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Brazil to provide 100 missiles to Pakistan

The original AGM-88 has been in use since the 1980s, and the original 1960s anti- radiation missile quickly evolved into what was called HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile).

The AGM-88E version defeats the favorite trick of anti-aircraft units, shutting down their radars when they note a HARM is on the way. The AGM-88E remembers where the radar is when it was on, and carries its own high resolution (millimeter wave) radar to make sure it gets the radar. Finally, the AGM-88E can transmit a picture of the target, just before it is hit, so the user can be certain of what was taken out.

The target memory is not just the feature of AGM-88E, not even the early AGM-88 versions. Rather earlier AGM-78B Standard ARM called shortly as 'STARM' also featured it as early as 1969.

http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/stardarm.htm

AGM-78 Standard ARM Summary

From [8.0] Anti-Radar Missiles

The AGM-78B was also fitted with a smoke flare to mark the target, allowing other aircraft to spot and attack an air-defense site with HE and cluster bombs after the STARM blinded its radar. However this target marking smoke flare seems to be a feature of even the early AGM-45 Shrike.
 
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A few thoughts in the issue of range of MAR-1:

1. Range for AGM-88 HARM was/is 57 nautical miles / 66 mi / 106 km (see e.g. Wiki). IMHO some have confused this as being the range for MAR-1. Example from a post on www . fuerzasmilitares . org: "O MAR-1 é um míssil anti radiação, equivalente ao HARM americano com alcance de cerca de 100Km." Such a post can easily be musunderstood to mean MAR-1 has the same range as AGM-88, while what is meant is that MAR-1 is equivalent to HARM in the sense that both are anti-radiation missiles.

2. Aside from the fact that some sources claim 35km rather than 25km range for MAR-1, I think in discussing the range issue that the italicised part of the quote below is often overlooked:

"The missile has a reported range of 25 km when launched from an altitude of about 33,000 feet/ 10 km."
http :// panamericandefense . wordpress . com / category / updated-by-country / brasil /

"A primeira versão testada tinha alcance no limite de 25 a 30 quilômetros, disparado na altitude de 33 mil pés, cerca de 10 mil metros."
(The first tested version had reach in the limit of 25 the 30 kilometers, gone off in the altitude of 33 a thousand feet, about 10 a thousand meters.)
http :// www . fab . mil . br / portal / capa / index.php ? datan = 07/12/2008 & page=mostra_notimpol

I suppose it would be able to fly further when launched from greater altitude?
 
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Tinamou/phoenix80 - stop creating multiple ID's.

I have already suggested a course for addressing your ban, follow that, and do not log on again until the webmaster lifts the ban on one of your ID's.
 
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Tinamou/phoenix80 - stop creating multiple ID's.

I have already suggested a course for addressing your ban, follow that, and do not log on again webmaster lifts the ban on one of your ID's.

AgNoStIc MuSliM;, sir
so that this thread also closed?:eek:
thanks
 
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i think the range of 25km is too little correct me if i am wrong...!! the strike aircraft will be completely exposed to the SAM's protecting the radars!! but whatever the case it is a good purchase for PAF
 
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I think in that case the Indians have S-300 PMU2s with a range of 195 kms already.

source: en/wikipedia.org/wiki/S-300P

Also the thing is that given that MAR-1 has limited range of 25 kms, the AD units in India have mainly to worry about OSA-AK mobile systems (which still can switch off and run from site in case of being noticed due to packaged systems ie radar and missiles on BMPs already and no need to set it up separately), the SA-3 Pechora units and finally the main fixed radars ..... the mobile ones have ability to relocate making it very difficult if not impossible to kill.
Yes I would agree that short-range SAM units are more vulnerable.
shot-range SAMs whose fire-control (or even search) radars are mounted over the same vehicle that also carries missiles seem to be more vulnerable to ARM attack. All in one vehicle is not safe, as if the fire-control radar is hit by ARM, the missiles would also be lost.

Although SAM missiles are useless if SAM radar is lost, even then missiles can be reused if they survive. Russian SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6, S-300 series carry missiles separately from both search and fire-control radars.

Now SA-8 (Osa-Ak), SA-19 Tunguska and Crotale carry fire-control radars together with missile on one vehilce, which is not ideal situation.

But even then its not so simple to survive for the medium-range ones too untill they meet certain conditions.
 
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We must have questions in mind that why can't a SAM site intercept and destroy an incoming ARM rather than shutting down the radar? We know that even artillery shells can be destroyed by missiles for example the British Sea Wolf anti-missile point defence system demonstrated such capability and in the Falklands war of 1982, no british ship equipped with Sea Wolf was hit by Exocet.

Now the RCS of an artillery shell is smaller than a missile and thus must be harder than ARM to detect. Also we know that Scud missiles were destroyed by US Patriot systems. But still we have not heard that ARM was destroyed en route to the radar. Here is an effort to understand this mystery.

There has always been an emphasis that air defence radars should have least sidelobes and backlobes. An ARM that homes on the main lobe of radar shall obviously be visible on the radar screen albeit at short range and the radar operator can shut down the radar, thus degrading the kill probability in case the radar is mobile and relocates in 10-15 seconds.

Anti-Radiation missiles therefore avoid the mainlobe and home on sidelobes and backlobes because a radar works through the main lobe. Radar receives the reflections from sidelobes too but they are generally unwanted and weak returns.

I conclude that ARM homing on backlobe means it is not following the launch aircraft's line-of-sight to fire-control radar and even may be coming from behind the fire-control radar. Similarly, an ARM homing on the sidelobe may strike from right or left and not from front.

If the returns from sidelobes are rejected, a single radar may not even see the ARM coming. Similarly if ARM is homing on backlobe, a very long range radar too may not get any warning as the radar does not function through backlobes.

This implies that a stand-alone (non-AESA) radar is more vulnerable than a set of radars and that the fire-control radars should be in coverage of search radars. An overlapping radar coverage is important for added security and safety.

Sidelobes issues is serious for older radars associated with short-range SAMs because the launch aircraft can release its ARM before the SAM and then the radar is more likely to follow the launch aircraft rather than ARM.
 
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Continuing to the last post,

When a fire-control radar of SAM is under attack by ARM, the search radar can alert the SAM crews even if the ARM is attacking from behind, left or right.

A mechanically scanned surveillance or acquisition radar is rotating at 360 degrees continuously and so are rotating its main, side and backlobes. Thus an ARM can't attack a search radar in surprise. On the other hand, an engagement/fire-control/targeting radar does not rotate continuously and rather track the target continuously.

With the coming on scene of AESA radars, this advantage of ARM shall erode if all radars on the ground too are upgraded to AESA technology.

Old antennae used to be of concave shape. Planar array radar antennae have less sidelobes as compared to classical concave reflecting antennae (known as dish antennae). The antenna is a flat plate in planar array. Still these early planar array antennae were mechanically scanned. APG-63 radar of early F-15 Eagle is one example of planar arrays.

Then came the phased array antenna or PESA radars. Lastly, we have AESA that have extremely small sidelobes as compared to all earlier radars, making it very difficult for ARMs.

From this point of view, our new AEW are not so prone to surprise attack even by an air to air anti-radiation missile and should get ample warning.
 
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There is another issue, along with the long range search radars, there are multiple medium and low level radars that complement the long range radar and which scan at different frequencies.

They are the ones who will actually be stopping the HARM's/ARM's IMO if the ARM tracks only the sidelobe of the LRSR and thus enters the range of the medium level SAM without being intercepted by the LRSAM.
 
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To the Pakistanis who think MAR-1's range is 25-35km. Do you seriously think they would release the actual range of a missile that is capable of complete and utter destruction of India's entire air defence network?
MAR-1's seeker has been tested to home in on radar sources from 500km away - this info is available on the net. Modern BVR AAMs have ranges of 100-200km.
Give me one good reason why MAR-1 can't reach similar ranges - we know for sure it's seeker is capable of much greater ranges. Got one? It doesn't matter.
Cos now you have to give me one good reason why that seeker can't be mated to a much longer ranged missile, such as a cruise missile. :cool:
 
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Of the topic i know but do any of you know which PGM system the PAF will go for? JDAM will only equip blk 52 F16S. What about FC20 and JF17, will they be fitted with a chinese targeting pod or something western like the ATLIS2?
 
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