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Can Pakistan Afford to Lose Musharraf?
By J. A. Malik
Fairfax, Virginia
Pakistan is now at yet another crossroads in its 60 years of existence. More specifically, its relationship with its ally the United States is playing out true to form from the cold-war playbook, and it history seems to be inevitably repeating itself. President Musharraf, however, just might be able to avoid suffering the same fate as Ayub and Zia, and more importantly, keep Pakistan from being hung out to dry as has always been the case. The question is, will, or can he?
American interest in Pakistan has always been self-serving, good for the short-term, and terrible for the long-term. What starts out as doe-eyed courtship of the powers to be in Islamabad ends with cruel abandonment, and this always has catastrophic consequences. Pouring military and economic aid into Pakistan during Ayub Khans government was great for the short-term. Ayubs ideology (much like Zias and Musharrafs) was that aligning itself with the wealthiest superpower would secure the development and preservation of Pakistan. The Americans, in return, got a new friend in the Soviet Unions backyard. At the onset it worked the industrial sector boomed. But this led to wealth being distributed unequally in society which carried a whole host of problems. Additionally, the US became more interested in Vietnam and seemed to be less interested in South Asia, declaring itself neutral in the Pak/Indian conflict and even cutting military aid. Ouch! So much for promises!
The second era in the on-again-off-again Pak-American love affair began when General Zia became Washingtons point man in fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. So much money and military aid was being poured into Pakistan at that time that neighboring rival India was shaking in its boots. Once the Soviets lost, America had no more use of Pakistan (or Zia). Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan in droves (bringing with them enough drugs and guns to make Scarface jealous), putting a big strain on Pakistans resources. Poor Zia was violently informed that his services were no longer needed while in mid-air. Not only was the total isolation and abandonment in the 90s bad for Pakistan, it wasnt good for business for the United States either.
During the 90s, Pakistan was teetering on the brink of war, economic collapse, complete international isolation and social disaffection with the rotating cast of corrupt characters that kept assuming the highest offices of the land. Pakistan was left without, as the Beatles sang, a little help from its friends. It is no wonder why many Pakistanis felt betrayed and this paved the way for anti-American sentiments in the junior ranks of the military, and extremist madrassas suddenly gained ascendancy. Not good for Pakistan, and really not good for America.
Enter General (retd) Musharraf, a moderate, reformist general who was welcomed with open arms by the masses, but not recognized as anything more than yet another banana republic dictator by Washington. All this changed when the Twin Towers were hit. The United States needed an ally to fight the War on Terrorism, and was willing to pump money, military aid, and anything else into Pakistan. Suddenly Musharraf became the rock star on the world stage. Sounds familiar? Swap Zia for Musharraf, Reagan for Bush, and the Soviet Union for Al Qaeda and we have a carbon copy situation. This time, however, the stakes were much higher.
For the first seven years of his rule, Musharraf was wildly popular at home. The economy was growing by 6% yearly, a near bankrupt Pakistan suddenly saw billions of dollars in reserves, large scale development took place, free media flourished and women were given much political representation. Not too shabby for a military ruler. Although these accomplishments can be attributed directly to Musharraf and his government, a large part of Musharrafs survival relied on the backing and blessing of Washington. In a country of coups, resignations, and political instability, Musharraf probably would not have maintained such a firm grip on power if it were not for the West. What went wrong?
Last year, Musharrafs popularity (and Pakistans stability) plummeted at an astounding pace. The elephant in the room must not be ignored. The United States must not only be retreating and once again leaving Pakistan in the cold.
Last years the Chief Justice debacle might at surface seem to be a miscalculated backfire of Musharrafs tussle with the Judiciary, but the well organized (and oddly political-style) lawyer protests simply cannot have been so well executed without a foreign hand. Then we have a serious of suspicious bombings and suicide-attacks in Pakistan, which further shook the confidence in the Musharraf government amongst the population. Where were all these suicide bombers the last seven years? On vacation? Then General Musharraf, whose tenure as Chief of Army Staff, although expired years ago to no real opposition, suddenly was forced to relinquish his uniform. The 700,000 man strong Army had been his power base, and suddenly he was put in a position where overwhelming calls for him to resign as Army chief forced him to give in. Next comes the return of Benazir Bhutto. Benazirs image in the world and in Pakistan was suddenly given a makeover so fast that it seemed as if Mother Theresa was coming to save Pakistan. Her twice dismissed government, plagued by corruption and inefficiency was forgotten and her Daughter of the Pakistan subtitle was shoved down everyones throats. Benazirs JFK-esque assassination (completed with magic bullets and slow moving motorcade) further throttled Musharraf in the eyes of the public. Although Musharraf would have had much more use of a living, US backed Benazir than a martyred Benazir, conspiracy theories have flooded the media, Internet blogsphere and common man word-of-mouth that Musharraf was involved. Political rhetoric coming from the American presidential candidates seem to be overwhelmingly critical of not just the Musharraf regime, but of Pakistan itself. Many candidates have suggested that if they were to come into office, they would cut aid to Pakistan. Even more alarming is the hints of US troop deployment inside Pakistan without Pakistans consent in the name of fighting terrorism! US Senators, legislators, analysts and various talking heads now have shifted towards a strategy of depicting Pakistan as an unstable, nuclear power that could collapse at any times and fall into the hands of the evil Al Queada, which Musharraf has been unable to effectively eradicate.
In these dangerous times, Musharraf, with his many faults, might be the lesser of other evils. Although he has blundered, he has still maintained resolve and has increasingly become vocally critical about anti-Pakistan Western designs. Where previously complacent to Washington, Musharraf now seems to be shedding his skin as US-backed Musharraf to simply Musharraf. In his recent European tour, Musharraf was openly defiant about what he called Americas obsession with democracy. Additionally, he made it quite clear that any American troops allowed on Pakistani soil would be seen as invaders. And the icing on the cake was his assertion that the Al Qaeda and Taliban resurgence was in part due to US military failure. This shift in his attitude seems to indicate that he has finally realized that the American policy of pump and dump is a very real threat to Pakistan. In fact, a recent New York Times article broke a story that a secret trip to Islamabad of national intelligence director Mike McConnell and CIA director General Michael Hayden proved fruitless for the Americans. The US suggested joint troop movement against jihadists operating in Pakistan and were told by Musharraf that this will not be allowed under his watch.
With a near certain win for Democrats in the upcoming US elections, a Pak-American showdown is inevitable. Pakistanis always seem to appreciate in hindsight. The old adage the grass is always greener on the other side is a perfect example of the fickleness with which we view our leaders. There is a story involving the late Ayub Khan that goes as such: well after leaving office, Ayub Khan was one day walking in a park in Islamabad when a group of pedestrians recognized the former President and surrounded him. They started cheering and proclaiming Ayub Khan Zindabad! Sadr Ayub Khan Zindabad! To which an emotional Ayub responded, Nahin, Ayub Khan ***** hai. Bhool gaye? He was referring to the contemptuous slogans once raised by the same population.
Has Musharraf been the best, ideal leader for Pakistan? Certainly not. But can Pakistan afford to lose Musharraf at this critical point? Is that a gamble that we are prepared to take?
Opinion
By J. A. Malik
Fairfax, Virginia
We learn from history that we learn nothing from history -George Bernard Shaw
Pakistan is now at yet another crossroads in its 60 years of existence. More specifically, its relationship with its ally the United States is playing out true to form from the cold-war playbook, and it history seems to be inevitably repeating itself. President Musharraf, however, just might be able to avoid suffering the same fate as Ayub and Zia, and more importantly, keep Pakistan from being hung out to dry as has always been the case. The question is, will, or can he?
American interest in Pakistan has always been self-serving, good for the short-term, and terrible for the long-term. What starts out as doe-eyed courtship of the powers to be in Islamabad ends with cruel abandonment, and this always has catastrophic consequences. Pouring military and economic aid into Pakistan during Ayub Khans government was great for the short-term. Ayubs ideology (much like Zias and Musharrafs) was that aligning itself with the wealthiest superpower would secure the development and preservation of Pakistan. The Americans, in return, got a new friend in the Soviet Unions backyard. At the onset it worked the industrial sector boomed. But this led to wealth being distributed unequally in society which carried a whole host of problems. Additionally, the US became more interested in Vietnam and seemed to be less interested in South Asia, declaring itself neutral in the Pak/Indian conflict and even cutting military aid. Ouch! So much for promises!
The second era in the on-again-off-again Pak-American love affair began when General Zia became Washingtons point man in fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. So much money and military aid was being poured into Pakistan at that time that neighboring rival India was shaking in its boots. Once the Soviets lost, America had no more use of Pakistan (or Zia). Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan in droves (bringing with them enough drugs and guns to make Scarface jealous), putting a big strain on Pakistans resources. Poor Zia was violently informed that his services were no longer needed while in mid-air. Not only was the total isolation and abandonment in the 90s bad for Pakistan, it wasnt good for business for the United States either.
During the 90s, Pakistan was teetering on the brink of war, economic collapse, complete international isolation and social disaffection with the rotating cast of corrupt characters that kept assuming the highest offices of the land. Pakistan was left without, as the Beatles sang, a little help from its friends. It is no wonder why many Pakistanis felt betrayed and this paved the way for anti-American sentiments in the junior ranks of the military, and extremist madrassas suddenly gained ascendancy. Not good for Pakistan, and really not good for America.
Enter General (retd) Musharraf, a moderate, reformist general who was welcomed with open arms by the masses, but not recognized as anything more than yet another banana republic dictator by Washington. All this changed when the Twin Towers were hit. The United States needed an ally to fight the War on Terrorism, and was willing to pump money, military aid, and anything else into Pakistan. Suddenly Musharraf became the rock star on the world stage. Sounds familiar? Swap Zia for Musharraf, Reagan for Bush, and the Soviet Union for Al Qaeda and we have a carbon copy situation. This time, however, the stakes were much higher.
For the first seven years of his rule, Musharraf was wildly popular at home. The economy was growing by 6% yearly, a near bankrupt Pakistan suddenly saw billions of dollars in reserves, large scale development took place, free media flourished and women were given much political representation. Not too shabby for a military ruler. Although these accomplishments can be attributed directly to Musharraf and his government, a large part of Musharrafs survival relied on the backing and blessing of Washington. In a country of coups, resignations, and political instability, Musharraf probably would not have maintained such a firm grip on power if it were not for the West. What went wrong?
Last year, Musharrafs popularity (and Pakistans stability) plummeted at an astounding pace. The elephant in the room must not be ignored. The United States must not only be retreating and once again leaving Pakistan in the cold.
Last years the Chief Justice debacle might at surface seem to be a miscalculated backfire of Musharrafs tussle with the Judiciary, but the well organized (and oddly political-style) lawyer protests simply cannot have been so well executed without a foreign hand. Then we have a serious of suspicious bombings and suicide-attacks in Pakistan, which further shook the confidence in the Musharraf government amongst the population. Where were all these suicide bombers the last seven years? On vacation? Then General Musharraf, whose tenure as Chief of Army Staff, although expired years ago to no real opposition, suddenly was forced to relinquish his uniform. The 700,000 man strong Army had been his power base, and suddenly he was put in a position where overwhelming calls for him to resign as Army chief forced him to give in. Next comes the return of Benazir Bhutto. Benazirs image in the world and in Pakistan was suddenly given a makeover so fast that it seemed as if Mother Theresa was coming to save Pakistan. Her twice dismissed government, plagued by corruption and inefficiency was forgotten and her Daughter of the Pakistan subtitle was shoved down everyones throats. Benazirs JFK-esque assassination (completed with magic bullets and slow moving motorcade) further throttled Musharraf in the eyes of the public. Although Musharraf would have had much more use of a living, US backed Benazir than a martyred Benazir, conspiracy theories have flooded the media, Internet blogsphere and common man word-of-mouth that Musharraf was involved. Political rhetoric coming from the American presidential candidates seem to be overwhelmingly critical of not just the Musharraf regime, but of Pakistan itself. Many candidates have suggested that if they were to come into office, they would cut aid to Pakistan. Even more alarming is the hints of US troop deployment inside Pakistan without Pakistans consent in the name of fighting terrorism! US Senators, legislators, analysts and various talking heads now have shifted towards a strategy of depicting Pakistan as an unstable, nuclear power that could collapse at any times and fall into the hands of the evil Al Queada, which Musharraf has been unable to effectively eradicate.
In these dangerous times, Musharraf, with his many faults, might be the lesser of other evils. Although he has blundered, he has still maintained resolve and has increasingly become vocally critical about anti-Pakistan Western designs. Where previously complacent to Washington, Musharraf now seems to be shedding his skin as US-backed Musharraf to simply Musharraf. In his recent European tour, Musharraf was openly defiant about what he called Americas obsession with democracy. Additionally, he made it quite clear that any American troops allowed on Pakistani soil would be seen as invaders. And the icing on the cake was his assertion that the Al Qaeda and Taliban resurgence was in part due to US military failure. This shift in his attitude seems to indicate that he has finally realized that the American policy of pump and dump is a very real threat to Pakistan. In fact, a recent New York Times article broke a story that a secret trip to Islamabad of national intelligence director Mike McConnell and CIA director General Michael Hayden proved fruitless for the Americans. The US suggested joint troop movement against jihadists operating in Pakistan and were told by Musharraf that this will not be allowed under his watch.
With a near certain win for Democrats in the upcoming US elections, a Pak-American showdown is inevitable. Pakistanis always seem to appreciate in hindsight. The old adage the grass is always greener on the other side is a perfect example of the fickleness with which we view our leaders. There is a story involving the late Ayub Khan that goes as such: well after leaving office, Ayub Khan was one day walking in a park in Islamabad when a group of pedestrians recognized the former President and surrounded him. They started cheering and proclaiming Ayub Khan Zindabad! Sadr Ayub Khan Zindabad! To which an emotional Ayub responded, Nahin, Ayub Khan ***** hai. Bhool gaye? He was referring to the contemptuous slogans once raised by the same population.
Has Musharraf been the best, ideal leader for Pakistan? Certainly not. But can Pakistan afford to lose Musharraf at this critical point? Is that a gamble that we are prepared to take?
Opinion
