delivering a 500 kg warhead 300 km. The Administration waived the sanctions on
November 1, 1994.

However, contentious policy questions about imposing sanctions for the 1992 transfer of
complete M-11 SRBMs (not just components) persisted until 2000. The Washington Times
(March 14, 1997) said “numerous” intelligence reports indicated that M-11 missiles were
“operational” in Pakistan, but these findings were disputed by some policymakers. Secretary of
Defense William Cohen issued a Pentagon report in 1997 stating that Pakistan acquired “SRBMs”
as well as related equipment from China in the early 1990s.11 In a 1998 report to Congress on
nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia, the State Department acknowledged its concerns about
“reports that M-11 missiles were transferred from China to Pakistan” but added that it had not
determined that such transfers occurred, “which would be sanctionable under U.S. law.”12 Gordon
Oehler, former head of the CIA’s Nonproliferation Center, testified on June 11, 1998, to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that in November 1992, “the Chinese delivered 34 M-11s to
Pakistan.” In July 1998, the Rumsfeld Commission said that China had transferred complete M-
11s to Pakistan.13

Some said that sanctions were not imposed for transfers of complete M-11s, because the missiles
remained inside crates at Sagodha Air Base, according to the Wall Street Journal (December 15,
1998). Critics in Congress said the Clinton Administration avoided making determinations of
whether to impose sanctions, by delaying tactics, re-writing reports, and setting high evidentiary
standards. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report in September 2000, saying
that the Administration avoided such determinations by the use of “bureaucratic maneuvers” to
delay the drafting of “Statements/Findings of Fact” by the intelligence community and by not
scheduling interagency meetings to consider those findings.

On September 9, 1999, the intelligence community publicly confirmed for the first time that
“Pakistan has M-11 SRBMs from China” and that they may have a nuclear role.15 However, the
State Department argued on September 14, 1999, that it required a “high standard of evidence”
and had not yet determined that Category I sanctions were warranted, despite the intelligence
judgment. (Category I sanctions would deny licenses for exports of Munitions List items, among
other actions, and Congress transferred satellites back to the Munitions List, effective March 15,
1999.) The Far Eastern Economic Review reported on May 18, 2000, that the Clinton
Administration and Senator Helms of the Foreign Relations Committee struck a deal in 1999 that
required a decision on sanctions for the PRC’s M-11 transfer to Pakistan in exchange for the
confirmation of Robert Einhorn as Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation (approved on
November 3, 1999). On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration said it determined that
PRC entities had transferred Category I and Category II missile-related items to Pakistani entities,
and sanctions would be waived on the PRC for past transfers, given its new missile
nonproliferation promise.

Missile Plants and MRBMs

While China promised not to transfer missiles, it has reportedly helped Pakistan to achieve an
indigenous missile capability. U.S. intelligence reportedly concluded in a National Intelligence
Estimate that China provided blueprints and equipment to Pakistan to build a plant for making
missiles that would violate the MTCR, according to the Washington Post (August 25, 1996).
Analysts disagreed, however, about whether the plant would manufacture some major missile
components or whole copies of the M-11 missile. Construction of the plant allegedly began in
1995. On August 25, 1996, Vice President Al Gore acknowledged concerns about the plant. Time
reported on June 30, 1997, that the Clinton Administration would not discuss possible sanctions
based on intelligence on the missile plant. The November 1997 report of the Secretary of Defense
also confirmed Pakistan’s facility “for the production of a 300 kilometer range ballistic missile.”
By 1998, the missile plant in Fatehjung was almost finished, awaiting delivery of crucial
equipment from China, reported the Wall Street Journal (December 15, 1998).

On April 6, 1998, Pakistan first tested its nuclear-capable Ghauri (Hatf-5) medium-range ballistic
missile (MRBM), which is based on the North Korean No Dong missile. U.S. intelligence was
said to suspect that China Poly Ventures Company delivered, perhaps in 1999, U.S.-made
specialized metal-working presses and a special furnace to Pakistan’s National Development
Center, a missile plant, reported the Washington Times (April 15, 1999). China reportedly was
building a second missile plant and providing specialty steel, guidance systems, and technical aid,
said the Far Eastern Economic Review (June 22, 2000) and New York Times (July 2, 2000).
Apparently confirming these stories, the DCI’s “Section 721 report” wrote that in August 2000,
besides North Korean help, PRC entities provided “increased assistance” to Pakistan’s ballistic
missile program in the second half of 1999. Also, China has assisted Pakistan with development
of the Shaheen-2 two-stage, solid-fuel MRBM, reported Jane’s Defense Weekly (December 13,2000). DCI George Tenet confirmed U.S. concerns about such assistance in testimony on
February 7, 2001, before the Senate Intelligence Committee, and in his February 2001 report on
proliferation.

Despite the PRC’s November 2000 missile nonproliferation pledge, in the first several months of
2001, a PRC company reportedly delivered 12 shipments of missile components to Pakistan’s
Shaheen-1 SRBM and Shaheen-2 MRBM programs, according to the Washington Times (August
6, 2001). On September 1, 2001, the State Department imposed sanctions on China Metallurgical
Equipment Corporation (CMEC) for proliferation of missile technology (Category II items of the
MTCR) to Pakistan. In November 2004, the DCI told Congress in a “Section 721 report” that, in
the second half of 2003, PRC entities helped Pakistan to advance toward serial production of
solid-fuel SRBMs (previously identified as the Shaheen-1, Abdali, and Ghaznavi) and supported
Pakistan’s development of solid-fuel MRBMs (previously noted as the Shaheen-2 MRBM). The
DNI’s “Section 721 report” of May 2007 reported to Congress that PRC “entities” continued in
2005 to work with Pakistan on its ballistic missile programs.

 

[Squallmao]

It's long article, but as soon as I read "This is from the latest Congressional Research Service report (The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress"
I stopped and time is saved

 

[applesauce]

It's long article, but as soon as I read "This is from the latest Congressional Research Service report (The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress"
I stopped and time is saved

HOLY Mother OF george washington i did the samething! lol