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Bowing down to the dragon

Rocky25

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By Kanwal Sibal Issue:

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Our statements on the recent India-China face-off in Ladakh continue to confound. One would have thought that we would have analysed the incident in depth, tried to figure out China’s motivations in staging it just before External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid’s visit to China and that of Chinese Premier Le Keqiang’s to India and examined if it was another instance of Beijing’s increased assertiveness on territorial issues rather than a reaction to any specific activity by India.

For the government, the Chinese action in Ladakh seems to be of secondary importance…

The several flag meetings with the Chinese military, the diplomatic demarches made at foreign secretary/ambassadorial level and the close consultations between diplomats in charge of the newly set up joint border management mechanism would have normally given us some clues. The preparatory work for our Minister’s Beijing visit should have involved a comprehensive internal analysis of why the Ladakh face-off occurred and produced a brief for frank discussions with the Chinese leadership on the subject.

Intrusion

But the government’s handling of the issue has been curiously different. On arrival at Beijing Shri Khurshid, astonishingly, told the Indian journalists that it was not clear why the incident happened and that the Chinese “were not offering us that background and we were not looking for (it)”, adding gratuitously that “actually, we are not even ready with our own analysis”, suggesting he came unprepared on this vital agenda point.

In talking to Chinese journalists he implied that the need was not to end such incidents altogether but resolve them “much quicker”. Oddly, he thought it was “not very helpful at this stage to apportion blame between them and us (as) it will only take away from the sense of relief and satisfaction that it was resolved in time”. According to him, the apple cart of what is going on with China is far more important and should not be upset, which suggests China had not done any upsetting with the Ladakh incident.

On return, Shri Khurshid has reaffirmed that “we did not do any post-mortem or apportion blame” on the Chinese intrusion and that he was satisfied that the mechanisms worked well to resolve the stand-off. This timidity towards China, to the point of fearing to raise a contentious issue and implicitly accepting part of the blame for the incident, seems more a pathology than an execise in diplomacy.

China prefers agreements to maintain peace and tranquility on the border without formally settling it…

For the government, the Chinese action in Ladakh seems to be of secondary importance; what is “more important is that the issue got resolved in a timely manner and within the laid down mechanism”. Why this reluctance to address the root of the problem and easy satisfaction that the immediate problem has gone away? In the context of premier Le Keqiang’s visit the Minister has added that “ there are no prickly issues, issues of major differences which can be seen as obstacles”. Is the border issue no longer a “prickly issue” or a “major difference” between the two countries?

All these statements imply that India can live with Chinese border intrusions, that they convey no political message to India, that the public anguish at home can be disregarded as exaggerated, and that such incursions will not be allowed to disrupt the growing relationship with China so long as they get resolved through established mechanisms in time for high level visits. Why we must bend so much before China is quite incomprehensible.

We forget that ever since it became our direct neighbour by militarily occupying Tibet, China poses an enormous strategic challenge to us. It already occupies large tracts of our territory. The issue is not any attempt by us to evict China from such territory, it is the legitimacy of our defensive measures to prevent China from advancing further south, either through additional territorial claims as in Arunachal Pradesh or by claiming control of terrain beyond its existing military positions over which India too claims control.

Unstable

There is no actual agreed line of actual control (LAC) on the ground; each side has its own perception of where it lies. Such a situation is inherently unstable. China prefers agreements to maintain peace and tranquility on the border without formally settling it because such agreements allow it to maintain its territorial demands on India and improve the military infrastructure on its side, even as they impose restraints on India to actively challenge China and open it to accusations of a provocative “forward policy” if it seeks to belatedly improve its defensive positions on the ground. India is being constrained to adjust itself to the realities on the ground that are to its disadvantage.

…why we believe that “China is willing to make concerted efforts with India… and promote the strategic cooperative partnership to a new level”.


The talk of a new “defence cooperation agreement” on the border serves this Chinese objective that it has apparently sought to advance by the Ladakh intrusion.

Strategy

While diplomatic niceties are part of political visits, one has to be careful about the import of statements and how they will be construed by our other partners. Shri Khurshid would have us believe that “Both in historical terms and in terms of potential that there is for collaboration between us, we cannot think of more important country at this point of time and we are pleased that this is recognised mutually”. Really?

It seems China is no longer a strategic adversary. Even as China is raising the temperature of its relations with several of its other neighbours in the east, we seem to believe that China has altogether higher stakes in its relationship with us. This would explain why we believe that “China is willing to make concerted efforts with India… and promote the strategic cooperative partnership to a new level”. While cannot ignore China as a powerful reality that has to be engaged, we certainly can ignore such self-serving, empty Chinese rhetoric.

Bowing down to the dragon » Indian Defence Review
 
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First it was Central Asians, then it was the British. Now China.
 
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The psycho is back. China will get colonised by USA before that. OH WAIT, IT ALREADY IS .....


The Chinese economy increased its dependence on the United States last year according to recently released trade figures from Beijing and Washington.

China’s overall trade surplus in 2011 was $155.1 billion, according to the Ministry of Commerce.

And how much of that surplus is related to America? Commerce Department figures show that, through the first 11 months of last year, China’s trade surplus against the United States was $272.3 billion. That’s up from $252.4 billion for the same period in 2010, a 7.9% increase.

The Commerce Department has not released the December trade number yet, and some are predicting that China’s surplus against us will top $300 billion when all the figures are in. Yet let’s assume, merely to be conservative, that China’s December surplus is zero. If December’s surplus is zero, then 175.6% of China’s overall trade surplus last year related to sales to the United States. That’s up from full-year figures for the three preceding years: 149.2% for 2010, 115.7% for 2009, and 90.1% for 2008.

Notice a trend? The Chinese economy is becoming even more hooked on selling things to the United States. Why the big jump last year? Because orders from the 27-nation European Union for Chinese goods collapsed. And if Europe falls apart this year—increasingly likely—China will become even more reliant on the American consumer.

President Obama, in his State of the Union message on Tuesday, is expected to announce the creation of a China trade task force that will combine officials from the Treasury, Commerce, and Energy Departments as well as the U.S. Trade Representative’s office.

Is the concept a good one? Ted Alden of the Council on Foreign Relations praised the idea in the January 12 Nelson Report when he said “this should be seen as an opportunity for creative thinking about trade enforcement.”

Perhaps it is, but we don’t need to get fancy on this issue. All we need is for President Obama to tell the Chinese that they need us more than we need them. And all he has to say is “175.6%.” The clever officials in Beijing will not need interpreters to figure out what that means.
 
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First it was Central Asians, then it was the British. Now China.


Chill buddy ,it's only for local consumption.Our next elections are only 10 months far.
By the way did you knew religion affiliations of your first Han ruler ??
 
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Gentlemen - can we keep the Japanese part (YASUKUNI Shrine) away from discussion? A lot of Indians really don't know the extent of SHEER BRUTALITIES that the Japs had committed on much of East and South East Asia during WW2 and it is a sore point for many , not only the Chinese but the Koreans, Malaysians, Thais, Singaporeans, Taiwanese and Filipinos.

We (Indians) were lucky that they did not take over India , for had it been the case, our hatred for the Japanese and their attrocities would have found a resonance with that of the Chinese /Koreans etc.
 
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This communists are the ones that slaughters the living crap out of the Indian military in 1962, 1967, 1987.

For your ego,

After the debacle of 1962, nothing could have enhanced the self esteem of the Indian Army than the mauling that was given to the Chinese at Nathu La in Sikkim on 11th September 1967 and at Chola on 1st October 1967. It must have come as a rude shock to the Chinese Army and also its political leadership. And by a happy coincidence, the Indian Army leadership which got the better of this eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation was the same that went on to create Bangladesh in 1971. Maj Gen Sagat Singh was GOC Mountain Division in Sikkim, Lt Gen Jagjit Aurora was the Corps Commander and Sam Manekshaw was the Eastern Army Commander.

I too served in Nathu La. After finishing my young officer’s course, it was on 21 July 1967 that I reported to my Unit, a mule pack artillery regiment in Sikkim. Those days young officers were made to have their professional mailing by sending them on long-range patrols (LRP) for area familiarisation, take part in khad race to increase their stamina and sending them to remote observations ports on Sikkim-Tibet border for a month. Having done my share of LRPs and having taken part in the khad race, I was sent to the main Sabu La observation post on the Sikkim-Tibet Border. This observation post is about a kilometre south-west of Nathu La. It dominates Nathu La by virtue of taking on higher ground and commands an excellent view of the pass as also the Chinese defense on the feature known as North shoulder. There were two observation posts at Sabu La and had a good old radio set 62 and PRC-10 and of course line communications to the guns deployed in the rear.

Nathu La at 14200 feet is an important pass on the Tibet-Sikkim border through which passes the old Gangtok-Yatung-Lhasa Trade Route. Although the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is well defined by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 17 March 1890, the Chinese were not comfortable with Sikkim being an Indian protectorate with the deployment of the Indian Army at that time. During the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, the Chinese gave an ultimatum to India to vacate both Nathu La and Jelep La passes on the Sikkim-Tibet border. For some strange reason, the Mountain Division, under whose jurisdiction Jelep La was at that time, vacated the pass. It remains under Chinese possession till date. However, Lt. Gen Sagat Singh, true to form, refused to vacate Nathu La. Incidentally it is at Nathu La where Chinese and Indian forces are deployed barely thirty yards apart, closest anywhere on the 4000 km Sino-Indian border and the border remains undemacrated. Chinese hold the northern shoulder of the pass while Indian Army holds the southern shoulder. Two dominating features south and north of Nathu La namely Sebu La and Camel’s back were held by the Indians. Artillery observation post officers deployed on these two features have an excellent observation into Chinese depth areas whereas from Northern shoulder, Chinese have very little observations into Indian depth areas. This factor proved crucial in the clash that ensued. At the time of the clash, 2 Grenadiers was holding Nathu La. This battalion was under the command of Lt Col (Later Brigadier) Rai Singh. The battalion was under the Mountain Brigade being commanded by Brig MMS Bakshi, MVC.

The daily routine at Nathu La used to start with patrolling by both sides along the perceived border which almost always resulted in arguments. The only one on the Chinese side who could converse in broken English was the Political Commissar who could be recognised by a red patch on his cap. Sentries of both the forces used to stand barely one meter apart in the centre of the Pass which is marked by Nehru Stone, commemorating Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s trek to Bhutan through Nathu La and Chumbi Valley in 1959. Argument between the two sides soon changed to pushing and shoving and on 6 September 1967 a scuffle took place in which Political Commissar fell down and broke his spectacles. These incidents only added to the excitement. I developed excellent rapport with Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and a few days before the clash we had gone to Gangtok together on “liberty” to see a movie. Little did I know that within a week, Dagar would be a martyr.

In order to de-escalate the situation it was decided by the Indian military hierarchy to lay a wire in the centre of the Pass from Nathu La to Sebu La to demarcate the perceived border. This task was to be carried out by the jawans of 70 Field Company of Engineers assisted by a company of 18 Rajput deployed at Yak La pass further north of Nathu La. The wire laying was to commence at first light on the fateful morning of 11 September 1967.

That morning dawned bright and sunny unlike the normal foggy days. The engineers and jawans started erecting long iron pickets from Nathu La to Sebu La along the perceived border while 2 Grenadiers and Artillery Observation Post Officers at Sebu La and Camel’s Back were on alert. Immediately the Chinese Political Commissar, with a section of Infantry came to the centre of the Pass where Lt. Col Rai Singh, CO 2 Grenadiers was standing with his commando platoon. The Commissar asked Lt Col Rai Singh to stop laying the wire. Orders to the Indian Army were clear. They were not to blink. An argument started which soon built up into a scuffle. In the ensuing melee, the commissar got roughed up. Thereafter the Chinese went up back to their bunkers and engineers resumed laying the wire.

Within a few minutes of this, a whistle was heard on the Chinese side followed by murderous medium machine gun fire from north shoulder. The pass is completely devoid of cover and the jawans of 70 Field Company and 18 Rajput were caught in the open and suffered heavy casualties which included Col Rai Singh who was wounded. He was awarded MVC later. Two brave officers – Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and Major Harbhajan Singh of 18 Rajput rallied a few troops and tried to assault the Chinese MMG but both died a heroic death. They were posthumously awarded Vir Chakra and MVC respectively. 2 Grenadier opened small arms fire on North shoulder but it was not very effective. Within the first ten minutes, there were nearly seventy dead and scores wounded lying in the open on the pass. Within half an hour, Chinese artillery opened up on the pass as well as in the depth areas but it was mostly prophylactic fire due to lack of observation and failed to do much damage. Meanwhile we as artillery observation post officers asked for artillery fire, permission for which came a little later. Because of excellent domination and observation from Sebu La and Camel’s back, artillery fire was most effective and most of the Chinese bunkers on North shoulder and in depth were completely destroyed and Chinese suffered very heavy casualties which by their own estimates were over 400. The artillery duel thereafter carried on day and night. For the next three days, the Chinese were taught a lesson. On 14 September, Chinese threatened use of Air Force if shelling did not stop. By then the lesson had been driven home and an uneasy ceasefire came about. The Chinese, true to form, had pulled over dead bodies to their side of the perceived border at night and accused us of violating the border. Dead bodies were exchanged on 15 September at which time: Sam Manekshaw, Aurora and Sagat were present on the Pass.

Every battle has its own share of heroism, faint heartedness, drama and humour. The Nathu La skirmish was no exception. 2 Grenadiers were initially shaken up due to the loss of Capt Dagar and injury to their CO but found their man of the moment in Lieutenant Atar Singh who went round from trench to trench to rally the troops and was later promoted as Captain on the spot. On the lighter side was one artillery observation post officer, my colleague at Sebu La whose radio set was damaged due to shelling and he was out of communication with his guns. He rightly decided to go back to the base at Sherathang in the depth to get another radio set. While he was on his way back, Commander Artillery Brigade was coming up. He stopped the young captain, accused him of running away from the battle and sent him back after reducing him to his substantive rank of a second lieutenant. Casualties could not be evacuated for three days and nights as any move to do so invited a hail of Chinese bullets. Some wounded may well have succumbed to cold and rain. There were awards for bravery as also court martial for cowardice. However, what stood out was the steadfastness of the commanders and bravery of the jawans and junior officers. Indians refused to blink and the mighty Chinese dragon was made to look ordinary.

The situation again flared up twenty days later when on 1 October 1967 a face-off between India and China took place at Cho La, another pass on the Sikkim-Tibet border a few kilometers north of Nathu La. Despite initial casualties, 7/11 GR and 10 JAK RIF stood firm and forced the Chinese to withdraw nearly three kilometers away to a feature named Kam Barracks where they remain deployed till date. Cho La Pass is firmly in Indian hands. Indian Army had got better of the Chinese yet again.

No wonder, Sino-Indian border has remained peaceful ever since to the extent that today Chinese soldiers come and ask their Indian counterparts at Nathu La for cigarettes, rum and tea, mail is exchanged twice in a week in a hut constructed specially for this purpose and border personnel meeting takes place there twice a year. It was my privilege to command the Nathu La Brigade many years later and conduct the first border personnel meeting at Nathu La is 1995.

Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, SM (Retd), commanded the Nathu La Brigade and an Infantry Division in the Ladakh Sector

http://http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=details&m_id=856&u_id=26

The Sino-Indian border has been a long and vexed issue and its role in the 1962 conflict needs no elaboration. Barring an armed clash at Nathu La in eastern Sikkim in 1967, the border between India and China (Tibet) – and specifically the ill-defined Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh/Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh - had remained free of any major incidents through the '70s and the early '80s. While relations between the countries remained frosty for the most part, official statements from Beijing and New Delhi professed a desire to solve the border tangle peacefully through mutual consultations. Beginning in 1981, officials from both countries held yearly talks on the border issue and these talks continued till 1989 [1]. The 7th round of border talks held in July 1986 was overshadowed by reports in the Indian media of Chinese incursions into the Sumdorong Chu valley in Arunachal Pradesh. This was followed by reports of large-scale troop movements on both sides of the border in early 1987, and grave concerns about a possible military clash over the border. While this incident raised the temperature in Delhi and Beijing for a while, it soon faded from the headlines, overtaken by other events in both sides of the border - Operation Brasstacks, Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, and the Tianamen Square incident in 1989 among others.

This article is an attempt to piece together the events that occurred, beginning in the summer of 1986 at the Sumdorong Chu valley. A description of the initial incident is followed by the subsequent escalation in tension in early 1987 and the diplomatic steps taken to cool those tensions. In the concluding section, some speculations concerning the motives behind the actions of the two countries are examined.

The Incident: June - October 1986

Sumdorong Chu (S-C) - referred to as Sangduoluo He in the Chinese media - is a rivulet flowing north-south in the Thag La triangle, bounded by Bhutan in the west and the Thag La ridge to the north. On June 26, 1986, the Government of India (GoI) lodged a formal protest with Beijing against intrusions in this region by Chinese troops, that had occurred beginning on June 16. Beijing denied any such intrusions and maintained that its troops were in a location north of the McMahon Line (ML), while the official Indian stance was that the Chinese troops had intruded south of the ML. (The actual region of the incursion has been described as the Thandrong pasture on the banks of the S-C, and also as the Wangdung region - which comes under the Zimithang circle of Tawang district [2]). This region has been located to the north of the ML by outside sources [3,4], as also by independent Indian observers [5,6].

This region falls along a traditional route from Lhasa to Tawang - and from there to the Brahmaputra valley - and the nearby Thag La ridge had witnessed serious clashes in the '62 conflict. The area had been considered a neutral area by both sides since 1962/63 [5,6] and had not been monitored by India between 1977 and 1980 [4]. However with the improvement of logistics on the Indian side, the Indian Army sought to reinforce and strengthen forward areas in Arunachal Pradesh in the early '80s. Patrols resumed in 1981 and by the summer of 1984 India had established an observation post on the bank of S-C [5,6] – which apparently afforded a view of Chinese positions on the other side of Thag La [3]. This post was manned by personnel of the Special Security Bureau (SSB) through the summer and vacated in the winter. In June of 1986, when a patrol from the 12th Assam Regiment returned to the area, it found a sizable number of Chinese already present, engaged in constructing permanent structures [2,8].

Initial reports put the number of Chinese at 40 - some of them armed and in uniform - who were soon reinforced to a total strength of about 200 men. Statements by Indian ministers in the Parliament described the intrusion as being between 1-2 km deep as the crow flies, supplied by mules along a 7 km trail [2]. By August the Chinese had constructed a helipad and began supplying their troops by air. Regarding the Chinese presence as a fait accompli and to prevent further 'nibbling', the Indian Army began aggressive patrolling across Arunachal Pradesh at other vulnerable areas. In September ’86 – while under pressure from both the public and opposition MPs to adopt a strong posture - the GoI sought a way out of the crisis by suggesting that if the Chinese withdrew in the coming winter, India would not re-occupy the area in the following summer. This offer was rejected by China whose troops were by now prepared to stay through the winter. By September-October, an entire Indian Army brigade of the 5th Mtn. Division was airlifted to Zimithang, a helipad very close to the S-C valley. Referred to as Operation Falcon [7,9], this involved the occupation of ridges overlooking the S-C valley, including Langrola and the Hathung La ridge across the Namka Chu rivulet. (These ridges are to the south of Thag La.)

Escalation: October '86 - May '87

In October, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping warned N.Delhi that if it continued nibbling across the border, China would have to "teach India a lesson" [10]. This threat – identical to that made to Vietnam in 1979 - was conveyed by the US Defense Secretary during a stopover in N.Delhi from Beijing. The rise in tensions was not helped, when in December 1986, Arunachal Pradesh was made a full state of the Indian Union. This drew a chorus of protests from across the border and Indian reactions that any change in Arunachal Pradesh’s administrative status was an internal matter. The spring and summer of 1987 saw media reports of heavy troop movements on both sides of the border and the very real possibility of a serious military clash [11,12,13]. Deng Xiaoping's earlier warning was conveyed again on March - this time by the US Secretary of State. By spring '87, Indian and Chinese camps were right next to each other in the S-C valley [3,10].

China – which has always had a large military presence in Tibet since its occupation – was said to have moved in 20,000 troops from the "53rd Army Corps in Chengdu and the 13th Army in Lanzhou" [23] by early 1987 along with heavy artillery and helicopters. By early April, it had moved 8 divisions to eastern Tibet as a prelude to possible belligerent action [6].

Troop reinforcements on the Indian side – which had begun with Operation Falcon in late 1986 – continued through early ’87 under a massive air-land exercise. Titled Exercise Chequerboard, it involved 10 divisions of the Army and several squadrons of the IAF and redeployment of troops at several places in the North-East. The Indian Army moved 3 divisions to positions around Wangdung [14], where they were supplied and maintained solely by air. These troop reinforcements were over and above the 50,000 troops already present across Arunachal Pradesh [11].

Denouement: May '87 - present

Rising tensions were lowered after a visit to China by the Indian External Affairs Minister in May 1987, where both sides reaffirmed their desire to continue talks on the border issue and to cool things down on the border. In August '87, Indian and Chinese troops moved their respective posts slightly apart in the S-C valley, after a meeting of the field commanders. During the 8th round of border talks on November '87, it was decided to upgrade the talks from the bureaucratic to the political level. Following Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, a Joint Working Group (JWG) was set up to discuss, among other things, the alignment of the LAC [15]. In 1993, an agreement was inked between the foreign ministers of the two countries on the reduction of troops along the LAC. It was decided to pull back from respective forward check posts in the S-C valley from a situation of "close confrontation" and in 1994, the Indian MEA described the situation as one of "close proximity" where the respective posts were 50-100 yards apart [16]. Following the JWG meeting on April 1995, the two sides agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from the four border posts - two Indian and two Chinese - in the S-C valley [3,15,17]. As of June 1999, the valley was unoccupied by either army, and their respective posts in the area were close to a kilometre apart [18].

Conclusions

The initial incident at S-C valley, viz. the establishment of a SSB post in the summer of 1985, can be considered to be a consequence of the uncertain and disputed nature of the LAC. The Indian side has been criticized by some [5] for being the first to intrude in a neutral area, and the subsequent events characterized as a Chinese reaction to India's 'forward policy' in the early '80s.

On the other hand, there is no unanimity as to the reason an isolated incident on the border should have led to such an increase in tension in early 1987. Prevailing international and domestic developments have been suggested as possible explanations. The troop reinforcements on the Indian side in the later months - during Operation Falcon, leading on to Exercise Chequerboard - have been thought by some to be an Indian reaction to growing Sino-Soviet rapprochement in 1986 [1,11]. The Indian reactions were apparently to test the extent of normalization in relations between China and the USSR and its effect on the Indo-Soviet relations. Reiterating his analysis of the 1962 conflict, Maxwell holds India solely responsible for the escalation [12], claiming the incident to be Rajiv Gandhi's method of provoking a confrontation with China in order to unite the nation and facilitate the imposition of an internal emergency. Regardless of the plausibility of some the explanations offered, many observers are agreed on the effect of the robust military moves on the Indian side. It is believed that the Indian Army used the events through 1986/87 both as an effective palliative for the bitter events of 1962, and to demonstrate the difference in the ground situation since that time, to the Chinese military [6,19,20,21].

On Chinese motivations behind the escalation, the consensus view seems to be that it was part of a strategy of indicating that the border issue in the Eastern sector was far from settled. While the early border talks had focussed mainly on the Aksai Chin region and not on the Eastern sector, the mid-'80s saw a change in Chinese attitude. The Chinese strategy changed to linking the border issues in the Eastern and Western sector, and demanding matching concessions in the Eastern sector for any Chinese withdrawals in Aksai Chin/Ladakh, in contrast to the Indian position that the two sectors be considered separately. In this view, a Chinese reluctance to react to a strong Indian military presence near or over the ML would weaken their negotiating position.

While an exchange of maps of the LAC would be an essential step towards the avoidance of such incidents, and eventually to a resolution of the boundary dispute, there has been a marked Chinese reluctance to comply with this, even after several years into the multi-level border talks [22]. There have been some reports following President Narayanan’s recent visit to China, of the increasing likelihood of such an exchange, particularly in the "middle sector" (Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh) [24,25]. It remains to be seen if such an event comes to pass.
 
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Indian military was battererd and brutalised in 1962, 1967 and 1987. We even made a mockery of India just a few weeks ago when the PLA came and got concessions out of India. We have always treated India as dirt. India is a defeated nation on our eyes.
 
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