Chief of Army Staff | General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

[Saleem]

from blian2's post it seems the fol are the candidates for the next chief in 2013 (since they are Corps Commanders now):

Lahore Corps Commander Lt-Gen Rashad Mahmood.

Peshawar Corps Commander Lt-Gen Asif Yasin Malik

 

[fatman17]

The matter of extension

Part II

Monday, July 26, 2010

Taj M Khattak

The merits/demerits of the decision notwithstanding, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani did the right thing by announcing the three-year extension to COAS General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s tenure, in the shortest speech of his term delivered at the oddest hour, thus putting an end to all speculations which had been ripe since last year.

Only recently, Defence Minister Chaudhary Ahmed Mukhtar told the media that the COAS had neither asked for an extension nor would it be granted to him. He was later snubbed by the prime minister and must now be ruing that statement.

Congratulations are also in order, as his success should be celebrated in all its manifestations. This chapter should now come to an end and the entire nation must render unreserved, unqualified and wholehearted support to the government and the military establishment in their ongoing effort to fight militancy.

With Kayani as the COAS and a PPP government at the centre, there were expectations that we would finally select our chiefs of staff in a routine manner. But that will now have to wait another day, or perhaps another generation.

An extension of three years is unprecedented in more than one ways. For one, its coincidence with the end of the present government’s tenure in 2013 makes it difficult to shake off the impression that the two are unrelated.

Then there are suggestions in the media that the extension is the first step towards possible changes in the structure of higher defence organisation. If so, it is hoped that fundamental changes in the hierarchical structures of the armed forces are not brought about in a hurried and hush-hush manner, but after extensive interaction and consultation process amongst the armed forces.

It might even be better if the issue is left unattended till hopefully a noticeable success is achieved in curbing the insurgency in the country.

While the harmonisation of the tri-service operation in any given situation is theoretically a laudable goal, its realisation in practice has regrettably remained elusive. For example, the navy and the air force had no prior knowledge of Kargil and even the recent major war games, Azm-i-Nau III, in response to India’s cold-start doctrine (which is a tri-service threat projection without any doubt), were conducted sans the navy.

It is, therefore, natural for unease to set in with every suggestion for change when the existing structure is already loaded in favour of the army. The navy and the air force are two important arms of the country’s defence establishment and any dilution of their independent characters through a planned restructuring should be avoided.

It is solemnly hoped that Kayani’s extension will help strengthen democracy and the present government’s comfort level with the army will be used for good governance and in the benefit of the common man, and not for covering a further undesirable climb-up on the Transparency International’s index for most corrupt countries.

American ‘support’ for the general’s extension was disturbing. We must know that what is in America’s interest may not necessarily be in ours. Views expressed by various US officials on the subject were, therefore, an unwelcome intrusion.

It is said that General Waheed Kakar acted on the lone counsel of Lt-Gen Lehrasab Khan in a corps commanders’ meeting against accepting an extension from the late Benazir Bhutto. It seems that the recent extension proposal was also put to the commanders in their last meeting. It will be interesting to know if there was a Lehrasab Khan in the pack. If there wasn’t, it should be a worrying thought since this forum traditionally had freedom of speech; an essential ingredient for the army’s institutional view to emerge in matters of national importance.

This culture began to suffer, first as the seniority difference between General Zia and his subsequent corps commanders widened and later when it happened between Musharraf and his commanders. Kayani’s extension and the large-scale retirements in 2011 are unlikely to improve that seniority gap.

Our propensity for cult figures, a generally low threshold for accepting dissent and quick claim to monopoly over wisdom further discourage free speech. General Kayani will have to guard against such weaknesses quietly creeping in.

Kayani has won a three-year extension. From now onwards he will be watched at every step along the way, and at the very least, he will have to apply the military discipline uniformly to all soldiers and officers without any fear and favour.

The whiff from Langhar (the soldiers’ kitchen in a unit, better known for its gup than the quality of food) is not always the same as in the first years of command.

Tailpiece: ‘The general is the supporting pillar of the state. If his talents are all encompassing, the state will invariably be strong. If the supporting pillar is marked by fissures, the state will invariably grow weaker’. Sun Tzu

To the powers that be: ‘For whoever habitually suppresses the truth in the interests of tact will produce a deformity from the womb of his thought.’ Liddelhart

Between Sun Tzu and Liddelhart, my thoughts are with the former, and a small prayer that he proves to be a strong supporting pillar of state is for the general.

The writer is a retired vice-admiral and former vice-chief of the naval staff. Email: taj khattak@ymail.com

 

[khurasaan1]

What is done is done now, however I think it would have been better if his term had been extended by a year (if at all) rather than a full 3 year term. This means that close to a dozen Lt Gens would now retire without having a chance at the spot of the Chief. After Musharraf's long years at this post, other senior officers would have been wanting a shot at the slot.

As far as continuity of policies is concerned, this should be the job of the institution of the Pakistan Army and not of its chief. Most of the officers in the senior positions are supportive of the direction the Army has taken and it would have been good had Gen Kiyani retired leaving the responsibilities in the hands of another capable general after setting a very good precedence in and outside of the combat theater.

I hope that Gen Kiyani sticks to his professional side and not allow the politicians to drag him into their mess and I truly hope he remains totally apolitical.

The great teacher creates great students and the great generalz create great soldierz....example Rasool Allah (PBUH).. I guess its blessing from Allah (SBWT) that he chose the best general in the Army to lead it. He might have some qualities maybe nobody even knowz in the Army itself except Allah(SBWT).
I hope Allah(SBWT) is going to prove him as his blessings for the country & for the world. The time is so critical at this point for the world that the evil/devil powerz are fighting the most treacherous warz in the human history to take over the world.
Alhamdolillah Im happy and hope that inshallah he will prove worthy of being given the duty to help bring peace and get rid of the evil powerz of the world.
just my 2 cents..bro..

 

[Dazzler]

His leadership during recent Operation Rah-e-rast alone is an ample example how capable a leader he is. A battle that entire NATO force lost in Afghanistan, he won with valor in Pakistan although there is a huge difference between TTP and ATs but they are all rugged fighters and Kiyani is a man enough to show them what Pak Military is all about. I feel disgusted when Yanks talk about training to Pak Army where as they need a few lessons from our victory.

 

[fatman17]

His leadership during recent Operation Rah-e-rast alone is an ample example how capable a leader he is. A battle that entire NATO force lost in Afghanistan, he won with valor in Pakistan although there is a huge difference between TTP and ATs but they are all rugged fighters and Kiyani is a man enough to show them what Pak Military is all about. I feel disgusted when Yanks talk about training to Pak Army where as they need a few lessons from our victory.

yes indeed but a few more battles are on the horizon which will require more of the same and thensome - we wish him and his troops well, ably supported by our air-arms!

 

[fatman17]

Kayani: Pakistan's quietly powerful army chief

Friday, 23 Jul, 2010

ISLAMABAD: General Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistan's powerful army chief of staff, has masterminded decisive battles against the Taliban and kept the military out of politics.

As head of the largest branch of Pakistan's military, the 58-year-old is the most powerful man in the country and commands respect from the armed forces, civilian government and the masses, but is rarely in public.

He took command in late 2007, succeeding General Pervez Musharraf when he hung up his uniform in a bid to cling onto power.

Western-friendly, methodical and with a deep understanding of regional security, Kayani significantly reduced the army's role in politics, withdrawing hundreds of officers from government positions and upholding civilian rule.

Widely considered a general determined to improve Pakistan's image abroad, Kayani forged close relations with US generals and launched a series of sustained offensives against the Taliban against their northwest havens.

Those operations earned widespread praise in the United States and have contributed to a certain rapprochement in the testy relationship between Washington and Islamabad.

America's top military commander, Admiral Mike Mullen, has praised him for taking “bold steps”, saying he has moved troops to the Afghan border, cracked down against militants and equipped the paramilitary Frontier Corps.

Kayani was also credited with helping prevent tensions with India over the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai from blowing up and was also seen as instrumental in helping to defuse a March 2009 political crisis at home.

“Kayani is by nature a quiet and cool person. He is a man of few words. He listens to people more and speaks less,” said one senior military official.

An avid golfer and president of the Pakistan Golf Association in his free time, Kayani is a chain smoker known to favour cups of tea.

He was born into a working class family in April 1952 in a suburb of Rawalpindi, the garrison city where the Pakistan military is headquartered.

His father was a non-commissioned officer from Punjab, where the army draws much of its manpower, and Kayani's meteoric rise after joining the army in 1971 is a rarity in Pakistan's privilege-dominated society.

“Imbued with the qualities of head and heart,” a formal military statement describes Kayani in gushing terms as “a purposeful and pragmatic commander”.

“Excellence and perfection remain the hallmark of his personality,” it said.

Like other Pakistani officers fast-tracked for the top, Kayani underwent training in the United States, becoming a graduate of Fort Leavenworth military college and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Hawaii.

Once a military assistant to the late prime minister Benazir Bhutto as well as a trusted protege of her rival Musharraf, Kayani has been recognised as a chameleon in surviving Pakistan's treacherous political waters.

He commanded several infantry units, including the Rawalpindi Corps whose 111 Brigade led all four military coups that have ruled Pakistan for more than half its 63-year history.

In 2004, Musharraf appointed him head of the premier spy agency, the much-feared Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), whose allegiance in the war on Al-Qaeda and battle against the Taliban has been a source of concern in the West.

His ascendancy to the chief of staff position three years later makes him the only Pakistani in history to have served in both coveted positions.

Kayani is married with a son and a daughter. — AFP

 

[GUNNER]

K Subrahmanyam: Talking to Kayani

India must find a way to engage Pakistan's all-powerful Army chief


K Subrahmanyam

To no one’s surprise, General Ashfaq Kayani, the chief of the Pakistan Army, got his tenure extended by another term of three years by the civilian government. The decision was formally announced by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani in a late night broadcast after he had consulted President Asif Ali Zardari, who also happens to be the chairman of the ruling party. After the recent 18th Amendment, the power to nominate the service chiefs had been restored to the Prime Minister as it was at the time of Z A Bhutto and in the second term of office of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

This extension of tenure for an army chief by a civilian government is happening for the first time since 1955 when the government headed by Iskander Mirza gave an extension to General Ayub Khan, the country’s first army chief. At that time, the Pakistan Army did not have very many senior officers and General Ayub Khan’s extension did not create any controversy.

On the present occasion, a leading Pakistan daily, the Dawn, has commented, “Like it or not, the extension does not reflect well on the army as an institution. It is almost an article of faith that the Pakistan Army is the only viable, strong and vibrant institution in the country. Whatever General Kayani’s intimate familiarity with the present state of affairs and whatever his unique understanding of the situation, a strong institution should be able to withstand the retirement of one man, however experienced.

A compelling example of institutional concerns coming before individuals was provided recently by the US, where the architect of the present American counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan was replaced. This in the middle of a war that is by all accounts going badly for the US. Here in Pakistan, the public is constantly told that the internal security situation has improved, that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is on the back foot, that progress, while slow, is real and meaningful. If it seems difficult to reconcile the idea of a strong institution having depth in talent and leadership with the ‘indispensability’ of a single man, then that’s because it truly is.”

General Kayani is not just the chief of the army. He is also the first Director-General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to become the army chief. In that sense, he may not be the originator but truly the sustainer of the Pakistan strategy of using the various terrorist organisations as “strategic assets”. He is in direct control and charge of the “crown jewels” of Pakistan — its nuclear weapons.

General Kayani is a far more sophisticated man than General Pervez Musharraf, who felt compelled to make himself the president of Pakistan to be able to get proper protocol when he came to meet the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at Agra in 2002. In the process, he had to rig two presidential elections and earn unpopularity among the people of Pakistan. By assuming direct responsibility for governance, he became accountable for the enormous governance deficit in the country. He got himself associated in the popular mind with the United States and thereby generated the hostility of the public at large and some of the more virulent jehadi organisations. General Kayani has avoided most of those mistakes.

He delinked himself from General Musharraf and gave the green light to political parties to push him out. He earned the reputation of having conducted the second free-and-fair elections in the history of Pakistan. Political parties hailed him as being democratic. He is not blamed for governance deficits and not even for the terrorist outrages committed by jehadi organisations earlier patronised by the ISI. On the other hand, he is hailed for fighting the TTP earlier nurtured by the ISI and he is considered indispensable by the prime minister and president to continue the counterinsurgency operations against the jehadis.

In spite of continuing terrorist attacks on US targets, the Obama administration argues that there is no alternative to the Pakistan Army and its present leadership to pursue the anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan. Though General Kayani does not hold any Cabinet office, there is no doubt in the minds of Pakistanis and Americans who rules Pakistan. The strategic dialogue with the US is conducted by him with Foreign Minister Qureshi providing the façade of being the leader. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spends more time in discussions with him than any Cabinet member.

On the eve of the strategic dialogue with the US, he summoned all the secretaries to the government concerned with the discussion to the GHQ in Rawalpindi and chaired the meeting to finalise the agenda. When he expressed the displeasure of the Pakistan Army on the Kerry-Lugar legislation, a senator was rushed from the US to mollify him. Clearly, General Kayani knew he had made himself irreplaceable, which is why he was not replaced.

All this highlights that India cannot have effective communication with the real power centre of Pakistan by talking to the foreign minister, the prime minister or the now powerless president. For meaningful communication, India should be in a position to talk to the Pakistan Army chief. This cannot be done by our strictly apolitical army chief trying to talk to his counterpart. Here too, General Kayani has an advantage. He can let loose Mr Gillani on Manmohan Singh, Mr Qureshi on S M Krishna while keeping the ultimate veto power with himself.

Therefore, the Indian prime minister has to think through an innovative solution. That has to be an empowered personal envoy like the one he nominated to talk to the Chinese premier. He has to be knowledgeable to deal with terrorism, counter-terrorism, conventional military balance, nuclear deterrence, Afghanistan, China, evolving strategic balance in the area and bilateral Indo-Pakistan issues. Such missions have to be undertaken without publicity as was done with the “back channel” discussions during President Musharraf’s tenure.

In the US, Harry Hopkins was used by President Roosevelt in such a role. Will the Pakistan Army chief agree to receive a special envoy of the Indian prime minister? That will be a litmus test of his intentions towards India and his seriousness to have a real dialogue with New Delhi

 

[Old School]

K Subrahmanyam: Talking to Kayani

India must find a way to engage Pakistan's all-powerful Army chief


K Subrahmanyam

They have been already talking to him through proper channel ever since his tenure began as the COAS in 2007 . But if they expect him to provide photo shoot opportunities while shaking hands with his Indian counterparts , they have to be disappointed. That is not going to happen.

 

[air marshal]

No PR279/2010-ISPR
Dated: Friday, July 23, 2010

His Excellency Mr. Liu Jain, incoming Chinese Ambassador called on Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani at General Headquarters today.

The visiting dignitary remained with him for some time and discussed the matters of mutual interest.

His Excellency Mr. Liu Jain, incoming Chinese Ambassador called on Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani at General Headquarters on Friday (23-7-2010) - Photo ISPR

 

[air marshal]

No PR287/2010-ISPR
Dated: Thursday, July 29, 2010

Her Excellency Ms Ulrika Sundberg, Swedish Ambassador to Pakistan called on General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Chief of Army Staff at General Headquarters today.

The visiting dignitary remained with him for some time and discussed the matters of mutual interest.

Her Excellency Ms Ulrika Sundberg, Swedish Ambassador to Pakistan called on General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Chief of Army Staff at General Headquarters on Thursday. (29-7-2010) – Photo ISPR

 

[fatman17]

K Subrahmanyam: Talking to Kayani

India must find a way to engage Pakistan's all-powerful Army chief


K Subrahmanyam

To no one’s surprise, General Ashfaq Kayani, the chief of the Pakistan Army, got his tenure extended by another term of three years by the civilian government. The decision was formally announced by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani in a late night broadcast after he had consulted President Asif Ali Zardari, who also happens to be the chairman of the ruling party. After the recent 18th Amendment, the power to nominate the service chiefs had been restored to the Prime Minister as it was at the time of Z A Bhutto and in the second term of office of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

This extension of tenure for an army chief by a civilian government is happening for the first time since 1955 when the government headed by Iskander Mirza gave an extension to General Ayub Khan, the country’s first army chief. At that time, the Pakistan Army did not have very many senior officers and General Ayub Khan’s extension did not create any controversy.

On the present occasion, a leading Pakistan daily, the Dawn, has commented, “Like it or not, the extension does not reflect well on the army as an institution. It is almost an article of faith that the Pakistan Army is the only viable, strong and vibrant institution in the country. Whatever General Kayani’s intimate familiarity with the present state of affairs and whatever his unique understanding of the situation, a strong institution should be able to withstand the retirement of one man, however experienced.

A compelling example of institutional concerns coming before individuals was provided recently by the US, where the architect of the present American counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan was replaced. This in the middle of a war that is by all accounts going badly for the US. Here in Pakistan, the public is constantly told that the internal security situation has improved, that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is on the back foot, that progress, while slow, is real and meaningful. If it seems difficult to reconcile the idea of a strong institution having depth in talent and leadership with the ‘indispensability’ of a single man, then that’s because it truly is.”

General Kayani is not just the chief of the army. He is also the first Director-General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to become the army chief. In that sense, he may not be the originator but truly the sustainer of the Pakistan strategy of using the various terrorist organisations as “strategic assets”. He is in direct control and charge of the “crown jewels” of Pakistan — its nuclear weapons.

General Kayani is a far more sophisticated man than General Pervez Musharraf, who felt compelled to make himself the president of Pakistan to be able to get proper protocol when he came to meet the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at Agra in 2002. In the process, he had to rig two presidential elections and earn unpopularity among the people of Pakistan. By assuming direct responsibility for governance, he became accountable for the enormous governance deficit in the country. He got himself associated in the popular mind with the United States and thereby generated the hostility of the public at large and some of the more virulent jehadi organisations. General Kayani has avoided most of those mistakes.

He delinked himself from General Musharraf and gave the green light to political parties to push him out. He earned the reputation of having conducted the second free-and-fair elections in the history of Pakistan. Political parties hailed him as being democratic. He is not blamed for governance deficits and not even for the terrorist outrages committed by jehadi organisations earlier patronised by the ISI. On the other hand, he is hailed for fighting the TTP earlier nurtured by the ISI and he is considered indispensable by the prime minister and president to continue the counterinsurgency operations against the jehadis.

In spite of continuing terrorist attacks on US targets, the Obama administration argues that there is no alternative to the Pakistan Army and its present leadership to pursue the anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan. Though General Kayani does not hold any Cabinet office, there is no doubt in the minds of Pakistanis and Americans who rules Pakistan. The strategic dialogue with the US is conducted by him with Foreign Minister Qureshi providing the façade of being the leader. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spends more time in discussions with him than any Cabinet member.

On the eve of the strategic dialogue with the US, he summoned all the secretaries to the government concerned with the discussion to the GHQ in Rawalpindi and chaired the meeting to finalise the agenda. When he expressed the displeasure of the Pakistan Army on the Kerry-Lugar legislation, a senator was rushed from the US to mollify him. Clearly, General Kayani knew he had made himself irreplaceable, which is why he was not replaced.

All this highlights that India cannot have effective communication with the real power centre of Pakistan by talking to the foreign minister, the prime minister or the now powerless president. For meaningful communication, India should be in a position to talk to the Pakistan Army chief. This cannot be done by our strictly apolitical army chief trying to talk to his counterpart. Here too, General Kayani has an advantage. He can let loose Mr Gillani on Manmohan Singh, Mr Qureshi on S M Krishna while keeping the ultimate veto power with himself.

Therefore, the Indian prime minister has to think through an innovative solution. That has to be an empowered personal envoy like the one he nominated to talk to the Chinese premier. He has to be knowledgeable to deal with terrorism, counter-terrorism, conventional military balance, nuclear deterrence, Afghanistan, China, evolving strategic balance in the area and bilateral Indo-Pakistan issues. Such missions have to be undertaken without publicity as was done with the “back channel” discussions during President Musharraf’s tenure.

In the US, Harry Hopkins was used by President Roosevelt in such a role. Will the Pakistan Army chief agree to receive a special envoy of the Indian prime minister? That will be a litmus test of his intentions towards India and his seriousness to have a real dialogue with New Delhi

they had their chance during agra talks which was scuttled by india's s-block or n-block. now there is a civilian govt. in place - they shd now deal with it. no pak army chief has ever paid a 'visit' to india on the invite of the indian chief and vice-versa - there was one occassion when the then indian chief (name forgotten) invited then army chief a/nawaz, which was 'rejected' by the nawaz govt. - opportunity lost? who knows.!

if india and pakistan are sincere to each other, they shd start thinking of 'out-of-the-box' solutions and not hold onto their 'past'.

 

[shanixee]

No PR287/2010-ISPR
Dated: Thursday, July 29, 2010

Her Excellency Ms Ulrika Sundberg, Swedish Ambassador to Pakistan called on General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Chief of Army Staff at General Headquarters today.

The visiting dignitary remained with him for some time and discussed the matters of mutual interest.

Her Excellency Ms Ulrika Sundberg, Swedish Ambassador to Pakistan called on General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Chief of Army Staff at General Headquarters on Thursday. (29-7-2010) – Photo ISPR

In the news it was also written that General Kiani will visit to sweden in order to increase defence cooperation.

I wonder wat else we can buy from sweden. as far as i know Pakistan is not interested in JAS Grippen any more

please reply my post

 

[Dazzler]

Foreign ambassadors meeting with Gen Kiyani shows who is the real force in Pakistan. Political ******** are merely for show off !

 

[Dazzler]

My thought is that Gen Kiyani has not made a decision to accept or reject GOP's decision of extension as he is a man of principal and will not fall to the bait thrown by Mr. Gilani for extending his tenure hence winning his obedience but if he accepts this, it will be a favor to Pakistan as a whole. ::

 

[Xeric]

K Subrahmanyam: Talking to Kayani

India must find a way to engage Pakistan's all-powerful Army chief


K Subrahmanyam

To no one’s surprise, General Ashfaq Kayani, the chief of the Pakistan Army, got his tenure extended by another term of three years by the civilian government. The decision was formally announced by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani in a late night broadcast after he had consulted President Asif Ali Zardari, who also happens to be the chairman of the ruling party. After the recent 18th Amendment, the power to nominate the service chiefs had been restored to the Prime Minister as it was at the time of Z A Bhutto and in the second term of office of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

This extension of tenure for an army chief by a civilian government is happening for the first time since 1955 when the government headed by Iskander Mirza gave an extension to General Ayub Khan, the country’s first army chief. At that time, the Pakistan Army did not have very many senior officers and General Ayub Khan’s extension did not create any controversy.

On the present occasion, a leading Pakistan daily, the Dawn, has commented, “Like it or not, the extension does not reflect well on the army as an institution. It is almost an article of faith that the Pakistan Army is the only viable, strong and vibrant institution in the country. Whatever General Kayani’s intimate familiarity with the present state of affairs and whatever his unique understanding of the situation, a strong institution should be able to withstand the retirement of one man, however experienced.

A compelling example of institutional concerns coming before individuals was provided recently by the US, where the architect of the present American counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan was replaced. This in the middle of a war that is by all accounts going badly for the US. Here in Pakistan, the public is constantly told that the internal security situation has improved, that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is on the back foot, that progress, while slow, is real and meaningful. If it seems difficult to reconcile the idea of a strong institution having depth in talent and leadership with the ‘indispensability’ of a single man, then that’s because it truly is.”

General Kayani is not just the chief of the army. He is also the first Director-General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to become the army chief. In that sense, he may not be the originator but truly the sustainer of the Pakistan strategy of using the various terrorist organisations as “strategic assets”. He is in direct control and charge of the “crown jewels” of Pakistan — its nuclear weapons.

General Kayani is a far more sophisticated man than General Pervez Musharraf, who felt compelled to make himself the president of Pakistan to be able to get proper protocol when he came to meet the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at Agra in 2002. In the process, he had to rig two presidential elections and earn unpopularity among the people of Pakistan. By assuming direct responsibility for governance, he became accountable for the enormous governance deficit in the country. He got himself associated in the popular mind with the United States and thereby generated the hostility of the public at large and some of the more virulent jehadi organisations. General Kayani has avoided most of those mistakes.

He delinked himself from General Musharraf and gave the green light to political parties to push him out. He earned the reputation of having conducted the second free-and-fair elections in the history of Pakistan. Political parties hailed him as being democratic. He is not blamed for governance deficits and not even for the terrorist outrages committed by jehadi organisations earlier patronised by the ISI. On the other hand, he is hailed for fighting the TTP earlier nurtured by the ISI and he is considered indispensable by the prime minister and president to continue the counterinsurgency operations against the jehadis.

In spite of continuing terrorist attacks on US targets, the Obama administration argues that there is no alternative to the Pakistan Army and its present leadership to pursue the anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan. Though General Kayani does not hold any Cabinet office, there is no doubt in the minds of Pakistanis and Americans who rules Pakistan. The strategic dialogue with the US is conducted by him with Foreign Minister Qureshi providing the façade of being the leader. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spends more time in discussions with him than any Cabinet member.

On the eve of the strategic dialogue with the US, he summoned all the secretaries to the government concerned with the discussion to the GHQ in Rawalpindi and chaired the meeting to finalise the agenda. When he expressed the displeasure of the Pakistan Army on the Kerry-Lugar legislation, a senator was rushed from the US to mollify him. Clearly, General Kayani knew he had made himself irreplaceable, which is why he was not replaced.

All this highlights that India cannot have effective communication with the real power centre of Pakistan by talking to the foreign minister, the prime minister or the now powerless president. For meaningful communication, India should be in a position to talk to the Pakistan Army chief. This cannot be done by our strictly apolitical army chief trying to talk to his counterpart. Here too, General Kayani has an advantage. He can let loose Mr Gillani on Manmohan Singh, Mr Qureshi on S M Krishna while keeping the ultimate veto power with himself.

Therefore, the Indian prime minister has to think through an innovative solution. That has to be an empowered personal envoy like the one he nominated to talk to the Chinese premier. He has to be knowledgeable to deal with terrorism, counter-terrorism, conventional military balance, nuclear deterrence, Afghanistan, China, evolving strategic balance in the area and bilateral Indo-Pakistan issues. Such missions have to be undertaken without publicity as was done with the “back channel” discussions during President Musharraf’s tenure.

In the US, Harry Hopkins was used by President Roosevelt in such a role. Will the Pakistan Army chief agree to receive a special envoy of the Indian prime minister? That will be a litmus test of his intentions towards India and his seriousness to have a real dialogue with New Delhi

Fail!