Call for Pakistan Army, to raise a TIER-1 Special Operations Force.

[fatman17]

FY2006-FY2010 – CT Capacity Building - Recipients and Funding.


Pakistan, the second-largest recipient with $203.4 million, or about 15% of total Section 1206 funding, did not receive funds in FY2010.

Some $113.5 million, or over half Pakistan’s funding, was provided in FY2009. Most Section 1206 funding to Pakistan provided equipment and training to increase the government’s ability to counter terrorism threats emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

A central feature was helicopter support. In FY2006, Section 1206 assistance was first used to address spare part shortages that limited availability from Pakistan’s “impressive inventory of helicopters.”55 These funds provided spare parts for Mi-17 and Cobra helicopters, as well as aviation body armor, night vision goggles, and limited visibility training for pilots.

FY2008 and FY2009
funds also have provided the means, technical support, and training to repair, maintain, shelter, and operate Pakistan’s helicopters for use in FATA operations. FY2009 funds supply four Mi-17 helicopters and spare parts for use along Pakistan’s western border.

Support to Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG), a special forces unit, to operate more effectively in the FATA has included a variety of equipment in FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009. Equipment contracted during those fiscal years included radios and other communications equipment, targeting systems, sniper rifles, ammunition, night vision goggles, global positioning systems units, lifesaver kits, body armor, and other field gear.

In FY2007 it included training for conducting nighttime raids from helicopters (FY2007). In FY2008, equipment was also provided to the Pakistan Army Aviation 21st reaction squadron.

Additional FY2009 aid included support to build a ground-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability for counterterrorism operations to support Pakistan Army counterterrorism operations in the FATA, and kits to assist the Pakistan Army and Navy effectively investigate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other explosives used in terrorism operations.

Program………………………………………………............Value
Pakistan Border Area T&E/ Marines T&E………… 29.0

Enhance Shared MDA and Cooperative Maritime Security Aid……….. 8.1
Helicopter CT Capability……………………………...... 20.9
Special Services Group COIN Kick Start Initiative……………………… 14.9
Mi-17 Support…………………………………………........ 17.0
Mi-17 Helicopters……………………………………........ 80.0
Aviation Maintenance Shelters in Federally Administered Tribal Areas.. 3.1
Army and Navy Capability Building to Investigate Explosives…………… 0.6
SOF CT Package………………………………………....... 17.0
Ground-Based Intelligence S&R Capability…………12.8

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf

 

[fatman17]

What is a rapid deployment force?


What is a rapid deployment force? How does it differ from other forces in structure, mission and use? A rapid deployment force is usually configured as an elite body of troops that are designed to move greater distances and in shorter times than their counterparts in the rest of the armed forces. Of course regular military formations are designed to be reasonably mobile and capable of distant deployment if necessary. For example, the Reforger reinforcements from the Continental United States, which were designed to reinforce NATO's Central Front in time of crisis, were expected to be withdrawing their equipment from the POMCUS (Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets) stores in around ten days. These reinforcements consisted of two divisional and ten non-divisional units of the US Army, as well as additional tactical fighter wings from the US Air Force. While this seems impressive (and it is) it should be remembered that the majority of these units would only have to be flown in by air into a Central European infrastructure (airports, military airfields, tarmac covered autobahns, major and minor roads) and assuming that they were mobilised ahead of hostilities (a good chance) would not be facing enemy action as soon as they arrived (or even as they were en route). A rapid deployment force must be prepared to have only a few, or possibly none of these luxuries. It must be able not only to move great distances in as short a time as possible, but take much of what it needs with it. Prepositioning, of course, can help to a certain extent but because rapid deployment forces are supposed to be mobile and cover a wide geographical area, this would unnecessarily tie it into one specific area, although maritime prepositioning is not as bad as the ships can be sent to the particular troublespot in question. The RDF may also have to arrange for the equipment to be unloaded (a problem if there is a lack of available landing strips or cargo handling facilities at the ports) and "marry up" the equipment with the appropriate personnel if they have arrived separately (as they did during Operation Desert Shield) and deploy, possibly under hostile fire. This is where the rapid deployment force differs from its counterparts - its flexibility, mobility and speed.

Some Interesting Problems
But the very nature of rapid deployment forces also brings a number of questions and issues into focus. The very specialised nature of the forces means that they also tend to cost more than their counterparts, not only in terms of the force itself (personnel, equipment, training in exotic locations and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I)) but of the assets required for it to do its job. These include strategic lift (airborne and maritime) and the logistical requirements they have, making sure the bases used on the way have the necessary equipment and supplies, the upkeep of equipment and supplies held in storage at prepositioned sites and the inevitable opportunity cost that this involves (for example, more prepositioning and fast break-bulk carriers means less money for the US Navy to spend on their submarines and carrier battle groups). There is also the question of effectiveness. In order to travel any sort of distance in a short time the force (or the initial elements of it anyway) will have to be based around light infantry, such as airborne or air mobile troops. As such these troops will only be able to carry a small amount of equipment and supplies until reinforced either by airlift or in the longer term, sealift. As very few transport aircraft can carry oversized loads (the Russian An-124 and American C-5 are examples) this will limit the number of vehicles the initial force can take with it and thus while it may have great strategic mobility initially, it will be limited in the amount of tactical mobility it has, once it deploys. It is worth noting two relationships that all planners of rapid deployment forces have to take into account, that of strategic mobility verses tactical mobility (the more a force has of one, the less it tends to have of the other) and the related one of airlift verses sealift (airlift can get to different areas of the world quickly but is limited in the amount of material it can carry, while sealift can carry vastly more in terms of material but takes a lot longer to get anywhere). so any initial force, while getting to the troublespot quickly will be limited in the amount of tactical mobility it has and may be in trouble if faced with a more tactically mobile opponent, especially if they are highly mechanised or even motorised. Rapid deployment forces also raise political issues, due to their funding and may be perceived as an implicit threat by those countries or actors with whom the state owning the force has relations with. It could also be used as a method of deterrence or political gesture if the force regularly exercises in allied territory. C3I is also a consideration which impacts on cost but also standardisation. The very mission of the rapid deployment force means that it may require more sophisticated or specialised C3I assets which may have to be developed differently from the rest of the armed forces. There is also the question of usage, do they have to react to every crisis, and if not, which ones do they react to? Are they a liability, meaning that once you have them, do people start looking to you in times of need? Does this saddle you with additional responsibility, that perhaps you were not ready for?

peter antill

 

[420canada]

@420canada

Would love to have your opinion mate.

i personally belive strongly that pakistan sould opt for a tire-1 sf. it comes at a time where Pakistan needs it. look at the naval base attack the ssgn where getting desimated! if i am not wrong tho QRU was established for the safe gaurd the nukes? are they not tier-1? if i remember they where chosen from the 3 of SF of Pakistan. as i see it these men need technology on their side a lot of it. UAV,s2s man protabel missiles ,EW, very reliable reacon from HQ and the list gose on. i think pakistan has to have a blank check book for them.

 

[blain2]

i personally belive strongly that pakistan sould opt for a tire-1 sf. it comes at a time where Pakistan needs it. look at the naval base attack the ssgn where getting desimated! if i am not wrong tho QRU was established for the safe gaurd the nukes? are they not tier-1? if i remember they where chosen from the 3 of SF of Pakistan. as i see it these men need technology on their side a lot of it. UAV,s2s man protabel missiles ,EW, very reliable reacon from HQ and the list gose on. i think pakistan has to have a blank check book for them.

Who said SSG(N) were decimated? the QRF exists for these duties, they responded to the attacks. SSG is not deployed for duties related to securing locations etc.

Another point, I see mention of Rapid Deployment Forces here which are very different from Special Operations Forces (RDF can include SOF elements but is more of an anarchronism from the Cold War days. Also the RDF should not be confused with QRFs either. Different contexts and roles for each.

Lastly, the topic of the thread around the "tiered" capability is a concept that is not widely used in the Pakistani parlance. The reason for this is because in Pakistan the Special Service elements within the three Services are already the best funded of all the Special Forces outfits. So if we were to go by the typical definition of the tiered system/scale, the SSG(A)/(N) and SSW would all be considered Tier 1 outfits for Pakistan.

If I were to nitpick on this a bit more, I would say the SSG (A), with all of its various capabilities and specially the Anti Terrorist/CT capability is at the highest end of this scale.

There is a significant qualitative difference and the specialization of forces deployed to safeguard nuclear facilities versus those that are deployed to safeguard bases and other general military facilities. In light of the attacks on some of these bases, my understanding is that the respective services are working to increase the readiness of the units involved in security roles.

 

[XYON]

In a modern military, Special Forces should be Tier 1 Joint Command indeed! But the question is; where is the money going to come to facilitate the equipment/ operations & infrastructure for this new command? Secondarily, until the Joint Services Command HQ is made viable, a SF Tier 1 Command cannot be a reality in Pakistan.

 

[Kompromat]

@blain2

Very informative post sir.

I do understand that all of our SOF units are highly trained are among the best.

The SOCOM is made up of all USSOF elements. However they introduced the 'delta detatchment' as a Tier1 unit due to the current threat environment.

The main difference between USSOF and Tier1 units under JSOC is that the Teir1 force recruits its operatives from the USSOF rather than from the US Army.

They have raised a SOF from within the USSOF.

They receive highly specialized training for 'offensive' operations, on top of their previous SOF training.

While we do have highly competent SOF apparatus, i feel that we need to institutionalize a Teir1 SOF to only be used to carry out offensive operations, to take the battle to the enemy, to take out high value targets and to operate under deep cover behind enemy lines.

They should be small in numbers but highly resourced, highly trained and immuned from any laws.

Our fight against terror is not going to end in 2014, such a force will bolster our ability to surgically alter events and eliminate individuals to gain strategic impacts on a terrorist organization.

 

[blain2]

Aeronaut,

Tiers are in place to define the level of funding provided to various units. You could have a highly funded (lets say Tier 1) force but may not know how capable it is unless it were used operationally. The assumption is that the higher up the tiers, the more operational readiness within the unit.

Secondly, the evolution of the special services/forces is towards specialization. I.e. the SF elements are being divided to have specialist units for various tasks. Those who perform the "conventional" mission of the SF, which is operating behind the enemy lines, make up the largest body of Pakistani Special Forces.

For large scale counter terrorism/militancy operations, the SOTF is specifically funded. Perhaps you could consider that to be a tier one element of the Pakistani SF (just depends on what your definition of "tier 1" is).

As far as extra-judicial killings of militants is concerned, that is something that can never be sanctioned.

 

[sharjeel1992]

1. Intel
2. Communication & Technology & transportation
3. Training in our own areas.

What is the difference between Pakistan's special forces and others? We send our forces to train abroad.
Take israel, they train their forces in their home lands (tel megiddido).
Intel:
We need intel about them. As some one already described earlier. Take battle to them. To take battle to them we will need to know their tactics. So, lads do we have the intel about them. If we have that do we know their locations?
Communication & Technology & transportation:
Well I think we got adequate man power to get the job done. What we lack is the technology and the communication between all the three units.
Training in our own areas:
Lastly, as I said and one of the guy pointed out earlier. What we need is to train the forces in lands that familiarize them with the situations they will tackle in warfare. To give them an idea about it bases should be installed in Army controlled area in Khyber Agency and South Waziristan.
Guerrillas can only be killed by Guerrillas, traditional war methods do not work for them.

 

[blain2]

learn from Israelis
they have very small teams who go in the homes of their targets and execute them there

No Chief Justice b@stardness
No Hamid Mir Jaffer or Orya Maqbool Jan who always defends taliban

Israelis go and kill Palestinians, not Israelis. In Pakistan, the counter insurgency is not about elimination primarily, it has a significant rehabilitation/weaning off aspect as well since many of the insurgents are Pakistanis.

My own take is that "Tier-1 SoF" is another Special Forces buzz that will stick around till the next big thing. In reality it is about allocating forces for specific missions (thus known as Special Missions Units). A budget is created and training in line with the mission on hand is provided to its cadres instead of having generalist SF cadres doing this job. The more important thing is that these elements benefit from having access to intelligence and training according to the needs of the mission.

Coming to the reality, as someone aptly put it, what is the need for something similar in Pakistan? We are not involved in a global manhunt for some specific entities. We don't want to be seen operating overseas as we are not a global power and even if we were, keep in mind most of the missions the US Tier-1 forces carry out can be challenged at The Hague.

In other words, besides the US, most other countries don't have the appetite or willingness to fly around and kill/capture those deemed to be enemies of the state etc.

Thus in most of these commonly touted lists of Tier-One forces, you will mostly find American teams.

For what Pakistan needs, our respective Special Service commands are appropriate.

As far as jointness of the Special Forces is concerned, that too has its pros and cons because this concept has been around since the 90's. The reason Pakistan has not gone for it because the respective services like to do their own planning for SF employment. It is an expensive endeavor with questionable value for a country like Pakistan.

The norm has been that the three services discuss the areas of responsibility for their respective special service commands and avoid overlap. This is also the reason that SSG(A) has the primary task of operating in a counter terrorism role. This is also the reason that SSG(N) and SSW don't have teams like Zarrar ATU. Their cadres train in AT role but so do FC and Police units. The Navy and the Air Force focus their efforts on their special missions.