General Kiyanis imminent scheduled honorable retirement
May 14, 2010
At my recent talk at the Atlantic Council in Washington DC about the successful counterinsurgency operations by the Pakistani army, renowned defence analyst Stephen Cohen posed a loaded question: whether Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani should get an extension when his tenure as COAS expires. My answer was no, that in order to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee the effective institution it was designed to be when it first came into existence in 1975, Gen Kayani should instead head a reformed JCSC.
On extensions my opinion is that once promoted to lieutenant general a three-star must complete his tenure of four years of service (age should not become a bar). But if he has completed his four years of service an extension can be given in extraordinary circumstances. Extension of service for a COAS is an entirely different matter. Primarily, it sets off a chain reaction which ends in promotions in the army being blocked. However loyal and sincere the senior military hierarchy, potential aspirants will feel deprived of their turn at attaining the top slot. Really good prospects down the line will find their careers and ambitions sidelined. All those presently in contention for the COAS job have good professional careers, and for the most part are not tainted by real-estate scandals. Extension will mean these officers will retire from service in the next 12-18 months. An extension to the COAS will put a monkey wrench into a natural process.
Promotions during the Kayani incumbency have been deserving ones, and crucial slots (the right man for the right job) have mostly been filled on merit. There will always be a perception of nepotism and favouritism, normal for any organisation or corporate entity. The boss will always tend to prefer those he considers close to him. Rightly or wrongly, a feeling will still prevail that, merit notwithstanding, crucial posts will go to favourites rather than to the man best suited to the job.
The JCSC must become an effective military instrument. Today`s warfare cannot be fought service by service, it has to be a combined, all-service affair. Not a single military analyst believes otherwise, so why is practice different from theory? The present Army-PAF cooperation during counterinsurgency operations has been superb, for while both chiefs are to be commended. Something routine had to depend upon the personal chemistry of the two leaders! This is unacceptable for a modern military machine, the combined potential on which the existence of our nation is dependant.
The JCSC should be the central HQ for all three services, formulating overall war plans incorporating their combined fighting potential, and the mechanism for implementing the war plans. Things basic to the three services must be unified. Some of it is already being donee.g., medical and engineering services. Why not entities that are common, basic training institutions, workshops, etc.? Specifics cannot be addressed in a short article, but what about standardisation of small arms, vehicles, the myriad types of which defy adequate description? The present incumbent can spend usefully the 150 days he has left by conducting an exercise on how the JCSC can be made effective.
Constructive reforms should include: (1) the JCSC becoming the GHQ for all three services, and the army`s headquarters, the Army HQ; (2) the chairman of the JCSC (rename him Chief of Defence Services, or something similar) presiding over the senior promotions, from one star to two stars and from two stars to three stars in all three services; (3) all postings of three stars taking place with the concurrence of the GHQ; (4) creation of a Joint Operations Chief (JOC), or any such nomenclature, in the GHQ; (5) all military procurement under the GHQ`s aegis; (6) the ISI and the ISPR reporting to the GHQ, etc.
We need services integration, and we need it now. Being 36 years out of date, current and better military minds than mine can work out the modalities of making the JCSC effective. One does not grudge them their task of taking apart and putting out to pasture a 19th-century military mindset having no place in the 21st century, and certainly not after World War II.
Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has remade the Pakistani army in many ways more than one: restoring the esteem that in which the army was held by the citizens of the country, and restoring the morale and self-confidence of its rank and file; recalling several hundred army officers on deputation in civil services where they had no reason to be; the military`s intelligence services not being allowed to interfere in the 2008 elections.
This set the stage for the army to get out of politics. He oversaw a peaceful transition (with dignity) of Gen Musharraf out of the office of president (and with some difficulty out of the Army House), and stayed neutral in the subsequent process of the election of the new president.
Kayani has focused on soldiers` welfare and a return to professionalism. Counterinsurgency training was carried out indigenously before soldiers were taken into battle. A peacetime outfit was converted into an effective military machine. Observers far and wide have been amazed by the effectiveness of the subsequent counterinsurgency campaign.
Our young men in uniform laid down their lives in Swat and South Waziristan. Their Shahadats amounted to something great. Kayani gently nudged the government into restoring the superior judiciary in the face of the long march. Kayani`s many successes have not gone to his head. Instead of developing Napoleonic tendencies, he remains committed to democracy, even a multi-flawed, inherently corrupt one like ours. His will be a difficult act to follow.
There are many more reasons for Kayani not getting an extension. To quote Air Vice Marshal (r) Shahzad Chaudhry, losing him would be a blow to the continuity of a transition in the nation`s institutional rebuilding, while extending his present position will likely not go down well with others in the army waiting to have their chance.
With the universal confidence reposed in Kayani, he can supervise the process of making the JCSC reforms effective. Without this, Kayani should opt to retire gracefully, putting the considerable strength of his popularity in ensuring that the best man for the job is selected as the new COAS.
General Kiyani?s imminent scheduled honorable retirement | Pakistan Daily